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This encyclopaedic dictionary is a vast collection and compilation of the Upanishadic themes of all important aspects of the Upanishads which plays vital role in development of Indian religio-philosophical tradition. If there is one mass of scriptures that has inspired and sustained the Hindus over the millennia, it is the Upanishads which have created, strengthened and preserved a great tradition of spirituality. This they have done, not only by a fearless spirit of inquiry to its logical conclusions, but also by intuitive mystical experiences beyond the ken of the intellect. No school of thought, no religious movement of the subsequent periods in the history of India has remained untouched by their influence if not pervaded by them.

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ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF UPANIṢADS

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ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF UPANIṢADS

Volume — 1
(A – K)

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Preface

Events in recent decades have underscored the need for major reference works that provides immediate access to the all important aspects of the Upaniṣads which play vital role in development of Indian religio-philosophical tradition. This encyclopaedic dictionary is a vast collection and compilation of the Upaniṣadic themes. Although several encyclopaedic works have been published in India and abroad but none of them is able to produce such a vast informative encyclopaedic dictionary of the Upaniṣadic themes.

If there is one mass of scriptures that has inspired and sustained the Hindus over the millennia, it is the Upaniṣads which have created, strengthened and preserved a great tradition of spirituality. This they have done, not only by a fearless spirit of inquiry to its logical conclusions, but also by intuitive mystical experiences beyond the ken of the intellect. No school of thought, no religious movement, of the subsequent periods in the history of India has remained untouched by their influence if not pervaded by them. In fact, many of these schools and movements could gain respectability or acceptance only because they tread the path lighted up by the Upaniṣads.

The word 'Upaniṣad' is derived from the verbal root *sad which* has several meanings: loosening, movement and annihilation. Putting all these three senses together, the word 'Upaniṣad' refers to that divine knowledge or wisdom which loosens the bonds of *samsara* (transmigratory existence) of a being, annihilates his *ajnana* or ignorance of his real nature and leads him to Brahman or God, the Absolute. The book or the scriptural work that teaches this wisdom is also called 'Upaniṣad'.

The orthodox view is the Upaniṣads are Revealed Word. They are revealed by God himself at the commencement of each cycle of creation to the worthy few. However, treating them as books of spiritual wisdom, can we assign any date or period, in relation to human history as known till now? The Upaniṣads have been an integral part of the Vedas. Hence, a date assigned to them can as well hold good for the Upaniṣads also. The date of the *Rgveda* has varied from 4500 B.C. (B.G. Tilak) and 2400 B.C. (Hang) to 1200 B.C. (Max Muller). Modern European scholars assign the period 700 B.C. 600 B.C. to the Upanisads assuming a gradual evolution of the philosophical ideas from the period of the Vedic hymns to that of the Aranyakas and the Upaniṣads. B.G. Tilak, on the basis of an astronomical data provided in the *Maitrayaniya Upaniṣhad*, has however, assigned 1900 B.C. as the date of the Upaniṣad. Hence, according to him and the scholars that concur with him, the Upaniṣads belong to the period 2500 B.C.-2000 B.C.

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From among the extant Upaniṣads, only ten to fifteen are considered to be the older ones. They are the basic sources of ancient Hindu philosophy. However, do all these Upaniṣads teach a single system of philosophy? Or, do they contain several, mutually conflicting, systems?

The orthodox Hindu tradition has always considered the entire body of the Upaniṣadic literature as one unit (*Sruṭi*) and hence teaching once philosophy. Though this philosophy may contain several aspects, they always form a homogeneous unit.

A look at the different and divergent teachings of these Upaniṣads does not easily convince us about the soundness of the orthodox standpoint. The traditional commentators, have, however, solved this problem by sticking to one view as the teaching of the Upaniṣads and explaining the others in a way that suits their interpretation.

Could it be that, over the centuries, many vital links have been lost and what we now have, are only fragments of the original works leading to this dichotomy of views? Though this is a plausible explanation, there is no clinching evidence to prove it.

The entries included in these volumes cover a wide range of information given by the contributors. Entries in the encyclopaedia are alphabetically arranged, strictly letter by letter. In order to mark use of the specialized expertise of individual scholars which ensuring that all aspects of the Upaniṣads are fully covered. To guide our readers from one entry to related discussions elsewhere in the work there is extensive system of cross references within the entries.

For the collection and complication of this monumental project, I have taken support from the various sources like monographs, biographical notes, personal interviews, books and journals. I am thankful to all those scholars whose works have been utilised in this encyclopaedic dictionary.

-EDITOR

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A

ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

We consider the aspects of Abnormal Psychology as developed in the Upaniṣads. The question as to what becomes of a man's soul after the death of the body recurs time after time in the Upaniṣads. Not content with a discussion of man's life here below, the seers of the Upaniṣads make the eschatological question assume quite an extraordinary importance. The question is very often asked-what must be considered the root of human life? "The tree, if hewn down, springs anew from the previous root; what must be the root of a man's life in order that it may spring up again, even through hewn down by (the great cutter) Death" (S. 9.a). It is supposed, moreover, that eschatological knowledge is the highest kind of knowledge. Let nobody call himself wise unless he knows what becomes of a man after death. It was thus that the Sage of Jaivali accosted Svetaketu, the son of Aruni, and proved to him that even though he reckoned himself wise, he was after all merely an ignoramus:

"Boy, has your father instructed you ?"

"Yes, Sir."

"Do you know where all the creatures go to from hence?"

"No, Sir."

"Do you know how they return again?"

"No, Sir"

"Do you know where the path of the gods and the path of the fathers diverge?"

"No, Sir."

"Do you know why that (the other) world never becomes too full?" No, Sir."

"Then, why did you say that you had been instructed? How can a man, who does not know these (simple) things, say that he has been instructed?" (S. 9.b).

The Problem of Death in Katha

The most important passage, however, where eschatological knowledge is regarded as the "highest good" occurs in the celebrated dialogue in the Katha Upaniṣad between Naciketas and Yama, the God of death, where Nachiketas, being offered three boon by Yama, and having chosen two already, declines to choose for the third boon anything short of the knowledge of the soul's existence after the death of the human body:

N: "There is this doubt in the case of a dead man; some say that he is, others say he is not. I would like to be instructed by thee in this matter. This do I choose for my third boon".

Y: "Even the gods have formerly entertained doubt about this matter. Nor is this matter easy of comprehension, being a subtle one. Choose another boon. O Nachiketas, Press me not, and let me alone on this point."

N: "Verily, the gods themselves have entertained doubt about this matter, and thou hast thyself said that this matter passes comprehension. It is impossible for me to find another instructor in that subject beside thyself, nor do I find that any other boon would be equal to this."

Y: "All those desires which are

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impossible to be satisfied in this world of mortals, ask me for them if you so wish: these damsels with chariots and musical instruments, such as are indeed impossible for men to obtain-be waited upon these, which I shall present to you; but, Nachiketas, do not ask me about death."

N: "All these, O God of death, are but ephemeral objects, and wear out the vigour of the senses. Moreover, life itself would be short (for their full enjoyment): Keep them unto thyself-these horses, these dances, and these songs. What mortal would delight in all long life, after he has contemplated the pleasures which beauty and enjoyment afford ? No. That which has become a matter of doubt and inquiry. O Death, speak to me about that great Hereafter. Nachiketas chooses no other boon than that which concerns this great secret." (S. 9. c).

The Problem of Sleep: The Fatigue and Puritan Theories

After the question of the nature of death, comes the question of the nature of sleep, which is only a palliated form of death. On this subject we find very interesting theories advanced by those seers of antiquity. One passage proclaims unmistakably an explanation of the nature of sleep given by modern physiology—the 'Fatigue' theory of sleep: "As a falcon or any other bird, after having flows in the sky, becomes tired, and folding his wings repairs to his nest., so dies this person hasten to that state where, when asleep, he desires no more desires, and dreams no more dreams." (S. 10). But beyond this proper physiological explanation of sleep, we find very curious theories held on this point by the sages of the Upaniṣads. The seer of the Prasna Upaniṣad holds that sleep is caused by the senses being absorbed in that highest 'sensorium,' the mind: "As all the rays of the Sun, O Gargya, become collected into the bright disc at the time of sunset, and emerge again from it at the time of sunrise, so do all the senses become collected into that highest sensorium-the mind: that is the reason why (in deep sleep) man is not able to hear, nor to see, nor to smell. People say about him that he has slept' (S. 11. a). This same seer qualifies his statement a little further, and says that the reason of the deep sleep is that the mind is merged into an ocean of light: "And when he is overpowered by light, then does this god (Soul) see no dreams, and at that time great happiness arises in the body" (S. 11. b). Another theory which is advanced in the Chhandogya Upaniṣad is that sleep is caused by the soul getting lodgment in the arteries..., When a man is fast asleep, and being happy knows no dreams, then his soul has moved in the arteries" (S. 11. c). This same idea is elaborated in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣad, where a physiological explanation, which in the light of modern science appears almost a mythological explanation; is offered according to the ancient ideas.

It was imagined that the heart sent forth about 72,000 arteries to the 'Puritat', which Deussen translates as 'perikardium', and which Max Muller, following the commentator, wrongly translates by the 'surrounding body'. This Puritat corresponds to the pineal gland of Descrates, so far as function is concerned; but it differs from it in its anatomical location. The Puritat must be considered as meaning a kind of membranous sac round the heart. It was imagined by those ancient seers, that in deep sleep the soul moved from the heart by means of the arteries and got lodgment inside the Puritat, when sleep followed. This same idea was later developed in the Nyaya philosophy where sleep was explained as being due to the moving of the soul right inside the Puritat,

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the state of dream being explained as due to the soul's position just on the threshold of the Puritat- the soul knocking for entrance inside it, -while it was imagined that during the waking state the soul kept moving from the heart to the Puritat. The origin of this doctrine in the Nyaya philosophy is to be traced to the passage in the Brihadaranyaka which we are at present discussing: "When a man is fast asleep and when he is not conscious of anything, his soul moves by means of the arteries, called Hitah, which are 72,000 in number, and which are spread from the heart to the Puritat: there he sleeps like a youth, or a great king, or a great Brahmin who has reached the summit of happiness"

The Problem of Sleep: The Prāṇa and Brahman Theories

Another explanation of the phenomenon of sleep is offered by the seer of the Chhandogya Upaniṣad when he says that sleep occurs when the mind is merged in Prana, that is breath or energy "As a bird when tied by a string flies first in every direction, and finding no rest anywhere, settles down at last on the very spot where it is fastened, exactly in the same manner, my Son, the mind, after flying in every direction, and finding no rest anywhere, settles down on breath; for indeed, my Son, mind is fastened to breath'. The next explanation of sleep occurs in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣad where we are told that sleep occurs when the soul goes to rest in the 'space' inside the heart. In order to prove this to Gargya an experimental inquiry was undertaken by Ajatasatru. He took Gargya by the hand and came to a place where a man was sleeping. He then called out to him by these names. "Thou, Great one, clad in white raiment, Soma, King of all", and (yet) he did not rise. Then he rubbed him with his hand, (struck him with a stick—Kau.) and he got up. Then said Ajatasatru "When this man was asleep, where then was this Person full of intelligence, and from whence did he return?" Gargya did not know the answer.

Thereupon Ajatasatru said "When this man was asleep, then the Person full of intelligence (i.e. the Soul) lay in the space which is in the heart". The last explanation offered of the phenomenon of sleep is the very curious explanation, that, in deep sleep, the Soul it at one with Brahman! This is like saying that when one has no explanation to give, one might excuse himself with the Absolute! A passage from the Prasna Upaniṣad, again, tells us that in deep sleep "the mind, which is the sacrificer, is carried every day to Brahman," which is corroborated by another passage from the Chhāndogya, which says "when a man sleeps, then my dear son, he becomes united with the True, he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say, 'svapiti', he sleeps because he is gone (apita) to his own (sva)' (S. 11. g). The idea was that in deep sleep the Soul was at one with Brahman and thus deep sleep was likened to the state of ecstasy. There is, in fact, as much likeness, or as little, between sleep and ecstasy, as there is, as Spinoza would have said, between God and Dog: "The same letters, but what an important difference ! It seems that this difference was later appreciated even in the Upaniṣads when it was said that even though the soul was at one with Brahman in deep sleep, it is till did not know this, was not cognisant of it: "As people who do not know a field, walk again ad again over a golden treasure that is hidden somewhere in the earth, and yet are not able to discover it, thus do all these creatures day after day become merged in Brahman, and yet do not discover it, because they are carried away by untruth".

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The Dream Problem

The next question to consider is the analysis which the Upaniṣadic philosophers make of the dream-state of consciousness in reference to the state of sleep. A famous passage in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣad tells us how, at the end of sleep, the soul "the soul moves away from his nest" wherever he likes: "guarding with breath the lower rest, the immortal one moves away from his nest, to where he can roam at will-That golden person, the lovely bird! Going hither and thither at the end of sleep, the God creates manifold forms for himself, either rejoicing with women, or eating, or seeing terrible sights" (S. 12.a). The same passage tells us how the states of sleep and dream constitute an intermediate state between consciousness and unconsciousness: "there are two states for that person, the one here in this world, the other in the other world, and there in an intermediate third state (which we may call the twilight state of consciousness), consisting of the states of dream and sleep; remaining in this third state, he sees both those states which belong to this and the other world."

We are also told how the soul in this state resembles a fish moving from bank to bank: "as a large fish moves along both the banks, the nearer and the farther, so does this person move along both these states, the state of sleeping and state of waking." And it is also said how the soul puts forth a great deal of creative activity in this state: "And there are no chariots, nor horses, nor any roads, but he himself creates the chariots and the horses and the roads; there are no joys, nor pleasures, nor any blessings, but he creates the joys and the pleasures and the blessings; there are no ponds, or lakes, or rivers, but he creates the ponds and the lakes and the rivers,- because he is indeed the Maker." We see here what a great stress is laid on the constructive activity of the soul in the state of dream. Finally, we are told in a passage of the Prasna Upaniṣad, how dreams, even though they are usually a mere replica of actual waking experience, also occasionally involve absolutely novel construction: "There that god experiences greatness in sleep. What is seen over and over again, he sees once more (in the dream); what is heard over and over again, he hears once again (in the dream.....What is seen and not seen, what is heard and not heard, what is enjoyed and not enjoyed, he experiences all, because he is the All" (S. 12. b). This must indeed be regarded as a very subtle analysis of dream-experience.

Early Psychical Research

As the Upaniṣadic philosophers made this acute study of the sleeping and dreaming states of consciousness, they were not slow to take into account the aberrations of consciousness as manifested especially in the phenomena of mediumships and possessions. If we might say so, they conducted their own psychical research, however rudimentary, and however noiseless, it might have been. We have a definite illustration of this kind to show that the problem of psychical research had attracted their attention even in those old days. For example, we are informed in a passage of the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣad (S. 13) how the sage Bhujyu, the son of Lahyayana, in his student days, went to the Madra country and came to the house of Patanchala, the son of Kapi. This Patanchala had a daughter who was possessed by a Gandharva, an aerial spirit, and who thus served as a medium. Bhujyu asked the spirit who he (the spirit) was, and received the answer that he was Sudhanvan, the son of Angirasa. On knowing this, Bhujyu

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asked the spirit two more questions: On knowing this, Bhujyu asked the spirit two more questions: One was as to the actual extent of the world, and the other as to where the sons of Parikshit were, who, by the by, at that time, must have been regarded as historical personages. What answer Bhujyu received to these questions we are not told; but we see definitely how Bhujyu must, on account of these questions, be regarded as an occultist who worked according to this own lights in his days on the line of modern Psychical Research.

The Power of Thought

Finally, we must notice the very great stress that is laid in various passages of the Upaniṣads on what the New Psychology calls "Thought-Power". "He who knows and meditates on the foot of Brahman, consisting of the four quarters as resplendent, becomes (himself) endowed with splendor in this world"; "He who meditates on the Brahman as lustre becomes himself illustrious reaches the illustrious and bright words". "When the Sun was born, all sorts of shouts rose round about him.....he who knows this, and meditates on the Sun as Brahman, him shall reach pleasant shows from all sides, all shall continue, yet shall continue: If one meditates on Brahman as support, he himself will find support: if as greatness, he himself will become great: if as mind, he himself will receive honour: if as the parimara of Brahman, round about (pari) him shall die (mri) all the enemies who hate him"; and lastly "He who meditates on Brahman as Not-Being, shall himself cease to exist: he, on the other hand, who will meditate on Brahman as Being shall (always) exist: this is what they know" (S. 14). We recommend these passages to all those who believe in the thaumaturgy of thought.

ALFRED DE VIGNY (1797-1863)

The poetic temperament of Vigny, a sombre figure among the French romantics shows a sharp contrast to the optimism of Lamartine and confident assertiveness of Victor Hugo. Literature was his necessary means of expression, but here in spite of the literary merit of some of his poems, he had more outward failures than successes.

Vigny's poems roughly fall into two groups with a long interval between. Since Vigny has been called by himself first and by most critics since, a philosophical poet, it is necessary for us to enquire into his philosophical theory if there be any. Vigny's own impression of himself is 'une sorte de moraliste epique.' This indicates that he adopts a distinct moral attitude in his poems, although his total poetic output does not reveal that his poems are merely the exemplifications of moral ideas. Nevertheless it is agreed upon by the critics the Vigny is the first among the 19th century French poets in whom a didactic attitude is clearly marked. In 'La Maison du Berger' there is an appeal to the poets to take their rightful place as spiritual and intellectual leaders of the people. This didacticism or the desire to communicate a message is an evident in Vigny's novel and drama as in his poetry. The result is that the ideas conveyed do not necessarily form a coherent philosophy but are coloured by a fairly consistent pessimism. A more or less constant assumption of Vigny is that mankind are the victims of an inescapable fatality, and unhappiness is their normal lot. The nobler the men are, the more they suffer. On whatever plane we like to consider man-moral, political or social, he seems condemned at best to solitude, at worst to isolation. God and nature seem to be indifferent to man. But in contrast a these dark notions, an excellent poem, 'La

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Bouteille a la Mer' (The Bottle in the Sea) offers a crumb of hope to those who can solace themselves with a sort of vicarious and gratuitous optimism. In this poem the idea of God has changed in essence in so far as God is no longer limned here as indifferent or unjust Vigny usually has in mind. As a matter of fact Vigny, as G. Brereton also thinks, had in him a profoundly ingrained religious faith which insisted that the Deity was benign in spite of all the evidence that may be advanced to the contrary. In the last series of his poems viz., 'Les Destiness' Vigny is found to be conscious of the sadness of human fate no doubt, but his pessimism appears to be replaced by an unbreakable courage. He develops an attitude of superhuman charity with no outbursts of bitterness or violence against any living person. A quite and proud, but not imperious resignation and a tender compassion are the chief characteristics of these pieces. As a moralist Vigny establishes a code of conduct on the cult of honour and exhibits a stoical resignation and proud indifference in response to the 'silence eternal de la Divinite.

ALPHONSE DE LAMARTINE (1790-1869)

'Les Me-ditations Poetiques' (The Poetic Meditations) published in 1820 was the first experiment in romantic poetry that made Lamartine famous. The Poems included in this volume cover such themes as early death, sadness in solitude, man's response to nature and nature's indifference, justice and injustice of the creator etc. In spite of certain limitations arising chiefly out of the poet's rhetorical manner of expression, moralising arguments or artificial vocabulary critics agree on one fundamental trait viz. that the features which appeared in Lamartine's early poems and gave them their novelty were the personal emotions conveyed directly from the author to the reader and not through the intermediary of an imagined third character. As was natural for a romantic poet, Lamartine, whatever the theme of his early poems might have been, treated it in close union with his sincere feeling. The lyrical outbursts of Lamartine's poems-their music, rhythm and flow on which his strength as a romantic poet rests are not our concern here. What we should take cognizance of is that apart from the lyrical charm and beauty of some of his poems in which perhaps he closely resembles Shelley, there is a philosophical fervour in his poems. In fact his greatest vein is not that of emotional lyricism in which he holds a distinctive position among the nineteenth century poets, but a philosophical fervour in which emotion and thought are inseparably fused. When we thus come to consider his philosophical views as reflected in his 'Poetic Meditations' as also in his later works we can not overlook his optimistic outlook on life and devoutly Christian sentiment. Prof. Dowden aptly remarks: "He was a noble dreamer in practical affairs, and just ideas formed a portion of his dreams. Nature had made him an irreclaimable optimist; all that is base and ugly in life passed out of view as he soared above earth in his luminous ether. Sadness and doubt indeed he knew, but his sadness had a charm of its own, and there were consolations in maternal nature, in love in religious faith and adoration ......The pure and ample harmonies of his verse do not attack the ear, but they penetrate to the soul. All the great lyric themes -God, nature, death, glory, melancholy, solitude, regret, desire, hope, love-he interpreted on his instrument with a musician's inspiration".

Lamartine's only consistent philosophy

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is a kind of Christian pantheism. The whole of the universe is supposed to be an expression of the deity. In his 'Poetic Meditations' he gives a poetic rendering of this idea in the following lines:-

"The universal star, which ne'er declines
Is God; that mighty whole, the self adored!
He is - all is in Him; immensity
And time compose the unmixt element
Of His infinitude. Space is his mansion,
Eternity His age; day is His glance;
The world His image, 'Neath His shadowing hand
The universe subsists. Existence flowing
In waves eternal downward from His bosom,
Like a vast river fed by that source boundless,
Escapes, and where gins returns to end".

Conceiving God as a personal being the poet in the spirit of a true Christian holds that man should put his firm faith in Him and it is by His grace that a moral regeneration of the people on earth is possible. Hence in the same poems the poet again says:-

"Lo ! Lo ! the God whom every spirit worships,
Whom Abraham served; of whom Pythagoras dreamed;
Whom Socrates announced, whom Plato saw
Dimly;...........
And whom at least Christ came to show to earth.
It is no more that God by mortals fashioned,
That God explained to error by imposture,
That God disfigured by false priests' hands,
Whom our forefathers blindly worshipped trembling;
He is alone, is one, is just and good,
Earth sees His work and Heaven knows His name."

From the experiments made in 'Poetic Meditations', a great work finally grew viz. 'Harmonies Poetiques et Religieuses' (Poetic and Religious Harmonies). Published in 1830 this volume not only fulfilld the promise of 'Les Me ditations Poe tiques', but even went beyond it. The glory of God as pervading and sustaining the entire universe is sung with strong devotion in many poems of this work. In the poem 'Cry of the Soul' for example, we find:-

"Lord! Lord! thy name alone relief affords!
'Tis the Echo sole responsive to my heart!
Or those bursts rather (transports void of words),
Are themselves th' Echo of how great thou art!
Not oft Great Name! thou sleepest in my breast.
Not oft thou sleepest on my lips of fire:
But each time deeper thou are there impressed,
And my soul's cry is e'er thyself our sir"!

Again in the poem 'Prayer' the poet says:-

'Nature.........seems to offer God in her grand language
The glorious homage of the whole creation
Behold th' oblation boundless universal!
All nature is the temple, earth the alter,
The sky's the dome, and its stars numberless

* * *

Are the blest torches lighted for this temple:

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* * *

Soul of the universe, Sire, God, Creator,
Lord I believe in thee, 'neath all these names.

* * *

Th' extent reveals Thy greatness to mine eyes;
The earth Thy goodness and the stars Thy splendour,
Thou hast produced Thyself in Thy bright work;
The universe entire reflects Thine image,

* * *

Sure of Thy love, and witness of Thy power,
I wait for th' endless day of life immortal
Death with funeral shades in vain surrounds me,
My reason through his darkness seeth light:
'Tis last step which brings me close to Thee.
'Tis the veil falling, 'twixt Thy face and mine;
Haste for me, Lord, that moment so desired,
Or, of Thou in Thy secrets holdst it still
Hear from Heaven's height my cry of need.

* * *

Nourish my frame with bread, my soul with hope;
Warm Thou again with Thine all-powerful eye
My spirit darkened by the senses' shade,
And as the solar beams exhale the dews,
For ever in Thy breast absorb my thought."

Geoffrey Brereton observes that no clearer chant to the glory of God had been raised in French literature since 'Le Genie du Christianisme' (the Spirit of Christianity), none in French verse since the choruses of 'Esther' and 'Athalie'. With the ardour of complete assurance Lamartine hymned in his poems the power and benefience of the creator and his self-manifestation in trees, stars, sunrise and evening.

Before we make a general assessment of the French poets as related to their possible borrowings from India, let us make a brief survey of the other two notable figures of the 19th century viz., Vigny and Hugo with particular reference to their views on religion.

AMṚTABINḌU-UPANISHAḌ

Om. Manas (mind) is said to be of two kinds, the pure and the impure. That which is associated with the thought of desire is the impure, while that which is without desire is the pure. To men, their mind alone is the cause of bondage or emancipation. That mind which is attracted by objects of sense tends to bondage, while that which is not so attracted tends to emancipation. Now inasmuch as to a mind without a desire for sensual objects there is stated to be salvation, therefore an aspirant after emancipation should render his mind ever free from all longing after material objects. When a mind freed from the desires for objects and controlled in the heart attains the reality of Atma, then is it in the Supreme Seat. Till that which arises in the heart perishes, till then it (Manas) should be controlled. This only is (true) wisdom. This only is true Ḍhyāna (meditation).

Other ways are but long or tedious. It (Brahman) is not at all one that can be contemplated upon. It is not one that cannot be contemplated upon. It is not capable of contemplation, (and yet)it should be contemplated upon. Then one

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attains Brahman that is devoid of partiality. Yoga should be associated with Swara (sound, accent). (Brahman) should be meditated upon without Swara. By meditating without Swara upon Brahman, that which is cannot become non-existent. Such a Brahman is paratless, devoted of fancy and quiescent (or free from the action of mind). Whoever cognizes "I" to be that Brahman attains certainly Brahman. A wise man having known that Brahman, that is without fancy, without end, without cause, or example, beyond inference and without beginning, is emancipated. There is (for him then) no destruction, no creation, no person in bondage, no devotee, no aspirant for salvation, no emancipated person. This is the truth. Ātmā that should be contemplated upon the One in (the three states), the waking, the dreaming, and the dreamless sleep. There is no rebirth to him who goes beyond the three states.

The one Bhūṭātmā of all beings is in all beings. Like the moon (reflected) in water, he appears as one and as many. While a pot is being carried (from one place to another), the Ākās (ether) that is within it is to carried (along with it). As the pot alone is carried, Jiva (within the body) may be-likened to the Ākās. Like the pot, the body has various kinds of forms. The body which perishes again and again is not conscious of its own destruction. But he (the Jiva) knows (it) always. He who is enveloped by the Māyā of sound, is never able to come to (or see) the sun (of parabrahman) from the darkness (of ignorance). Should such darkness be cleared, then he alone sees the non-dual state. Parabrahman is Sabḍākshara. What remains after the cessation of Sabda-Vedas, that is Akshara (inde-structible), should be meditated upon by a learned man who wishes to secure quiescence to his Ātmā.

Two Viḍyās (sciences) are fit to be known, *viz.*, Śabḍabrahman and parabrahman. One who has completely mastered Śabḍabrahman attains Parabrahman. Having studied well the books, the learned man should persevere studiously well the books, the learned man should persevere studiously in Jnana (the acquisition of knowledge) and Vijnāna (Self-realisation according to such knowledge). Then he should discard the whole of the books, as a person in quest of grain gives up the straw. Though there are cows of different colours, yet their milk is of the same colour. Like milk is seen Jnana, and like cows are seen the different kinds of forms (in the universe). As ghee is latent in milk, so is Vijnāna (Self-realisation) latent in every being. Through churning always the Manas with the churning-stick of Manas and the string of Jnana, Parabrahman that is partless, calm and quiescent should be brought out like fire from the wood. I am that Brahman. That Vāsuḍeva who is support of all beings, who lives in all and who protects all creatures in Myself. That Vasudeva is Myself.

Such is the Upanishaḍ.

AMṚṬANĀḌA-UPANISHAḌ

The Upanishaḍ treating of Nāḍa (spiritual sound) which is Amṛṭa (nectar). Here Prāṇas are spoken of, as they produce Nāḍa within and without.

The wise, having studied the Śāsṭras and reflected on thom again and again and having come to know Brahman, should abandon then all like a firebrand. Having ascended the car of Om with Vishṇu (the Higher Self) as the charioteer, one wishing to go to the seat of Brahmaloka intent on the worship of Rudra, should go in the chariot so long as he can go. Then abandoning the car, he reaches the place

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of the Lord of the car. Having given up māṭrā, linga, and pada, he attains the subtle pada (seat or word) without vowels or consonants by means of the letter M without the svara (accent). That is called praṭyāhāra when one merely thinks of the five objects of sense, such as sound, etc., as also the very unsteady mind as the reins of Āṭmā. Praṭyāhāra (subjugation of the senses), ḍhyāna (contemplation), prāṇāyāma (control of breath), ḍhāraṇā (concentration), tārka and samāḍhi are said to be the six parts of yoga.

Just as the impurities of mountain-minerals are burnt by the blower, so the stains committed by the organs are burned by checking prana. Through prāṇāyāmas should be burnt the stains; through dhāraṇā, the sins; through praṭyāhāra, the (bad) associations; and through ḍhyāna, the godless qualities. Having destroyed the sins, one should think of Ruchira- (the shining). Ruchira (cessation), expiration and inspiration-these three are prāṇāyāma of (rechaka, pūraka and kumbhaka) expiration, inspiration and cessation of breath. That is called (one) prāṇāyāma when one repeats with a prolonged (or elongated) breath three times the Gāyaṭrī with its vyahrtis and Pranava (before it) along with the śiras (the head) joining after it.

Raising up the vayu from the ākāś (region, viz., the heart) and making the body void (of vāyu) and empty and uniting (the soul) to the state of void, is called rechaka (expiration). That is called pūraka (inspiration) when one takes in vāyu, as a man would take water into his mouth through the lotus-stalk. That is called kumbhaka (cessation of breath) when there is no expiration or inspiration and the body is motionless, remaining still in one state. Then he sees forms like the blind, hears sounds like the deaf and sees the body like wood. This is the characteristic of one that has attained much quiescence. That is called ḍhāraṇā when the wise man regards the mind as sankalpa and merging sankalpa into Āṭmā, contemplates upon his Āṭmā (alone). That is called ṭārka then one makes inference which does not conflict with the Veḍas. That is called samadhi is which one, on attaining it, thinks (all) equal.

Seating himself on the ground on a seat of kusa grass which is pleasant and devoid of all evils, having protected himself mentally (from all evil influences), uttering raṭha-manḍala, assuming either paḍma, svastika, or bhaḍra posture or any other which can be practised easily, facing the north and closing the nostril with the thumb, one should inspire through the other nostril and retain breath inside and preserve the Agni (fire). Then he should think of the sound (Om) alone. Om, the one letter is Brahman; Om should not be breathed out. Thought this divine manṭra (Om), it should be done many times to rid himself of impurity. Then as said before, the manṭra-knowing wise should regularly meditate, beginning with the navel upwards in the gross, the primary (or less) gross and subtle (states).

The greatly wise should give up all (sight) seeing across, up or down, and should practise yoga always being motionless and without tremor. The union as stated (done) by remaining without tremor in the hollow stalk (*viz.*, Sushumnā) alone is ḍhāraṇā. The yoga with the ordained duration of twelve māṭrās is called (ḍhāraṇā). That which never decays is Akshara (Om) which is without ghosha (third, forth, and fifth letters from K), consonant, vowel, palatal, guttural, nasal, letter R and sibilants. Prana travels through (or goes by) that path through which this Akshara (Om) goes. Therefore it should be practised daily, in order to pass along that (course).

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It is through the opening (or hole) of the heart, through the opening of vayu (probably navel), through the opening of the head and through the opening of moksha. They call it bila (cave), sushira (hole), or maṇdala (wheel).

(Then about the obstacles of yoga). A yogin should always avoid fear, anger, laziness., too much sleep or waking and too much food or fasting. If the above rule be well and strictly practised each day, spiritual wisdom will arise of itself in three months without without doubt. In four months, he sees the devas; in five months, he knows (or becomes) Brahmanishtha; and truly in six months he attains Kaivalya at will. There is no doubt.

That which is of the earth is of five māṭrās (or it takes five māṭrās to pronounce Pārṭhiva-Praṇava). That which is of water is of four māṭrās; of agni, three māṭrās; of vāyu, two; and of ākāś, one. But he should think of that which is with no māṭrās. Having united Aṭmā with manas, one should contemplate upon Aṭma by means of āṭmā. Praṇa is thirty digits long. Such is the position (or range) of prāṇās. That is called Prāṇā which is the seat of the external prāṇas. The breaths by day and night are numbered as 1,13,180. (Of the prāṇas) the first (*viz.*,) Prāṇā is pervading the heart; Apāna, the anus; Samana, the navel; Uḍāna, the throat; and Vyāna, all parts of the body. Then come the colours of the five prāṇas in order. Prāṇa is said to be of the colour of a blood-red gem (or coral); Apāṇa which is in the middle is of the colour of Inḍragopa (an insect of white or red colour); Samāna is between the colour of pure milk and crystal (or oily and shining), between both (Prāṇa and Apāna): Uḍāna is apāṇdara (pale white); and Vyāna resembles the colour of archis (or ray of light). That man is never reborn wherever he may die, whose breath goes out of the head after piercing through this mandala (of the pineal gland). That man is never reborn.

ANANDA (BLISS)

One of the philosophical and religious symbols which has struck deepest roots in India is the formula *saccidanānda*, a Karmadharaya compounds made of the words sat (being, reality), cit (consciousness, thought), and *ānanda* (bliss, joy). As far as we know this formula appears for the first time only in the rather late *Nṛsimhottaratāpaniyopaniṣad* 1-7, in the *Rāmapūrvatapaniyopaniṣad* 9.2, and in the *Rāmottaratāpāniyopaniṣad* 2-5. Although the formula itself is thus not found in the classical Upaniṣads, yet it was soon accepted in Inida as summing up in a lucid and terse definition the core of the Upaniṣadic thought. And the Indian tradition, so fond of preserving and meditation on the short sentences that contain the essence of a teaching, the *ādeśas* as they were called in the Upaniṣadic times, did not fail to nurture this concentration of the essence of reality.

Of the three concept included in the *saccidānanda* formula the first two have often been studied in modern Indological research, both in Inida and the West. The concept of being (sat) and its identification with consciousness (cit) in a great part of Indian philosophical thought could not fail to attract the attention of modern philosophers and historians, especially, given the fact that the birth and development of Indological studies coincided to a great extent with the apogee of the great idealist philosophies of Europe. But, surprisingly enough, little reflection has been done on *ānanda*, and this often in a passing manner. P. Deussen devotes some pages to it, but here, as in all his works, his interpretation of the Upaniṣads is dominated by the *advaita*

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tradition. B. Heimann has also analysed carefully this concept in the Upaniṣads, in so far as it is a divine attribute.

In her penetrating studies she systematises and explains almost all the Upaniṣadic references to *ānanda* which apply to the *atman* or to Brahman. More recently Professor Rasiklal C. Parikh, of Ahmedabad, has developed the theme in a series of lectures delivered at the University of Baroda and published under the title *Ānandamimāṃsā*. This interesting book contains a wide survey of the theme of *ānanda* in the whole of the Indian culture, particularly in the line of poetics, and has many apt references to a vast variety of Western authors. But, by its very breadth of scope, the essay cannot enter into a detailed discussion of any period. Moreover, being written in Gujarati, it is mostly inaccessible to the Western world and to a part of the Indian public.

The notion of *ānanda* is therefore the centre of our study. We know from the dictionary that *ānanda* means bliss, happiness, joy, enjoyment.....But a mere translation of a word, particularly if coming from a culture so different from the one into which it is transferred, cannot render its full meaning. As Heimann tells us, "We must shun any attempt to change or translate Indian terms into European terms'", for the latter never exhaust the connotations of the original notion. This is why our objective in this study, is to make an analysis of the various contexts in which *ānanda* occurs, to ascertain its exact connotations, and to relate it to other philosophical and vital notion. We shall more or less prescind, provisionally, from dictionary translations, so that we may rediscover all the richness of the word.

A study of one concept in the complexity of a system is, we believe, justified, especially in the case of such notions as *ānanda*. For words, found in uniform columns in dictionaries, do not have all the same value. We should like in tis connection to borrow some ideas of a fine analysis by J.P. Audet, developed in a context similar to ours. He explains the need for a study of certain individual nations. There are words, he says, which are pragmatic, matter-of-fact, associated with well-defined human activities and restricted, in their meaning. They are words without history and with no connotations. Their translation presents no difficulty: "crayon" in French or "Bleistift" in German given exactly the same meaning as the English "pencil". Other words are more intimately linked with a particular culture and mode of life, and their translation never conveys the full connotation of the original. "Thus nothing would seem simpler than to translate the Greek oikos or the Latin *domus* for the English *house* or the French *maison*. Yet everybody knows that this simplicity is only apparent. If one wants to avoid rough approximations which give a deformed picture of reality and are consequently more or less misleading in conveying the real human signification of a word, one must enrich the lexicography with much information that comes from other branches of knowledge. One must refer to the history of house architecture and even to the climatic, geographic, economic, social and religious atmosphere of the country to which the word refers. Studying oikos and domus in the light of such contextual information, one cannot fail to realize that words which are apparently so simple are nevertheless partly untranslatable."

Finally there is a third type of words by which "a language expresses for those who use it not just precise activities, gestures or attitudes, nor even a certain way of life, but the feelings, the ideas and, in general, the inner life of a given human

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group. Words of this type,-for example *religion, profane, sacred*--never succeed in fact in transferring fully to another culture and civilization the immense load of human reality which they have been charged throughout the history of the civilization to which they belong". To translate them with some accuracy one has to transfer with them many other words that have semantic connections with them, whether these words that have semantic connections with them, whether these connections have been expressly realised or not by the individual or collective consciousness that has formed them. It is a most difficult task. "At least in certain cases the surest way to somehow succeed in such an operation is to take the word not only in an abstract and isolated manner, or even as surrounded by its immediate context, as we generally do, but in all the concrete phenomenological conditions of its existence; to take it such as it is imbeded in the more or less current literary forms that have given to it, little by little, its full signification".

We believe that the world *ānanda* belongs to this last group and it therefore requires and deserves an intensive study of its full meaning. Necessarily therefore this essay will become principally a study of words. We are not afraid of this. As S. Rodhe has pointed out, the study of the words becomes if anything more important in Indian religion and philosophy than elsewhere. One cannot but be struck by the consistency with which Indian terminology even in modern languages, has kept the connotations of its Sanskrit antecedents, and the vigour with which derivative words suck their meaning from the relatively few basic roots. Indian tradition itself has form ancient times developed a real philosophy of language. This is why Heimann has been able to say that "Language problems are in India questions of philosophy."

There is more in this attempt than an effort to understand the sources of the Hindu spiritual tradition. We would like it to be part of the spadework necessary for serious work on comparative religion, specially in the context of the exchange of ideas and values that is taking place at present between the Hindu tradition and the theology of Christendom.

We are aware that the modern science of comparative religion has largely passed beyond the stage when one contrasted words with word, notion with notion of different systems, generally to arrive finally at a value judgement about the superiority of one particular notion over the other. One used to start from the religion one wanted to prove superior and compared its concepts with those of other systems which were soon proved to be inferior. The fallacy of this method is at present too evident to require any demonstration. Nowadays we seek rather to understand a full religious system in its entirety: for it is in their total context that different religious or philosophical notions acquire their true value. But it seems to us that an overall study of religious systems should not neglect the detailed analysis of each of the key concepts that enter into the composition of that system, just as the study of a language cannot omit an analysis of the words that compose it, even if the study has then to be pursued further into an understanding of its structure. Further, it seems to us that the method of comparison and contrast of notion with notion within the same system or in other systems is too precious an instrument of thought and too closely bound to the very psychological processes of understanding to be omitted altogether, even if this method is a dangerous one and requires great caution in its use. There is no

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question here of a value judgment, but of an examination of a notion in all its aspects in order to be able to apprehend all its richness.

An etymological approach

Unlike the first-two components of the *saccidānanda* formula, the last element is not from a simple base. It is itself a composite word, derived from the root nand and the prefix a. The Sanskrit prefix a is very often added to words of motion and suggests horizontal, quasi-mechanical, spontaneous motion; in general this is a forward movement, but it can at times also suggest a backward move (cf. *gam-ā-gam; dā-ā-dā*). In this dynamic meaning the prefix can often be translated by towards, in, and approximates the Latin ad or in with the accusative. The particle can also have a more static connotation of the place whereto the movement has taken place and in which it now rests (cf. *ā-sthana, ā-yatana, ā-laya, ā-śrama, ā-dhāra*). In combination with nand it seems to suggest a dynamic aspect of interiorization and of concentration (cp. *ā-kuncana*, contraction; *praty-ā-hāra*, reabsorption), or perhaps even of interior pervasion (cp. *ā-kāśa*).

Unlike sat, which is the present participle of the Indo-European verb to be, and unlike cit which has also probably Indo-European connexions, the root nand and consequently the noun *ānanda* do not seem to be related to any known Indo-European word. Although recorded by panini (3.1.134) the root appears rarely in the Rgveda, and only in its more recent layers, a pointer, it would seem, to the relatively late entry of this root into Sanskrit, at least in its present meaning.

Philologically several explanations and connections have been proposed. Even early in the century J. Charpentier, rejecting several connections with Indo-European roots proposed previously, tried to show that *nand* was a derivative from (by reduplication) of the root *nad*, to sound, to howl, to shout. To support this thesis he had to rely mostly on the use of the compounds of *nand* such as *prati-nand, abhinand*, etc. (but not *ānanda*, which is rare), all of which according to him, would show that "at the background of *nand* there in an old verb of speech or, in an earlier stage, of shouting or crying." This conjecture is reinforced, Charpentier thinks, by an analysis of the nominal formations belonging to *nand* (*nandi, nandaka, nandana, nandihosa, nandi-turya, nandinī*).

Such parallel variations as *vad-vand, syad-syand, krad-krand, mad-mand*, all of them Ṛgvedic, would seem to favour Charpentier's derivation, although these cases would not suggest a reduplication. However, in these variations the meanings of the two forms are clearly allied, which is not the case with *nad-nand*. Besides, the verb *ā-nad* is not recorded in the Rgveda and hence these suggestions of Charpentier did not find much acceptance. This may also be due to the fact that many of the texts alluded by him belong to rather later literature.

More recently J. Gonda has tried to define more precisely the meaning of *nand*: There are, in my opinion, some arguments in favour of the view that the root *nand* in general not only means "to rejoice", but also "to be refreshed, to be strengthened, especially by blessing or praising", and besides, that this shade of meaning appears to be the original one.

He then proceeds to a study of texts, particularly in the Samhitas; and disagrees with Deussen's view that "sexual pleasure" is the primary original meaning of the word *ānanda*. He concludes: A plausible Indo-Eupropean etymology of this Sanskrit root has not been found. Burrow's suggestion

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(i.e. an identity with the Tamil *nantu*, "to prosper, flourish, be luxuriant, to be proud, glow with pride or splendour") is worth considering and fits in with my above remarks.

The last reference is interesting. In effect, although M. Mayrhofer finds the relationship to Dravidian "difficult to prove", there seems to be much to be said for the argument of T. Burrow that "the adoption of Dravidian words by Sanskrit was already begun in the time of the Rgveda, and continues throughout the later stages of Sanskrit and is continued in the Middle and Modern Indoaryan languages". The general reluctance to accept such a relation seems to proceed from the fact that we are accustomed to consider the Rgveda as a purely "Aryan" product, and the Dravidian civilization a later phenomenon, limited to South India. The studies of Burrow and of others seem to show that already in the Rgveda we have at least partially a product of an Indian fusion of cultures; and, on the other hand, recent archaeological discoveries have increased the probability that a Dravidian or "proto-Dravidian" culture was spread over a great part of Northern India. Remains of what has so far been called the Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro cultures have been uncovered in several parts of Gujarat, Rajasthan and other places in the North of India. It is true that it has not yet been proved that this culture was really Dravidian: but this still remains a very plausible hypothesis

This question of a possible non-aryan philological origin of *ānanda* and other words should be distinguished from the question whether the Upaniṣads represent in general a non-aryan cultural revolt against the Brāhmanic culture. Modern studies on the Upaniṣads seem rather to bring to light more and more clearly the close dependence of the Upaniṣads on the preceding thought of the Brahmanas. As S. K. Belvalkar already contended, they are more in the nature of a compromise and alliance than of a revolt. If "revolt" there was, and we would rather call it fusion of elements, it took place much earlier, and indeed from the very beginning of Indian thought as it has come down to us. A. B. Keith is also rather s ceptical of a sharp contrast in historical times between the Aryan and Dravidian thought: These contentions, we may admit, do not lead to any assured results in the sense of establishing the Dravidian claim. What they indicate is the unquestionable fact that the Upaniṣads, as *in some degree all earlier thought* in India, represent the outcome of the reflection of a people whose blood was mixed. We may, if we desire call the Upaniṣads the product of Aryo-Dravidian thought; but if we do so, we must remember that the effect of the inter-mixture must be regarded in the light of a chemical fusion in which both elements are transformed.

While admitting such a fusion, it is not perhaps, an impossible task to try and find out the probable derivations of individual words and notions by means of philological and philosophical analyses.

Whatever be the origin of the words *ananda*, the notion did come to hold a very important place in Indian philosophical and religious thought. This importance does not appear, indeed, from the very beginning, for the occurrences of the word in the Samhitas and the Brāhmanas and in most of the classical Upaniṣads- apart from the Taittiriya-are relatively rare; and yet, they are sufficiently, interesting to make a study worth-while. It is much later, however, with the rise of the sectarian literature and particularly in the "minor Upaniṣads" which have been so little studies up to now, that the importance of *ānanda* grew. One factor is this growth was

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undoubtedly, the spread of the experimentation on induced states of pleasure and bliss promoted in the more Tantric cults and practices. Furthermore, the *bhakti* literature often proposed *ānanda* or the union in bliss with the Absolute as the religious ideal of the devotees.

It should be noticed, however, that many archaic currents of thought have surfaced in the written evidence of these later texts. This is specially true of the Tantric literature. Would this be a further pointer to the probability that the spiritual importance of the notion of *ānanda* was first developed in milieus other than those responsible for the early Vedic literature?

Method and philosophical tendencies

The original intention of this essay was to make a study of the concept of bliss in the whole of the classical Hindu tradition. It was soon evident that the subject was far too vast and it was necessary to limit to a definite period. That the era chosen is that of the Upaniṣads needs little justification. To any student of Indian religious thought it is evident that even more than the hymns of Saṃhitās, the dialogues and the teachings of the Upaniṣads have dominated a great part not only of the philosophy but also of the religions of India. Even in modern times, the Upaniṣads are, to a great extent, the starting point for the spirituality of both, the traditionalist circles of Hindu thought, which continue in their own quiet way to meditate on the wisdom transmitted from generation to generation, and of the reform movements which try to renew and adapt Hinduism to the modern condition of life. If the Upaniṣads are in a true sense *the* "end of the Knowledge"-*Vedānta*-they are no less the beginning of speculation: not indeed in the sense that we cannot detect any traces of philosophical reflection already in the Samhitas and in the liturgical discussions of the Brahmanas, but in the sense that all this, earlier thought converges, so to speak, in the Upaniṣads, is concretised there and becomes in them the starting point of the philosophical systems or darśanas, containing already, as they do, a great part of the main themes of Indian speculation. It is obvious that to understand the Upaniṣadic references two *ānanda* we shall need to study also the pre-Upaniṣadic Vedic literature.

We are not going to make here a list of the questions that are treated in the Upaniṣads. They are rather in the nature of a quest that searches even for its own formulation, than a clear-cut set of questions as we might find in an examination paper or in a manual of philosophy. The questions posited generally imply the belief in an all-pervading reality which is the origin and the final end of everything and the assumption that the inner knowledge of this truth really leads to immortality- this immortality meaning the end of rebirth, the recovery or discovery of the true Self and therefore the attainment of the perfect bliss of liberation.

For us, it is more important to understand the method of inquiry of the Upaniṣads than to know the questions and answers which they formulate. For the Upaniṣads continue in part the liturgical reflection of the the Brāhmaṇas, although in a more interiorised, and more symbolical way following the trend already started in the Aranyakās. We are going to see in the next chapter a clear example of this relationship to the liturgical speculation. The basis of liturgical speculations is symbolism. M. Eliade has analysed the capital importance in the history of religions of the logic of symbols and their functions, insisting on the unifying function of the symbol as a sort

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of language that tends to integrate the profane into the sacred and thus sacralise the whole of reality. In Vedic India the whole sacrifice and each of its elements had a hidden symbolic value, and the knowledge of this "language" was equivalent to a grasp of reality and of the secret forces of the universe. The enigmas, the aphorisms, the etymologies real or imaginary, the word-puzzles, the myths, the dialogues, the colloquies, the syntheses of various views, the discussions and on the contrary, as Lacombe has pointed out, knowledge in an "immediate transparency of Being to itself"; it is a discovery, a realisation of what already is.


If this is so, it means the liberation, salvation, the supreme state of happiness to which man aspires are identified with Being. In other words *Brahman* is *Mokṣa*. This is precisely what the Vedanta holds. The supreme beatitude is not something to be achieved, produced or arrived at, but, like bring, something to be "realised". The *reality* must shine in the pure and unobstructed light of its *self-consciousness* so that it may appear as supreme bliss and satisfaction: *sac-cid-ānanda*! The conception of Being or of Brahman in its pure light of non-duality, remains therefore a conception pregnant with meaning. It is this meaning, specially the aspect of *ananda*, that we are going to study in the following chapters.

ANYO'NTARA ATMANANDAMAYAH

In the Taittiriya Upaniṣad we find the locus classicus where the teaching of the notion of *ānanda* is developed. Although the study of word statistics has singularly little value in our field, still they do provide some indication of the importance of certain themes in particular works. Thus among the older classical Upaniṣads the words *ānanda* or its derivatives are not found at all in Aitareya, Kena, Katha, Isa, and Svetasvatara; it comes once in the Mundaka; thrice in the Chandogya and in the Prasna; 12 times in the Kausitaki; 27 times in the Brhadaranyaka and 37 times in the Taittiriya Upaniṣad- a fact all the more significant as this Upaniṣad is hardly one sixth the size of the Brhadaranyaka.

(a) The Taittiriya tradition:

The Taittiriya Upaniṣad belongs to the Black Yajurveda. L. Renou and other scholars have stressed the importance of the Yajurveda tradition not only because it preserves so many texts and gives so much information about the ritual, but also because it is an important source of early speculation. This applies particularly to the Taittiriya school, which is extremely well-documented and is perhaps the most complete of the Vedic sakhas. Keith has worked out an hypothesis for the probable derivation of the different branches of the black Yajurveda that have come down to us. His proposals would form a scheme like this:



We can see here how the Taittiriya would represent the purest Yajurveda tradition that we have. Renou, however, is much more sceptical and thinks that it is not possible to establish a "geneology" and chronology of the *śākhās* and their subdivisions, much as this would help us to understand the development of Vedism. On the other hand, given the fact that there is a very slight connection between the Taittiriya early tradition and its

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Upaniṣads, genealogy is not of very great interest for us.

The Taittiriya Upaniṣad comes to us as a constitutive part of the Taittiriya Āraṇyaka. The latter has ten *propāṭhakas* or chapters. Chapters 1-6 form the Āraṇyaka proper with more 'liturgical' explanations of the ceremonies and notes supplementary to the Saṃhitā and the Brāhmaṇs: there is little difference in this *śākhā* between the Saṃhitā, the Brāhmaṇa and the Āraṇyaka. Chapters 7-10 of the Āraṇyaka, however, are Upaniṣads "totally independent" of the preceding matter:

The Taittiriya Upaniṣad, which forms the seventh, eight and ninth chapters of the Āraṇyaka of that name.....condemns the teaching of the Vedas, not excepting that of the first six chapters of the work of which it forms a part, to lead the students on to an intellectual forms of worship in which Indra, Vāyu and Agni yield their places to Mahābrahma, and the oblations and offerings of the Vedas to reflection, contemplation and meditation.

The Taittiriya Upaniṣad itself is not a single composition, as is shown even froms the testimony of ancient Indian sources: In the Kāṇḍānukrama, which claims to be a product of the Ātreyi śākhā of the Black Yajurveda, is given a summary of the contents of the text of the sakha. In it the *Brāhmaṇa* and the *Āraṇyaka* are considered as well as the Samhita, and the whole division as explained by the commentator runs as follows:......(1 to 41). Then follow *three* Upaniṣads, the Sāṃhiti (Āraṇyaka 7), the Yājnikī, (ib. 10) and the Vāruṇī (ib. 8 and 9).

According to the Kāṇḍānukrama, therefore, what is now the first vallī of the Taittirīya Upaniṣad, is a separate text. The fact that the Kāṇḍānukrama places chapter 10, which is our present Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad and an admittedly much later works, between chapter 7 on the one hand and chapters 8 and 9 on the other, show how slight is the connection between the first *valli* of our present Upaniṣad and the other two *vallis.* A mere look at the structure and content of the Upaniṣad confirms this opinion: the Sikṣavallī has its own mangalapāṭha at the begining and at the end, and its subject matter is quite different from that of the Ānandavallī and the Bhṛguvallī. Sāyaṇācarya, in his commentary on the Sāṃhitī Upaniṣad, agrees also with this distinction: "This Taittīriya Upaniṣad is threefold: the Samhiti, the Yajniki and the Varuni..... among these three, the Varuni is the most important". This is the reason why we shall start our study of the concept of *ānanda* in the Upaniṣads with the second and third vallis of the Taittiriya, where we find all but one references to the word *ānanda* in this Upaniṣad.

Most scholars agree in placing this Upaniṣad in the group of the older prose Upaniṣads, generally after the more famous Bṛhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya. But we know how uncertain is even the relative chronology of the Vedic works, and we must content ourselves with nothing that even if the Taittiriya is later than the two great Upaniṣads, its preoccupations seem to be different from, and its content generally independent of the two previous works. It has a strikingly greater internal unity, its language is simple and apparently more disentangled from the ritualistic speculations of the older Upaniṣads.

We say "apparently" -because in reality this Upaniṣad, like the older ones, has to be studied in the light of the meditations on the Vedic ritual. The studies of Edgerton have shown without doubt that the Upaniṣads prolong the liturgical preoccupations of the Brāhmaṇas, and

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that they aim at a revalorization and spiritualisation of the ritual. More concretely, the thought of the second *valli* of the Taittirīya Upaniṣads has close connections with Brāhmaṇic speculations on the building of the sacred alter, the *agnicayana*, as is clear from van Buitenen's study on the Maitrāyaniya Upaniṣad to which we shall refer later. The *agni-cayana* ceremony and the speculations on it occupy five out of the fourteen section of the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, i.e. *kāṇḍas* 6 to 10. It is "a very solemn ceremony which would seem originally to have stood apart from, if not in actual opposition to, the ordinary sacrificial system, but which, in the end, apparently by some ecclesiastical compromise, was added on to the Soma ritual as an important, though not indispensable, element of it. The avowed object of this ceremony is the super-exaltation of Agni, the Fire, who, in the elaborate cosmogonic legend with which this section begins, is identified with Prajāpati, the Lord of Generation, and the source of life in the world:.

Belvalkar and Ranade also agree as to the autonomous character of this ceremony: both the enormous length of the speculations on it and the list of the authorities quoted in the text do suggest that this portion developed somewhat independently of the main sacrificial system. It is, however, rich in symbolism and fertile in philosophic ideas. We are summarising here the main ceremonies and their symbolism as they appear in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa.

b. The agnicayana : ceremonial and meaning

1. *The ceremonial* : Of the three fires used at the *śrauta* sacrifice, the most important is the *āhavanīya*. The building of a brick altar that has to receive this fire constitutes the ceremony of the "piling of the fire" (*agni-cayana*). The altar is a large structure made of over 10,000 bricks, the main body of which occupies an area of about nine hundred square feet. The construction took a year, because "Prajāpati is the Year", and the alter is at various times "homologised" with Prajapati, or with the fire, or with the sacrificer. The chief ceremonies in the construction of the alter include the following items:

(1) The ground on which the alter is to be built is ploughed, watered and sown.

(2) At the exact centre on the ground level a fresh lotus leaf is laid, symbolizing the womb, the matrix of the universe, and the primeval waters which are the womb of the world.

(3) On this leaf a golden plate, symbol of the sun, is laid. It also symbolises truth, light and immortality. The sacrificer has carried this plate with him for one year. The oft-used stanza sung when laying down the golden plate is obscure but suggestive: ".......The sun has disclosed from the shining boundary and revealed the highest extent of the deep the womb of the existent and the non-existent".

(4) On the golden plate a golden figure of a man is laid down. It symbolises Prajāpati, the "figure in the Sun, the *Puruṣa*"; and also the sacrificer, i.e. "the immortal, divine form of the sacrificer", not his human form. At the sides of the golden figure two sacrificial spoons are placed forming as it were the arms of the person.

(5) On these elements the five-layer alter is built. Although some passages speak of six or seven layers, yet it is clear that this is due to a dismemberment of the fifth layer into two or three. The ritual, as we have it, requires a five layer alter, although we can guess an earlier stage in which there where only three layers, symbolising the earth, atmosphere

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and heaven: the second and the forth layers in the Satapatha Brahmana ritual are clearly subsidiary. The first brick to be laid is the *svayamātṛṇṇā* the 'self-perforated' brick, probably made of a sort of porous material. It is placed just above the golden figure in the centre and similarly in the third and the fifth layers two more *svayamātṛṇṇās* are laid, while the second and fourth layers leave the centre empty. The three "self-perforated" bricks form thus a sort of cosmic column reaching heaven (symbolised by the fifth layer) which allows the "golden man" to breathe and also to reach the heavenly regions. The lowest of these bricks, like the whole of the lowest layer, symbolises the earth and the food of the earth. On the brick of tuft of *Dūrvā* grass is laid, "which is the cattle of the earth."

(6) After the first, the other bricks of the bottom layer are laid in a definite order. Room is also found in this layer for a living tortoise "the life-sap of the worlds", for the mortar and pestle which also symbolise food, and on which the fire pan is placed. Besides this, there are the seven heads of seven victims of sacrifice, into which seven pieces of gold, "the seven breaths", are supposed to be inserted. As each layer is finished a coating of loose sand is spread over it.

(7) The second layer symbolises the region between the earth at the atmosphere-a clearly artificial region showing the secondary character of this layer.

(8) The third layer symbolises the atmosphere, and as in the others, the bricks must be laid in a particular, definite pattern.

(9) The fourth layer represents the "region between the atmosphere and the sky". There is a curious text that is important for the later speculation. It asserts that "the fourth layer indeed is the Brahman and the Brahman is Agni, and this, the *fifth* layer, is as it were the cover of that".

(10) The fifth layer represents the sky, the world of the gods, the world of heaven of immortality without fear, and this layer and the whole later are fittingly completed with the all important *nākasad* (heaven-sitting) brick, laid by the side of the third *svayamātṛṇṇā*. In this layer the whole fire-altar becomes completed, and therein these (bricks are) the firmament (*nāka*), the world of heaven; it is therein that the gods seated themselves and in as much as the gods seated themselves in that firmament, in the world of heaven, the gods are the firmament-seated ones. And in like manner does the sacrificer, when he lays down these (bricks) now sit himself on that firmanent, in the world of heaven.

A spread of gold shavings gives the last touches to the whole structure.

2. *Reintegration of the cosmos and of the individual:* As can be seen, this is a ceremony rich in symbolism and liturgical theology.' Leaving aside the significance of concrete details, let us see what are the main ideas that govern and are implied in this ritual. The 'piling of the fire' is clearly inspired by the 90th hymn of the tenth *maṇḍala* of the Rgveda, where the 'creation' of the world is described as the dismemberment of the Primeval *Puruṣa*, who, transcendent though he is, still comprises the totality of the Universe. His creative sacrifice is not so much an 'initial' act, a definite activity in time or at the beginning of it. It is rather a constant process, or, better still, a process outside time, that co-exists with all the points of time in this creation. After that sacrifice, the Brāhmaṇas tell us again and again,

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Prajāpati was "exhausted" (*vy-asramsata*, from the root *srams;* to fall, drop asunder or go to pieces, and the prefix vi meaning dispersion, multiplicity). Now it was those five bodily parts (*lit.*, "bodies", *tanū*) of his (Prajāpati's) that become 'exhausted', -hair, skin flesh, bone and marrow-they are these five layers (of the fire-alter); and when he builds up the five layers, thereby the builds him up with those bodily parts; and inasmuch as he builds up (*ci*) therefore they are layers (*citi*).

The *agnicayana* therefore is the rebuilding of that Prajāpati. In a sense it is a movement opposed to the creative sacrifice, but is completes it: it brings together the fallen-away parts, and in this sense it ushers in the reintegration of the universe, the 'involution' to the primeval form. To the next just quoted the five layers, represent five different tissues of the body of men. More often, and at the cosmic level, they represent, as we have seen, the different layers of the Vedic universe. This idea is stressed throughout the course of the ceremony. We shall find it again in a text we shall quote below, which incorporates further ideas. The same idea of the totality of the Universe being contained in the altar is stressed when attention is called to the fact that the different kinds of beings are represented in the alter: the earth, in the earth-made bricks; the animals, in the heads of the victims; gold in the plate and in the figure of the man and in the pieces used on other occasions; wood, in the spoons and mortar, and fire-logs; and 'food' in the lotus-leaf, in the tortoise, the ghee and the honey used in the sacrifice.

From the point of view of time the five layers are the five seasons, and in space they are the five regions (North, South, East, West and Zenith), but more important than this symbolism is the cosmic symbolism of the different horizontal layers of the universe, which we have already mentioned. For although it is occasionally said that the whole of the *āhavanīya* fire represents of sky, the world of the gods, while the *gārhapatya* represents this world of men and the *dakṣiṇāgni* the world of the dead, yet it is particularly the fifth layer of the alter that represents heaven. Indeed, the whole operation of building the alter is represented as a symbolic journey to heaven. At every layer that they build, the gods-and the sacrificer after them-rise higher and higher till they reach the world of light, heaven, the place of immortality. This is precisely the idea evoked at the beginning of the explanation of each layer: as by meditation (*citya*) they discover each layer (*citi*) the gods ascend to the higher regions. This conception reminds us clearly of the myth of the three strides of Visnu, which is indeed recalled in one passage. A curious text to which a reference has already been made gives us the same teaching. In it we have a seven-layer universe, a point that shows a later development. But it also contains the remnants of a three-layer alter by its identification of th first three layers with the three main divisions of the universe:

Now, then, there is the consideration of the layer-fillings. The first layer is this (terrestrial) world; and the filling of soil means cattle; thus in covering the first layer with a filling of soil he covers this (terrestrial) world with cattle. The second layer is the air, and the filling of soil means birds; thus in covering the second layer with a filling of soil he covers (fills) the air with birds.

The third layer is the sky, and the filling of soil means the stars: thus in covering the third layer with a filling of soil, he covers the sky with stars.

The fourth layer is the sacrifice, and the filling of soil means sacrifical gifts;

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thus by covering the fourth layer with a filling of soil he covers the sacrifice with sacrificial gifts.

The fifth layer is the sacrificer, and the filling of soil means progeny (or subjects, *prajā*): thus is covering the fifth layer with a filling of soil he covers (abundantly supplies) the sacrificer with progeny (or subjects).

The sixth layer is the heavenly world, and the filling of soil means the gods: thus is covering the sixth layer with a filling of soil he fills the heavenly words with gods.

The seventh layer is immortality-that is the last (layer) he lays down, and thus bestows immortality as the highest thing of all this (universe): therefore immortality is the highest thing of all this (universe), therefore the gods are not separated therefrom, and therefore they are immortal. Thus much as to the deity.

By the side of this reintegration of the cosmos there is also a reintegration of the individual: the ritual gestures have always a polyvalent symbolism. The text just cited continues as follows:

Now as to the Self (body). The first layer is the legs, and the downward flowing vital air, and the filling of soil is the flesh; thus in covering the first layer with a filling of soil he covers that (part) of his (Agni's) body with flesh..............The second layer is (that part of the body) which is above the legs and below the waist; and the filling of soil is flesh......... The third layer is the waist itself; the fourth layer is that (part of the body) which is above the waist and below the neck; the fifth layer is the neck; the sixth layer is the head; the seventh layer is the vital airs. This he lays down as the last (or highest): he thus makes the the vital air the highest of all this (universe). He places it on a filling of soil; and the filling of soil means flesh- he thus covers (the channels of) the vital airs with flesh. He does not cover it above, whence these (channels of the) vital airs are not closed up above.

Thus a complete personal reintegration is achieved by the "piling up" of the alter itself, and this ceremony is considered as a sacrifice in itself- its fruit is heaven:

If he piles up the alter with its *ātman* (body), he becomes possessed of *ātman* in yonder world. If he mentions Agni's dear abode he himself goes to that abode.

This is why everything in the alter centres around the golden man placed in the middle, the symbol of the sacrificer, hidden in the interior, in the *guhā* (secret cave) of the alter, just as the *ātman* is in the *guhā* of the heart.

3. *Attainment of "heaven" and of bliss:* The sacrifice is meant to lead the sacrificer to heaven. Let us note that in Hindu liturgical theology the sacrificer (*yajamāna* literally "the sacrificer-for-himself", since the present participle is in the *ātmanepada*) is not priest who recites, sings, performs or directs the ceremony, but the patron, the layman, a magnate for whose intentions and benefit the ceremony is performed, and who supplies the *dakṣiṇās*, the sacrificial, fees, to all the priests. He is not, indeed a passive onlooker at the sacrifice: important ceremonies are reserved to him, ceremonies that generally stress his identification with the deity or with the sacrifical fire. The sacrifice will be for him the means of going to the heavenly regions of light and immortality, to share there in the blissful life of the gods-but this after a full span of life, a full 100, years of success in this world.

The alter was built in the forms of a schematic bird, with a body, a head, two wings and a tail. It faced the East. Ritual details are prescribed to ensure that the forms of the bird appears clearly, and the need for this shape is defended against other theories that would propose other shapes. The idea of the bird shape is

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undoubtedly to suggest that the altar is a means of ascending to the highest region of heaven. But Keith speaks of a more mystical origin of this shape: the altar is identified with Agni, the sacrificial fire, and Agni is often associated with the form of the bird, because it '*flew down*' from heaven in the guise of lightning and thus brought to us Soma, the drink of immortality.

We have already mentioned to cosmic column formed by the three *svayamātṛṇṇā* bricks. It marks the path to heaven for the sacrificer who is represented, at the centre of the lowest level, by the golden man resting on the golden plate and on the lotus leaf (= the womb). But the conception of the sacrificer *going* to heaven is not sufficient: the sacrifice is not a vehicle, exterior to the realities which it symbolises and to which it leads. In the mind of the Brāhmaṇas the sacrifice is Prajāpati, and the sacrificer *becomes* Prajāpati and the gods, the world of ultimate reality: As to this they say, 'For what object is the fire (alter) built? -'having become a bird, he (Agni) shall bear me to the sky (*divam*)!', so say some; but let him not think so; for by assuming that form the vital airs become Prajapati; by assuming that form Prajapati created the gods (*devān*); by assuming that form, the gods became immortal (*amṛtāḥ*); and what thereby the vital airs and Prajapati and the gods became that indeed he (the sacrificer) becomes.

It is for the purpose of achieving this mystical identification that the sacrificer is obliged to carry along with him for one full years the fire that will finally be put on the alter:

Being about to build Agni (the fire altar), he takes him up into his own self; for from out of his own self he causes him to be born, and wherefrom one is born such-like he becomes. Now were he to build up Agni without taking him up into his own self, he would beget man from man, mortal from mortal, one not freed from sin from one not freed from sin; but when he builds up Agni after taking him up into his self, he causes Agni to be born from Agni, the immortal from the immortal, the sinless from the sinless.

And this is the stanza the sacrificer recites when he takes up the fire to carry it along with him: Within me I first take Agni, For increase of wealth, For healthy progeny, For vigorous manhood, And my the deities stand by me.

On reaching the highest heaven, on being identified with Prajapati, one obtains immortality and bliss. The notion of immortality is more explicit than that of bliss in Indian tradition : we have found it often in the texts quoted on the previous pages; the golden plate, symbol of the sun is also the symbol of truth, of light and of immortality and it is on it that the golden man (=the sacrificer) lies. In general gold symbolises life and immortality. However, he idea of bliss is also found frequently in these texts. The fifth layer is introduced with the meditation of the gods: they see the fifth layer as the far-shining heaven, and that world pleases them. They want to make it "foeless and undisturbed". Calaka Sāṇḍilyāyaṇa also will call the fifth layer "all desires" (*sarve kāmāḥ*). And elsewhere it is said that while the fourth layer is Brahman, and brahman is Agni, the fifth layer above it is "as it were the (soil)-cover of that" -that is the symbol of a reality, a state, intimately connected with the notion of Brahman and yet surpassing it. As we shall see in the course of this study, precisely this is the conception often accompanying the notion of *ānanda*: happiness emerges out of the very idea of totality, it is the fruit of the reintegration of the whole of Prajāpati of the whole of man and of the whole of the universe, "and

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hence whosoever thinks himself quite whole (*sarvaḥ kṛtsnaḥ*) sings or delights in song".

The placing of the sacred fire on the altar, compared to the 'placing of the seed in the womb' is accompanied by a hymn to Agni asking him "to spread joy to all the regions". And again there is the prayer: "May the abode-concealing Agni, may Indra, may god Brahmā, may Bṛhaspati and the wise Visvedeva speed our sacrifice unto bliss (*yajnam prāvantu naḥ śubhe*)".

It is in this same meditation of the tenth kanda of the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, the *agni-rahasya*, that we find the identification of the man in the sun with the "man in the right eye" and with Indra. But Indra, the type of the male, is incomplete without Indrani, the female principle. Their union of love takes place in the heart during the state of profound sleep, and this union brings about the completeness of man and therefore is the source of supreme happiness, the total *ānanda*.

The state of *ānanda* is truly transcendental. It is a state without any desires and hence well above all the human states. But it is so because in it all desire are fulfilled — a conception that merges already into the ideas of the Upaniṣads: That (golden man), indeed, the body (of the alter) is the end of everything here: he is in the midst of all waters, endowed with all the objects of desire-for all (objects of) desire are the waters: while possessed of all (objects of) de-desire he is without desire, for no desire of anything troubles him.

Regarding this there is this verse: "By knowledge they ascend to that (state) where all desires have vanished, sacrificial gifts go not thither, nor the fervid practices of rites without knowledge'—for, indeed, he who does not know this does not attain that world either by sacrificial gifts or by devout practices, but only to those who know does that world belong.

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER : EUROPEAN UPANISHADIC INTERPRETERS

Arthur Schopenhauer occupies a distinctive position in the history of the nineteenth century western philosophy. What chiefly preoccupies him is the question of evil in the world. A pessimist by temperament, he keenly felt the trouble of existence and found in the world what he felt in himself— a futile drive towards the acquisition of ever new objects of desire which yield no lasting satisfaction. This regnant tendency of his thought determines to a high degree the general complexion of his philosophy. In fact his philosophy is considered by some to be 'in its outcome, a doctrine of redemption from sin'.

We shall consider at the end of this chapter the factors that led him to take to pessimism. But it must be noted at the outset that in spite of his pre-occupation with pessimism, he does not remain nonchalant to the theoretical problems of philosophy. As a matter of fact on the theory of knowledge and the nature of reality and also on the real import of the beautiful and the good, Schopenhauer offers his solutions which are striking and original. His famous treatise-'Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung' ('The world as will and Idea') which appeared in 1819, gives us a fresh and stimulating insight into the nature of the world and human life. Long before this he had the occasion to peruse the Latin translation of the Upaniṣads made by Anquetil Duperron. That this study had left an ineffaceable impression on his mind is amply proved by his rapturous appreciation worded thus: "And

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oh: how thoroughly is the mind here washed clean of early engrafted Jewish superstitions! In the whole words there is no study except that of the originals, so beneficial and so elevating as that of the 'oupnekhat'. It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace in my death".

Pointing out the 'value of the Upaniṣads as the products of the highest wisdom, Schopenhauer says : "If he (the reader) is a partaker of the benefit conferred by the Vedas, the access to which, opened to us through the Upaniṣads, is in my eyes the greatest advantage which still young century (i.e. 1818—the beginning of the nineteenth century) enjoys over the previous ones, because I believe the influence of the Sanskrit literature will penetrate not less deeply than did the revival of the Greek literature in the fifteenth century: if I say, the reader has also already received and assimilated the sacred, primitive Indian wisdom, then he is best of all prepared to hear what I have to say to him".

It is to enough to say that Schopenhauer had only a deep respect for the Upaniṣadic message. What counts most is that the thoughts incorporated in his principal philosophical writing—'The World as will and Idea' bear adequate testimony to the fact that he was profoundly influenced by the Upaniṣadic thought. Our impression is shared by MaxMuller who records his observations, in his 'The Sacred Books of the East'.

Schopenhauer explains the universe through his concepts of 'Will' and 'Idea'. 'Will', according to him, is the inner core or substratum and 'idea' is the outer crust. He equates 'Will' with a 'force' which desires to maintain through the species the flow of life. It uses the individual as the instrument for this purpose and in the process inflicts misery on it. The 'idea' is the experience an individual goes through and is the only basis on which the reality of the outside words depends. The material world has no essence independent of mental perception.

These essential features of Schopenhauer's philosophy bear striking resemblance to some thoughts formulated in the Upaniṣads and the Advaita Vedanta. There is evidence (which we shall refer to in our analysis) that Schopenhauer himself is conscious of this. In order, therefore, to trace the extent of the Upaniṣadic impact on him, it is necessary for us to explain and examine his fundamental thesis on the world as idea and the world as will in some detail.

The World as idea:

Let us first take up his concept of the world as idea as formulated in the first book of 'Die Welt als Wills Und Vorstellung. Schopenhauer starts with the proposition 'The world is my idea or presentation. The German word 'Vorstellung' conveys the generalized meaning of the Lockean 'idea', now frequently expressed by the more technical term 'presentation' or 'representation'. By Schopenhauer the word 'Idea' (with an initial capital letter 'I' intrast with 'idea' just mentioned) has been used exclusively in the sense of the Platonic 'Idea' which plays an important part in his philosophy. Now this truth viz., 'that the world is my idea' is something a man is fully conscious of, although it holds good for all beings who live and know. The world that lies before us, exists only as an idea in relation to the mind. In other words, the whole world is only an object in relation to a subject, the perception of a perceiver in a word 'idea'. Appreciating Berkeley's contribution to philosophy, Schopenhauer says that Berkeley was right in denying the 'I-know-not-what-substratum' or the material substance of Locke serving as the cause of the ideas we perceive. We have no

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reason to believe that any thing exists-apart from the ideas and the mind that knows them. The phenomenal world is thus purely mental in its constitution. Schopenhauer here is a through—going subjective idealist or mentalist. But he is careful to observe that this view viz. 'that the world is an idea-is only one-sided and not the whole truth. He says that although nobody can free himself from such a conception, it is also to be noted that the other side of the truth which is more serious and impressive, is that a man can emphatically say, 'the world in my will-a view developed in the second book of his principal work. It is no doubt true to say that Schopenhauer in an idealist in the sense in which we call Berkeley's theory of external world 'idealism'. But his difference from Berkeley is also clearly marked when we come to consider his concept of 'will'. This difference proceeds from his following of Kant. Kantianism as accepted by Schopenhauer consists in the recognition of apriori forms by which the subject construct for itself an objective world of appearances. While allowing the Berkeley was more consistent than Kant in the general formulation of idealism, he thinks that Berkeley was altogether inadequate in working out the principle.

Kant's systematic construction is however reduced in effect to a very little by Schopenhauer. In fact his is a quite simplified apriorism. Of the twelve categories of the understanding Schopenhauer accepts only causality side by side with space and time which are in Kant's view forms of intuition. Thus these three forms, according to Schopenhauer, make up the understating of men and animals. All intuitions are thus intellectual. It is not true to say in the Kantian spirit that the intuitions first come under the spatio-temporal background and wait for the understanding to organise them, but in animals as in men they are put in order at once under the three froms that suffice to explain the knowledge we have of the phenomenal world. To 'Reason' as distinguished from Understanding Schopenhauer does not assign any exalted function as is attributed to it by Kant, for according to Schopenhauer 'Reason' should be restricted to mean a faculty of abstract concepts.

This reason and not understanding is that which distinguishes men from animals. It discovers and invents nothing, but only puts in a generalized from what the understanding has discovered in intuition. Hence following Berkeley and kant, Schopenhauer proceeds to consider that aspect of the world which is knowable and finds that all presented objects including even our own bodies are merely ideas. 'Will' by itself, as we shall see in our subsequent analysis, constitutes the other aspect of the world. To quote Schopenhauer-

"As the world is in one aspect entirely 'idea', so in another it is entirely 'will'. A reality which is neither of these two, but an object in itself (into which the thing in itself has unfortunately dwindled in the hands of Kant) is the phantom of a dream".

In an attempt at establishing his idealistic position Schopenhauer makes a detailed analysis of his theory of knowledge. He holds, all that exists in the external world, exists-only for the subject who knows all things, but is known by none. Everybody finds himself to be subject only in so far as he knows, not in so far as he is an object of knowledge. But his body in an object or rather an immediate object and may be called an idea, since like all other objects of perception of body is conditioned by the universal forms of knowledge (in kant's language, 'apriori forms of intuition) i.e., space and time. The subject on the

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contrary does not come under these forms for the simple reason that he is always the knower and never the known.

The world as idea in Schopenhauer's view has two fundamental, necessary and inseparable halves. The one half is the objective world of multiplicity appearing thought space and time and the other half is the subject which is to in space and time since it is present entire and undivided in every percipient being. These two halves are inseparable even for thorught, for each of the two has meaning or existence only through and for the other and each appears with the other and vanishes with it. Following Kant Schopenhauer affirms that it is with the help of apriori forms the mind imposes on the sensations, that the sensations are organised into objects of perception.

That space, time and causality lie apriori in our consciousness is a fact on which Schopenhauer fully agrees with Kant, but he goes beyond Kant in maintaining that the 'principle of sufficient reason' is the general expression for all these forms of the object of which we are apriori conscious. Hence all that we know purely apriori is only the content of that principle and what follows from it. Kant, according to Schopenhauer, drew up only a somewhat miscellaneous list of apriori forms including spance and time and the twelve categories of the understanding. He did not adequately explain the relationship between them, nor did he trace their common origin back to a single principle. Fichte made an attempt at finding such a principle in his concept of the Ego.

But Schopenhauer thinks that Fichte was not successful in his attempt. Schopenhauer believes that he has been successful in tracing this common principle which is the principle of sufficient reson' with its four fold root viz.., (i) cause and effect explaining tht every change implies a cause, making natural science possible; (ii) ground and consequent, the ground on which the logical judgements are based and inferences drawn; (iii) space and time making mathematics possible and (iv) motive and action, every action being the outcome of an assignable motive making apparently social sciences possible. Thus according to Schopenhauer every event that occurs in human experience and every object the appears in the external world are subject to the laws of sufficient reason and are determined according to the universal and apriori laws. Human conduct is as subject to law as external events. Like Kant Schopenhauer also seems to be a thorugh determinist in the domain of human experience subject to the principles of space, time and causality.

Ideas of perception and abstract ideas:

Schopenhauer makes a distincition between ideas of perception and abstract ideas. Abstract ideas signify only one class viz., concepts which are the possession of man alone and the faculty which forms these concepts is reason. The ideas of perception on the other hand comprehend the whole of the visible world or the sumtotal of experience with the conditions of its possiblity. The relation between the ideas of perception and those of reflection or abstract ideas is analysed by Schopenhauer with the help of an analogy: "As from the direct light of the sun to the borrowed light of the moon, we pass from the immediate idea of perception which stands by itself and is its own warrant, to reflection to the abstract, discursive concepts of the reason, which obtain their whole content from knowledge of perception and in relation to it". So long as we continue to perceive, everything is clear and-certain, and doubts and errors hardly arise here. What springs purely

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from perception and remains true to it, can not be false since it does not present an opinion but the thing as such. But with abstract knowledge, with reason, doubt and error appear in the theoretical, care and sorrow in the practical.

In the idea of perception however, illusion may sometimes take the place of the real, but in the sphere of abstract thought error may reign for a thousand years. Nevertheless when ideas are considered with reference to the subject we get, as Schopenhauer holds, a distinctive faculty of man i.e., reflection which distinguishes consciousness of man from that of the lower animals and by virtue of which human behaviour also becomes very much different from that of the irrational brutes. Hence we pass from immediate ideas of perception to reflection i.e. to the abstract or discursive concepts or ideas of reason in which lie the special prerogative of man over other lower creatures.

In the language of Schopenhauer "the brute feels and perceives; man in addition to this 'thinks' and 'knows'; both 'will'. Thus concepts, according to him, from a distinct class of ideas existing in the mind of man only and entirely different from the ideas of perception which are always considered with reference to time, space and matter. In spite of the concepts being fundamentally different from the ideas of perception there is a necessary relation between them Reason, which is said to be the faculty of forming concepts, is feminine in nature; it can only give after it has received. Of itself it has nothing but the empty forms of its operation. Concepts in general can only exist after the experience of the ideas of perception and as their entire nature consists in their relation to these, it is clear that they (i.e. concepts) presuppose them (i.e., perceptual ideas). The concepts may, therefore, be called ideas of ideas. Thus the entire world of reflection must ultimately rest on the world of perception as its ground of knowledge. Knowledge in the forms of sense-perception is valid only of the particular case and as it can not, therefore, extend beyond what is immediately present, reason must come in, in order to substitute abstract concepts for ideas of perception and take them as the guide of action. On the value and importance of rational or abstract knowledge which can be communicated and permanently retained Schopenhauer says: "Any one may have a direct perceptive knowledge through the understanding alone, of the causal connection, of the change and motions of natural bodies, and he may find entire satisfaction in it", but he can not communicate this knowledge to others until it has been made permanent for thought in concepts.

Criticism of materialism

It has already been indicated that the objective world or the world of idea is regarded by Schopenhauer as the outer crust of the real world whose in most kernel or essence in 'Will'. But the exponents of materialism get hold of the wrong end of the stick when they take this outer world for the real world and explain the origin of everything including the self and the will from 'matter'. Schopenhauer naturally launches his invectives against materialism which regards matter and with it time and space as existing absolutely, ignoring thereby the relation to the subject in which alone all this really exists. Materialism seeks to discover the primary and most simple state of matter and then tries to develop all the others from it. If we suppose this to have been done the last link in the chain would be animal sensibility i.e., knowledge which would

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consequently appear as a mere modification of a state of matter produced by causality. Thus the knowledge which is reached so laboriously is presupposed as the indispensable condition of its very starting point, -mere matter. When we imagine that we think matter, we really think only the subject that perceives matter. Hence Schopenhauer points out that the fundamental absurdity of materialism consists in the fact that it starts from the 'objective' and takes as the ultimate ground of explanation something 'objective', whether it is matter in the abstract simply as it is 'thought' or after it is empirically given as a substance. Schopenhauer is quite dicided on the principle that there is no object without a subject, and this renders all materialism for ever impossible.

This idea is illustrated by Schopenhauer is detail. Some important passages may be quoted here: — "Suns and Planets without an eye to see them, and an understanding that knows them, may indeed be spoken of in words, but for the idea, these words are absolutely meaningless".

"The existence of the whole remains ever dependent upon the first eye that opened, even if it were that on an insect. For such an eye is a necessary condition of the possibility of knowledge, and the whole world exists only in and for knowledge, and without it, it even thinkable. The world is entirely an idea and as such demands the knowing subject as the supporter of its existence."

"Thus we see on the one hand the existence of the whole world necessarily dependent upon the first conscious being, however undeveloped it may be; on the other hand, this conscious being just as necessarily entirely dependent upon a long chain of causes and effects which have preceded it and in which it itself appears as a small link".

Fichte's viewpoint trounced

The examination of materialism leads Schopenhauer to declare forcefully that there is clearly a reciprocal and inseparable relation between the subject and the object and at the same time an inevitable antithesis between them. This knowledge, as we shall consider later, leads him to discover the 'will' as thing-in-itself which steers clear of this antithesis. Now as opposed to materialism just examined, there is the system of J. G. Fichte which Schopenhauer proceeds to examine with equal severity, for Fichte, in his opinion, goes to the other extreme by starting from the subject- 'Ego', and attempting to derive object from it con amore.

Considering Fichte to be one among the 'false philosophers', Schopenhauer holds that Fichte failed to penetrate deep into Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' and grasp the exact import of Kant's doctrine of thing-in-itself. In Schopenhauer's view an honest attempt on the part of Fichte to follow Kant could have made him realize that the principal teaching of Kant is that the principle of sufficient reason is valid only in the sphere of phenomena. Hence the inner nature of the world or the thing-in-itself can not be found by the guidance of this principle. Further the principle of sufficient reason does not concern the subject, but is only the forms of objects which are therefore not things-in-themselves. The Subject must exist along with the object, and the object along with the subject, so that the subject and the object can not stand in a relation of reason and consequent. But, for Fichte, the 'Ego' stands for the ground of the world and the 'non-ego' for the object which is just its 'consequent, its creation.

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To be more specific, it is under the guidance of the principle of sufficient reason of existence in space, that Fichte's ego produces and fabricates the non-ego from itself. It is thus, in Schopenhauer's view, the tardy expression of the converse of old materialism. Just as materialism overlooked the fact that with the simplest object it assumed the subject also, so also Fichte overlooked the fact that with the subject (Ego) he assumed the object also, for no subject is thinkable without an object. So Fichte's system begins by assuming what it proposes to deduce-the necessary correlative of its starting point. Thus by opposing materialism and Fichte's system Schopenhauer tries to make his position clear. To quote him: "The method of our own system is toto genere distinct from these two opposite misconceptions, for we start neither from the object, nor from the subject, but from the 'idea' as the first of consciousness. Its first essential, fundamental form is the antithesis of subject and object".

Critical analysis of the outer world

In order to corroborate his proposition that the outward world is merely an idea in relation to self Schopenhauer insists upon a critical enquiry into the constitution of the outer world with reference to time, space and matter. All that takes place in the outer world goes on in time. But time is nothing but succession. As to space, it is nothing but the possibility of the reciprocal determination of parts of one another in their respective positions. Again matter on reflection, is found to be nothing but causation. The true meaning of matter consists in its action. Only as active phenomenon does it fill space and time. The consequence of action of any material object upon any other is known only by the difference in the way it acts now from the way it acted before. Cause and effect thus constitute the whole nature of matter. Certainty in mathematics shows that space and time are the forms which mind gives apriori to all the contents of perception which constitute the outer world. Time and space can be mentally presented apart from matter, while matter can not be so presented apart from time and space. Space and time are not only each for itself, presupposed by matter, but a union of the two (i.e., of space and time) constitutes the essence of matter, for this as we have indicated, consists in action i.e., causation.

In fact according so Schopenhauer causation means that at the same point of space one thing is followed by another at different instant in time. Thus causality unties space and time, depends upon them and could not occur without them. What is determined by the law of causality is, therefore, not merely a succession of things in time, but this succession with reference to a definite space, and not merely existence of things in a particular place, but in this place at a different point time. Change or variation which takes place according to the law of causality, implies always a determined part of space and a determined part of time together and in union. Thus causality unites space with time. The unalterable characteristics of matter which we know apriori such as impenetrability, indestructibility, mobility etc.- all imply occupation of space and persistence in time. Hence causality and with it matter are merely ideas presupposing the prior presence of the opposition between objects that are known and the subject that knows them. Schopenhauer explains this thought repeatedly in many different passages in his work.

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Impact of the Advaita Vedānta

The analysis made so far makes it clear that Schopenhauer wants to establish one of his fundamental propositions that the material world has no essence independent of the perceiving mind. This idea of Schopenhauer is supported by the contention of the Advaita Vedanta as interpreted by Sir William Jones. The opinion of Jones presumably refers to the Vedantic concept that the material world is an appearance induced by faulty perception.

"How early again this truth was recognized by the wise men of India, appearing indeed as the fundamental tenet of the Vedanta Philosophy ascribed to Vyasa, is pointed out by Sir William Jones in the last of his essays-'On the philosophy of the Asiatics', where he says: "The fundamental tenet of the Vedanta school consisted not in denying the existence of matter, that is, of solidity, impenetrability and extended figure (to deny which would be lunacy,) but in correcting the popular notion of it, and in contending that it has no essence independent of mental perception; that existence and perceptibility are convertible terms." These words adequately express the compatibility of empirical reality and transcendental ideality".

The same idea is developed by Schopenhauer in a different way when he specifically refers to the concept of maya as developed in the Advaita Vedanta in order to substantiate that the phenomenal world has only an apparent reality and that this outer world is an idea. Schopenhauer makes a candid confession that this doctrine viz., that the objective world has a merely relative existence, is quite old. It is in this connection that we find him referring to the maya concept of the Advaita Vedanta. Which he does not accept as valid.

"The substance of this doctrine is old; it appears in Heraclitus when he laments the eternal flux of things; in plato when the degrades the object to the which is ever becoming; in Spinoza as the doctrine of the mere accidents of the one Substance which is a nd endures. Kant opposes what is thus known as the mere phenomenon to the thing-in-itself. Lastly the ancient wisdom of the Indian philosophers declares-'it is Maya, the veil of deception, which blinds the eyes of mortals, and makes them behold a world of which they can not say either that it is or that it is not: for it is like a dream; it is like the sunshine on the sand which the traveller takes from after for water, or the stray piece of rope he mistakes for a snake'.

We shall now close our analysis of this part by referring to an important point of similarity between Schopenhauer and the Upaniṣads. Schopenhauer, as we have found, rejects the doctrine of maya as explained by the Advaita Vedanta and in the light of the interpretation given by William Jones recognizes the relative reality of the outer world. It is here that Schopenhauer comes very close to the Upaniṣadic thought (perhaps without his being aware of it), for in the spirit of the Upaniṣads he holds that the phenomenal world is real and not an illusion. In explaining the concept of the all comprehensive Brahman the Upaniṣads have only toughed upon and not fully developed the illusion-hypothesis (māyā vāda). On the contrary these texts, as we have explained (in section I of this work), have asserted that the world being rooted in Brahman has a share of reality, Brahman could not remain content with its absolute unity and in order to have a taste of joy (ānanda) it wanted to be many. (So'kāmyata'bahusyāṁ prajāyee'ti') It is only when there is a dualism that the

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communication of thought is made possible.

"Yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati taditara itaram jighrati taditara itaraṁ paśyati taditara itaram śṛṇoti...."

Hence The Upaniṣadic sages contend that Brahman created the world of multiplicity out of itself and manifested itself into many concrete forms on the basis of dualism. Now this Brahman is the sole reality and the world of variety including the living individuals has no independent existence apart from Brahman. Thus the phenomenal world is given a relative reality and is not annulled outright as illusory. In the same way Schopenhauer maintains that the phenomenal world is not ultimately real, for ultimate reality according to him is 'Will' and the entire world is an objective manifestation of this 'Will'. The concept of 'Will', however, is not an exact counterpart of the Upaniṣadic concept of Brahman. Nevertheless we can hardly deny that in ascribing relative existence to the outer world Schopenhauer appears to be voicing the spirit of the Upaniṣads.

Transition from the view of the world as idea to that of the world as will

After having explained the theory of the world as idea, Schopenhauer in the second book of his 'Die Welt als wille und Vorstellung' proceeds to establish his doctrine of 'Will' as objectified in nature. It is in this section that we discover how Schopenhauer's thought is 'powerfully impregnated' by the fundamental teaching of the Upaniṣads.

Schopenhauer first clearly outlines the limitations of scientific enquiries. Scientific explanations are strictly confined to the presentations ordered in space and time. This is as true of the sciences of causation (the Etiological Science) as it is of mathematical science. The province of natural science is divined by Schopenhauer, broadly into two parts viz., Morphology and Etiology.

"Etiology proper comprehends all those branches of natural science in which the chief concern is the knowledge of cause and effect. The sciences teach how, according to an invariable rule, one condition of matter is necessarily followed by a certain other condition; how one change necessarily conditions and brings about a certain other change; this sort of teaching is called 'explanation'. The principal sciences in this department are Mechanics, Physics, Chemistry and Physiology".

The first treats of the permanents forms and structures of things and the second indicates the order of the changes occuring in them according to some laws. Natural sciences can tell us absolutely nothing about the inner nature of the phenomena which they classify and the regular order of occurrences which they describe. When we consider the investigation made by mathematical science we find that it treats of animals, plants and inorganic objects as they fill space and time, that is, as they are quantities. It can not tell us what they really are.

The sciences thus can disclose nothing about the real nature of anything. So long as we are in the domain of sciences the ultimate reality beyond the world of presentation remains inaccessible. Schopenhauer says,— 'the most complete etiological explanation of the whole of nature can never be more than an enumeration of forces which can not be explained, and a reliable statement of the rule according to which phenomena appear in time and space, succeed and make way for each other. But the inner nature of the forces which thus appear, remains unexplained by such an explanation which must confine itself to

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phenomena and their arrangement, because the law which it follows does not extend further. Here Schopenhauer is found to follow Kant in holding the view that the world of human experience explained by the science and subject to the law of space, time and causality is not ultimate reality. Kant calls it a world of phenomena or appearances, and so does Schopenhauer. Kant, however, thought it impossible to say anything definite about the thing-in-itself. No categories of the understanding can, in his opinion, be applied to it, and hence a scientific knowledge of the thing-in-itself is impossible. Kant only speculated about it with the help of moral postulates and aesthetic analogies.

Schopenhauer claims to have advanced beyond Kant in discovering the real nature of the thing-in-itself. In asserting the existence of the world as 'my idea' he does not deny the reality of the world. He clearly distinguishes between (i) the world as it is in itself and (ii) the phenomenal world which is 'my perception', 'my idea' or 'my intellectual organisation'. "As a reality", as Weber and Perry clearly explain the point, "it exists independently of me, but as an object of sensibility and the understanding, or in a world as a phenomenon, it depends on the 'subject' which perceives it: it is a wholly relative thing created by the ego and the apriori conditions of thought". Hence it is palpable that although Schopenhauer follows Kant to a considerable degree, he seems to go beyond Kant when he holds that the thing-in-itself is 'Will' which he claims to have discovered through 'immediate intuition'.

It will be clear from our subsequent analysis that this 'Will' is conceived by Schopenhauer in its broadest sense so as to include not only the consciously reasoned volition, but also the unconscious inward drives, impulses and desires together with the entire conative side of nature, and then we find that we are all primarily the creatures of 'Will'. But for the genuine desire, man would never have taken the trouble of perceiving anything or thinking about anything or of acting with reference to it. Man discovers that all his thoughts and actions are virtually prompted by 'Will'. So this truth we all discover by direct intuition or introspection and not through the medium of ideas.

Regarding the 'knowledge of will' Schopenhauer makes an important observation later in connection with his remark on bodily action as an act of will objectified. He says: "The knowledge which I have of my will, though it is immediate, can not be separated from that which I have of my body. I know my will not as a whole, not as a unity, not completely according to its nature, but I know it only in its particular acts, and therefore in time, which is the form of the phenomenal aspect of my body, as of every object. Therefore the body is a condition of the knowledge of my will. Thus I can only really imagine this will apart from my body".

We can infer a similar will in other persons because of their resemblance to ours. According to Schopenhauer the fundamental essence of us in 'Will', while thought is only a derived phenomenon-an accident of 'Will'. Thought or consciousness is considered the essence of mind by the rationalistic philosophers which. Schopenhauer thinks, is an initial mistake and hence should be set aside. Consciousness, in his view, is the mere surface of our mind of which, as of the earth, we do not know the inside but only the crust. It may be a fact that sometimes under the conscious intellect there is the conscious or unconscious will, a striving,

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persistent vital force, a spontaneous activity, a will of imperious desire, or that the intellect sometimes leads the will, but only as a guide leads the master. Schopenhauer, therefore, clings to his conviction that intellect is in the service of the individual will and it is only designed to know things so far as they afford motives for will, but not to fathom them or to comprehend their true being. Will Durant explains this viewpoint of Schopenhauer when he says that 'Will' is the only permanent and unchangeable element of the mind. It is will which obviously through continuity of purpose gives unity to consciousness and holds together all its ideas and thoughts accompanying them like a continuous harmony. On the basis of empirical evidence Schopenhauer emphatically declares that what is the essence in us is also the essence of all other phenomena in nature. Just as we are award of ourselves inwardly as 'Will's, so also the entire universe considered in its essence is 'Will' which is ultimately real and the external aspect is the objectification or phenomenal mani-festation of it.

Schopenhauer repeatedly asserts in his work that this ultimate reality which is 'Will' is groundless and hence inexplicable through causation. In other words causal explanation of science can not give ultimate account of anything. To quote him: "Only the appearance, the becoming visible in this place, at this time is brought about by the cause and is so far dependent on it, but not the whole of phenomenon, nor its inner nature".

—The World as Will and Idea; Tran, by Haldane & Kemp; p—179.

Objectification of Will

Schopenhauer now proceeds to demonstrate with meticulous care and precision the process of objectification of 'Will'. He holds that the starting point for the metaphysical knowledge we seek it given to us in our own body. The animal body is the immediate object of the subject. We perceive our own bodies as ideas among all other ideas, as objects among objects, subject to the same scientific laws as other objects; but at the same time we experience our inward wills. Whittaker rightly explains the point when he says: "In virtue of his own body the investigator is not a pure knowing subject standing apart from that which he knows. In the case of the particular system of presentations constituting his organism he knows what these presentation signify, and that is his 'will' in a certain modification". "This 'will' alone gives him the key to his own existence, reveals to him the significance, shows him the inner mechanism of his being, of his action, of his movement".

In fact the subject appears as individual through its identity with the body, and this body is given in two different ways. On the one side it is given as an object among objects and subjected to their laws, on the other side as the 'will' immediately known to every one. The act of will and the movement of the body are not two different states related as cause and effect. They are one and the same act given in different matters: the will immediately to the subject the movement in sensible intuition for the understanding.

Hence the action of the body is nothing but the act of the will objectified, i.e., passed into perception. Schopenhauer believes that this is true not only of those bodily actions that follow upon motives, but also of those involuntary movements which follow upon mere stimuli. Hence he holds that the whole body is nothing but objectified will i.e., will become idea. To quote Schopenhauer: "In a certain sense we may also say that "will' is the

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knowledge apriori of the body, and the body is the knowledge aposteriori of the will. It is only in reflection that to will and to act are different; in reality they are one. Every true, genuine, immediate act of will is also, at once and immediately, a visible act of body.

In the first book of "The World as Will and Idea", Schopenhauer is driven to the conclusion that the human body like all objects of this world of perception, is merely an idea of the subject who knows it. But in the second book when he enquires into the essence of the objects, he finds that our body, apart from being an idea, appears in consciousness in quite a different way and this is denoted by the world 'Will'. In other words, as we have seen, our body is the product and instrument of will. Now this double knowledge of the nature and activity of our own body furnishes the clue on the basis of which, as Schopenhauer says, we can enquire into the essential nature of every other phenomenon in the external world. We find thus that any object which is an idea in one respect, is also like our bodies, in its inner nature, the 'will'.

Schopenhauer is aware of the fact that if a person could regard all the things and beings i.e., other persons, animals, plants and inorganic objects simply as ideas with no other basis of their existence except his own consciousness, it would them lead to Solipcism or 'theoretical egoism' as he puts it. He believes that although such a view can not be demonstrably refuted, it can not stand as a 'serious conviction' except in a mad house. Hence this view needs a cure rather than a refutation, and this cure is found in discovering the will as objectified in the material world. In analysing the reality of the body and its action we go beyond the fact that it is a mere idea and we find nothing in it expect the 'will' and with this its reality is exhausted.

In the same way the material world besides being 'idea' of the knowing subject is also in its inmost nature the 'will'. What is naturally true of ourselves can be reasonably inferred to be true of everything else in nature. A man thus recognizes the 'Will' as the ultimate reality or the inmost nature not only in those phenomenal existences which thoroughly resemble his own, in men and animal, but reflection leads him also to recognize the same inward force germinating and vegetating in plants, a force through which crystals are formed, that by which magnet turns to the north pole, the force that acts so powerfully throughout matter appearing, for example, in repulsion and attraction, decomposition and combination and even gravitation. All these are different in their phenomenal existence, but in their inmost nature identical with what we know in ourselves as will. 'Will' thus is the inner nature or the kernel of every particular thing existing in every blind force of nature and also in the preconceived action of man. The different between these two is only in the degree of manifestation, not in the nature of what manifests itself.

Now in order to substantiate the view that the entire universe considered in its essence, is the 'Will' that objectifies itself, we have to demonstrate in some detail Schopenhauer's concept of 'Will' as the ultimate reality in plants, animal;s and even in inorganic nature. The will, whether assisted by conscious intellect or not, act in us uninterruptedly and indefatigably. It acts in the body not only during its formation, but exists prior to the body. The will forms and organises the body according to its needs. The will in the embryo transforms a part of the cerebral substance into a retina 'in order to' receive optical phenomena. The mucous membrane of the thoracic canal is transformed

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into lungs, because the body 'wills' to assimilate the oxygen of the atmosphere. The capillary system produces genital organs, because the individual in process of formation 'will' to propagate the species.

When the organisation of animals is taken into consideration, it appears at the first blush that their habits and practices and their mode of life depend on their organisation. Ordinarily it is supposed that the birds fly because they have wings or that the oxen but because they have horns. But on keen and intelligent observation just the contrary is found. There are animals who are found to manifest the will to use the organs which they do not yet possess. The goats or oxen, for instance, butt before they have horns; the wild boars attack with the part of their snout where tusks are going to be. Hence, as Weber and Perry very aptly remark,—'the will is the principle of organisation, the centre of creative evolution'.

In fact instances can be multiplied to illustrate the point. Wild beasts, for example especially the eagles and condors) that 'desire' to tear their prey to pieces, to live on plunder and on blood, have teeth and huge claws, strong muscles, piercing eyes. There are creatures viz., stage, roe bucks and gazzelles who do not usually 'desire' to fight, but instinctively 'seek' safety in flight and develop instead of organs of defense, a fine sense of hearing, slender and agile legs. The birds of the moor (storks and pelicans) who 'desire' to feed on reptiles have particularly well-developed legs, neck and beck; owls 'desire' to see in the dark and so have enormous pupils, soft silken down in order not to awaken the animal 'desired' for prey. The porcupine, the hedgehog and the tortoise cover themselves with a shell because they do not 'desire' to flee. The cuttlefish conceals itself in a brownish liquid; the ai, in order to hide from its enemies, assumes the appearance of a tree trunk covered with moss. As a rule, particularly in the desert, the animal assumes the colour which least distinguishes it from the surroundings in which it lives, because it 'desires' to escape the pursuit of the hunter. In all these cases the 'will' or more correctly the 'will to be' i.e., the 'will to exist' is the principal guiding factor. Where none of these means suffices the will provides itself with a still more efficient safeguard viz. 'intelligence' which in man supersedes all the others. This intellect is said to be very much powerful a weapon in so far as it can conceal the will under false appearances, while in the case of animals the intent is always manifest and is always of a definite character.

In the vegetable kingdom the same picture is found, for here also the 'will to live' plays the same role, although it is not always easily discernible. Here also everything is 'striving', desire', 'unconscious appetition'. The tree top 'desiring' light invariably tends to assume a vertical position unless it finds it (light) else where, The seed planted in the ground will invariably push its steam upward, its root down-ward, in whatever position it may be placed. The toads-tool performs real feat s of strength and wonderful acts of will, breaking through walls, splitting stones, in order to reach the light. Potatoes growing in a cellar infallibly turn their sprouts to the light. Hence in all these cases, as in the animal kingdom, everything is reduced to that 'elementary will' not connected with an intellect i.e., irritability. There is no essential difference between irritability and the faculty of being determined by motives, for the motive regularly produces an irritation which sets the will in motion. The plants turn to the sun by irritation and the animals also do the same. But the only difference between a plant and an

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animal is that the latter is endowed with intelligence and knows what effect the sun produces on the body. It is only in the case of men and in the minerals,— at the summit and at the base of creation, that the character seems to be full of mysteries and it becomes, therefore, difficult to recognize the 'will' in these two extremes of creation. Every animal or every vegetable has its fixed character and normally it is possible for us to tell in advance what to expect of it. The behaviour of a dog (that it will be faithful) or of a fox (that it will be cunning) or that of a cactus (that it will 'desire' dry surroundings) or that of a plant (that it will bud or bloom at a particular time) can be fairly predicted. With men and minerals the case is not exactly the same, since it requires a prolonged experience to say anything definite about them. Nevertheless, we find in men clearly marked tendencies, inclinations or propensities, while the mineral kingdom also has its constant tendencies. What Schopenhauer wants to simply by all these instances is that 'will' lies at the basis of all things. It is a perpetual desire to be, the never-ending source of the phenomenal world. As long as there is a 'will' there will be a universe. Individuals may come and go (because they are subject to birth and death, growth and decay), but the 'will'— the desire which produces them is eternal. Birth, decay and death do not apply to the 'will', but only to its manifestations.

Relation between Will and its phenomenal manifestations

The manifestation of 'Will' as explained above points to the fact that Will as thing-in-itself is quite different from its phenomenal appearances. Space and time are the principle of individuation (principism individuationis) in so far as it is through them that the 'Will' differentiates itself into diverse objects in different places and at different times, all of which are none the less interconnected according to the law of causation. Every individual thing or person is determined through and through in all its activities, although the causal determination of inorganic objects differs from that of organisms due to stimuli, and of conscious intelligence due to motives. Schopenhauer says that Spinoza was right when he said that if a stone projected through the air had consciousness it would believe that it was moving of its own will. The impulse given it is for the stone what a motive is for a man. What in the stone appears as cohesion, gravitation and rigidity is in its inner nature what we know as 'Will' and what the stone, if it were conscious, would also recognize as 'Will'. Schopenhauer means to say that knowledge and consequent action from motives belong only to the determinate form that the will has in animals and men. But the reality of the stone is the same in essence as that to which we apply the name of will in ourselves. To quote Schopenhauer: "I on the other hand consider the inner being which alone imparts meaning and validity to all real necessity (i.e. effect following upon a cause) as its presupposition.

In the case of man this is called character, in the case of a stone it is called quality, but it is the same in both. When it is immediately known it is called 'will'. In the stone it has the weakest and in man the strongest degree of visibility, of objectivity." He who can have the faculty of knowing the innermost being of nature will interpret the forces of vegetation, of crystallisation, of magnetism, of chemical affinity, even of weight etc. as different only in phenomenal manifestation, but in essence the same i.e., 'Will'. Hence only the Will as thing-in-itself is wholly different from presentation and is that of which presentation is a phenomenon, the

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visibility, the objectivity. Differences, there-fore, affect only the degree of appearing, not the essence of that which appears.

It appears from our foregoing analysis that 'Will' as the thing-in-itself which is outside of space and time through which it individuates itself into different objects, is one and indivisible. It does not, in other words, admit of plurality, since plurality indicates subjection to space and time. In the words of Schopenhauer- "It (Will) is free from all multiplicity, although its manifestations in time and space are innumerable. It is itself one, though not in the sense in which an object is one, for the unity of an object can only be known in opposition to a possible multiplicity: nor yet in the sense in which a concept is one, for the unity of a concept originates only in abstraction from multiplicity; but it is one as that which lies outside time and space the principium individuationis i.e. the possibility of multiplicity."

Schopenhauer is careful to add that it would be wholly untrue to say that in some way or other there is a smaller part of the Will in the stone and a larger part in man for the relation of part and whole belongs only to space and does not apply to the Will as things in-itself. The Will manifests itself as completely in one oak as in million oaks. Hence the multiplicity of individuals does not belong to the Will itself, but only to its manifestations. The Will as such exists whole and undivided in every single thing in nature just as the subject of contemplation exists whole and undivided in each cognitive being. Further the individual or the person, as is perhaps evident in the world of existence is not Will as a thing-in-itself, but is only a phenomenon of Will and as such determined, while the 'Will' is free in so far as there in nothing beyond itself to determine it. Then again Will is in itself mere activity without end, a blind striving. Knowledge appears only as the accompaniment of its ascending stages. It follows, therefore, that primarily and prior to individuation the Will is single, unitary and free. Separate individuals are secondary, derivative and determined. In the 'World-will' we are all really identical with one another and with the whole of nature.

Grades of objection of Will

A question is sometimes raised: how do we pass from the universal to that which has a particular character or quality? Of the Will as thing-in-itself, as we have seen, there is not a greater portion of it in a man and less in a stone. The relation of part and whole belongs exclusively to space. The more or less of anything, as already said, touches only the phenomena i.e. the visibility, the objectification. A higher degree of it is in the plant than in the stone, in the animal than in the plant and so forth. But the 'Will' that is the essence of all is untouched by the degree, since it is beyond plurality, space and time and the relation of cause and effect.

Hence the question just raised is sought to be answered by Schopenhauer with reference to his interpretation of Platonic 'Ideas'. The Will as thing-in-itself first affirms the 'Ideas' before revealing itself into a multitude of perceptible objects and individual things and events in space and time (which are all 'ideas' or 'representations' — translated from 'Vorstellungen'). Ideas' for Plato are eternal forms related to particular things as models. Following Plato Schopenhauer believes that 'Ideas' or universals include all genera and species, class-concepts, universal qualities and principles. These 'Ideas' are unending, spaceless, timeless, causeless, unchanging laws of nature. All phenomenal objects are copies of them or

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participate in them in some way. Individual men are merely instances of species 'man'. They are born and die and undergo changes, while the species 'man' is enduring. In the same way there is a contrast between all enduring 'Ideas' and the changing particular 'ideas' of the objective world. The universal 'Will' thus has different grades of objectification which are called 'Ideas'. It is through space and time that the Will multiplies the 'Ideas' in innumerable instances as phenomena determined by the law of causality.

The lowest grade of objectification of Will is represented by the forces of inorganic nature. This grade is partly found in those universal forces of nature appearing in all matter e.g.. gravity, impenetrability and partly in those appearing only in different species of matter like rigidity, fluidity, elasticity, electricity, magnetism, chemical properties etc. The higher grades of objectification of Will as 'Ideas' are represented by the different species of plants, animals and men. Any particular plant, animal or man is a specimen or an individuation of the species at a particular plant, animal or man is a specimen or an individuation of the species at a particular time and place in accordance with the principle of sufficient reason. Schopenhauer thus reaches the conclusion that the whole world with all its phenomena is the objectivity of one and indivisible 'Will' or 'Will-to-be'.

Schopenhauer and Buddhism on will to live

Now this concept of 'will to be' or 'will to live', as developed by Schopenhauer, closely resembles the Buddhistic view of 'Taṇhā' (tṛṣṇā). Hence it seems to be relevant for us to pause and consider the Buddhistic view of Taṇhā that constitutes an important stage in their wheel of causation (dvādaśnidāna). Schopenhauer does not accept the doctrine of momentariness on which the structure of Buddhism is built, but he subscribes to their view of causation as explained in their theory of dependent origination (Pratītya samutpāda vāda).

Buddha (like Schopenhauer) simply accepts the facts of experience and rules out the possibility of any ultimate cause whence this world of multiplicity may be derived. Adopting the empirical method Buddha holds, there is no 'being' but only 'becoming'. The supreme reality for him is the law of change and that is causality. On this point, it may be noted, Buddhism widely differs from the Upaniṣads.

Dr. Radhakrishnan makes this point clear. He says: "The Upaniṣads do not posit a mere being exclusive of becoming. They do not regard the world of becoming as an unrelated procession of states. It may be appearance, but yet it is the appearance of reality. The Upaniṣads exclude the idea of absolute change by calling attention to the fact that there is a permanent underlying the flux.

Buddha does not say that all change involves a permanent that changes, nor does he say that change alone is permanent as some of his followers interpret him. He is indifferent to the "being" of things and finds the reality relevant to our practical interests in growth".

We shall now consider the import of the doctrine of Pratitya samutpada that accounts for the coming into being of life which is suffering as well as its cessation. The term 'Pratītya-samutpāda' or dependent origination implies that every point instant of reality arises in dependence upon a combination of point instants to which it necessarily succeeds, it arises in functional dependence upon a

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totality of causes and conditions which are its immediate antecedents. The formula in which the theory or causation is expressed, is-this being, that appears' (Asmin sati, idam bhavati). There is no real production, but only interdependence. In opposition to the realistic and materialistic theories the Buddhists declare that things arise not from one's own self, nor from another self, nor haphazardly. They arise in functional dependence upon other causes. There is no causation in the sense of one eternal stuff changing its forms in the process of evolution, because the conception of an eternal stuff, for the Buddhists, is a misnomer. Nor should causation be understood to mean the sudden bursting of one substance into another. The realistic idea of causation implying the simultaneous existence of the cause and effect-one producing the other is also ruled out by the Buddhists, for according to them cause can exist no more when the effect is produced. The effect only follows upon the cause and is not produced by it when it is said that a cause 'produces' an effect; it is only an inadequate conventional expression (Saṁketa), a metaphor (Upalakṣaṇam).

Hence the Buddhists contend that the result arises in functional dependence upon this or that thing (tat tadāśritya utpadyate). The effect thus springs up immediately after the existence of the cause and there is no interval providing the cause any scope for 'work' or 'operation'. The mere existence of the cause constitutes its work. In other words, efficiency in synonymous with existence (artha kriyākāritva lakṣaṇaṁ sat). When the question is raised: 'What then is meant by operation of a cause producing the effect?' —or what exactly is the 'dependence' of the effect upon its cause?— the answer is, in the words of Stcherbatsky, 'we call dependence of the effect upon its cause the fact that it always follows upon the presence of that cause, and we call 'operation' of the cause the fact that the cause always precedes its effect'.

To follow the import of the doctrine of 'pratitya Samutpada,' as Buddha himself said' is to realize 'dhamma', for it is upon this fundamental principle that the other teachings of Buddha rest. The doctrine is explained by the Buddhists with the help of twelve successive causes or 'nidanas' each of which conditions the next. This series of these terms or nidanas expresses an interrelation among them and explains that the past present and future of an individual are closely interlinked. Further, this chain of causes and effects also brings out the idealistic character of the outer reality. In order, therefore, to follow the full implication of the contention that out life and all its sufferings originate from 'desire' or 'will' we have to consider the idealistic explanation of reality as adduced by the Buddhists.

According to the early Buddhists nothing exists independent of human mind. The world of multiplicity which is normally supposed to be outside the knowing mind is, in fact, flow of different mental states and processes. The five causal states or nidāṇas with the help of which the Buddhists try to explain their position are vijnāna, saḍāyatan, sparśa, vedanā and nāmarūpa. By vijnāna is meant the ego-sense that acts as a knower and is set apart from the outer world. In order to know the object certain auxiliary factors are necessary and Saḍāyatan (six sense organs) operate as auxiliary factors. Apart from five sense organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch there is mind which is considered to be the internal sense organ. Now for the awareness of the object there must be a

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'contact' between these sense organs and the object.

This is indicated by Sparśa, and this again gives rise to sense-feeling or 'Vedanā'. Thus the contact between the knowing subject and the known object results in the awareness of the flow or reality (viśvapravāha) and this is indicated by the term 'nāmarūpa'. 'Nāma' comprises four states viz., (i) vedanā signifying sense-feeling (ii) samjnā meaning perceptual knowledge facilitated by the sense feeling, (iii) saṁskāra-meaning a sort of tendency to work and (iv) vijnāna-meaning intellect that helps one know the object.

Rūpa means that which has a sensible form, and all sense-objects with their embodies form fall within this category (Rūpyati iti rūpaḥ). Thus it becomes understandable why 'nāmarūpa' is considered a continuous flow of conscious states and processes. What is ordinarily regarded as the outer world on the basis of a knower-known relation is in Buddha's view, virtually a continuity of a series of mental states, and this series of everchanging mental states is constituted by the aforesaid four mental states which again operate as a result of contact of two factors viz, conscious intellect or knower on one hand and the sense-object (rūpa) on the other. Hence 'nāmarūpa' virtually stands for this world of reality meaning, as we see, a continuous flow of everchanging conscious states (cetanāpravāha). Now from this flow of conscious states generate the 'will to live.'

This 'will to live', according to the Buddhists, is the ground of our existence and its negation is salvation. Schopenhauer holds that our greatest sin is to have been born in this world. The inkling of this idea is found in the causal chain of the early Buddhists. Avidyā or ignorance that constitutes the first factor is the series consists in accepting the unreal as real and this produces a 'tenacious clinging' to life and prompts one to live and enjoy the world. Ignorance also generates egoism which leads an individual to consider himself separate from the rest of existence, and thus the false desire in him is all the more accentuated.

In fact ignorance and false desire are the theoretical and practical sides of one and the same fact. "The empty abstract from of false will is ignorance and the concrete realization of ingnorance is false will". Excepting ignorance or avidya and jarāmaraṇa or old age and death-which appear respectively as the first and the last factor in the chain of causes, the other ten nidānas are regarded as ten 'Karmas' or acts guiding or determining our existence. The second link in the chain which is known as Saṁskāra (Predisposition or tendency) actually indicates good or bad action deserving reward or punishment here or here after in wider sense of the term, as Radhakrishnan interprets, it means the 'will force' or 'spirit energy' which determines the new existence. This train of thought is again forcefully presented in 'Taṇhā' that constitutes an important phase in the causal nexus. Taṇhā hterally means thirst or longing.

It is an earnest longing for life-a potent cause of life together with all its sufferings. Our existence is due to our thirst for being. We also suffer because of our thirst for pleasures. In the series of causes the early Buddhists try to show how our strong and insatiable thirst results in sufferings and sorrows of all sorts and thus leads us from birth to birth. Thus so long as man is possessed by the 'thirst for life' (that corresponds to Schopenhauer's 'will to live', he is bound to be tossed about in the dark unfathomable depths of Saṁsāra.

From our foregoing analysis it becomes clear that Schopenhauer comes very near to Buddhism on some important points.

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He accedes to the general outline of the idealistic explanation given by the buddhists. His concept of all-pervasive 'Will' corresponds to the Buddhistic view of tanha which is the ground of all existence. The pessimistic tinge, of Buddhism is also found in him. Finally, just as the Buddhism prescribe the way to nirvana by arresting the transitive character of causation, so also Schopenhauer has indicated the way of escape from sufferings ultimately through the total denial of the will, which, however, need not be dilated upon in the present context.

The question of supreme reality has been taken up with all earnestness by almost all the philosophers since the ancient times down to the present day. This reality which the Eleatics call the 'One and the All', Spinoza calls 'Substance', Schelling the 'Absolute' or the 'World Soul', Schopenhauer calls 'Will'. The systems of Schelling and Spinoza have already been dealt with. We shall, therefore, touch upon the Eleatic philosophy here to see how far, if at all, Schopenhauer subscribes to the view of the Eleatics.

The Eleatics and Schopenhauer

Of the four exponents of Eleaticism. Permenides was the chief and real protagonist of this school, although he seized upon the germs of thought latent in Xenophanes who is admittedly the founder of the school. With his reformative zeal Xenophanes was chiefly preoccupied with propagating his religious views rather than any philosophical doctrine. His principal aim was the moral development and amelioration of the common people. Having trounced the degrading conception of Gods and Goddesses of the early Greeks he introduced a monistic tendency of thought by declaring that God is one and non dual, is 'all-eye, all-ear, all-thought'. God is supposed by him to control the world not from outside as an external being, but He is one eternal and all-pervading.

As a matter of fact the world according to Xenophanes is God, a sentient being though without the sense-organs. His system, properly speaking, has a pantheistic rather than a monotheistic colouring. But to the question-how the multiplicity came into existence from his conception of world-god. Xenophanes could not give any satisfactory reply. Thus the relation between the one i.e., God and the many, between the eternal and the non-eternal is left unexplained in the system of Xenophanes. This problem is only set on foot by the Eleatics for the first time in the history of European thought.

The essence of the philosophical system of Permenides in found in the first part ('the way of truth) of his philosophic didactic poem captioned—'On Nature', the other part being 'the way of opinion'. The first part comprises the discussion on the concept of 'Pure Being' which, according to Permenides, is absolutely real. Its opposite is 'non-being' or 'becoming' which is equated with the sensible world undergoing changes. This non-being is supposed to be illusory, for reality is only ascribed to 'Being'. The character of this 'Being' is described for the most part in a series of negatives.

"There is in it no change, it is a absolutely unbecome and imperishable. It has neither beginning nor end, neither arising, nor passing away.

There is for it no past, no present and no future. It is undivided and indivisible.... It is unmoved and undisturbed, for motion and disturbance are forms of becoming all becoming is excluded from Being.........of positive character Being has nothing..... Its only quality is so to speak 'isness' —W.T. Stace: —A Critical History of Greek Philosophy. P—44.45.

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In Permenides the distinction between 'sense' and reason is distinctly pronounced. The world of multiplicity, of change, presented to the senses is, to him, an illusion. The 'Being' which is the only truth is discoverable by reason. Now this Being, as it appears, has been identified with God. But one of the observations made my Permenides viz., that 'Being' is spherical or globe-shaped and that it occupies space, led some critics to give a materialistic interpretation of the system of Permenides. Without entering into the controversy as to whether Permenides is a materialist or an idealist, it is enough for us to take note of the fact that his concept of Being gives adequate evidence of his monistic trend of though, which annuls the world of sense as illusion. The view of Permenides is buttressed up by Milesus who, however, differs from the former on one point. Milesus believes that 'Being' is not globe-shaped or finite, but it extends illimitably through space. As for Zeno, he accepts the principal current of thought initiated by Permenides and goes on demonstrating vigorously the falsity of the idea of multiplicity and motion. His arguments, however, seem to be 'childish puzzles' and not at all convincing.

Schopenhauer no doubt accepts the 'monistic principle' of the Eleatics, but he differs from them at the same time on certain fundamental points. He does not agree with them in holding that this 'one and all' or 'Being' is God. The concept of 'Being' so laboriously developed leads the the Eleatics, as many critics hold to a sort of dualism. As a matter of fact to call the world of plurality an illusion is not certainly to explain it. To the question—how this illusion arises, there is no convincing answer. They are thus faced with two worlds, viz. the true world of becoming, laying side by side without any link to show how the one arises from the other. The reason for this dualism seems to be due primarily to the utter barrenness of the first principle.

The concept of Being is a featureless, characterless concept, completely empty and abstract. If multiplicity is excluded upto the hilt, the concept of Being naturally becomes barren and abstract. This conception of abstract monism is undoubtedly alien to Schopenhauer, for he does not regard the world of multiplicity as illusory. He, as we have already seen, recognizes the relative reality of the outer world. He conceives 'will' as the essence of the world of multiplicity. The objective manifestation of the 'Universal Will' in space and time points to the unitary essence of all things. Hence all that we can say is that Schopenhauer accepts the monistic trend of thought of the Eleatics only as a principle. But in the actual formulation of this principle Schopenhauer and the Eleatics are poles asunder.

Schopenhauers voluntarism as contrasted with certain other voluntaristic theories of the West.

Schopenhauer's concepts of the all-pervading 'Universal Will' makes his theory of idealism demonstrably voluntaristic which, however, leads him to pessimism. In the history of western thought we come across some philosophers-not in all cases idealists, who are found to put emphasis more upon 'will' than upon 'intellect' and so are voluntarists. It is necessary for us to consider in brief a few such systems, for this will help us know that voluntarism does not necessarily lead to pessimism. We shall start our review with the system of the famous German thinker Leibnitz (1616. 1716).

The dualism of extended or unconscious and inextended or conscious substance as developed in the Cartesian school is opposed by Leibnitz. According

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to him if matter is nothing but extension, as Descartes thought, we shall be unable to explain 'attraction,' 'repulsion' and many other sensible phenomena. In the same way, if mind is conceived to be nothing but conscious thought, many minute perceptions of which we are not conscious, particularly those in a state of profound dreamless sleep or in a swoon, will remain inexplicable. Hence Leibnitz proceeds to develop the notion of 'force' as the ultimate reality. Extension, for him, presupposes an effort or force that extends itself a power both of resistance and expansion. Matter is essentially resistance which again involves activity. So the essence of corporeality is not extension, but the force of extension or active force. True metaphysics does not recognize the inert lifeless matter as enunciated by the Cartesian Physics.

A substance that does not act or that which is not the expression of force is inconceivable. Only what is active is real and there is action every where. Now this force in itself is essentially inextended and imperceptible and hence immaterial. Only the effects of force are perceptible. Since force constitutes the essence of matter, it may sound paradoxical to say that matter is in reality immaterial in essence. But it is with this paradox that Leibnitz overcomes the dualism of the physical and the mental worlds. Being inextended force is indivisible, simpie and original. As against Spinoza's on substance, Leibnitz speaks of many substance, for according to him there are as many simple, indivisible and original forces as there are things. Now these original forces he calls 'monads' which are properly speaking metaphysical points differing from physical points in that they have no extension, and from mathematical points in that they are objective realities. Again they are said to be real like physical points and exact like mathematical points. These monads have been declared by Leibnitz to be 'windowless' so that each monadic unit constitutes a separate, self-sufficient and independent world of its own. But when the question is raised: What becomes of the universe and its unity?

Leibnitz, we think, can not advance any convincing reply. Nevertheless, he finds the synthetic principle in the analogy of monads and in his notion of 'pre-established harmony'. He is of opinion that though each monad differs from all others there is a sort of family resem-blance among them is so far as they are all endowed with perception and 'desire' or 'appetition'. This desire or appetition closely resembles Schopenhauer's 'will'. All monads whatever stage they may belong to, are 'forces', 'entelechies' and 'souls'. Leibnitz thus gives a spiritualistic tint to his pluralistic theory of monads by holding that souls alone exist, for the so called extension is only a confused perception, sensible manifestation of immaterial force.

In other words, everything swarms with life. When the question is raised-viz., how can a stone or a plant or any being inferior to man think?-Leibnitz opines that the perceptions of lower beings of those of the so-called inanimate objects are infinitely minute and confused, while those of men are clear and conscious. What is true of our soul is true in a measure of all monads. All monads are thus spiritual or psychic forces. There is in them something analogous both to our sensations and to our conations or tendencies to action. These perceptions or tendencies only differ in degree of clearness and distinctness. In the lowest monads everything is confused resembling sleep. Such dormant life fs found in plant. In animals there is consciousness which is called perception together with memory: in man consciousness becomes

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still clearer which is called 'apperception' this being a reflexive awareness of the inner state.

With these fundamental tenets Leibnitz proceeds to show that there is a law of continuity by virtue of which the monads form a graduated progressive series from the lowest to the highest, from the dullest piece of inorganic matter to God.. God according to him, is the highest and perfect monad, pure activity, the monad of monads. The principle of continuity demands the existence of a supreme monad. His theory of supreme monad, however, is not at all warranted by the definition of monad he has given earlier. But he wants to demonstrate that the harmony governing the universe is a harmony pre-established by God. In fact Leibnitz tries to gloss over the inconsistency involved in such a notion.

He only tries to establish that all monads are nonetheless created by God and hence they are neither absolutely primitive and eternal, nor absolute, but they depend on a divinity the primitive unity or the original simple substance of which all monads, created or derived are the products and are born so to speak, from moment to moment, by continual fulgurations of the Divinity. This observation is not, strictly speaking, pantheistic (although it comes very close to it., for God here is conceived as a real God distinct from the universe. Leibnitz's theological position on the whole bears greater resemblance to theism than pantheism. In his theological essays he attempts to reconcile his religious views with his philosophical doctrine. Here we find that his voluntaristic idealism is connected with an optimistic world-view. God, the perfect Being as he is, does not undergo any change or development to which all other monads are subject. He created the world of monads (a view which contradicts Leibnitz's earlier contention that God and monads are co-eternal) according to a plan and chose this world as the best possible world. His choice is not groundless but determined by the principle of goodness or moral necessity. He is also determined by logical necessity, for the fundamental laws of thought are binding on Him as well as man.

Here Leibnitz has to face some questions: Why this particular world as it is presented to us was chosen by God ? Why again is this world full of so many evils and imperfections? Why are so much suffering and ennui, oppression and rancour between man and man found in this world? How can, in a word, this world of evil be accounted for? In answer Leibnitz contends that an analysis of God's nature makes us understands that there could not have been a better world than this in which we live. God is omnipotent, omniscient and kind. Had it been possible for Him to create a better world. He would have certainly done it, for by virtue of his omniscience. He could have known it.

Leibnitz acknowledges that the existence of evil apparently contradicts his viewpoint. But he observes at the same time that world free from all imperfections is inconceivable and can not be the best possible world. Referring to the inherent limitations of the finite individuals and also the impediments they have to face, Leibnitz says, there is and must be the physical evil or all pains and sufferings. But these evils, he thinks, help in reforming and training us. Moral evil or sin is never desired by God. It is the nature result of 'freedom' of action human beings enjoy. Further Leibnitz, with the help of some analogies, tries to prove that evil is a foil to goodness enhancing the beauty of the latter. Evil, to him, is only a spur that goads us to good action. Evil is nothing positive. Like the dark shadow of a picture

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or a discord in a music it helps to bring about the beauty and glory of the good. In fact each monad constantly aspires after something better and has within it an inherent appetition to be free from passivity. These arguments of Leibnitz (which are sometimes highly rhetorical) in explaining evil may not always stand to reason. But he is firmly of opinion that evil is only an imperfection and it exists finally for an all round welfare of all. Thus viewed, his system appears as an optimistic system of voluntaristic idealism.

J.G. Fichte (1762-1814):—Almost a similar view point is traceable in the idealistic system of Fichte according to whom the fundamental reality is 'Ego'. Although he is influenced by Kant, he is found to have made certain modification of Kantian theory. According to Kant the materials of knowledge i.e. unorganised sensations or intuitions are given to the mind and organised by the categories of the understanding. Fichte thinks that there can be no 'given' to the Ego; rather everything including time, space, substance and all the Kantian categories are produced by the activity of the Ego. According to him it is unnecessary to assume the thing-in-itself with the exception of the Ego.

We are aware of our own selves in our experience and it in sufficient to posit a larger or universal Ego outside of experience which is said to be the source not only of the forms of our minds by which the sensation are organised into the objects of experience, but also of the sensations themselves. Now this Ego which is always present as the presupposition of all experience, is not any individual ego, mine or yours, but it is the larger Ego which has posited separate individuals and set up in opposition to individual wills an external world of which we become aware through our sensations. This Ego is Common Mind or Will whose nature consists in pure action. In Fichte's system the metaphysical principle and the ethical principle are identified. The 'real reality', according to him, is described in different terms viz, 'Good', 'Active Reason', 'Pure Will' 'Moral Ego' etc. The ultimate principle from which we come and towards which we strive is not 'being' but 'duty' ; it is an ideal which is not, but which ought to be. What Fichte means is that 'Being' as such has no value. The universe is to be understood as the manifestation of 'Pure will'-the symbol of the moral 'Idea' which is the real thing-in-itself, the real Absolute.

This Absolute or God as he calls it, objectifies itself in the phenomenal world which exists only for moral purposes in order that the individuals here can find the scope for performing their duties and realizing their vocations. Referring to the 'Primacy of practical reason' Fichte tries to show how the dualism between the theoretical and the practical reason is overcome. The faculty of understanding or the theoretical reason which divides the ego into subject and object is the auxiliary of practical reason, the organ of will or the servant of freedom. In other words, understanding simply becomes a phase in the development of freedom. Knowledge is only a means, a secondary thing, and action is the principal and final goal of being. The non-ego or the phenomenal world of senses and temptations stands as an obstacle which the ego sets itself in order to overcome it and thus to realize its essence i.e., freedom.

From these basic features of Fichte's system (the detailed account of which being redundant for our purpose), it appears that his is a voluntaristic theory very much akin to Schopenhauer's. But the fundamental difference between them is that while Schopenhauer is pessimistic Fichte is optimistic in his outlook. He is

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alive to the fact that the absolute autonomy of reason which the ego pursue as an ideal, is never fully attained. But this conflict between the empirical and the ideal reality proves that the individuals are destined for an immortal lot and it is the source of their progress also. That which we call evil is the result of misuse of freedom and it is our bounden duty imposed on us by the Supreme Will to mitigate this evil. Hence all that exists in the world is meant for the well-being of mankind.

William James (1842-1910) & Henry Bergson (1859-1041):— It is necessary to mention in this connection that even after the departure of Schopenhauer from the history of philosophy there appeared some thinkers (not idealists) whose systems are found to have enunciated voluntarism without leading to any pessimistic conclusion. Their views indicate a sort of meliorism seeking a compromise between optimism and pessimism. William James of America and Henry Bergson of France may be referred to as two chief exponents of such voluntarism. Both W. James and Bergson agree in holding the view that the world is fully of so many evils and grisly phenomena that the verdict of the idealists like Leibnitz and Fichte does not seem to be readily acceptable. But they contend at the same time that we need not throw up the sponge and succumb ultimately to the hapless and gruesome goal which is supposed by Schopenhauer to be in store for us.

Both W. James and H. Bergson oppose materialism and mechanism in so far as both of them find the centre of reality in the field of life and mind. Both again oppose traditional spiritualism in that they interpret life and mind in terms of their observed or felt existence. The difference between them, however, is that for Bergson, these common terms retain a stronger favour of life; while for James they retain a stronger favour of mind. For Bergson's reality the most adequate term is 'activity', for that of James it is 'experience', James's preoccupation with psychology and the influence of the British empirical school on him are chiefly the reasons of his difference from Bergson. It is no doubt a fact that James is disposed to construe consciousness after the manner of the British empirical tradition as a manifold of distinguishable states traceable to sense experience, he nevertheless insists upon its activity and unity. The activity of consciousness, for him, is selective, interested and teleological. Thus mind, for him, is not just a mirror reflecting the environment, it is an effective agency that seeks to satisfy its desires. It chooses to which of the presented stimuli it will respond in order to fulfil its purposes. Mind is thus primarily teleological in character and not a mechanistic product of the organism. James's theory of knowledge is developed from this psychological standpoint and is dominated throughout by its two main characteristics viz, (i) its emphasis on the categories of interest and practice, and (ii) its reduction of relations, substances and other so called transcendent elements to the continuities of sense experience. The former motive leads to James's voluntarism and pragmatism, and the latter to his radical empiricism.

W. James does not conceive reality as something ready-made and complete from all eternity. It is rather in the making, unfinished and a flux. He applies pragmatism as a 'method' in ascertaining truth in all areas including philosophy. He finds pluralism pragmatically preferable to monism. Monism, he thinks, presents a block universe and robs us of our freedom of will or moral responsibility, individual efforts and aspirations. Pluralism on the

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other hand takes perceptual experiences at its face value and the concrete perceptual flux, and offers in our activity-situations perfectly comprehensible instances of free will. This view of pluralism is, according to him, quite compatible with his melioristic interpretation of the universe.

James is found to have been attracted and amazed by the endless variety of religious experience and belief. Although he does not fully agree with them all, he perceives, nevertheless, some truth in every one of them and demand an open mind toward every new hope. He holds the view that in upholding polytheism the ancient thinkers appear to be wiser, for it may be truer than monotheism to the astonishing variety of the world. Such polytheism, he says, 'has always been the real religion of common people and is so still to day'. These observations have led the critics to declare that James is somewhat indefinite about his conception of God. We can not, however, doubt his firm faith in God and his idea of Him which is in keeping with his melioristic world view. He speaks of God as a part of the universe, a sympathetic and powerful (though not all-powerful) helper, a conscious personal and moral being as we all are, with whom we come into communion as certain experience show.

God is not, according to him, the guarantor of goodness of the world, but a powerful ally in our efforts to combat the evil. This conception of God naturally harmonizes with James's meliorism. In his 'Varieties of Religious Experience' James is found to stick to the view that the practical needs of religion require a God to exist in a realistic sense, independent of us, yet friendly to us and our ideals. In his later essay 'The will to believe' he affirms our 'right to believe' in God even without absolute proof, because by accepting God we can gain enrichment in our lives and inspiration to effective conduct which otherwise we should lack.

To return to Henry Bergson again, we find that his dualistically tinged metaphysics agrees with William James on certain fundamental points, but it asserts that the correct approach to reality which is ceaseless changing, is not to be gained through reflective thinking, but through intuition. In his dissertation 'Time and free will' Bergson maintains that reality is 'Duration' i.e., a continuity in time, not broken up into parts by which our intellect tries to interpret it when it measures intervals of time in terms of space, and that our life in a space-less time is in a sense free and undetermined. In his principal work 'Creative Evolution' he speaks of duration as a continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances.

Now this 'duration' is constituted of two factors,—one is matter which is inactive and existing in space, and the other is consciousness or vital force (Elan Vital') existing in all living beings and with full vigour and prominence in man. This 'Elan Vital' is free and active, and the inner urge of it to manifest itself makes the world process dynamic. Evolution, according to Bergson, is a creative process going on in time and not determined beforehand by any omnipotent and omniscient creator.

It is rather governed spontaneously by the 'Elan Vital' which ever presses onwards, overcoming the obstacles put by 'matter' in its course. This explanation, briefly speaking, gives us a convincing account of Bergson's voluntarism. But as we have indicated, his voluntarism does not lead to pessimism as is the case with Schopenhauer. The concept of 'vital impulse' is equated by Bergson, with the concept of God which is, however, different from the traditional theological concept. In 'The two Sources of Morality and Religion'

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Bergson develops this idea. Without dilating on the point it is sufficient for our purpose to note that in this treatise he gives us in clear terms a melioristic view of the universe in the spirit of William James. The second or higher source of morality and religion which he calls 'intuition' enables us to have an insight into the vial impulse or God operative in evolution, and thus it helps us develop an altruistic attitude. Bergson thus believes that the progress in human society can be furthered and all evils averted by our won efforts.

Schopenhauers pessimism

Some of the voluntaristic systems discussed above make it clear that voluntarism is not necessarily connected with pessimism. Schopenhauer does not appear to be very much inconsistent in his viewpoint. But it is equally true that his pessimism is not implied in his voluntaristic idealism. His pessimistic conclusions are based mainly on two grounds, viz., (i) his analysis of the nature of 'Will' and (ii) empirical evidence. In all grades of its objectification from the lowest inorganic forms to the highest organic forms, the Will is controlled by no aim. Striving is its sole nature which no attaining can put an end.

The confusion that sometimes arises of the will as the thing-in-itself with its manifestations is made clear by the following observation of Schopenhauer himself:—

"Every particular act of will of a knowing individual (which is itself only a manifestation of will as thing-in-itself) has necessarily a motive without which that act could never have occurred.........Hence the motive determines only the act of will of a knowing being at this time in this place and under these circumstances as a particular act, but by no means determines that that being wills in general......Therefore every man (because he has some permanent aims and motives guiding his conduct) can give account of his particular actions, but if he were asked, why he wills at all, or why in general he wills to exist, he would have no answer, and the question would indeed seem to him meaningless..........In fact freedom from all aim, from all limits belongs to the nature of the will which is endless striving". Schopenhauer; 'The World as will and Idea'-Translated by Haldane and Kemp; Book-II, P-213.

It is not, therefore, capable of any final satisfaction. This endless striving of the will-to-be, the will-to-live, the will-to-conquer, the will-to-reproduce, we see everywhere and see hindered in many ways. A particular desire arises from some want or deficiency and when it is fulfilled the pain is temporarily removed and no positive pleasure or happiness is attained.

Again every satisfaction lays the seed of some new desire. Thus there is no end to individual wishes. Why is this ? Schopenhauer's answer is that it is all due to the fact that 'Will' is the lord of all worlds-the endless source of all life. Everything is but a manifestation of this Will. Therefore no one single thing can ever give it satisfaction. This apart, when a particular desire, be it sensuous or intellectual, is satisfied, it results in a sort of boredom. When again it is not satisfied, a sense of uneasiness continues. Thus a man's life swings like a pendulum backwards and forwards between uneasiness and boredom. There is a constant transition from desire to satisfaction and from satisfaction to a new desire. So much for Schopenhauer's analysis of desire.

By way of empirical evidence Schopenhauer points out numberless instances of macabre and calamitous incidents of

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human history. History, according to him, is merely an interminable series of murders, robberies, intrigues and lies, and if you know one page of it, you know them all. The so-called human virtues viz., the love of labour, perseverance, temperance, frugality and the like are nothing but refined egoism. Human life surveyed as a whole, seems to him a tragedy. The over arching, never-satisfied wishes, the frustrated travails, the pulverized and abandoned hopes, grave errors piled up throughout life together with increasing anguish or trauma and death at the close-are always a tragedy. Optimism, for Schopenhauer, is not merely absurd, it is rather a cruel mockery to speak of optimism in the face of the unspeakable miseries of mankind.

The rejection of optimism by Schopenhauer and his adherence to a pessimistic world-view do not stand the test of logical scrutiny. There are critics who do not accept his analysis. Wright, for example, observes and rightly:— "The pessimism in Schopenhauer may be claimed to be based on a false analysis of desire. It simply is not true, in the opinion of most philosophers, that pleasure is purely negative, that it is merely there removal of pain. The joy in life is something positive....... Schopenhauer is right that nothing desired will permanently satisfy any body, and that whenever a person has some success he desires to make further progress.—The remedy, however, is not to cease endeavours, but ever to seek new ends which previous attainments have brought within one's horizon. Thus man advances from year to year in the life of the individual and from age to age in the history of the species".— Wright: 'A History of Modern Philosophy'. P-381.

As to the empirical evidence Schopenhauer, in our view, seems to have overlooked the brighter aspects of human life and human history and thus appears to give hyperbolic statements in explaining the import of human experience.

It must be noted in this connection that Schopenhauer's personal life was full of so many unhappy and undesirable incidents that it might have been very difficult for him to to nurse an optimistic outlook on life. Will Durant aptly remarks: "At the bottom of Schopenhauer's unhappiness was his rejection of normal life". (Vide:— W. Durant — 'Story of Philosophy; P-378). In fact his was not a perfectly normal life. He spent almost all his life in a boarding house as a bachelor. He could not develop a happy relation with his mother whom he deserted for more than one reason during the last twenty four years of her life. Further, Schopenhauer could not control his strong sensual impulses which drove him into a series of irregular amours of which he was ashamed. He is said to have become greatly relieved when old age delivered him from the temptations of the flesh. (Vide :- Wright: 'A history of modern philosophy', P-359). Again when he was at the university of Berlin his lectures were little attended, while Hegel in the same period was at the zenith of glory. This made his disgruntled. It is alleged that he was sickened at the sight of the sufferings of the poor in central Europe during the economic depression subsequent to the Napoleonic wars. All these factors were largely responsible for his having resorted to pessimism.

We are, in his opinion, like shipwrecked mariners who struggle and struggle with their backs to the wall save their wearied bodies from the terrible waves only to be engulfed at last. To him 'world' and 'evil' become almost synonymous terms.

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Way of escape sought

Now a few words may be added on Schopenhauer's suggestions regarding the way of escape from the world of perpetual sufferings. In the third book of the 'World as Will and Idea' Schopenhauer develops his views on a esthetics. Here he contends that man can, in his brief aesthetic experiences, (i.e. in the contemplation of the beautiful and the sublime in nature and art) forget his individual self and his desires and thus by abolishing his subordination to the 'will' he can fix his mind directly on the timeless platonic 'Ideas'. Schopenhauer is aware that the relief sought here from the gnawing pains of self-conscious individual desires is purely temporary. Hence he proceeds to elaborate his views on ethics and religion in the fourth book of the 'World as Will and Idea' and also in t he 'Basis of Morality'.

He holds here first that greater relief than what is obtained in aesthetic experience, is gained through morality the basis of which is sympathy. It is in sympathy that we forget for the time our egoism and recognize our own fundamental identity with those whom we pity so that the sufferings of others become our sufferings also. This is true in all acts of justice and still more true in benevolence. But since all such altruistic feelings can not solve the difficulties of life permanently, Schopenhauer urges upon the unhappy man to follow a sort of asceticism. This he indicates by what he calls 'the denial of the will to live'. He says that this line of thought is also entertained by the Buddhists, the Christian saints and certain mystics of other religions. The denial of will-to-live is facilitated by certain ascetic practices viz., fasting, self-flagellation, celibacy and the like. It is the best way to deny the will-to-live altogether so that the 'Will' can no longer manifest itself in the finite individuals who constantly strive and suffer. If the will to live can thus be denied or completely eradicated from a person's mind, he can enter into a state of blessedness which the Buddhists call the state of 'Nirvana'.

Impact of the Upaniṣads on the concept of Will

From what has been discussed so far, it becomes evident that Schopenhauer adopts and explains the pantheistic spirit of the Upaniṣads in his analysis of the concept of 'Will'. As a matter of fact the association with pantheism Schopenhauer accepts in principle though the term 'pantheism' may not appear to be congenial for him. The concept of 'Will' or the universal force is in his system one and all and it is through the operation of this 'Will' that the entire universe is sought to be explained. This force is the basic reality, while the individuals of the species representing diversity have a secondary role. Schopenhauer thinks that the Upaniṣadic concept of 'Tattvamasi' (that thou art) supports his contention. He holds that unity is the essence and not the diversity. The individual is subordinated to the basic reality. He expressly states in his principal work: "The Hindus were deeper than the thinkers of Europe, because their interpretation of the world was internal and intuitive, not external and intellectual, the intellect divides everything, intuition unites everything, the Hindus saw that the 'I' is a delusion, that the individual is merely phenomenal and that the only reality in the Infinite One 'that art thou'. Whoever is able to say this to himself with regard to every being with whom be comes in contact-whoever is clear-eyed and clear-souled enough to see that we are all members of one organism, all of us little currents in an ocean of will he is certain of all virtue and blessedness and is on the direct road to salvation."

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The Upaniṣadic concept of 'Brahman' and Schopenhauer's concepts of 'Will' should not, however, be interpreted as absolutely identical. The fundamental difference that does not escape our notice is that 'Brahman' in the Upaniṣads is conceived as *Ānandam* or Rasavan (blissful existence) who creates this universe and pervades it for tasting aesthetic joy. Schopenhauer's concept of 'Will' has no such objective and it is due primarily to his pessimistic bent of mind. His 'Will' is completely blind to the interests of the individual. It uses the individuals only as an instrument, as a means for the perpetuation of species and the maintenance of the flow of life. In this sense Schopenhauer's view is teleological. But apart from this, we can not be blind to the striking points of resemblance between Schopenhauer's thought and that of the Upaniṣads. For a clearer understanding of Schopenhauer's viewpoint it is necessary to refer to and analyse an important observation made by Schopenhauer himself. He says: "With the Eleatics, Scotus Erigena, Bruno, Spinoza and Schelling, I accept the one and the all, the doctrine of the unitary essence of all beings; only I an careful not to add : all is God, and so I differ essentially from the pantheists. The god of the pantheists is an X, an unknown quality by means of which they aim to explain the known: my 'Will' on the other hand is a fact of experience; I proceed as all true science must proceed from the known to the unknown. My method is empirical, analytic, inductive; that of the pantheistic metaphysicians synthetic and deductive. Pantheism is synonymous with optimism; in my system, however, the evil in the world is frankly conceded and its significance fully recognized."

When Schopenhauer thus differentiates his philosophy from pantheism he obviously refers to some forms of pantheism as conceived in the west according to which the material world is sought to have been deduced from the concept of one substance or God. That is why he says that those systems are deductive while his philosophy is inductive. In fact his philosophy does not seek to explain the ultimate cause or causes of the world; rather it confines itself to the facts of inner and outer experience which are accessible to every body and points out the true and intimate connection existing between these facts. Hence his philosophy without drawing any conclusion concerning what lies beyond experience, merely explains the data of sensibility and self-consciousness and strives to understand only the immanent essence of the world. He holds that it is the business of the dogmatic metaphysicians and transcen dentalists to keep on asking 'Why' and 'Whence' and they forget that 'Why' means by what cause, that there are no causes and effects outside the time-succession and that therefore the 'Why' has no meaning in the sphere to which the forms of time and space can not be applied. Hence Schopenhauer offers us an empirical metaphysics and standing on the ground of experience he boldly declares this reality which constitutes the basis of being and its substance by its right name 'Will'. This 'Will' is that which is intuited or known immediately in experience and is, therefore exclusively fitted for the explanation of the rest. What is unknown should always be explained by what is better known and not conversely.

The basic approach to reality in the Upaniṣads is, as we have seen, both intuitive and intellectual or cognitive, but according to Schopenhauer, it is purely intuitive. Even after acknowledging this difference it is possible for us to maintain that in the analysis of their fundamental

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contention both the Upaniṣads and Schopenhauer come very close to each other. In fact Schopenhauer appears to have developed a deep respect for the pantheistic spirit of the Upaniṣads and this is evident not only in his eulogistic statements about the Upaniṣads, but also from his detailed analysis, as we have seen, of an all-pervading force or Will. Our opinion on this point stands corroborated by an important observation made by Max Muller: "That Schopenhauer should have spoken of the Upaniṣads as 'products of the highest wisdom' ('Ausgeburt der hochsten weisheit'), that he should have placed the pantheism there taught high above the pantheism of Bruno, Malebranche, Spinoza and Scotus Erigena as brought to light at Oxford in 1681, may perhaps secure a more considerate reception for those relics of ancient wisdom than anything that I could say in their favour". Schopenhauer has spoken of the essential identity of all that is mundane by virtue of the objective manifestation of a universal Will almost in the spirit of the Upaniṣads where the Supreme Spirit of Brahman is said to permeate the entire existence. It is, therefore, neither an exaggeration nor a distortion of truth if we say that the study of the Upaniṣads prompted Schopenhauer to accept and follow the pantheistic doctrine enunciated there in.

The Upaniṣadic doctrine like Schopenhauer's is also voluntaristic. The Brahmavada of the Upaniṣads, as we have explained in the previous section, conceives the supreme reality as an all-pervading force (very much like Schopenhauer) which 'desired' to the many and thus manifested itself in the world of perception for tasting '*ānanda*' ('joy'—that is comparable to a esthetic emotion). It is also thus voluntaristic wedded to an objective. The only difference here is that Schopenhauer's voluntarism leads him to a pessimistic conclusion and finally to seek absolute relief by way of the denial of 'will to live'. But the Upaniṣadic concept is sublime and unique of its kind. It is neither pessimistic nor optimistic. Its objective is to derive aesthetic joy by producing a work of art which is the universe. It is from the concept of 'Ānandam' that all beings originate, all live for it or go unto it or enter into it after death. This cosmic spirit revealed as 'Ānandam' or 'Amṛtam' is known or realized by the learned.

ASVAMEDHA YAJNA

The most impressive account of sacrifice in the Upaniṣads is found in the beginning of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. The sacrifice with which the Upaniṣad opens is asvamedha, the horse-sacrifice which has been recounted elaborately in the Satapatha. Since the Upaniṣad occurs in the Brahmana in close proximity of the chapter dealing with *aśvamedha*, it was quite natural for the sacrificial account to have been carried on into the Upaniṣad.

Here the sacrificial horse is said to have the dawn as head, the sun as eye, the air as breath, Agni Vaiśvānara as mouth, year as body, sky as back, atmosphere as belly, earth as hoof, quarters as sides, intermediate quarters as ribs, seasons as limbs, months and half months as joints, days and nights as feet, stars as bones clouds as flesh, sand as food in the stomach, rivers as blood-vessels, mountains as liver and lungs, herbs and vegetations as hair, the the rising sun as the forepart and the setting sun as the hind part, lightning as yawning, thunder as shaking, rain as urination and speech itself as his voice. The day is taken as the *mahiman* vessel in his front while the night as the same behind him. The sea is

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regarded as his companion or source.

It is obvious from the above account that the horse, as referred to here is not an actual one. Much less is the horse-sacrifice a mere offering of the dissected body of the horse to the fire. Without leaving us aguessing, the Upaniṣad goes ahead to characterize the horse as death while the latter as appetition.

> "In the beginning, verily there was nothing here, all this was covered by death or, indeed, by appetition, for, appetition is dearth."

Since the appetition was a sheer urge in vacuity, it naturally tended first to concretize itself. The process of concretization resulted in the production of water. The forth of the water, when solidified, assumed the form of the earth. The earth presented a solid ground for the operation of the appetition. Since it was of fiery nature, its excessive operation resulted in it emitting heat which assumed the form of fire. The fire produced out of it the sun and air. Thus, besides water, there were born three other entities, fire, sun and air. With the birth or air, the primeval appetition became organic. The eastern direction served as his arms, the western as his tail while the two sides became his hip-bones. The southern and the northern directions served as his two sides while the sky became his back, the atmosphere his belly and the earth his chest. As a whole, this colossus stands firmly in the waters.

Having fire as its central being, the appetition cannot get satisfied unless it has something else to consume. However, since it, as yet, is the sole being there, it can have the other object only by producing it out of itself. Being organic, it can produce organically. As procreation requires both, the masculine and the feminine, the appetition used its mind as the principle of masculinity and speech as that of feminity. The semen effused in this manner assumed the form of year. The year took a year to grow to its full size in the womb. When it was born, the appetition wished to devour it. Being sacred, the year cried out *bhāṇ*. It was this sound of the sacred babe which, when fully developed, assumed the form of speech.

Then the Creator thought that if he killed the babe, he would only cause diminution in his food. He, therefore, thought to make use of speech and mind again. Through their union, he created *ṛks*, *yajusas*, *sāmans*, chandas, sacrifices, subjects and animals. Being appetition, he began to eat whatever he produced. On account of his nature of eating everything, he is called *aditi* (from ad, to eat) The acts of crating and eating were to his immense liking. Consequently he resolved to manifest himself with a till greater gusto. This resulted in his exertion. As a result of it, energy oozed out of his body. It was his prana. The oozing of the pranas resulted in the swelling of the body. Thought he had departed from the body, he was still interested in making use to it. This could be done by utilizing it as a sacrificial offering. Since the inflated body was thus turned into a sacrificial offering by reincarnating the appetition in it, the whole thing led to the formation of the idea of house-sacrifice. Moreover, since the Creator had left the body un-ensouled for one year, the horse is left roaming for the same duration in the actual sacrifice.

The sun, along with the events associated with it, is conceived as a good example of the above creative process. It is conceived as the horse-sacrifice. The year is taken as it ataman and fire as its original fire which appeared in a liquid form. Thus the sun and the fire represent the primeval horse-sacrifice.

Conceiving of the whole of the cosmic

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process as a sacrifice or of the destiny of the individual in this world and beyond as the *pancāgni-vadyā* also is illustrative of the principle of convenience. So also is the case with the representation of the earth, the atmosphere and the heaven by the *uyāhṛtis* and various *sāman* notes.

The same principle is discernible in the use of abbreviation also. Representation of a complete text or mantra by its initial word, or a word by its initial letter, of a number of sentences by a cryptic combination of a few letters are illustrations of it. Names of the *Iśa* and *Kena* Upaniṣads are beautiful examples of textual abbreviation. The same tendency is operative in the representation of the waking consciousness and the earth by the letter a, of the dream consciousness and the atmosphere by *u*, of the sound-sleep consciousness and the heaven by m and of the Transcendent by the so-called unheard sound following the utterance of the world *Om*. Words like *tajjalān* exemplify abbreviation of several sentences just in one word.

AITAREYA-UPANIṢAD

May God be revealed; speech merge in mind; mind merge in speech. May they bring me the Wedas. May I ponder over that knowledge day and night, may I never forget it. Truth shall be on my lips, and truth in my thoughts. May truth protect me; protect my teachers; protect us both.

May peace and peace and peace be everywhere.

There was in the beginning one sole Self; no eye winked. He thought: 'Shall I create territories?"

He created territories: that of the first water, that of light, that of earth, that of water. Heaven and beyond heaven is that of the first water; sky is that of light; this mortal territory is that of earth; under earth is that of water. He thought again; 'The territories are there; let me create their rules.' Out of water he lifted an egg.

He warmed it, and because of His warmth a being with a mouth appeared through a crack, for His own form lay within it. From the mouth came speech; from speech fire. A nose appeared; from its nostrils came breath, from breath air. The eyes appeared; from the eyes came sight; from sight the sun. The ears appeared; from the ears came hearing; from hearing the four quarters. The skin appeared; from the skin came hair; from hair vegetation. The heart appeared; from the heart came the mind; from the mind came the moon. The navel appeared; from the navel came the downward breath Apana; from Apana death. Sex appeared; from sex came seed; from seed water.

When these gods were created, they went back into the waters. Then he endowed that being with hunger and thirst. Then the gods said: 'Give us some place where we can live and eat.'

He created a bull out of the waters. They said: 'No; it is not sufficient.' He created a horse. They said : 'No; it is not sufficient.'

He created a man. They said: 'You have done well'. Because they were satisfied, man is the chief of creatures. He said to the gods: "Take your places."

Fire in the character of speech entered the mouth; air in the character of scent entered the nose; sun in the character of sight entered the eyes; for quarters in the character of hearing entered the ears; vegetation in the character of hair entered the skin; moon in the character of mind entered the heart; death in the character of Apana entered the navel; water in the character of seed entered the loins.

Hunger and thirst said 'Where is our place?' He said : Take our place beside all the gods, for I have made you the partners

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of all. To whatever god man makes oblation, hunger and thirst shall partake.'

He thought: 'Here are the territories and their rulers. I will create food.'

He meditated on water, and from the heat of meditation came an image. That image is food.

Food fled from man. Man tried to grasp it with speech but failed; had he succeeded, to talk about it had been satisfaction enough.

He tried to grasp it with breath but failed; had he succeeded, to inhale it had been satisfaction enough.

He tried to grasp it with his eyes but failed; had he succeeded, to hear it had been satisfaction enough.

He tried to grasp it with his ears but failed; had he succeeded, to hear it had been satisfaction enough.

He tried to grasp it with his skin but failed; had he succeeded, to touch it had been satisfaction enough.

He tried to grasp it with his mind but failed; had he succeeded, thinking of it had been satisfaction enough.

He tried to grasp it with the downward breath Apana and succeeded. Apāna alone receives food; Apāna lives on food.

God thought: 'Can they live without me? How shall I enter the body?' He knew that even if tongue spoke, breath breathed, eyes saw, ears heard, sink touched, mind thought, Apāna drew in, sex threw out, they would not know Him.

He opened the suture of the skill, entered through the gate which is called the Gate of Joy. He found three places in the body where He could live, three conditions where He could move: waking, dreaming, sleeping.

He entered the body, named its various parts, wondered if there could be anything there not Himself, rejoiced to find there was nothing but Himself.

Hence He is known by the name Idandra He that sees or it is shortened into Indra; for even the gods are affectionate.

First He becomes the seed of a man, which is light gathered from all the limbs of the body. Man nourishes himself within himself as seed. When he ejects that seed into a woman, he himself is born. That is his first incarnation.

The seed merges in the woman's body; because it becomes her body, it does not harm her. She nourishes the self of the man within herself.

Protect her, for she is protecting the seed. Before and after the birth of the child man blesses the child, blessing himself. Man lives in his child; that is his second incarnation.

The son being the father over again, carries the traditions of the family, and the father having completed his fate, exhausted his years, dies and is born again. That is his third incarnation.

Sage Wamadewa said: 'When laying in the womb, I understood how the gods worked. They put me into that iron-gated, hundred-gated, person; but I fled quickly; I fled like a hawk'.

Sage Wamadewa, broke out of the body, did all that he desired, attained the Kingdom of Heaven, became immortal; yes, became immortal.

'On whom should we mediate as the Self? Which of two is He? Is He that by which we see, hear, speak, smell separate the sweet from the sour?

'Or is He that other, living in the mind or in the intellect as imagination, discrimination, knowledge, continuity, intuition, conviction, contemplation, will, emotion, memory, desire, resolution, being, living, loving longing; all names for one Intelligence?'

He is Spirit, Creator, God' all gods; earth, air, water, wind, fire, constituents of life, all greater and lesser combinations; seminal, egg-born, womb-born, sweat-

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born, soil-born; horses, cows, men elephants, birds; everything that breathes, movable, immovable: all founded upon, all moved by the one Intelligence. Intelligence is Spirit.

Sage Wamadewa, with this knowledge, did all that he desired, left this world for Heaven, became immortal; became immortal.

--E.B.

ĀṬMABOḌHA-UPANISHAḌ

This Upaniṣad treats of Ātmīc instruction.

The three symbols stand for Akasa, Mansas, and Buddhi.

Om. Prostrations to Nārāyaṇa wearing conch, discus, and mace, by whom the Yogī is released from the bondage of the cycle of rebirth through the utterance of Him who is of the form of Pranava, the Om, composed of the three letters A, U, and M, who is the uniform bliss and who is the Brahmapurusha (all-pervading Purusha). Om. Therefore the reciter of the Mantra "Om-namo-Nārāyaṇāya" reaches the Vaikuntha world. It is the heart-Kamala (lotus), *viz.*, the city of Brahman. It is effulgent like lightning, shining like a lamp. It is Brahmanya (the presider over the city of Brahman) that is the son of Ḍevakī. It is Brahmanya that is Maḍhusūḍana (the killer of Maḍhu). It is Brahmaṇya that is Puṇdarīkāksha (lotus-eyed).

It is Brahmaṇya, Vishṇu that is Achyuṭa (the indestructible). He who meditates upon that sole Nārāyaṇa who is latent in all beings, who is the causal Purusha, who is causeless, who is Parabrahman, the Om, who is without pains and delusion and who is all-pervading- that person is never subject to pains. From the dual, he becomes the fearless non-dual. Whoever sees this (world) as manifold (with the differences of I, you, he, etc.), passes from death to death.

In the centre of the heart-lotus is Brahman, which is the All, which has Prājnā as its eye and which is established in Prajnāna alone. To creatures, Prajnāna is the eye and Prājnā is the seat. It is Prajnāna alone that is Brahman. A person who meditates (thus), leaves this world through Prajnāna, the Āṭmā and ascending attains all his desires in the Supreme Swarga deathless. Oh ! I pray Thee, place me in that nectar-everflowing unfailing world where Jyoṭis (the light) always shines and where one is revered. (There is no doubt) he attains nectar also. Om-namaḥ.

I am without Māyā. I am without compare. I am solely the thing that is of the nature of wisdom. I am without Ahankara (I-am-ness). I am without the difference of the universe, Jīva and Īśwara. I am the Supreme that is not different from Praṭyagātmā (individual Ātmā). I am with ordinances and prohibitions destroyed without remainder. I am with Āśramas (observances of life) well given up. I am of the nature of the vast and all-full wisdom. I am one that is witness and without desire. I reside in My glory alone. I am without motion. I am without old age—without destruction—without the differences of My party or another. I have wisdom as chief essence. I am the mere ocean of bliss called salvation. I am the subtle. I am without change. I am Ātmā merely, without the illusion of qualities. I am the Seat devoid of the three Gunas. I am the cause of the many worlds in (My) stomach. I am the Kutastha-Chaitanya (supreme Cosmic-mind). I am of the form of the Jyotis (light) free from motion. I am not one that can be known inference. I alone am full. I am of the form of the stainless salvation. I am without limbs or birth. I am the essence which is Sat itself.

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I am of the nature of the true wisdom without limit. I am the state of excellent happiness. I am One that cannot be differentiated. I am the all-pervading and without stain. I am the limitless and endless Sattwa alone. I am fit to be known through Vedanta. I am the one fit to be worshipped. I am the heart of all the worlds. I am replete with Supreme Bliss. I am of the nature of happiness, which is Supreme Bliss. I am pure, secondless, and eternal. I am devoid of beginning. I am free from the three bodies (gross, subtle, and causal). I am of the nature of wisdom. I am the emancipated One. I have a wondrous form. I am free from impurity. I am the One latent (in all). I am the equal Ātmā of eternal Vijnāna. I am the refined Supreme Truth. I am of the nature of Wisdom-Bliss alone

Though I cognize as the secondless Aṭmā by means of discriminative wisdom and reason, yet is found the relation between bondage and salvation. Though to Me the universe is gone, yet it shines as true always. Like the truth in the (illusory conception of a) snake, etc., in the rope, so the truth of Brahman alone is, and is the substratum on which this universe is playing. Therefore the universe is not. Just as sugar is found permeating all the sugar-juice (from which the sugar is extracted), so I am full in the three worlds in the form of the non-dual Brahman. Like the bubbles, waves, etc., in the ocean, so all beings, from Brahma down to worm, are fashioned in Me; just as the ocean does not long after the motion of the waves, so toMe, there is no longing after sensual happiness, being Myself of the form of (spiritual) Bliss. Just as in a wealthy person the desire for poverty does not arise, so in Me who am immersed in Brahmic Bliss, the desire for sensual happiness cannot arise. An intelligent person who sees both nectar and poison rejects poison; so having cognized Āṭmā, I reject those that are not-Āṭmā.

The sun that illuminates the pot (both within and without) is not destroyed with the destruction of the pot; so the Sākshī (witness) that illuminates the body is not destroyed with the destruction of the body. To Me there is no bondage; there is no salvation, there are no books, there is no Guru; for these shine through Māyā and I have crossed them and am secondless. Let Prāṇas (vital airs) according to their laws be fluctuating. Let Manas (mind) be blown about by desire. How can pains affect Me who am by nature full of Bliss? I have truly known Āṭmā. My Ajnāna has fled away. The egoism of actorship has left Me. There is nothing I should yet do. Brāhman's duties, family, Gotra (clan), name, beauty, and class-all these belong to the gross body and not to Me who am without any mark (of body). Inertness, love, and joy-these attributes appertain to the causal body and not to Me, who am eternal and of changeless nature. Just as an owl sees darkness only in the sun, so a fool sees only darkness in the self-shining Supreme Bliss. Should the clouds screen the eyesight, a fool thinks there is no sun; so an embodied person full of Ajnāna thinks there is no Brahman. Just as nectar which is other than poison does not commingle with it, so I, who am different from inert matter, do not mix with its stains. As the light of a lamp, however small, dispels immense darkness, so wisdom, however slight, makes Ajnāna, however immense, to perish. Just as (the delusion) of the serpent does not exist in the rope in all the three periods of time (past, present, and future), so the universe from Ahankara (down) to body does not exist in Me who am the non-dual One. Being of the nature of Consciousness alone, there is not inertness in Me. Being of the natue of Truth, there is not non-

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truth to Me. Being of the nature of Bliss, there is not sorrow in Me. It is through Ajñāna that the universe shines as truth.

Whoever recites this Āṭmāboḍha-Upanishaḍ for a Muhūrṭa (48 minutes) is not born again-yea, is not born again.

The Atman

From the subjective standpoint can say the Reality is the Ataman. In the Chhand Upanishad the author narrates a story to arrive at the conception of the Self-conscious Being from the subjective standpoint. He brings out how the Ultimate Reality must not be mistaken with the bodily consciousness; how it must not be confused with the dream-consciousness; how it transcends even the deep-sleep-consciousness; how finally it is the Pure Self-consciousness, which is beyond all bodily or mental limitations. We are told in the Chhāndogya Upanishad that Indra, among the gods, and Virochana among the demons, went to Prajāpati to know the real nature of the Ātman. They wanted to know the Self which is free from sin, free from old age, free from death, free from grief, free from hunger, free from thirst, whose desires come true, and whose thoughts come true-that it is which should be searched out, that it is which one should desire to understand. Prajāpati would not immediately tell them the final truth. He tried to delude them by saying first that the self was nothing more than the image that we see in the eye, in water, or in a mirror indra and Virochana went back, Virochana was satisfied with the teaching of Prajāpati; and thought that the self was nothing more than the mere consciousness of body. But Indra was not satisfied with the first teaching of Prajāpati. He went back again to Prajapati to request him once more to tell him what Ultimate Reality was. Prajāpati tried to confuse him again to examine his worthiness by saying that dream-consciousness was the true Self. Third time Indra went back to Prajapati. Again he confused him (Indra) by saying that deep sleep-conscious was the true Self. Finally when Indra went back to Prajapati to learn the real nature the of Ātman, Prajapati said; "Verily O Indra, this body is subject to death, but it is at the same time the vesture of an immortal soul. It is only when the soul is encased in the body, that it is cognisant of pleasure and pain. There is neither pleasure nor pain for the soul once relived of its body. Just as the wind and the cloud, the lightening and the thunder, are without body, and arise from heavenly space and appear in their own form, so does this serene being, namely, the Self, arise from this mortal body, reach the highest light, and then appear in his own form. This serene being, who appears in his own form is the highest person. The pure self is immortal and incorporeal. The embodied self is the victim of pleasure and pain. So long as one is identified with the body, there is no cessation of pleasure and pain. But neither pleasure nor pain touches one who is not identified with the body.

When the self comes to inhabit the body, it must be recognised as passing through certain psychical states. The Mandukya Upanishad makes the analysis of th four states of consciousness. The quarter (*pāda*) of the self is called *Vaisvānara*, whose sphere of activity is the waking state, who is conscious of external objects. The second pada is *Taijasa*, whose sphere of activity is dream state, and who is conscious of internal objects. The third is *Prajāna*, whose sphere is deep-sleep in whom all experiences become unified. The *Turiya* is not that which is conscious of the inner (subjective) world, nor that which is conscious of the outer (objective) world, nor that which is conscious of both, nor

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that which is a mass of consciousness. It is not simple consciousness nor is it unconsciousness. It is unpercieved, unrelated, incomprehensible, uninferable, unthinkable, and indescribable. It is the cessation of all phenomena; it is all peace, all bliss, and nondual. This is Ātman, and this has to be realized.

In Prasna Upanishad Pippalāda describes the self as *Purusha* with sixteen parts. "He said to Sukesha: "That person-He from whom these sixteen parts arise is verily here within the body." He created Prāna; from Prāna faith, space, air, fire, water, earth, the organs, mind, food, from food virility, austerity, the Vedic hymns, sacrifice, the worlds; and in the worlds He created names.

Like Brahman, the Ātman was also postulated as the world ground by the Upanishadic philosophers. Finally these two world-grounds, Brahman and the Atman, are not different and separate. We find it directly stated: 'verily, that great unborn Soul, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless, is Brahman. As oil (exists) in sesame seeds, butter in milk, water in river-beds and fire in wood, so the Self is realized (as existing) within the self, when a man looks for it by means of truthfulness and austerity, when he looks for the Self, which pervade all things as butter (pervade) milk, and whose roots are Self-knowledge and austerity that is the Brahman...... The Upanishadic Philosophers regard the Atman as identical with Brahman. The world ground which is the Absolute. The Atman is Self-conscious and Brahman is identical with the Atman, the Self-consciousness. Professor R.D. Ranade says: "Here we have unmistakably the ontological argument, namely, that ultimate existence must be identified with Self-consciousness. Thus by a survey of the different approaches to the problem of Reality, namely, the cosmological, the theological, and the psychological, we see that the Upanishadic philosophers try to establish Reality on the firm footing of Self-consciousness. Self-consciousness to them is eternal verity. God to them is not God, unless He is identical with Self-consciousness. Existence is not existence if it does not mean Self-consciousness. Reality is not reality, if it does not express throughout its structure the marks of pure Self-consciousness. Self-consciousness thus constitutes the ultimate category of existence to the Upanishadic philosophers."

This Ultimate Reality or Atman is described as *Purusha*. We are told that Ātman shaped a *Purusha* and drew him fourth from the waters, and brooded upon him. From the mouth of this *Purusha* came Fire; from his nostrils, Air, from his eyes, the Sun; from his ears, the quarters, of heaven; from his skin, plants and trees, from his heart, the moon; from his navel, death; and from his virile member, water. And in creating man, we are told that the Deity ordered those various elements in the external world to enter into man, and 'fire became speech and entered the mouth. Wind became breath and entered the nostrils. The sun became sight and entered the eyes. The quarters of heaven became hearing and entered the ears. Plants and trees became hairs, and entered the skin. The moon became mind, and entered the heart. Death became the out breath (*apāna*) and entered the navel. Water became semen and entered the virile member. What is note-worthy is that both the self and the non-self, which seem so entirely different from each other, are here regarded as having a mutual correspondence, since both of them are primeated by the same forces which emanated from the primeval Purusha. Further, the old Rigvedic idea of cosmic Purusha, from the parts of whose body

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various elements in the universe are regarded as emanating an idea which occurs frequently in the Upaniṣads, as well as in later Indian writings — is here assimilated by the Atman-theory. The view that Ultimate Reality was Purusha or presiding genius of the universe appears thus to have developed side by with the view that It was Ātman. Nay more, as evidenced by these early Ātman theories, it would appear that the distinction between Purusha and Ātman was not maintained, the two being freely identified with each other. Thus, the Upanishadic philosophers describe cosmic Purusha as identical with Ātman and maintain that Atman is not different from Brahman.

Kaikeya's instruction of the six Brahmans who come to him each with a different notion as to what Brahman is., viz., that he is heaven, sun, wind, space, water, and earth, is not only to show that Brahman is all these, but also to deduce from each of these partial definitions of Brahman, a corresponding attribute in Him. Thus, as heaven. He is the brightly shining One; as sun, the manifold one; as wind, one who possesses various paths; as space, one who is expanded; as water, one who is all wealth; as earth, one who is a support. Here again obviously the philosopher attempts to describe Brahman is terms of what is most striking and significant in each of these various elements with which he is identified, and concludes by painting out that Brahman is the Soul which is within one-self.

The progressive instruction of Nārada by Sanatkumāra, whereby Nārada is led from lower to higher and higher conceptions of Brahman from Brahman as name, speech, mind, conception, thought, meditation, understanding, etc., to Soul (Ātman) as the highest has for its characteristic the fact the each category, which is mentioned as descriptive of Brahman, is mention on the ground that it is important and indispensable and if it is transcended it is only because there is a still higher category, which is also important and indispensable, and which has the added merit of subsuming under itself the previous categories. Thus an effort is made to describe Brahman is terms of qualities, the most significant and all inclusive. In this way, it would seem, philosophers sought to go beyond the view that Brahman, the ultimate ground of all things, is a conscious principle, and to describe it in terms suggestive of value and pre-eminence. It is true that they do not tell us very much about the attributes of Brahman; beyond what has been mentioned above. Nevertheless, it is significant that Brahman, the all-pervading conscious principle, tended to be regarded as possessed of value. Brahman is the unity which explains all this diversity, straightway identified everything in the universe with Brahman. To the Upanishadic philosophers nothing can exist without Brahman. They, therefore, proclaim, "Lo, here, all is Brahman. Verily, this whole world is Brahman. Tranguil, let one worship it as that from which it came forth, as that into which it will be dissolved, as that in which it breathes. Verily, what is called Brahman—that is the same as what the space outside of a person is. Verily, what the space outside of a person is—that is the same as what the space within a person is. Verily, what the space within a person is- that is the same as what the space here within in the heart, is. Verily, this whole world containing all desires, containing all odours, containing all tastes, encompassing this whole world, the un-speaking, the unconcerned—this is the Soul of mine within the heart, this is Brahman."

A contemporary of Malebranche, Benedict Spinoza is considered to be a

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philosopher of outstanding merit, because he appears to have propounded almost a revolutionary theory of God or Substance to the utter surprise and bewilderment of the Jewish and Christian thinkers of his time. The general impression on him is that he is a pantheist, for his doctrine of substance helps one reach some such conclusion. Our purpose here is to examine his fundamental tenets finally to see whether or not he can truly be regarded as a pantheist.

The central teaching of Spinoza is that there is only one, infinite, divine substance which is identified with 'Nature,-'Deus Sive Natura'. One of the striking features of his philosophical analysis is the geometrical form of presentation. Just as in geometry the conclusions follow necessarily from the axioms and definitions, in like manner the conclusions of Spinoza's philosophy are arrived at from certain fundamental definitions. Axiomatic truths are self-evident and absolutely certain and they are discerned by intuition. In Spinoza's opinion the idea of God is absolutely certain from which all other ideas follow. With full confidence in 'necessary know ledge' demonstrated in geometry. Spinoza has recourse to geometrical method and seeks to explain everything with the help of 'ground and-consequence' formula. God or Substance is said to be the ultimate ground from which everything necessarily follows. The question of any purpose or aim and free choice is thus ruled out. Spinoza, according to many critics, develops the logical implications of the philosophy of Descartes in a monistic direction. As a matter of historical fact, however, he has not based his thoughts purely on Descartes and there is reason for thinking that before he devoted his attention to Cartesianism some Jewish mystical writers of the late middle ages had exercised some formative influence on his thought. Further, he was also considerably, influenced by another pantheistically inclined thinker viz. Geordano Bruno. Let us see first how far Spinoza develops his concept of Substance in a logically consistent way from the definition of its given by Descartes.

In defining substance Descartes held that it is an existent thing which requires nothing but itself in order to exist. He could not, however, stick to this definition, since besides God he also accepted body and mind as two other fundamental substances in explaining the world process, although God, for him was supposed to be more fundamental than the other two. In defining Substance Spinoza holds: "By Substance I mean that which is (exists) in itself and is conceived through itself, on other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception." What Spinoza means by this definition is that Substance is 'causa sui', infinite, eternal, absolutely free and indeterminate. Now this Substance is equated by him with God and Nature. The conception of God here is different from the Christian conception in as much as God, for Spinoza, is not an external or transcendent cause of the world in the sense in which a father is the cause of his son or the sun in the cause of sunshine. God is the immanent cause of the world in the sense in which an apple is the cause of its red colour or milk in the cause of its whiteness. Spinoza, therefore, appears to hold that God does not create the world. Nothing virtually exists independent of God and nothing is produced by or emanates from God. Rather all that exist in the phenomenal world follow necessarily from the nature of God in the way in which the characteristics of a triangle follow necessarily from the nature of the triangle. To Spinoza God is not only the ground of

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everything, but He is also considered the totality of being. Thus God, Nature and Substance mean the same reality. He has tried to explain his position in his theory of attributes and modes. Let us see how.

"By attribute" says Spinoza, "I understand that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of Substance". Of the infinite attributes of God only two viz., 'extension' and 'thought' are known to us. Differing from his predecessor Descartes, Spinoza says that these two attributes are the two ways of understanding one Substance. They are the parallel manifestations of God or Nature. Although they belong to the same Substance they are independent of each other and no conscious thought can de explained with the help of matter (as is done by the materialists), nor can matter be explained with the help of conscious thought (as the idealist do). But because the two are the manifestations of the same reality, a physical change is always accompanied by a corresponding mental change and vice versa. Spinoza thus seeks to solve the problem of Cartesian dualism by the theory of psycho-physical parallelism as against Descartes' interactionism.

Now in explaining the world of finite beings Spinoza makes a thorough analysis of 'modes'. Finite minds are, in his view, the mods of God under to attribute of thought, and finite bodies are the modes of God under the attribute of extension. "By modes", says Spinoza, "I understand the modifications (affections) of a Substance or that which is in something else through which it may be conceived". He means to say naturally that nothing finite is possessed of self-subsistent individuality. Corresponding to two attributes, there are two different mods, 'Motion' and 'rest' are the modifications of 'extension', and 'understanding' and 'will' are the modifications of 'thought'. Here Spinoza makes a distinction between infinite and finite modes. Motion, for example, is infinite and eternal, but the corporeal forms which it constitutes or through which it is manifested are subject to origination and decay. In the same way intellect and will are eternal and infinite, but each particular intellect has a limited duration' What Spinoza intends to assert is that each of the infinite modes constitutes an infinite series of finite modes.

These finite modes are contingent, relative and merely possible, while Substance or God is the absolute, eternal and necessary cause of itself. In view of the opposition between immutable Substance and mutable modes a question invariably crops up: How much reality do the modes possess in the system of Spinoza? A mode is not conceivable without a Substance that is modified, Now the Substance, as Spinoza has defined it, is not modifiable; hence the movement or change in a word the entire relative world with all its particular and individual beings, bodies and souls seems to have no existence.

But Spinoza is not supposed to have aimed at this conclusion. He is fully alive to the changing phenomena of the existent world. Unmindful of the principle of contradiction, but supported by experience, Spinoza tries to smooth over the difficulty by affirming both the immutability and perpetual change of being. In order therefore, to do justice both to reason and facts of experience he makes a distinction between infinite and eternal mode and finite or temporal mode of God. Thus according to Spinoza's version it appears that from the modifications of two infinite attributes viz, through and extension, the sensible world of multiplicity comprising conscious beings and extended objects arises. To put it

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otherwise, the different particular bodies and minds or material and conscious phenomena constitute the changing perceptible world. The being that controls or actively determines this external manifestation of the world is God which is the fundamental reality. Hence is Spinoza's view God is operative in nature and the principles or laws regulating the external nature are determined by the nature of God. This point is sought to be made clear with the help of an analogy. "From the infinite nature of God all things......follow by the same necessity and in the same way as it follows from the nature of a triangle from eternity to eternity, that its three angles are equal to two right angles".

The above exposition of Spinoza's viewpoint encourages many critics in holding the view that Spinoza is an ardent exponent of pantheism. According to these commentators the unmistakable mark of pantheism is noted in the identification of God with Nature. This 'Nature' is viewed ether as an infinite Substance (Nature Naturans) without any reference to its modifications or as a system of modes (Nature Naturata). The first way of considering Nature is logically prior to the second. When 'Nature is considered in the second way i.e., as 'Natura Naturata' Spinoza is found to explain that a particular mode is caused by some other particular mode and this again by some other mode or modes and so on. There is thus an endless chain of particular causes. Spinoza is careful to add that this series does not admit of the intervention of any transcendent God for the creation of particular modes. Further the series of finite causes and effects is logically and ontologically dependent on 'Natura Naturans' or Nature viewed as self-determined, self-dependent, unique Substance. Nature or God expresses itself in modifications and in this sense it is the immanent cause of all its modifications or modes. This analysis has evidently led the critics to hold that Spinoza is undoubtedly a pantheist and his pantheism takes the form of saying that God is an infinite being including within itself all beings or all reality, and that since God is an infinite Substance, finite beings must be the modes of this Substance. Thus if one stresses the metaphysical aspect one's attention is likely to be directed to the fact that 'Nature Naturans' and 'Natura Naturata' are ontologically co-extensive or identical, and the former is only logically prior to the latter.

But several questions crops up here which, we think, can not be answered satisfactorily from the Spinozistic standpoint. Our first question is,— does the definition of substance, as given by Spinoza, indicate in any way that it 'must' have modes? The answer must be in the negative. As a metaphysician Spinoza is found to have started his system with the concept of Substance or God. But he also appears from the beginning to have been aware of the existence of the finite world of multiplicity. It is quite possible, therefore, that in "developing his deductive system he knew in advance his point of arrival and it seems probable that his knowledge that there are finite beings encouraged him to believe that he had achieved a logical dedication of 'Nature Naturata". But then the question remains: how far has Spinoza been successful in deducing the 'Nature Naturata' from his concept of of Substance? Substance is said to be the ultimate and supreme cause of the finite world of experience. But this substance, in Spinoza's view, is one, undivided and partless. How then these innumerable finite modes constituting the 'Nature Naturata' appear from such a concept of Substance remains in deed a

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riddle. How, in other words, the individual, particular and finite modes are evolved from the one Infinite Being has not been adequately accounted for by Spinoza. In the Upaniṣads we have seen that the one desired to be many and this 'desire' serves as the genuine cause that produces the multiplicity. But Spinoza's God does not evince any such causal efficacy as 'desire'. Again the relation between Substance and the modes is one between the infinite and the finite. The infinite and the finite are the correlative terms and the existence of one logically implies the existence of the other. But Spinoza's arguments do not proceed this way either. Spinoza observes that the two infinite attributes viz., extension and thought give rise to finite mods. But how this actually takes place has not been convincingly explained by him. He is aware that an infinite being can only give rise to what is infinite and not what is finite

Thus Spinoza, being fully aware of the existence of the phenomenal world and at the same time of his inability of explaining this world as the modification of substance or the attributes, resorts to another train of thought. He says that the finite object is infinite in 'essence' and its 'existence', is finite.

Thus the 'infinite essence' and the 'finite existence' combined together give rise to finite modes. But to the fundamental question as to how the 'infinite essence' and the 'finite existence' are harmonized together so as to give rise to finite modes, Spinoza has given no answer. In the first part of his 'Ethics' Spinoza has declared God or Substance as infinite and this God again is 'Nature' outside of which nothing exists. His observations in this section give an impression of Nature as an all-comprehensive reality signifying that both what is actually existing and what is possible for anything to exist, are all included within this infinite. If this be the real implication, what then, is the difference between 'Natura Naturans' and 'Natura Naturata'? Spinoza opines that 'Natura Naturans' is the creative power of Nature. But if nothing can exist except that which is already in Nature, this creative force of Nature becomes meaningless. There are critics according to whom the term 'creation' has virtually no room in Spinoza's system. From the definition or essence of a triangle its characteristics (viz., that its three angles are equal to two right angles etc.) are not produced as effect but only follow necessarily and what is suppressed is made clear to the intellect.

In the same way the creativity of Nature, it is argued, implies that the objects which come out of Nature by way of logical necessity, remain unmanifested within Nature and become manifested to the intellect. There is thus no new creation. But this way of arguing obviously obliterates the basic difference between 'Natura Naturata' and 'Natura Naturans' which Spinoza is keen on maintaining. The external nature is considered by Spinoza to be separate and distinct from God. He makes an explicit reference to Nature in its two-fold aspects. The first i.e., 'Natura Naturans' which closely resembles Bergson's 'Elan Vital' is identified with God. But the material, or sensible i.e., 'Natura Naturata; is set apart from God. He says that as an active force or cause he does not consider God to be separate or different from Nature.

It is in this connection that he declares God as the immanent and not the extraneous cause of all things. But he is not agreeable to accept the proposition that the created material world is identical with God. To quote his words: "It is, however, a complete mistake on the part of those who say that my purpose.....is to

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show that God and Natura under which last term they understand a certain mass of corporeal matter, are one and the same; I had no such intention".

No Upaniṣadic pantheism discovered

In view of what has been analysed so far, it becomes clear to us that as in the cases of Bruno and Malebranche, so also in the Spinozistic system, the essential marks of pantheism are not consistently developed. Pantheism proper, as we have found in the Upaniṣads, involves the conception of a Reality that must comprehend the multiplicity in a unity. The 'one' will reveal itself in 'many' and the 'many' must be within the one. This feature is conspicuous by its absence in Spinoza. The reason probably is two-fold. First, a sharp line of demarcation is drawn between 'matter' and 'mind' in such a way as to make an interaction between them inadmissible. All that Spinoza says in justifying his position is that extension and thought being the attributes of the same Substance, any physical change is accompanied by a corresponding mental change and vice versa. In order thus to maintain consistency in the mutual relation of mind and matter he takes the help of a third concept i.e., God or Substance. Here Spinoza's argument hardly appears to be more convincing than Leibnitz's theoryof 'Pre-established harmony'. His psycho-physical parallelism can not thus solve the problem. secondly, he admits the presence of God as the creative force in Nature, but th created or manifested Nature which he calls 'Natura Naturata' is considered completely alien to God. This is no doubt quite repugnant to the pantheistic spirit. Spinoza's endeavour to give a pantheistic explanation may have been quite earnest, but his success is little. We see, therefore, that the systems of Bruno, Malebranche and Spinoza can not be called pantheistic in the sense in which the philosophy of the Upaniṣads is.

It will, therefore, be no arrogation for us to assert that it is Schelling who for the first time propagates pantheism successfully in his Philosophy of Nature and in so doing he follows the message of the oriental savants as depicted in the ancient Upaniṣads.

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BHIKSHUKA-UPANISHAD'

Among bhikshus (religious mendicants) who long for moksha (salvation), there are four kinds, *viz.*, Kutīchaka, Bahūḍaka, Hamsa, and Paramahamsa. Ganṭama, Bharaḍvāja, Yājnavalkya, Vasishtha and other belong to the first kind. They take eight mouthfuls (of food daily) and strive after moksha alone through the path of yoga. The second kind carry three (bamboo) staves (tied together) and a waterpot, and wear tuft of hair (śikhā), sacred thread (yajnopavīta) and red-coloured cloth. They take eight mouthfuls of food in the house of Brahmarshis, abstain from flesh and alcohol and strive after emancipation alone through the path of yoga. Then the Hamsas should live not more than a night in a village, five nights in a town, and seven nights in a sacred place, partaking daily of cow's urine and cow's dung, observing Chānḍrāyan'a and striving after moksha alone through the path of yoga. Paramahamsas like Samvarṭaka, Āruṇī, Śweṭakeṭu, Jada-bharaṭa, Ḍaṭṭāṭreya, Śuka, Vāmaḍeva, Hārīṭaka and others take eight mouthfuls and strive after moksha alone through the path of yoga. They live clothed or naked at the foot of trees, in ruined houses, or in burning grounds. With them, there are no dualities as dharma and adharama, gain and loss, and purity and impurity. They look upon gold and stone and clod of earth with the same eye (of indifference), live on alms, begging from all without any distinction of caste and look upon everything as Āṭmā alone. Being (naked) as nature made them, being free from the sense of duality and from covetousness, being engaged in pure contemplation (śuklaḍhyāna), meditating on Āṭmā, and begging at stated times, simply to keep the body and soul together, they reside in ruined houses, temples, straw-huts, ant-hills, the foot of trees, potteries, the places of agnihotra, the sand in the bed of rivers, mountain-caves, cavities, the hollows of trees, waterfalls, and sthandila (the level square piece of ground prepared for sacrifice). Having advanced far in the path of Brahman, and being pure in mind, they quit this body through the methods prescribed for Paramahamsa Sannyasins. These are the Paramahamsas. Such is the Upanishad.

Now Brahma said: "Please go and look at yourselves in a pan of water and see what is there, if you cannot, understand anything about the Atman, then let me know." They went and saw themselves in a pan of water. Then Brahma asked them, "What do you see?". They immediately gave the answer: "Up to the hair and the nails, everything that we are, we see exactly reflected in this water. This is what we see. We see ourselves as we are."

Then Brahma said, "This is the Atman". Now what Brahma said was highly significant. But the mystery behind the instruction was so deep that it was again grossly misunderstood by the disciples. Whatever we see is God-this is generally what we say. It is a true statement, no

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doubt. But it is also an untrue statement. The untrue aspect of it can simply take us astray. But the true aspect of it, will of course, liberate us from bondage. So is the instruction of Brahma. "What you see in your eyes is the Atman. What you see in the reflection is the Atman. This is the Atman, this is the fearless abode, this is the Absolute." So they were told about what they saw as their reflection. Happy and composed in heart, both the students went back thinking that they have known the Atman.

When they had gone out of sight, Prajapati thought: "What a pity! These students have understood nothing from me. They have mistaken my teaching completely. They are thinking that their own body is the Atman, and if any one is to consider this body as the Atman and regard it as the ultimate Reality, and teach others a doctrine that this material body is the Atman, it will not succeed. Those who follow this doctrine are going to be defeated everywhere."

Virochana went to the demons and said: "I have received initiation. Now I know what the Atman is by which you can control all the worlds and fulfil all your desires. This body itself, what we see here, is the Atman. This is what Prajapati told us. This body is to be adorned beautifully and taken care of well. It is to be tended well, because it is the Reality. There is nothing more real than this body. It is to be protected by any manner available. It is the knowledge of this Reality, this Atman, this physical embodiment that will help us in fulfilling all our desires. The body is an instrument for the fulfilment of desires and it is through the instrumentality of this body that you have to control all the worlds." This is the doctrine of the crass materialist and the sensualist, that the demons learnt from Virochana. This became the doctrine of the *Asuras*.

To this day people generally say, 'here is a demon' when a person has no charitable nature. He who has no faith in the superphysical realms, who never worships deities above this world, who never performs sacrifices of any kind, who is intensely selfish, self-centred and body-centred, is generally called a demon, in common language. 'Here is a demon' they say. This is the doctrine of the Asuras. Those people who think that the body is very valuable, adorn even a corpse. They decorate it beautifully. They cover it with silk, gold, etc., and keep it as if is very valuable, falsely thinking that it is the true self of man. People are there even now who think that the body has a tremendous value, and even after its death they cannot afford to think that its value is completely gone. This was the conclusion the Virochana arrived at and all the Asuras were taught this philosophy. This demoniacal doctrine was proclaimed as a consequence of the initiation that Virochana received from Brahma in respect of the Atman. This is the fate of Virochana and his followers.

Now what happened to Indra? Did he also follow the same doctrine? Poor man! He did not reach home at all. Half way itself he had doubts in the mind. He thought: "How could this body be the Atman? That cannot be, because if what is reflected in water or reflected anywhere, which is nothing but this body, is the Atman, then the Atman would be affected by every kind of defect to which the body is subject. So there would be a defective Atman. This Atman cannot then be called immortal. This body is subject to death. When this body goes, the Atman also will go, if the body is Atman. Where then comes fearlessness and immortality and *Brahmatva* mentioned by the Creator? There seems to be some mistake in my understanding of this teaching." So he had

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these doubts and he did not go to the gods to communicate this knowledge. Instead, he returned immediately to Prajapati.

BRAHMACHARYA

Now, the means to the realisation of this great Truth is emphasised in the present section. The word used for this means is *Brahmacharya*. The character of Brahman is *Brahmacharya*. The conduct of Brahman is what we call *Brahmacharya*. Charya is conduct. The meaning of the word 'Brahman', of course, we known very well. The conduct of Brahman is *Brahmacharya*. To live as Brahman would be *Brahmacharya*. How Brahman is, in that way one should be. It is very difficult to conceive this. It is a total abstraction of the senses in a sublimation of consciousness which recognises itself alone, to the exclusion of everything else. This is the only practice which one has to endeavour for. By the practice of this, one would have performed every other duty in this world, because every other duty is a tendency towards the fulfilment of this duty. This is what the Upanishad tells us in the following passages.

What we call sacrifice, a holy performance, worship, all this is equivalent to the practice of continence, because continence brings all those results which any kind of sacrifice would bring to the performer of the sacrifice. The knower of Truth, through the practice of self-control, attains those benefits which accrue by the performance of a sacrifice. What we call the sacrificial performance from the point of view of Vedic injuctions, is also equivalent to the practice of self-control, *Brahmacharya*, continence by which one attains to every benefit which would otherwise come as a result of the performance of Vedic rituals.

Sattrayana is again a session for sacrifices. *Sattra* is a *Yajna*, a sacrifice, and a session for the performance of these sacrifices is *Sattrayana*. It is a great ritual enjoined in the Vedas. But, this ritual called *Sattrayana* is equivalent to the practice of continence, self-control. *Sattrayana* is the word used to designate this particular sacrifice, and here the Upanishad gives a peculiar etymological resemblance of the result that follows by the practice of continence to the meaning of the word *sattrayana*. *Sath atmanastranam vindate sattrayana*, is the way in which we split the word *sattrayana*. *Sat* is Being, *trayana* is the way of freedom or attainment of the benefits of protection in every way. One protects one's self, frees oneself by contact with true Being. This protection or freedom which one gains through contact with Being is also achieved by the practice of self-restraint, *Brahmacharya*. So it is equivalent to *Sattrayana*, the performance of the Vedic sacrifice. What we call observance of silence, not speaking, *Maunam*, is the same as *Brahmacharya*, because that again is the silence of all the senses, on account of the contact of the Atman which is the Supreme Silence. One understands things correctly and enters into a natural state of phychic silence by the acquisition of the knowledge that automatically follows the practice of self-control.

Anasakyana is a vow of fasting. This vow of fasting which people engage themselves in, is also equivalent to *Brahmacharya*. Here again, an etymological semblance is introduced into the interpretation. Atman does not perish at any time. Therefore, this imperishable character of the Atman is comparable with the imperishable results that accrue to one by the practice of the religious vow of fasting. Whatever benefits accrue to a person by this vow come to him

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spontaneously by self-control. Forest dwelling which is the *Vanaprastha* life, living in seclusion, etc., are all great vows and austerities, no doubt. But whatever one gains by these austerities, vows and practices, one gains merely by self-control, because it is the highest austerity and nothing can be comparable to it.

A person who transcends mortal experience and is blessed with an access into the realm of Brahma, has to pass through various mystical experiences. Some of the words contained in the passage that we are discussing refer to certain subtle experiences in the higher realms of Being which a seeker would encounter on his ascent to Brahman, the Absolute. It is said here that there are two oceans in the realm of Brahman filled with nectar where the world this and world that both come together in a fraternal embrace. It is as if two oceans join together to form a single ocean. *ara* and *nya*, are the two names given to these two different oceans. They exist beyond this world. They are in the third world altogether, not in the physical world, not in the atmospheric world or even the astral world, but in the spiritual world they are. There is another miraculous thing there which one can see after going there. There is a tank filled with exhilarating nectar which is the food of the gods and the food of those who have shed their physical bodies. It is immortal bliss that one would experience there. It does not mean that it is actually a physical food which one would taste through the tongue. As I mentioned, they are subtle references to mystical experiences of the soul, which are referred to here, as contact with tons of nectar of exquisite sweetness. There is a tree there which yields all one asks for, which exudes nectar from its body. It is a huge peepul tree, very vast in its expanse from every pore of which nectar exudes. It is the *Kalpavriksha*, as the *Puranas* call it, a tree that give anything you ask. If you think something while sitting under it, it immediately materialises itself. That is called *Kalpavriksha*. Such a kind of peepul is present there in this highter realm where nectarine immortality flows, as it were, from every side. This is the city of Brahman which cannot be entered by those whose minds are extrovert, whose senses seek sense objects outside. It is an invincible fortress of Brahman. No one can conquer it, no one can pierce through it, no one can break through it, no one can touch it or contact it, because it is not a physical fort. It has very very rarely been conquered by any one. Those who have been wedded to world experience through the mind and the senses are unfit to contact or enter into this city. There is inside this city a hall which is called *Prabhuvmitam*, built by Brahma himself, shining like gold, resplendent in every way, into which the soul is introduced. These experiences are also described in other Upaniṣhads in different ways, all very mystical indeed, referring to different exhilarating experiences of consciousness through which we pass when we get separated from the body and come nearer and nearer to that which is more and more universal. Language fails here and words cannot express what all this really means. It is only an indication symbolically of miraculous experiences and wonders which we cannot dream of, through which we have to pass as a result of self-control and practice of meditation on Brahman.

Freedom untrammelled is our reward if we could practise this technique of meditation. We would be the possessors of all these treasures, the nectars and the trees exuding ambrosia and the oceans of nectar, etc., referred to here. All these would be our possessions and we would

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be rejoicing in these experience and be one with them provided that—a great condition is here- we are able to withdraw our senses and mind and centre our consciousness in that which we call Brahman. Then we are free and this freedom is what we call *Moksha*, Liberation.

BRAHMAN

The Upanishadic philosophers describe Brahman as having two aspects: *Saguṇa* and *Nīrguna*. When Brahman becomes conditioned by the upadhi of *Māyā*, it is called *Saguna*, Brahman. *Nirguna* Brahman is devoid of all qualifying characteristics. *Nirguna* Brahman is called also the Supreme Brahman (*para-Brahman*), while *Saguṅa* is called *apara Brahman*. The Upanishads ascribe numerous attributes to Brahman. He possesses many marvellous powers. Sitting, he proceeds after, laying, he goes everywhere....who is the bodiless among bodies, stable among the unstables, the great, all-pervading Soul. Besides such qualities which make Brahman incomprehensible, the Upanishadic philosophers also ascribe to Brahman numerous perfections. Unmoving, the one (*ekam*) is swifter than the mind. The sense-powers (*deva*) reached not it, speeding on before. Past others runnings, this goes standing. Eternal, all Pervading, Omni present, exceedingly subtle. Brilliant is it the light of lights. Vast, heavenly of un-thinkable forms, "Having an eye on every side and a face on every side, having an arm on every side, and a foot on every side." The person has a thousand heads, a thousand eyes, a thousands faces, He surrounds the earth on all sides, and stands ten fingers beyond. He is the Lord of all; He is the knower of all. He is the controller within. He is the source of all; and He is that from which all things originate and in which they finally disappear. He is the fountain of all blessed qualities and the consummation of such divine attributes as power strength, glory knowledge, and virility.

By a fraction of His power He upholds all beings. The Upanishadic seers say that Brahman is the Supreme Lord, greater than the great, and free from the least trace of suffering. He who in the Supreme Lord of lords, the Supreme Deity of deities, the Supreme Ruler of rulers — Him let us know as God, adorable and paramount, the Lord of the world. *Saguna* Brahman is called *Isvara* because He is all powerful, the Ruler of the entire universe. The seers say, 'that all created objects, and the all-powerful Māyā as well as, are under His control. The non-dual Lord of Māyā rules alone by his power...there is one *Rudra* only they do not allow a second-who rules all the worlds by His powers'. Under His control the sun, the moon, and the planets perform their allotted functions. Because of His power a moral order controls, the universe as well as man's life. "There is one Supreme Ruler, the inner-most Self of all beings, who makes His one from manifold..... there is one who is the eternal Reality among non-eternal objects, the one (truly) conscious entity among conscious objects, and who, though non-dual, fulfills the desires of many." This Brahman can inspire great terror, like a thunder bolt ready to Him the sun rises; from terror of Him fire, Indra, and death, perform their respective duties. The different gods, the powerful cosmic forces, are His manifestations through Maya. They are entirely dependent upon Him. The Upanishads describe Him as Maheshvara. If the Lord wishes to lad a man up from these worlds, He makes him do a good deed, and that if the Lord wishes to lead him down from these worlds, He makes him do a bad deed. This is not to be confused with the doctrine of prestination.

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The text only means that no action, good or bad, is possible without the power of the Lord. Brahman is like al light: with its help a good man performs righteous action, an evil man the reverse, but the light is impartial, though without it no action can be performed. Man reaps the result of his own action.

Sageena Brahma

Brahman, without any external compulsion, assumes the upadhi of Māyā and appears as the universe and its creator. Thus He becomes pervading in the universe, from the relative standpoints.

The philosophers of the Upanishads give descriptions of both the *transcendent* and the *immanent* aspects of Brahman. The immanent Brahman dwells in the universe. The Upanisadic passages describing the Immanent Brahman show a *pantheistic* trend of thought. Brahman has become the universe. But does Brahman exhaust Himself in the universe? Knowledge of alal Gods certainly not because Brahman, in His own nature remains transcendent. He is eternal one. The Katha Upanishad very clearly describes both the immanent and the transcendent aspects of Brahman: "As the non-dual fire, after it has entered the world, becomes different according to whatever it burns, so also the same non-dual Ātman, dwelling in all beings, becomes different according to whatever it enters. And it exists also without....As the sun, which helps all eyes to see, is not affected by the blemishes of the eyes or of the external things revealed by it, so also the one Ātman, dwelling in all beings, is never contaminated by the misery of the world, being outside it."

The thought of Divine immanence is traced to such an extent that it leads them into thoroughgoing pantheistic utterances, "Having entered into it, He became both the actual (*Sat*) and the yon (*Tyat*), both the defined, and the undefined, both the based and the non-based, both the conscious (*Vijnāna*) and the unconscious (*ajnana*) both the real (*Satya*) and the false (*anrita*). As the real, He became whatever there is here." The same view appears also in the later Upanishads. 'By the Lord enveloped most this all be whatever moving there is in the moving world. He who on all things looks as just in the Self (Ātman), and on the Self as in all beings he does not shrink away from Him." The Mundaka, in language reminiscent of the Rigvedic idea of the Primeval Purusha, from various parts of whose body the universe came into being "Fire in His head; His eyes, the moon and sun. The regions of space; His ears; His voice, the revealed Vedas, Wind, His breath; His heart, the whole world; out of His feet, the earth. Truly, He is the Inner Soul of all. From Him, the seas and mountains all. From Him roll rivers of every kind. And from Him all herbs, the essence too, where by that Inner Soul dwells in beings." Similarly the Śvetaśvatara describes Brahman as the soul which pervades all things as butter is contained is cream. The pre-dominant thought of the Upanishads seems, therefore, to be that Brahman pervades the world. Everything is regarded as dependent on Brahman who resides in them as their inner power, that the Śvetaśvatara even proceeds to speak of Brahman poetically as Himself these various objects. That surely is Agni. That is Adity. That is Vayu, and this is the moon. That surely is the pure. That is the waters. That is Prajāpati. 'Thou art woman. Thou art man. Thou art the youth and the maiden too. Thou as an old man tollerest with a staff. Being born thou becomest facing in every direction."

The Upanishadic philosophers make it

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clear that Brahman is not only the operative cause of the universe, but also its material cause; i.e., that the universe depends on Brahman, not only for its energising power, but also for its very substance. Thus the universe with all its diversity depends for its matter as well as its form on Him. The early cosmogonies always proceed, as we saw, by saying that Brahman, (Ātman) existed alone at the beginning, and then created the world out of Himself. They do not recognise a second Principle existing side by side with the Creator and providing Him with the materials necessary for Creation. Accordingly, they picture creation predominantly as an emanation spider might come out with his thread, as small sparks come forth from the fire, even so from this Soul come forth all vital energies (*Prāna*) all worlds, all gods, all beings. Thus it is clear that only Brahman is the material cause as well as the efficient cause of the universe. So He is the essence all things and everything of the world is dependent on Him.

The very definition of Brahman is the Vedanta Sutras is, as we have stated: Whence is the origin, continuance, and dissolution of the universe. This definition is called as Tatasthalakshana. We find this definition of Brahman is Taittiriya Upanishad. The Chhandogya Upanishad reveals 'Tajjalan' as a secret name of Brahman by which He should be worshipped. According to Sankara the meaning of the formula is this: From this (*Tad*) Brahman the universe has arisen (*Ja*). So on the reverse path to that by which it has a risen, it disappears (li) into this identical Brahman. And in the same way, finally it is Brahman, in whom the universe, after it is created, breaths (an), lives, and moves. Therefore in the three periods (past, present, and future) the universe is not distinct from Brahman. The word *Tajjalan* is a mysterious name of the universe as identified with Brahman. According to Sankara's view therefore we should have before us already in the name *Tajjalan* (*Tan-Ja-La-an*) as summerising of the three attributes of Brahman as creator, preserver and destroyer of the universe. Brahman is not only the creator, but also the preserver of the universe. The worlds come from Brahman and He alone preserves them all. In the Kaush. Upanishad, it is said. "He is the protector of the universe, He is the ruler of the universes. It means that the Atman as protector of the universe maintains things in their conditions. And that He as ruler of the universe guides the creatures in their action.

Brahman is the womb into which the universe again returns. Hence He is called the Destroyer. In the Birh. Upanishad Brahman is said to be *Aditi* because all that He creates, again He resolves to devour. He devours every-thing, therefore He is the *Atta*. The various beings come forth from Brahman and again return unto Him. In the Mandukya also it is said: 'He is the Lord of all. He is the knower of all. He is the inner controller. He is the source of all; for from Him all beings originate and in Him they finally disappear.

Creation means, really, the beginning of the present cycle, because the creation is really, beginningless. Each creation presupposes an earlier one and consequently no creation can be the first. Therefore the Rigveda says, that The Lord creates in this cycle the sun and moon as they existed in the previous cycle. So creation is a never-ending process. In this way, it is clear that according to the Upanishadic philosophers Brahman is the only cause of the universe. He is the essence of all.

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BRAHMAN AS EXISTENCE-KNOWLEDGE-BLISS

In the Taittiriya Upanishad Brahman is defined as *'Satyam-Jnānam-anantam Brahma*. Brahman is pure being, pure consciousness, and infinity. In the Birth. Upanishad Brahman is described as *Vijnānam ānandam-Brahma*. He is knowledge and bliss. Paul Deussen quotes Sarvopanishatsara, No. 21, where Brahman is defined as true, knowledge, infinite, bliss. According to some Vedantins, the words: Sat, Chit, and *Ānandam* refer *Saguna* Brahman, and according to others, to *Nirguna* Brahman. The former group contends that the words are positive characterising terms, and therefore cannot be employed in connection with the Supreme Brahman, which is to be described as only by negation. But the others say that these words can very well refer to the attributeless Brahman: for these words are used in a negative sense. *Sat* indicates that Brahman is not *asat: chit;* that Brahman is not *ajnāna* or nescient; and *ānandam*, that Brahman is not a mere absence of Pain. If we define Brahman as *'Satyam-jnānam, anantam Brahma*, then the word *anantam* means infinity, so the meaning will be, the Brahman is limitless. Brahman is not limited by anything.

According to some vedantins this definition of Brahman is *Swaroopalakshana*. But we think that it is not a *Swaroopalakshana*, because it is not possible to describe the true nature of Brahman. No definition can directly define Brahman. Only indirectly Brahman is definable. so by *Swaroopalakshana* also we can define Brahman directly, and therefore *Satyamjānana-manantam-Brahma*. This definition is *Tatasthalakshana*.

Brahman is pure existence. Brahman does not exist as an empirical object for instance, like a pot or a tree, but as Absolute Existence, without which material objects would not be perceived to exist. Just as a mirage cannot be seen without the desert, which is its unrelated substratum. So also the universe cannot exist without Brahman. Further, when the Vedanta Philosophy describes the creation to be an appearance, there must be a principle ground of appearance. Without the reality, an appearance cannot appear. No object apparent or otherwise, can exist without the foundation of an immutable existence, and tat is Brahman, is to be understood as the negation of both empirical reality and its correlative unreality. The universe is not, in reality, other than Brahman. In the Chhandogya Upanishad the saga Aruni gives instruction to his son. Svetaketu, says the father, since you are so conceited, considering yourself so well read, and so stern, my dear, have you ever asked for that instruction, by which we hear what cannot be heared, by which we perceive what cannot be perceived, by which we know what cannot be known? What is that instruction, sir? asks the son. Aruni replies: My dear, just as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay may be known, the difference (*Vikāra*) being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is clay; just as, my dear, by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold may be known, the difference being only a name arising from speech but the truth being that all is gold.

The effect, apart from the cause, is nothing but a name, a mere matter of words; it is, in essence, the same as the cause. We distinguish the effect from the cause by superimposing upon the latter a name of and form to serve a practical purpose of life in the empirical world. This name and form apart from the substratum,

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is not real. The non-dual Brahman alone appears as the universe and its objects. Just as, from the standpoint of name and form, one distinguishes between a bracelet and an ear-ring, so also, from the standpoint of name and form, one makes distinctions between the various objects of the world, yet all are, in reality, Brahman. For nothing whatsoever exists but Brahman. If a man believes that he see something other than Brahman, he does not know the fact.

Brahman is *chit*, or pure consciousness. Professor Paul Deussen says: "The conception of the Ātman implies that the first principle of things must above all be sought in man's inner self." Many philosophers in the East and the West have come to the conclusion that the soul is to be conceived of as something similar to reason, spirit, thought, or intelligence. Brahman is pure knowledge. The Aitareya Upanishad says, "It....is known in accordance with its different functions as consciousness, Lordship, knowledge, wisdom,...all these are but various names of consciousness (*Prjanānam*).....All this is guided by consciousness (*Prnjnānam*), is supported but consciousness. The basis of the universe is consciousness. Consciousness is Brahman." the Quoting above version, Professor Ranade says," This is as outspoken an Idealism as Idealism can be. "He compares this Upanishadic Idealism with that of Berkeley and says, "This is in the very spirit of Berkeley." The Katha Upanishad describes Brahman as the One conscious Entity among all the conscious objects. By Brahman's light all this is lighted. Yajnavalkya describes this Brahman as *Swayamjyoti* The Self-luminous. According to the Upanishadic philosophers the Self is reality, the Reality is pure consciousness. The reality is identical with consciousness.

Brahman is pure Bliss. Brahman is the immeasurable ocean of Bliss— the Bliss that knows no change. It is important to remember that no real Bliss is possible without knowledge or consciousness. In the Chhandogya, it is said of the Brahma-world "All evils turn back therefore, for that Brahma-world is freed from evil." And it is asserted that the Brahman-Atman is free from evil, ageless, deathless, sorrowless, hunger-less, thirstless. His name is exalted, for He is exalted above all evil. All these frequently recurring descriptions are summed up in the designation of Brahman as *Ānandam* or Bliss. Brahman is not possessing bliss, but bliss that is the very substance of Brahman. The Bliss which is identified with Brahman, is not to be confused with worldly happiness which a man experiences when in contact with an agreeable sense-object. Worldly bliss is but a part of the Bliss of Infinite Brahman, the Bliss of Brahman coming through an earthly medium. The Bliss of Brahman pervades all objects. Without the Bliss, man cannot live. By a small portion of this Supreme Bliss, all other creatures live. The chief passage treating of Brahman as Bliss is the Brahmanandavalli, Taitt, 2. Here Brahman is described as *Ānandamaya*. It is said "He who knows the Bliss of Brahman he is not afraid of anything whatsoever. The Atman consists of Bliss." It is said again— "Love is his head, Joy His right side; *Pramoda* His left side; Bliss His trunk, Brahman His under part, His base." Bhrigu, the son of Varuna, realizes that Bliss (*Ānanda*) is Brahman; for all the beings come from Bliss. This Upanishad describes the gradation of blisses upto the bliss of Brahman in its *Brahmanandavalli* that This human bliss, multiplied one hundred times, is one measure of the bliss of the human Gandharvas,.....This bliss of the divine-Gandharvas, multiplied one

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hundred times, is one measure of the bliss of the fathers of their long-enduring world a hundred blisses of the fathers in their long-enduring world are one bliss of the gods who are born so by birth (*ājāna-ja*)......A hundred blisses of the gods who are born so by birth are one bliss of the gods who are gods by work (*karma-deva*) who go to the gods by work.....A hundred blisses of the gods who are gods by work are one bliss of the gods......, A hundred blisses of the gods are one bliss of Indra. A hundred blisses of Indra are one bliss of Brihaspati.....A hundred blisses of Brihaspati are one bliss of Prajapati.........A hundred blisses of Prajapati are one bliss of *Brahma*. This bliss of Brahma is identical with Brahman. Brahman is said to be Bhuma, the Infinite. The chhandogya says "That Infinite indeed, is below. It is above, It is behind. It is before, It is to the south. It is to the north. The infinite, indeed, is all this, and He who sees this, who thinks this, who understands this, who has pleasure in the soul, who has delight in the Soul, who inter-courses with the soul, who has bliss in the Soul he is autonomous (*Swaraj*), he has unlimited freedom in all the worlds,"

The Infinite (*Bhuma*) is bliss and bliss is Brahman. There is no bliss in anything finite. Only the Infinite is bliss. One must desire to understand the Infinite. "Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understand nothing else—that is the Infinite. Where one sees something else, hears something else, understands something else—that is the finite. The Infinite is immortal, the finite mortal."

Brahman itself is pure Existence, pure Consciousness and pure Bliss-all are one. It is its very nature to be such. Brahman is not a substance having these qualities or even a subject knowing or feeling these qualities. But existence, consciousness and bliss are one here. The Real is the Rational and the Rational is the Real. So also the Real is the Bliss and the Bliss is the Real. But ultimately Brahman is devoid of all qualities. All distinctions of substance and qualities cease here. To define Brahman as mere existence, different from consciousness is to admit quality in Brahman. The Shastra says that Brahman is *Vijnānaghana*-All consciousness. Brahman cannot be defined as mere existence and consciousness, different from bliss, because Brahman is the only source of all happiness. So it is pure Bliss. But ultimately three are one. From the metaphysical standpoint, Brahman is pure Existence. From the epistemological standpoint. It is pure Consciousness and from the ethical standpoint, It is pure Bliss. It is the Absolute.

Nirguna Brahman

Nirguna Brahman, as has already been stated, cannot be characterized by any indicative marks, qualities, or attributes. Therefore, It is not describable by words. From whence all speech, with the mind, turns away, unable to reach It. *Nirguna* Brahman is the negation of all attributes and relations. It is beyond time, space, and causality. Though It is spaceless, yet without It space could not exist; through It is timeless, yet without It time could not exist; though It is causeless, yet without it the universe cannot exist. Only if one admits the existence of *Nirguna* Brahman as an unchanging substratum can one understand proximity in space, succession in time, and independence in the chain of causality. No description of It, is possible except by the denial of all empirical attributes, definitions, and relations; *neti-neti*-not this, not this.

It is soundless, intangible, formless, undecaying, and likewise tasteless,

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eternal, and odourless; It is without beginning and end, beyond and unchanging reality. The Mundaka says, "It is invisible, ungraspable, without sight or hearing is It, without hand or foot, eternal." This *Nirguna* Brahman is indefinable, inconceivable, so mere negative statements are all that can be asserted of this Pure Being which is void of the qualification, determination, and diversity implied in descriptive attribution. One can use here the famous dictum of Spinoza;' "Omnis determinato negatioest"— All determining is a negating.

Sometimes the Upanishads ascribe the Brahman irreconciable attributes in order to deny in It all emirical predicates and to show that It is totally other than anything, we know. 'That non-dual Ātman, though never stirring, is swifter than the mind. The devas cannot reach It, for It moves ever in front. Though standing still, It overtakes others, who are running." Brahman is above causation, causality is operative only in realm of becoming and cannot affect Pure Being. Brahman is not the creator of the universe in the sense that a potter is the creator of a pot, nor the cause of the universe in the sense that milk is the cause of curds. No change is possible in Brahman; It is itself causeless.

We have seen that the Upanishads speak of both forms of Brahman, *Para* and *Apara*, the Transcendent as well as Immanent. It does not mean that the Upanishads describe the two contradictory aspects of the same Reality as separately real. In fact there is no contradiction al all. The transcedence of Brahman, which we have tried to depict, has no opposition to immanence, if we rightly comprehend Its nature. The Upanishads speak of two aspects of Brahman and not of a third beyond both, because, according to them, there is no relation of opposition between immanence and transcedence which are to be reconciled in a third natural entity. Here the transcendence itself signifies the real nature of the Absolute of Brahman and the very transcedent Reality is viewed as Immanent when looked at from the end of the world. Spirit-in-itself is transcendent, spirit is immanent in reference to the order of expression The Transcendent alone is Truth the Dynamic Divine is the Transcendent presented in the aspect of relation. The transcedent is called *Para*; The Supreme or the Higher, and the Immanent '*Apara*' or the not Supreme- or the lower. The immanent is 'Apara' in the sense that it is the view of Reality through a medium or relation and hence not direct or intimate, while the Transcedent is the view of Reality in and through itself, and hence '*Para*' but we must view Reality Through the relation first, and then to pass beyond all relations. Brahman is the Absolute. In fact, the Absolute is the existence of all existence, the truth of all truths, the Reality of all realities. There is no plurality here. Those who are engrossed in plurality go on revolving in the cycle of birth and death. Fear proceeds from diversity. Unity is fear lessness. Just as rivers, leaving their names and forms, merge in the ocean so a wiseman, arising above name and form, becomes one with the Absolute. The Absolute is not limited by anything. It is free from the limitations of past, present, and future. It is described as eternal, without beginning or end. IT is other than what has and what is to be. From the standpoint of the Absolute, everything is Brahman. Nothing can be there other than Brahman.

BRAHMOPANISHAḌ

This Upanishad is intended to give a complete and clear idea of the nature of Āṭmā that has four avasthas (states of consciousness) and four seats, for the

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better consummation of th nirguna dhyana.

Śaunaka Mahāsala questioned the holy Sage Pippalāḍa of the Angiras goṭra thus: "In this beautiful Brahmapura of body, the fit residence of divine beings, how are (the deities of) vāk, etc., located? How do they function? To whom belongs this power? He to whom this power belongs, what is He?"

Pippalāḍa then having deeply considered, imparted to him the Brahmaviḍyā (divine wisdom), that most excellent of all things. "It is prāṇa (i.e.,) Āṭmā. It is Atma that exercises this power. It is the life of all Ḍevas. It is their death and (their) life. Brahman that shines pure, nishkala, resplendent, and all-pervading, in this divine Brahmapura (of body), rules (all). The Jīva (identifying himself with) the inḍriyas, rules them like a spider. The spider throws out from a single thread out of his body a whole web, and draws it into himself by that same thread; so prāṇa, whenever it goes, draws after it the objects of its creation (vāk, etc.). During sushupti, (the prāṇa) goes to its seat (Brahman) through the nādis of which is the ḍevaṭā, like an eagle, that making air as the means of communication, reaches his abode. They say, as ḍevaḍaṭṭa, though beaten (during sushupṭi) by a s tick, etc., does not move, so also the actor does not suffer or enjoy for the merits or demerits of religious actions. Just as a child obtains happiness without desiring for it (in play), so also ḍevaḍaṭṭa obtains happiness in sushupti. He certainly knows, (being) Param—Jyotis, and the person desiring jyoṭis, enjoys bliss in the contemplation of jyotis. Then he comes back to the dream-plane by the same way, like a caterpillar. It remaining on a blade or grass, first puts forward its foot on another blade in front, conveys its body to it, and having got a firm hold of it, then only leaves the former and not before, So this is the jāgraṭa state. As this (ḍevaḍaṭṭa) bears at the same time eight skulls, so this jāgraṭa, the source of Ḍevas and Veḍas, clings to a man like the breasts in a woman. During the jāgraṭa avasṭhā, merit and demerit are postulated of this Ḍeva (power); he is capable of great expansion and is the inner mover. He is khaga (bird), karkata (crab), pushkara (ākāś), prāṇa, pain, parāpara, Āṭmā and Brahman. This deity causes to know. He who knows thus obtains Brahman, the supreme, the support of all things, and the Ksheṭrajna. He obtains Brahman, the supreme, support of all things, and the Ksheṭrajna.

"The Pursuha has four seats-navel, heart, neck, and head. There Brahman with the four feet specially shines. Those feet are jagraṭa, svapna, sushupṭi, and ṭurya. In jagraṭa he is Brahmā, in svapna Vishṇu, in sushupṭi Ruḍra, and in ṭurya the supreme Akshara. He is Āḍiṭya, Vishnu, Īsvara, Purusha, prāṇa, jīva, agni, the resplendent. The Para-Brahman shines in the midst of these. He is without manas, ear, hands, feet, and light. There the worlds are no worlds, Ḍevas no Ḍevas, Veḍas no Veḍas, sacrifices no sacrifices, mother no mother, father no future, daughter-in-law no daughter-in-law, chaṇḍāla no chaṇḍāla, paulkasa no paulkasa, śramana no śramana , hermits no hermits; so one only Brahman shines as different. In the Hṛḍayākāś (ākāś in the heart) is the Chiḍākāś. That is Brahman. It is extremely subtle. The Hṛḍayākāś can be known. This moves in it. In Brahman, everything is strung. Those who thus know the Lord know everything is strung. Those who thus know the Lord know everything. In him the Ḍevas, the worlds,the Piṭṛs and the Ṛshis do not rule. He who has awakened knows everything. All the Ḍevas are in the heart; in the heart are all the prāṇas; in the heart are prāṇa,

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jyoṭis and that three-plied holy thread. In the heart in Chaiṭanya, it (prāṇa) is. Put on the yajnopaviṭa (holy thread), the supreme, the holy, which came into existence along with the Prajāpaṭi, which gives long life and which is very excellent; let this give you strength and ṭejas. The wise man having shaved his head completely, should throw away the external thread. He should wear, as the holy thread, the supreme and indestructible Brahman. It is called sūṭra, because sūchanāṭ (indicating) (that the Āṭmā is in the heart). Sūṭra means the supreme abode. He who knows that sūṭra is a vipra (brāhmaṇa), he has crossed the ocean of the Veḍas. On that sūṭra (thread), everything is strung, like the beads on the thread. The yogin, well versed in yoga and having a clear perception of Truth, should wear the thread. Practising the noble yoga, the wise man should abandon the external thread. He who wears the sūṭra as Brahman, he is an intelligent being. By wearing the sūṭra, he is not polluted. They whose sūṭra is within, whose yajnopavīṭa is jnāna-they only know the sūṭra, and, they only wear the yajnopavīṭa in this world. Those whose tuft of hair i.e. janāna, who are firmly grounded in jnāna and whose yajnopavīṭa is jnāna, consider jnāna only as supreme.

Jnāna is holy and excellent. He whose śikhā (tuft of hair) is jnāna like the śikhi (flame of agni) — he, the wise one; only wears a true śikhā; others wear a mere tuft of hair. Those brāhmaṇas and others who perform the ceremonies prescribed in the Vedas- they wear this thread only as a symbol of their ceremonies. Those who know the Veḍas say that he only is a true brāhmaṇa who wears the śikhā of jnāna and whose yajnopavīṭa is the same (jnāna). This yajnopaviṭa (Yajna means Vishṇu or sacrifice and Upavīṭa is that which surrounds; hence that which surrounds Vishṇu) is supreme and is the supreme refuge. He who wears that really knows- he only wears the sutra, he is Yajna (Vishṇu) and he only knows Yajna (Vishṇu). One God hidden in all things, pervades all things and is the Inner Life of all things. He awards the fruits of karma, he lives in all things, he see all things without any extraneous help, he is the soul of all, there is nothing like him, and he is without any gunas (being secondless). He is the great wise one. He is the one doer among the many actionless objects. He is always making one thing appear as several (by māyā). Those wise men who see him in buḍḍhi, they only obtain eternal peace. Heaving, made Āṭmā as the (upper) araṇi (attritional piece of wood) and Praṇava the lower araṇi, by constant practice of ḍhyāna one should see the concealed deity. As the oil in the sesamum seed, as the ghee in the curds, as the water in the rivers, and as the fire in the arani, so they who practise truth and austerities see Him in the buḍḍhi. As the spider throws out and draws into itself the threads, so the jīva goes and returns during the jagrata and the svapna states. The heart is in the form of a closed lotus-flower, with its head hanging down; it has a hole in the top. Know it to be the great abode of All.

Know that during jāgraṭa it (jīva) dwells in the eye, and during svapna in the throat; during sushupti, it is in the heart and during turya in the head. (Because buḍḍhi unites) the Praṭyagāṭma with the Paramāṭma, the worship of sanḍhyā (union) arose. So we should perform sanḍhyāvanḍana (rites). The sanḍhyā-vanḍana performed by ḍhyāna requires no water. It gives no trouble to the body or the speech. That which unites all things is the sandhya of the one-staffed (sannyāsins). Knowing That from which speech and mind turn back without being able to

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obtain it and That which is the bliss of jīva, the wise one is freed. The secret of Brahmaviḍyā is to reveal the real nature of the Āṭmā, that is all-pervading, that is like ghee in the milk, that is the source of āṭmaviḍyā and tapas and to show that everything is in essence one.

"So ends the Brahmopanishaḍ".

BRIHAD ARANYAKA UPANISHAD

This Upanishad is called *Brihad*, 'great', on account of its length. Dr. Roer's translation, with extracts from Sankaracharya's Commentary, occupies 318 pp., making a volume of itself. It forms the seventeenth book of the Satapatha-Brahmana of the White Yajur-Veda, and is divided into six adhyayas or chapters. Other names given to it are Vajasaneya Bramha Upanishad, and Kanwa Upanishad.

Sankara, in his "brief" commentary on this Upanishad, says that it is "composed for the sake of those who wish to liberate themselves from the world, in order that they may acquire the knowledge that Bramha, and the soul are the same, a knowledge by which the liberation from the cause of the world (ignorance) is accomplished."

The Upanishad abounds with wearisome repetitions like the following;—

"He who dwelling in the heavens, is within the heavens, whom the heavens do not know, whose body are the heavens, who from within rules the heavens, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal."

He who dwelling in the sun, is within the sun, whom the sun does not know, whose body is the sun, who from within rules the sun, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal.

He who dwelling in the quarters, is within the quarters, whom that quarters do not know, whose body are the quarters, who from within rules the quarters, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal.

He who dwelling in the moon and stars, is within the moon and stars, whom the moon and stars do not know, whose body are the moon and stars, who from within rules the moon and stars, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal.

He who dwelling in the either, is within the ether, whom the ether does not know, whose body is the ether, who from within rules the ether, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal.

He who dwelling in the darkness, is within the darkness, whom the darkness does not know, whose body is the darkness, who from within rules the darkness, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal.

He who dwelling in the light, is within the light, whom the light does not know, whose body is the light, is within the light, whom the light does not know, whose body is the light, who from within rules the light, is the soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. III. 7.

Only selections will be given, including some of the most important passages.

The Upanishad commences as follows;—

First Bráhmana

Om! The dawn in truth is the head of the sacrificial horse. The sun is the eye; the wind the breath; the fire, under the name Vaisvanara, the open mouth; the year the body of the sacrificial horse. The heaven is the back; the atmosphere the belly; the earth the footstool (hoof); the quarters the sides; the intermediate quarters the bones of the sides; the seasons the members; the months, and the half months, are the joints; day and night the feet; the constellations the bones; the sky the muscles; the half digested food the sand; the rivers arteries and veins; the liver and spleen the mountains; the herbs and trees the various kinds of hair. The sun, as long as he rises, is the fore-part

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of the body; the sun as long as he descends, is the hind part of the body. The lightning is like yawning; the shaking of the members is like the rolling of the thunder; the passing of urine is like the rain of the clouds; its voice is like speech.

The day is the Mahima, placed before the horse; its birth-place is the eastern sea; the night the other Mahima, which is placed behind the horse; its birthplace is the western sea; these Mahimas are placed around the horse. The horse, under the name of Haya, carried the gods, under the name of Vaji the Gaudharvas, under the name of Arva, Asurs, under the name of Aswa, men. The sea is its companion, the sea its birth place.

Conclusion of the Third Brahmana

Therefore afterwards the rite of Abhyaroha of the Pavamana *Stotras* is defined. The prasier verily praises the Sama. Where he praises it, there let him mutter these *Mantras*:

From the unreal lead me to the real, from darkness lead me to light, from death lead me to immortality.

In the words of the Mantras: From the unreal lead me to the real, death is the unreal, the real immortality; from death lead me to immortality, which implies render me immortal.

Further in the words: From darkness lead me to light, death is darkness, light immortality; from death lead me to immortality, which implies render me immortal. In the last Mantra: From death lead me to immortality, there is nothing concealed.

Therefore in those Sutras he may choose a blessing. Whatever desire he may desire, the same *he may choose*; viz. the Udgata who thus knows. Whatever desire he may desire either for himself or the sacrificer, the same to accomplishes by the recital. This verily overcomes the worlds. There is verily no doubt to be worthy of the worlds for him who thus knows this Sama?

Account of Creation!

This was before soul bearing the shape of a man. Looking round he beheld nothing but himself. He said first: 'This am I'. Hence the name of I is produced. Therefore even now a man, when called, says first: 'It is I,' and tells afterwards any other name that belongs to him. *And* because he as the first of all of them consumed by fire all the sins, therefore he is *called* Purusha. He verily consumes him who before this strives to obtain the state of Prajapati, he namely who thus knows.

He was afraid; therefore man, when alone, is afraid. He then looked round: Since nothing but myself exists, of whom should I be afraid? Hence his fear departed; for whom should he fear, since fear arises from another.

He did thus not feel delight. Therefore nobody when alone feels delight. He was desirous of a second. He was in the same state as husband (pati) and wife (patni) are when in mutual embrace. He divided this two fold. Hence were husband and wife produced. Therefore was this only a half of himself, as a split pea *is of the whole*. Thus verily has Yajnavalkya declared it. This void as thus completed by woman. He approached her. Hence men are born.

She verily reflected: how can he approach me, whom he has produced from himself? Alas, I will conceal myself. Thus she became a cow, the other a bull. He approached her, hence kine were born. The one became a mare and the other a stallion, the one a female ass, the other a male ass. He approached her. Hence the one-hoofed kind was born. The one became a female goat, the other a male goat, the one became a ewe, the other a ram. He approached her. Hence goat and

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sheep were born. In this manner he created every thing whatsoever down to the ants.

He knew; I am verily this creation; for I created this all. Hence the *name of creation is derived.* Verily he who thus knows, becomes in this creation *like him.*

Then he churned From his mouth, as the place of production, and from his hands he created the fire. Both therefore are inside without hair; for the place of production is inside without hair.

That they speak there this word: Sacrifice to this, sacrifice to this, hence sacrifice to the one or the other god, is not proper. This is really this creation; for he verily is all the gods.

Then whatsoever is moist, the same he created from his semen, this is the Soma. So much is this whole universe, either food, or the eater of food. Soma is the food, and Agni the eater of the food. This is the surpassing creation of Bramha. Because he from the better parts created the gods, *and also*, because he, a mortal, created the immortals, therefore is it a surpassing creation. He who thus knows, becomes in this surpassing creation *like Prajapati*........

Bramha verily was this before one alone. Being one, he did not extend. He with concentrated power created the Kshatra of elevated nature, *viz.*, all those Kshatras, who are protectors among the gods, Indra, Varuna, Soma, Rudra, Prajanya, Yama, Death and Isana. Therefore none greater than the Kshatra; thereupon the Bramhana, under Kshatriya, worships at the Rajasuya ceremony. The Kahatra alone gives *him* his glory. Brahma is thus the birth-place of the Kshatra. Therefore, although the king obtains the highest dignity, he at last takes refuge in the Bramha as in his birthplace. Whoever despises him, destroys his birth-place. He is a very great sinner, like a man who injures a superior.

He did not extend. He created the Vit. He is all those gods who, according to their classes, are called Vasus, Rudras, Adityas, Viswedevas, and Maruts.

He did not extend. He created the caste of the Sudras as the nourisher. This *earth* is the nourisher; for it nourishes all this whatsoever.

He did not extend; he created with concentrated power justice of eminent nature. This justice is the preserver (Kshatra) of the Kshatra. There is nought higher than justice. Even the weak is confident *to defeat* the more powerful by justice, as *a house-holder* by the king. Verily justice is true. Therefore they say of a person who speaks the truth, he speaks justice, or of a person who speaks justice, he speaks the truth, in manner verily it is both.

This *is the creation* of the Brahma, the Kshatra, the Vit and the Sudra. He was in the form of Agni (fire) among the gods as Bramha, he was the Bramhna among men in the form of Kshatriya, Kshatriya; in the form of Vaisya, Vaisya; in the form of Sudra, Sudra; therefore among the gods the place (loka) is desired through Agni only, among men through the Brahmana, because in their forms Bramha became *manifest.*

Self (the soul) alone was this before; he was even one. He desired; Let me have a wife; again, —let me be born; again, let me have wealth; again,—let me perform work. So far extend verily desire. For without desire one does not get more than this. Therefore also now a person, when alone, desires. Let me have a wife,—again, let me be born,—again, let me have wealth,—again let me perform work. As long as he does not obtain one of them, so long he thinks himself incomplete. His completeness is this, that the mind is his self (soul) and speech his wife. Life is their offspring, the eye the wealth of men; for by

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the eyes one obtains it,— the ear *the wealth* of the gods; for by the ear one hears it: self is even his work,—for by self one performs work.

The sacrifice is five-fold, the animal, five-fold, the man five-fold this all whatsoever. Whosoever thus knows, the same obtains this all.

The Meaning of Putra

Hence again the making over. When *the father* thinks he is to die, then he says to his son: "Thou art Brahma, thou art the sacrifice, thou art the world." The son repeats: "I am Brahma, I am the sacrifice, I am the world." Of all that has been read, is Brahma the identity. Of all the sacrifices that *are to be performed*, is sacrifice the identity. OF all the worlds that are to be conquered, is world the identity. Thus far extends verily all this. All this multitude preserve me from this *world*. Therefore they call a son who is instructed Lokya; therefore they instruct him. When he, having such a knowledge, departs from this world, then he enters together with those lives the son. If by him anything through negligence remains undone, the son liberates him from all this. Hence the name of a son (Putra). He continues by a son alone in this world. Then those divine immortal lives enter him.

Origin of the Vedas, etc.

As from fire, made of damp wood, proceed smoke, sparks, &., of various kinds, thus, behold, is the breathing of this great Being, the Rig Veda, the Yajur Veda, the Sama Veda, The Atharvangirasa, the narratives (Itihasa) the doctrines on creation (Purana), the science (Vidya) the Upanishads, the memorial verses (Slokas) the aphorisms (Sutras), the explanation of tenets (Anuvyakhyanani) the explanation, of Mantras (Vyakhyanani), all these are his breathing.

Questions of Gargi

Then asked him Gargi, the daughter of Vachaknu,— "Yajnavalkya," said she, "all this (earth) is woven and rewoven" (He replied), — "On the wind, O Gargi." "On what then is woven and rewoven the wind?" "On the worlds of the atmosphere, Gargi." "On what then are woven and rewoven the worlds of the atmosphere?" "On the worlds of the Gandharvas, O Gargi." "On what then are woven and rewoven the worlds of the Gandharvas?" "On the worlds of A'ditya, O Gargi." "On what then are wove and rewoven the worlds of A'ditya?" "On the worlds of the moon, O Gargi." "On what then are woven and rewoven the worlds of the moon?" "On the worlds of the stars, O Gargi." "On what then are the worlds of the stars woven and rewoven?" "On the worlds of the gods, O Gargi." "On what worlds of Indra, O Gargi." "On what then are woven and rewoven the worlds of Indra?" "On the worlds of Prajapati, O Gargi." "On what then are woven and rewoven the worlds of Prajapati?" "On the worlds of Brahma, O Gargi." "On what then are woven and rewoven the worlds of Brahma." "Gargi," said he, "do not ask an improper question, in order that thy head may not drop down. Thou askest the deity which is not to be questioned. Do not question, O Gargi. Thence Gargi, the daughter of Vachaknu, became silent."

Number of the Gods

Then asked him Vidagdha: the son of S'akala,—How many gods are there, O Yajnavalkya? He (answered),—

This can be learnt from the Nivit; as many (gods) as are mentioned in the Nivit of the Vais'vadeva (Sastra), (so many are there), (viz.,) "there and three hundred, and three and three thousand (3,306)." He said, —"Om ! How many gods are there, O

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Yajnavalkya?" "Thirty-three." -He said, —"Om ! How many gods are there?" He said, —"six," He said, —"Om ! How many gods are there, O Yajnavalkya?" "Three." He said, —"Om ! How many gods are there, O Yajnavalkya?" "Two." He said,— "Om ! How many gods are there, O Yajnavalkya?" "Adhyradha" "One." He said,—"Om ! Which are these three and three hundred, and three and three thousand."

He said,—"This is even for their glory; there are (in reality) thirty-three gods." "Which are those thirty-three?" "Eight Vasus, eleven Rudras, twelve A'dityas. These are thirty-one; besides Indra and Prajapati. These are thirty-three."

"Which are the Vasus?" "The fire, the earth, the wind, the atmosphere, the sun, the heavens, the moon, and the stars. These are the Vasus, for upon them this all is founded; this means Vasu, therefore they are called Vasus."

"Which are the Rudras?" "The ten organs (Pranah) in man, and the soul and the eleventh. When they leave this body after death, they weep. Therefore, because they weep (Rodayanti), they are called Rudras."

"Which are the A'dityas?" "The twelve months of the year are the A'dityas; for taking all this they pass. Because taking all this they pass (adadana yanti), therefore they are called A'dityas."

"Who is Indra, who is Prajapati?" "The cloud is Indra, the sacrifice is Prajapati." "Which is the cloud?" "The lightning." "Which is the sacrifice?" "The animals."

"Which are the six?" "The fire (Agni), the earth, the wind, the atmosphere, the sun and the heavens; for they are six; for this all is six."

"Which are the three gods?" "The three worlds, for within them all those gods are (comprehended)." "Which are the two gods?" "Food and life." "Which is the Adhyardha?" He who purifies."

"Here it is objected, —He who purifies, is one even; how then is he Adhyardha." "Because all obtain increase in him therefore is he Adhyardha." "Which is the one god?" "Life; this is called Brahma, this what is beyond."

Rebirths

As a leech when arrived at the top of a blade of grass, in order to gain another place of support, contracts itself; so the soul, in order to gain another place of support, contracts itself, after having thrown off this body and obtained (that state of) knowledge.

As a goldsmith, taking a piece of gold, forms another shape, which is more new and agreeable, so throwing off this body, and obtaining (that state of) knowledge, the soul forms a shape which is more new and agreeable, either suited to the world of the forefathers, or of the Gandharvas, or of the gods, or of Prajapati, or of Brahma, or of other beings.

The Condition of him who has obtained liberation while yet alive

This great unborn soul is the same which abides as the intelligent (soul) in all living creatures, the same which abides as ether in the heart; in him it sleeps; it is the subduer of all, the Ruler of all, the sovereign lord of all; it does not become greater by good works, nor less by evil work. It is the Ruler of all, the sovereign lord of all beings, the Preserver of all beings, the bridge, the Upholder of the worlds so that they fall to to ruin. In accordance with the word of the Vedas the Brahmans desire to comprehend him by sacrifice, gift, ascetic work and subduing of desires. One who knows him thus, becomes a Muni. Desiring him as (their) place, the wandering mendicants wander about. This is indeed the cause of the state of wandering mendicant), that the ancient

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sages did not desire offspring (thinking by themselves),—What shall we do by means of offspring. Those to whom, (like) us, the soul is the (supreme) place, lead the life of a religious mendicant, after they have abandoned the desire for a son, the desire for wealth and the desire for (heavenly) places; for the desire for a son is the same as the desire for wealth; the desire for wealth is the same as the desire for (heavenly) places; for both are even desires. The soul, which is not this, nor that, nor ought else, is intangible; for it cannot be laid hold of, it is not to be dissipated; for it cannot be dissipated; it is without contact, for it does not come into contact; it is not limited; it is not subject to pain nor to destruction; those two do verily not subdue him; therefore (he does not say,) —I have done evil, or I have done good. He subdues them both; neither good nor evil deeds agitate him.

The same is said in the following Rik,—"The eternal greatness of the Brahman is neither increased by work, nor diminished. Let him even know the nature of that (greatness); knowing that (greatness), he is not stained by evil work. Therefore one who thus knows, who has subdued his senses, who is calm, free from all desires, enduring, and composed in mind, beholds the soul in the soul alone, beholds the whole soul; sin does not subdue him; he subdues sin; sin does not consume him; he consumes sin. He is free from sin, free from doubt, he is pure, he is the (true) Brahman; this is the (true) world of Brahma, O king, of kings," thus spoke Yajnavalkya. "I will give thee, O Venerable, the kingdom of the Videhas and my own self, to become thy slave."

This soul is great, unborn, the consumer of food, the giver of wealth. Whoever thus knows, obtains wealth.

This great, unborn, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless soul is Brahma; Brahma is verily fearless; he who thus knows becomes verily the fearless Brahma.

The Sun nearer the earth than the moon

When the Purusha proceeds from this world (to another), he comes to the air. The air opens there as wide for him as the aperture of a chariot-wheel. By this (aperture) he ascends, (and) comes to the sun. The same opens there for him as wide as the aperture of a Lambara. By this he ascends, and comes to the moon. The same opens there for him as wide as the aperture of a small drum. By this he ascends, and come to the world, where there is no grief, where there is no snow; there he dwells endless years.

The Gayatri

Bhumi (earth), Antariksha (the atmosphere), Dyau (the heavens) are eight syllables; the first food of the Gayatri consists of eight syllables; this (foot) of the Gayatri is that (nature of the earth, of the atmosphere, and of the heavens). Whoever thus knows the (first) foot of the Gayatri, conquers all that is in the three worlds.

The Richah, Yajunshi (and) Samani are eight syllables; the second foot of the Gayatri consists of eight syllables; this (foot) of the Gayatri is that (nature of the three Vedas). Whoever thus knows, conquers all that is conquerable by the knowledge of three Vedas.

Prana (the vital air which goes forward), Apana (the vital air which descends), (and) Vyana (the vital air which equalises), these are eight syllables; the third foot of the Gayatri consists of eight syllables; this (foot) of the Gayatri is that (nature of the three vital airs). Whoever thus knows the third foot of the (Gayatri) conquers all that has life. Again, the turiya (the fourth), the Darsata foot of the Gayatri, is the Paro Raja, which sheds

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rays. What is (commonly called) Chaturtha, (the fourth), is (the same as) the "turiya." It is, as it were, beheld (dadrise); hence it is called the Darśata foot. (It is called) Paro Rājā, because it sheds rays upon all the dustborn creatures of the universe. Whoever thus knows that (foot of the Gáyatri), is radiant with power and glory.

This Gayatri is founded upon the fourth, the Darsata foot, the Paro Raja. This (fourth foot) is founded upon truth. The eye is verily truth; for (that) the eye in truth, (is evident). Hence, if at present two have entered upon a dispute (one saying),— I have seen, (the other),—I have heard, then we believe him, who has said, I have seen. Truth is founded upon power: life is verily power. Upon this life (truth) is founded. Therefore it is said, power, is stronger than truth. In the same manner the Gayatri is founded upon that which bears a relation to the soul for this (Gayatri) preserves (tattre) the Gayas; the vital organs (Pranah) are the Gayas; therefore, because it preserves the Gayas (gayans tattre), it is called Gayatri. The Savitri which he teaches, is this (Gayatri): it preserves the life of him to whom he has taught it.

Some call this Savitri Anustup, (saying), "Speech is Anustup; we repeat that speech is Anustup." Let none do so, let him call the Gayatri SAvitri. If one who thus knows, receive even many (gifts), yet he would not receive so much as is equal to one foot of the Gayatri.

If one receive the three worlds, full (of all their riches), he would obtain (no more than is equal to) the first foot. Again if one receive as much as the science or the three Vedas extends, he would obtain (no more than what is equal to) the second foot. Again, if one receive as much as all that has life extends, he would obtain (no more than what is equal to) its third foot. Again, the fourth Darsata Paro Raja foot of the Gayatri is never by any one obtainable. Hence how could he receive (an equivalent) which extends so far?

The Praise of this Gayatri is given in the following Mantra? —Thou art of one foot, of two feet, of three feet, and of four feet: for thou are not obtained. Salutation to thy fourth Darsata Paro Raja foot. May this (enemy of thine) not accomplish this (work). If (one who thus knows) hates any body (and makes against him this invocation), "this (man is my enemy); may his wish not be accomplished," then the wish of the latter will verily not be accomplished, if he makes against him the invocation, " I have obtained his wish."

Janak, the king of the Videhas, thus addressed Butila, the son of Aswatara, — "(If) thy saying that thou knowest the Gayatri (be true) then why hast thou become an elephant to carry (me)?"

He said,—"I did not know the mouth of the Gayatri, O king of kings." Its mouth is fire. Even much wood, thrown into fire, is consumed by the same; in the like manner, one who thus knows, although committing many sins, consumes them all, becomes clean and pure, and is without decay and immortal.

Open, O Pushan, the mouth of truth, concealed in the golden vessel, to (me who have been) devoted to true piety, for the sake of beholding (the truth). O Pushan, thou sole Rishi, Yama, Surya, son of Prajapati, do withhold thy rays, diminish thy splendour, that I may behold thy most auspicious form. I, that Purusha, am immortal. (Let) my vital air (join) the wind: then (let) my body, when reduced to ashes, (join) the earth. Om! Kratu, remember (my) acts; Remember, O Kratu, remember my acts remember ! Guide (me), O Agni, by the road of bliss to enjoyment; O god, who knowest all dispositions, deliver (me from) crooked sin. Let us offer thee our best salutation.

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BUDDHISM AND UPANISHAD

It is not certain that Buddha had any deep knowledge of the Vedas and Upanisads. In the six years which he spent as a wanderer and seeker, previous to his enlightenment, he does not confront any profound spokesman of idealistic wisdom. Some of his later biographies speak of him as being fully conversant with the schools of metaphysical philosophy. But from a study of the Tripitaka literature this claim is not substantiated. He, however, must have had some acquaintance with the fundamental theme of the Upaniṣadic thought which is to expound the metaphysics of the absolute spititual real. Buddha derides the Vedic and Upniṣadic theological and theosophical conception but be does not engage in an abstruse psychological and metaphysical examination of the bases of the old teachings. He adopts a pragmatic orientation and is content with relegating the 'indescribable' or *Auyākṛta* questions as examples of empty and futile intellectual jugglery. He was perfectly free to minister as a pragmatic doctor and healer of the existing wounds of society. I am only stating that there is nothing in the Tripita ka literature to prove that Buddha had any profound acquaintance with the metaphysical teachings of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads. It is not possible to identify the sixty-two schools of thought and experiences mentioned in the *Brahmajāla Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya* with the Upaniṣadic concepts. Nor is there any record of any deeply learned discussion between him and any acknowledged authority on the Upaniṣadic metaphysics Aristotle repudiates the Platonic doctrine of universal and Hegal repudiates the Fichtean doctrine of subjectivism. But their repudiation is at a philosophical level. On the other hand, Buddha's main and uppermost concern was with the elimination of pain and sorrow and as an ethical pragmatist he found metaphysics to be unnecessary for his purpose. His concrete immediate concern for the cessation of suffering is illustrated in his exhortation to Malunkyaputta. He says:

> "A man is hit by a poisoned arrow. His friends hasten to the doctor. The latter is about to draw the arrow out of the wound. The wounded man, however, cries: "stop: I will not have the arrow drawn to until I know who shot it, whether a warrior or a Brahman, a Vaiśya or a Sudra, to which family he belonged, whether he was tall or short, of what species and description the arrow was', and so on. What would happen? The man would die before all these questions were answered. In the same way the disciple who wished for answers to all his questions about the beyond and so on, would die before he knew the truth about suffering, the origin of suffering, the cessation of suffering and the way to cessation of suffering."

It is difficult to characterize the entire thought of the Upaniṣads with any particular 'ism'. Smakara interpreted the Upaniṣads as a gospel of spiritual monism. Deussen found deep similarities in the ideas of Parmenides, Plato, Kant, Schopenhauer and the Upaniṣads. According to Jacobi, Keith and Sukthankar the true import of the Upaniṣads is pantheism. It should be stated that the supreme quest of the Upaniṣads is for the *bhumā*-the stupendous comprehensive being. The seers of the Upaniṣads attempt to make a transition from the surface materialistic standpoint to the vital sphere and thence-from successively to the mental and the intellectual spheres and finally arrive at the notion of the supreme, delightful and blissful sphere of the transcendent reality. In the *Chhāndogya*

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Upaniṣad, Prajapati leads Indra from the materialistic physical point of view of the identification of the corporeal being with the self, to the empirical standpoint of the identification of the self with the dreaming being. Thenceforward an ascent is made to the idealistic standpoint of the dreamless self and the final culmination is conceived as the realisation of the highest spiritual self in the super-conscious layer of profound spiritual awareness. The deepest and profoundest reality, according to the Upaniṣads is not a contentless, featureless, indeterminate abstraction. But it is said to be identical with the inmost self of man himself. But whatever be the central gospel of identical with the inmost self of man himself. But whatever be the central gospel of the Upaniṣads-monistic idealism or pantheistic spiritualism— the dominant concern of early Buddhism is not at all with any such metaphysical theory There is no sanction in early Buddhism for the acceptance either of spiritual idealism or divine immanence. The great discourses of Buddha do not refer to any substantial spiritual existent. It is true that Buddha does not openly and categorically refute monistic metaphysics. Sometimes it has been stated that Buddha's supreme indifference to metaphysical disquisitions might have had its remote roots in the Upaniṣadic view that the Absolute is not amenable to the grasp of empirical knowledge. But to argue that because he was silent about the supreme spiritual real, he believed in that in his heart of hearts, is an absurd conclusion. It will be attributing a charge of gross infidelity and betrayal to Buddha if we regard him as a mighty teacher and prophet and in the same breath credit him with the cunning and the ingenuity to have hid from the vast number of his disciples the deepest secret for nearly forty-five years. The great evangelists are anxious to give out the highest result of their endeavours even at the cost of endless repetitions. A great teacher does not reserve the end product his supreme realization to an obscure mention in the course of a discourse, which is liable to different interpretations, but repeats it almost ad *nauseam*. Thus the supreme theme of the Upaniṣadic philosophy is conspicuous by its absence in the early Buddhist literature because Buddha did not subscribe to them in any way. It unmistakably points out the deep rupture in the two systems of the Upaniṣads and early Buddhism.

It is possible that at the religious level the Upaniṣads advocate the worship of one monotheistic God— the *tadvanam* in the *Kena Upaniṣad* and the *tajjalān* in the *Chhāndogya*. In the Upaniṣads the cosmological argument for the existence of God as the creator is found. There are some incipient references also to the ontological argument for theism. Towards the end to the Vedic period the worship of one supreme Godhead, for example, the Hiranyagrabha, the Visvakarman etc., was advocated. In some of the metrical Upaniṣads like the *Muṇḍaka* and the *Śvetāśvatara* there are references to a supreme personal God. In some of the Upanisads there is the advocacy of meditation on spiritual symbols. Buddha emphatically repudiates every kind of external worship. In some of the Sutta he ridicules the traditional method of invocation to Vedic deities. In the *Tevijja Sutta* of the *Digha Nikāya* Buddha mocks at the attempts of the Brahmins to invoke Indra, Ishana, Prajapati, Brahma, Mahardhi, Yama etc.... He mocks at the idea of reaping fruits and rewards through propitiating the gods. He never prescribes the use of symbols for the purposes of concentration although the early Buddhist Scriptures contained a detailed categorised scheme of mystic and supra-psychic

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experiences. There is no mention of symbols in the Buddhist scheme of Jnānas. Thus there is no place in early Buddhism either for the personal God of the Upanisads or for the symbolic method of concentration.

Buddha's hostility to the Upaniṣadic *Brahman* and the Vedic and Brahmanic God and deities is in like with the ideas of some of the contemporary teachers. All the six Tirthaka teachers like Ajita Keśakambala, Prakuddha Katyāyana, Sanjay Belathaputta, Nigganṭha Nātaputta, Makkahali Gośāla and Purāṇa Kaśyapa repudiated the conceptions both of a monistic impersonal indeterminate absolute and a theological personal God. Atheistic ideas are present in the views of Virochana as reported in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* and called as the *Āsuropaniṣad*. Perhaps the ideas of the original atheistical Sāmkhya which might have been prevalent at that time had strengthened at anti-theological intellectual trends. The *Ahirbudhnyasamhitā* contains references to an early Sāmkhya work the *Shashtitantra*. Possibly the Samkhya of the *Shashtitantra* and theistic and resembled the theism of the Pancarātra Vaishnavas. According to the *Ahirbudhnyasamhitā*, the Samkhya system of Kapila was Vaishnava. Buddha's atheism remains a permanent antithesis of the Upanisadic teachings. Although the dominant trend of the Upaniṣads is to inculcate some type of transcendental-immanentistic metaphysics of a spiritual kind, they contain references to heterodox views which have been mentioned there for the purpose of being refuted. Thus we find that there were schools which believed in the origination of existence, sat, from non-existence, asat. Since the Vedic days there were sceptics who did not favour the contemporary pantheon of gods. There seems to be a persistent tradition of sceptics, pseudo-rationalists and free thinkers who did not favour the dominant theology and spiritual metaphysics of that age. Buddha belongs not to the tradition of the Vedas, Brahmanas and the Upaniṣads but to this critical anti-Vedic tradition whose views are occasionally referred to in the sacred literature but never elaborated upon. Just as the foundations of the Reformation movement of Luther were laid by Wycliffe and just as John the Baptist prepared the background of the ethical movement of Jesus-Christ, similarly the tremendous intellectual stir and freedom of thought created by the researches, opinions and investigations of teachers and leaders of heterodox thought in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. prepared the atmosphere for the rise and development of the movement of Buddhism. It is essential to realise the point that the genesis of Buddhism has to be sought not so much in the idealism and spiritualism of the Upaniṣads as in the critical, sceptical, rationalistic and heterodox schools of thought that were contemporary with the Upaniṣads and which had their beginnings even in the period of the Samhitas. Buddha's opposition to the Vedic theology and Upaniṣadic absolutistic metapysics would appear to be definite and monumental step in the advance of the heterodox ideology. Buddha may safely be taken to be the spokesman of the section that failed to received consolation in the confused motley of the numerous gods or who failed to obtain intellectual and emotional response in the concept of a static primordial absolute reality utterly aloof in its archetypal supernal abode from the anguishes and sufferings of humanity. To the sensitive heart of Buddha deeply moved by the pervasiveness of human discomforts, disease, and death it was downright betrayal to harp on the uncontaminated bliss of the absolute

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being in the context of a world infected by tragic contradiction and fatality.

The denial of the soul in the Buddhist philosophy of *anātmavada* was a great break from the Upaniṣadic tradition. The very term *anātman* is deliberately designed to assert the great break from the Upanisadic tradition. There is no place for a soul in the teachings of Buddha. There can be three possible conceptions of the soul. There is the primitive conception of the soul as almost a physical entity and a counterpart of the body. All objects in the world are supposed to have a soul according to the panpsychic conceptions of animism. In ancient Egypt, for example, there was the conception of a 'double' of the human being. After the death of the man this 'double' was supposed even to eat and drink and hence in the tombs of relations people used to put objects of food and drink for this departed double. A second conception of the soul is psychological. The soul is regarded as the resultant of the total physical and psychical structure of a man. In modern terminology the soul as a psychological conception may be equated with a man's personality. This soul is sometimes supposed to be extinguished at the cessation of the physical being of the man. The *Samyatta Nikāya* contains reference to a school— the *Ukkalavassabhanna*-which rejected the persistence of individuality after death. One of the schools of the Carvakas accepted this phychological view of the soul. There is the third or the metaphysical concept of the soul. In this sense there can be two sub-variants of the theory. One metaphysical view of the soul regards it as a spiritual substance. In this sense the Jainas, the Mimansakas, the Naiyayikas and the Samkhya accept the existence of a super-physical entity. This substance is supposed to transmigrate to other corporeal existences after the death of the physical body. A second metaphysical view of the soul conceives of it as the limitation or unique particularisation or modalnization of an absolute spiritual reality. The Upaniṣads generally tend towards this view of the soul. Buddha repudiates the metaphysical view of the soul. There is no place in his teachings for the anthropological and psychological conceptions of the soul either. Against the dominant *Ātmanism* of the period he stands for *anātman*. Sometimes relics of the anthropological view of the soul have been traced in the Buddhist conception of a *gandharva* which is an operative factor in the rebirth of man's personality. Sometimes the *vijnāna* which is one of the five factors in the *nāmarupa skandha* of the Buddhist psychological scheme has been interpreted as a parallel to the spiritual self. Sometimes the concept of the *pudgala* held by some of the Hinayāna schools has been regarded as some kind of a spiritual soul. According to the Vātsiputriyas the *pudgala* is neither identical with nor different from the five *skandhas*. According to Stcherbatsky, all schools of Buddhism repudiated *ātmavāda* or the theory of a soul corresponding to a psycho-physical individual but the Sāmmitiyas and the Vātsiputriyas adhered to the theory of *pudgalvāda* or the doctrine of permanent soul. Vasuvandhu attacked the *pudgalavādins*. But inspite of these speculations which interpret early Buddhism teachings as found in the Tripitakas in one of the negation of the soul as a substantial reality. This neutralization of the spiritual soul, as inclucated in the Upaniṣads, by reducing it to a complex of five psychophysical processes as maintained in the doctrine of the *nāmarupa skandha* represents a frontal attack of Buddhism on the prevailing absolutist metaphysics. Sometimes it is stated that the concept

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nāma in *nāmarupa skandha* might have been taken from the *Atharvaveda* and the pre-Buddhistic literature. In the Upaniṣads the *nāmarupa* is the phenomenal appearance and the real substratum is behind that. But according to the Sarvastivadi school *nāmarupa* signifies the acceptance of a radical form of pluralistic realism. Jacobi wants to trace the roots of the five skandhas in the five Pranas of the Upaniṣadic tradition. C. A. F. Rhys Davids would like to trace their roots in the five *Indriyas*. But these are wild conjectures. There is not the least ideological affinity between them. There seems to be more truth in the view which would point out the affinity between the five skandhas and the five *Kosha* referred to in the Taittiriya Upaniṣad. The negation of the soul as a substance was a revolutionary doctrine in many sense. It indicated that the challenge represented by Buddhism was far more radical than that of the Jainas because the latter believed in the habitation by the soul in all kinds of substances. It made also, the further question of the identity of the psychic-self and the cosmic and the trans-cosmic *brahman* meaningless because if the soul itself was a non-entity there was nothing worth-while to be gained by useless speculations about its future eschatological destiny. There are some passages in the Buddhist literature which however take a cautious attitude on the problem of the *attā*. In one of the dialogues Buddha says:

"If I, Ananda, when the wandering monk Vacchagotta asked me: "Is there the ego?" had answered : 'the ego is', would that have served my end. Ananda, by producing in him the knowledge: all existence (*dhamma*) are non-ego? That it would not, sire. But if I, Ānanda, when the wandering monk Vacchagotta asked me: 'Is, there not the ego?' had answered: 'The ego is not', then that [would lead] Vacchagotta to be thrown from the bewilderment into another: 'My ego, did it not exist before? But now it exists no longer!"

The Buddhist concept of the *anātman* marked a more radical departure from the Brahmanical theology than the mild and moderate protests of the Upaniṣads against the sacrificial liturgy. No sacrificial cult could stand on the basis of 'a psychology without a soul.' Bhattacharya says that the sacrificers had such supreme faith in the power of the sacrificial mechanism that there was no need of God in this school of thought. But Bhattacharya is wrong in ascribing the later view of the Mimansakas to the ritualists and sacrificers flourishing in the period previous to and contemporary with the rise of Buddhism. It is true that in some of the Upaniṣads we find some kind of condemnation of the sacrificial creeds and formulas. In the Upaniṣads some attempts were made to allegorize and spiritualize the sacrificial cult but they (the Upaniṣads) accepted the validity of the traditional Vedic liturgy and ritualism as a path to the lower realm of *pitṛyāna*. Thus the sacrificial *karmakānada* received at least a subordinate place in the scheme of the Upaniṣadic thought. It is true that by the inclucation of the overwhelming superiority of a transcendental metaphysics, the Upaniṣads had tried to put before the people a goal higher than the dry mechanism of a credal and ritualistic sacrament.

There was no institution like the priesthood under Buddhism. There were no priests in the Samgha. Even among the lay Upāsakās of Buddhism, the far greater probability is that there would absolutely be no place for a priesthood in a religious system which believed in the surrender to Buddha and not to any God or deity. The

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Buddhist monks did not perform any religious ceremony and had no sacerdotal functions. The rejection of the priesthood was more trenchant in the Buddhistic than in the Upaniṣadic traditions. The Upaniṣads had tolerated the priesthood. Aśvala, one of the teachers mentioned in the *Brihadāraṇyaka*, is a *Hotā*. In the *Chhāndogya* Upaniṣad we find that the esoteric doctrine of pancāgni vidya is symbolically represented in terms of a sacrificial rite, thus indirectly implying that the services of a priest might possibly be required for the consummation of some of the processes mentioned there. Buddha's break with the institution of priesthood was far more fundamental than that of the Upaniṣads.

Although Buddha is represented in the Tripitakas as being deliberately silent about the concept of an absolute spiritual existent and once or twice scoffingly treats the entire theme, there is the recognition in early Buddhism of the concept of avidya which is an important instrument in the dialectics of gloom and spiritualism. Both the Upaniṣads and early Buddhism accept the concept of *avidyā*. But there is one important difference in the connotation of this term. The Upaniṣads tend to conceive *avidyā* at a cosmic level also, although this tendency receives its final crystallization only in later Vedānta. Early Buddhism, on the other hand, recognizes *avidyā* only at the psychological level. At best avidya is conceived as the basis of individual existence-*bhāva* and *jāti*.

Thus we see how deep, radical and fundamental was the gap between the traditional religious system of thought and liturgy and that of the Buddhists. Buddha repudiated monistic metaphysics, ridiculed monotheistic and polytheistic conceptions and utterly pulverized the concept of a soul as a self-subsistent reality. By challenging the validity of the sacrificial cult and the institution of priesthood he drew himself further away from the conservative Brāhmanical elite who were the repositories and conservers of the contemporary religious tradition.

The concept of *nirvāṇa* is also a doctrine which hits at the roots of the Upaniṣads. Buddha's refusal to say anything about the future destiny of the Tathāgata is persistent. The eschatological problem of the existence of one who has attained *nirvāṇa* is a great mystery. The nature of *nirvāṇa* according to Buddhist authors is controversial. There is a school which regards *nirvāṇa* as tantamount to utter extinction. The other school would interpret *nirvāṇa* only as an annihilation of pain and sorrow. Even if this later interpretation were true and *nirvāṇa* was only the absolute neutralization of suffering, it is never possible to equate it with the Upaniṣadic conceptions of emancipation. According to Caird, the early Buddhist religion treats the whole objective world as an illusion from which it is the highest duty of man to free himself. The religion of Buddha begins with the negation of all the objective gods of earlier Hinduism or the reduction of them to parts in the great illusion of outward existence, and which at last finds the divine, if anywhere, only in the self-negating process of the finite mind and the *nirvāṇa* which is supposed to be its result. The ultimate spiritual density of the men of knowledge, according to the Upaniṣads, is a positive state of fullness of being and the attainment of absolute delight. This goal of final bliss can provide a great impetus and teleological incentive to the spiritual endeavours of men. Even a lady like Maitreyī hankers after immortality and refuses to be satisfied with mundane Prosperity. The teleology of immortality and refuses to be satisfied with mundane prosperity. The teleology of immortality is

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indeed, blissful and inspiring. At a few places in the Tripitaka literature *nirvāṇa* is interpreted as an indeterminate predicateless something. Thus even if nirvāṇa were not total extinction but some kind of positive absolute reality, its conceptualization in terms of negative predications is possibly aimed as a deliberate counterpoise to the Upaniṣadic characterizations of the blissful nature of the supreme status of the man of knowledge. There can be no doubt that from the terminological standpoint the concept of *nirvāṇa* is an antithesis to the concept of *brahmaloka* of the Upanisads. It is true that at times the Upanisads also tend to characterize the supreme reality in negative terms-the terms *neti neti* are supreme example of this negative methodology, but notwithstanding these negative characterizations, there is no doubt in the minds of the Upaniṣadic teachers that the final spiritual goal of man is positive plenitude of bliss. In some of the later Mahāyāna teachers like Aśvaghosha we do find some formulations of the concept of an Absolute. There is a passage in the *Iti-Vuttaka* which might imply belief in an Absolute. "There is O monks!: something not born, non existent, not made, not compounded. If there were not this something not born, non-existent, not make, not compounded there would not be known here deliverance from what is born, existent, made and compounded." But even if at the metaphysical level there may be some passages which assert a more positive and absolutist conception of reality, it remains true that at the religious level the concept of *nirvāṇa* might not evoke the same emotional response as perhaps the concept of *mukti* as propagated in the traditional metaphysics of the day, can do. If Buddha had the slightest certainty about the reality of a permanent spiritual existent, the concept of *nirvāṇa* would be the most unfortunate depict the state of realization of that indeterminate ultimate. A negative concept could not evoke the sympathy of the masses which is the desideratum of a popular religious movement as distinguished from an aristocratic metaphysical conceptualism meant for the select coterie of thinkers and intellectuals. I am constrained to believe that just as the concept of *anātman* is deliberately designed to challenge the concept of the self as propounded in the Upaniṣads, so also the concept of *nirvāṇa* is deliberately chosen as a conceptual antithesis to the Upaniṣadic notions of *ānandam brahman*. If Pāṇini belongs to the pre-Buddhistic days and if the word *nirvāṇa* occurring in the *Ashtādhyayi* is pre-Buddhistic, still the appropriation of this concept in the metaphysics of early Buddhism would imply a definite protest against the notions of contemporary absolutist metaphysics and the ideas of traditional religious systems. Thus we see the radical, almost unbridgeable gap between the Upaniṣads and early Buddhism.

The Influence of the Upaniṣads upon Buddhism

But although in some of his dominant philosophical conceptions Buddha's attitude was a radical departure from the Upaniṣadic system of thought, still there are some unmistakable evidences of the influence of the Upaniṣads upon early. Buddhism. Buddha was inspired by the contemporary monastic ideal of life. In the *Ṛgveda* there is the picture of the inspired *muni* which some Jaina scholars regard as a reference to their Sadhus. The word *yatayah* also occurs in the Vedic literature. But the institution of an organized monasticism cannot be proved for the Vedic time. There was no organized monastic institution in the ancient

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civilizations of Egypt, Assyria and China although in the Sumerian culture we find references to the existence of sacred virgins dedicating their lives to intellectual and commercial pursuits. The Vedic attitude towards life and its problems is one of strength and conquest, hope and optimism. But with the Upaniṣads the clouding veil of gloom and pessimism makes its appearance. The phenomena of the world come to be regarded as full of sorrow. In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* we find reference to the prevalence of cosmic misery-*lokadukha*. But although the Indian philosophical schools accept the immensity of cosmic suffering, they also prescribe a way of release and emancipation from suffering. According to the Buddhist system, the fist and the second truths asset the existence of cosmic suffering which is explained through the formula of *pratityasamutpāda*. The third and the fourth truths indicate the possibility of the complete cessation of suffering through the pursuit of the Aryan eight-fold path. A similar philosophy of the existence and extinction of sufferings propounded in other systems like the Nyāya, the Yoga and the Samkhya. Yājnavalkya fails to find happiness in a householder's life and finally renounces the world. In the case of Yājnavalkya, monasticism might be a social corollary to the concept of a supreme spiritual Absolute whose everwhelming majesty and dominance is a direct contrast to the transitory, painful and ephemeral character of the worldly phenomena. Hence his quest for the supernal absolute is postulated upon the belief in the eventual hopelessness of all earthly endeavours. But although monasticism makes its appearance is the Upaniṣadic age, it is conceived primarily at an individual level. Perhaps Yājnavalkya is a monumental but isolated example of a monastic figure. Angira and Pippalāda appear to be heads of educational establishments and are not peripatetic monastic preachers. Ushasta Cākrāyaṇa, Raikva and Uddālaka Āruṇi are men of the world. Some of the celebrated figures of the Upaniṣads like Janaka, Ajātaśatru and Pravāhaṇa Jaivali are householders. But if monasticism is an isolated phenomenon in the Upaniṣads, the organized monkhood of early Buddhism is a great and vital social reality. The widespread movement of monasticism that we find associated with the religion of Buddha is inexplicable if considered only as based on the Upanisadic parallel and model. There must be some deeper causes of this monastic movement. Analysing the origin of the concept of *mukti* Deussen says:

"The attempt has often been made to understand man's longing for deliverance from another side as the result of the heavy pressure upon the Indian people of the Brāhmanical system. Thereby, according to the view suggested, the ancient delight in existence had been ruined and lost in consequence of the subservience of the mind to the Brahmanas, and the body to the Kshatriyas. But not to mention that the conditions of life in the rich valley of the Ganges were in all probability hardly worse than formerly in the Punjab, and that the idea of emancipation had certainly arisen not in the circle of the oppressed but rather in that of the oppressors, a disposition to pessimism, such as the theory assumes, was not at all peculiar to the times in which the doctrine of emancipation arose. It is true that by emancipation suffering also with all its possibilities was removed; but Buddhism was the first to transform that which was a mere consequence into a motive, and by conceiving

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emancipation as an escape from the suffering of existence, to make selfishness the ultimate mainspring of existence, —even if not to the extent that was done later by Islam, which is never weary of depicting to the people the glories of heaven and the terrors of hell.

The Upaniṣads inculcate a life of meditation and contemplation of the great truths but they do not emphasize withdrawal from the mundane pursuits of a householder's life. In Buddhism, on the other hand, the stress on the renunciation of all ties of the home life is dominant. The occasional disgust expressed in the Upaniṣads at the contemptible character of worldly existence is transformed into the Buddhist gospel of permanent recoil from the sorrowful and evanescent nature of mundane life. It is possible that the renunciation of Mahavira, the Jaina prophet, might have been of some inspiration to Buddha. Mahāvira, also organized his band of monastic disciples. There were other monastic congregations also at the time Buddha flourished. The germs of the monastic movement which began in the days of the Upaniṣads assume tremendous proportions under the leadership of the new Śramana teachers like Mahāvira and Buddha. In the personal psychological make-up of Buddha there seems to be a supreme fascination for the bliss and glories of the monastic life. In the *Rāshtrapāla Suttanta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* there is a categorization of four factors which ordinarily impelled people to adopt the monastic life: (i) *jarāhāni*, old age, decrepitude, (ii) *vyadhihāni*, fatal disease, (iii) *bhogahāni*, loss of fortune and (iv) *jnātihāni*: loss of relations. But the monasticism of Rāshtrapāla, the son of Agra Kulika is based on a different motivation. Rāshtrapāla is a Buddhist Bhikkhu and he became a monk because he found that the world of becoming did not have any sound basis. Buddha's admiration for the life of the ascetic Bhikkhu makes him condemn in unmeasured terms the evils of sense gratifications. He says:

"A butcher throws before a dog tormented by hunger, a bare and fleshless bone with which he cannot satisfy his hunger-like such a bare bone are the sensual pleasures, full of torment and sufferings, out of which only evils arise. As a bird of prey pounces upon a piece of meat and other birds attack him and illtreat him-so only suffering and evil arise from sensual pleasures. The sage shrinks back before sensual pleasures as from a pit filled with glowing coals. Sensual pleasures are like a beautiful dream vision, which vanishes when one awakes, like a borrowed treasure, on account of which one is envied by those who do not know that it is only borrowed. A man comes into a forest, sees a tree laden with fruit, and climbs up in order to eat till he is satisfied: then a second man comes along, sees the same tree, and in order to gain possession of the fruit, sets about felling the tree: evil will befall the man up in the tree: thus only suffering and torments and kinds of evil arise from the gratification of sensual pleasures."

Buddha's great renunciation permanently added a sacramental halo to the monastic ideal of life and gave to monasticism immense esteem and reverence. In the Buddhist strees on the monastic ideal of life, however, we may accept some degree of Upanisadic influence.

The concept of *Karman* reveals the immense debt which early Buddhism owes to the previous philosophical tradition. According to the Upaniṣads a man's personality is constituted by his actions. It is true, however, that the ultimate

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primacy belongs according to the teachings of the Upaniṣads to philosophical gnosis and not to noble actions. The belief, nevertheless, in the operative efficacy of a spiritual law of *karman* is strong. The future births of a person are determined by his actions. In Buddhism also the knowledge of the four Aryan truths is emphasized but *karman* has a fundamental importance in Buddhist thought. Due to the great importance of ethics in early Buddhism *karman* has necessarily been emphasized. It is surprising that although Buddhism repudiated the concept of soul as a substance it could not do away with the notion of rebirth. But according to Buddhism there is the rebirth not of any substantial spirit but only of character or personality which is constituted by karman. According to Paul Deussen, *karman* must have in every case an individual bearer and that is what the Upaniṣads call *ātman* and what the Buddhists inconsistently deny. Hiriyanna criticizes Deussen and says that according to Buddhism there is rebirth not only at the end of this life as in other Indian systems but at every instant. Buddhism denies a 'stable self' but accepts a 'fluid self'. Sometimes it is said that the concept of *karman* was a new addition to Upaniṣadic thought. This is indicated by the confidential character in which Yājnavalkya and Jāratkārava speak about the matter. Although the roots of the theory of *karman* as a moral law lie in the Vedic concept of *rita* it is possible that implications of *karman* had not been yet sufficiently generalised. Buddha imparted a very wide and comprehensive significance to *karman*. Karman constitutes the beings of a man. One's action is one's fate. One is the maker of one's destiny. At the time Buddha flourished there were dialectical antagonistic tussles going on between the respective protagonists of actionism and non-actionism. Makkhali Gośāla and Purāna Kassapa (Kaśyapa) were fatalists. They did not believe that good and bad actions lead to good and bad results. Buddha foresaw the disastrous consequences for moral life that would follow from a non-adherence to the law of *karman*. It is possible that the Upaniṣads might not have been the sole roots of the Buddhist theory of *karman*. Jainism also strongly adheres to the belief in the concept of *karman*. Nevertheless the great influence of the Upaniṣadic concept of *karman* on early Buddhism has to be accepted.

The famous formula of the *pratityasamutapāda* or the *dvādaśāyatana* is a great example of the use of the category of causation, or more technically, dependent origination, to explain individual life and destiny. Several of the terms in the *dvādaśāyatana* are also used in the Upaniṣads. It is possible to find the germinal roots of the *dvādaśa nidāna* is the *Brihadāraṇyaka* notion that a man's being is constituted by his *karman*, his *karman* is determined by his will (*kratu*), and his will is impelled by his fundamental desire or Eros (*Kāma*).

The dominant note of the spiritual teachings of the Upaniṣads is the inculcation of the immanence of the spirit and the identity of the human self with the universal and transcendent reality. But contrasted to the mechanical and dogmatic ritualism of the Brāhmanas, the Upaniṣads also emphasize the ethical note. Some of the Upaniṣads like the *Taittirīya*, the *Muṇḍaka* and the *Kaṭha* emphatically assert that without absolute adherence to the path of piety, it is not possible to realize the spirit. The supreme truth can be realized only by the strictest observance of the moral norms. According to the *Brihadāraṇyaka*, it is imperative to

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renounce the egoistic desire for wealth, family and progeny in order to be a true aspirant for the supernal reality. Among the Orphics and the Pythagoreans also, there was great stress on the pursuit of the ethical way as a prerequisite for spiritual realization. The neo-Platonists, the medieval Christian monastics and the Sufis also believed in the sanctity and supremacy of moral endeavours. Buddha subscribes to the supremacy of the moral norm. He condemns the undue importance of physical askesis. He would not advocate the practice of Yoga for obtaining supernormal powers. He believes in an ethical *tapasyā* and inward meditation. He was a wise, humane and compassionate teacher. His stress is on holy life. As a fulfilment of the ethical endeavours. He inclucates the filling in of the mind with pure feelings. It is true that in early Buddhism we have dialectical discussions about the psychology of *anātman* and the metaphysics of *pratityasamutpāda* but the overwhelming stress in on the conquest of pain and sorrow through a pious life. Thus it can be stated that the ethical discipline which is mentioned in the Upaniṣads is made the dominant theme in early Buddhism. In Greece Socrates stressed the ethical and humanistic orientation in philosophy as opposed to the previous stress on cosmogonic speculations. Instead of the *arche* and the *aperion*, Socrates called attention to virtue as knowledge. Buddha also stood for the ethical way. He taught that a dedicated pursuit of the Aryan eitht-fold way was the sure means to trans-mundane illumination and even super-rational consciousness.

The theory of Yoga is also mentioned in the Upaniṣads. Yoga is sometimes recognized as a possible way for the realization of the Absolute but it is true that the greatest emphasis in this system is on philosophic and mystical contemplation. Buddha himself was a Yogi. In early Buddhism there is an elaborate theory of the different stages of meditative cognition. But according to both-the Upaniṣads and Buddhism, Yoga is not the pre-eminent path to the cessation of suffering. However, it can be said that the emphasis on the technics of Yoga is one of the common points between the Upaniṣads and early Buddhism. The *Satipatthāna Sutta* refers to the various kinds of exercises of *praṇayāma*. Sometimes it has been maintained the Buddha had learnt from his teachers the method of *samādhi* but the technic of prajnā (wisdom) has been his particular contribution to the science of meditation. The advocacy of Yogic practices and the references to the attainment of some form of superior transcendent wisdom (*prajnā)* and enlightenment makes early Buddhism a rather confused system of thought. It is possible to accept the efficacy of meditation even in a non-theistic system. The Sāmkhya provides in example. But the theory of mystic vision obtains its rational justification only when some form of absolute spiritual real is posited which is to be intuitively realized. Early Buddhism accepts the transcendence of normal rational criteria, it adheres to the efficacy of the path of Yogic concentration and contemplation but it repudiates, even if it be by silence and by a deliberate indifference, the concept of a spiritual Existent. But, at least the partial acceptance of the technics of Yoga by early Buddhism, is a testimony to the fact that as a religious movement, although the latter could dispense with an Absolute and a personal God, it dare not go against the socially prevalent criteria of some of the accompaniments of a holy man.

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Conclusion: The Decline of Religion and the Rise of Early Buddhism

According to Windelband there are three factors operative in the appearance and success of any system— (i) "logic of things" —the pragmatic demands of the existing types of speculation—(ii) the Cultural Complex—the general ethos of time and the complication or interweaving of problems— and (iii) the Individual—the personality of the thinker. It has to be remembered that the greatness of a genius consists in providing an original synthesis of the dominant ideas of the age Genius is not another name for mere exercise in novelty or eccentricity. The important point is not the derivation of an idea from this or that source. What is of significance is the final form provided and the impact of an idea on the social; forces and movements.

There are differences of opinion as to the true nature of the Vedic religion. But even the acutest critic testifies to the growth of consmological speculations and pantheistic and even monothjeistic conceptions towards the end of the Samhita period. The seers of the Upaniṣads inherited the philosophical legacy of the Samhita period as is clear from phrases like *ṛchābhyuktam*. But the Vedic religion had also a practical ritualistic side. This tradition was extended and carried to a logical finish in the Brāhmanas.

Anthropologists and ethnologists trace in the Vedic religion an amalgam of conceptions of different races. The Rgveda represents the religion of the nature-worshipping Brahmin priests and Indo-Aryans. The *Atharvaveda* shows a stage when the Indo-Aryans were in contact with the other Easterners and were absorbing element of folk-religion. The legacy of the Indus valley people-the Proto-Australoids, the Mediterraneans and the Mongoloids was also there. It seems to be clear, hence that the religion prevalent in India from c. 2000 B. C. to 1000 B. C. was a complex structure. Because it was influenced by different races, it can be easily understood that other racial contacts and movements also, in their turn, could change it.

The Brahmanas, the exegetical literature concerning the Vedic sacrifices, carried to great extremes the ritualistic details. The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* contains the story of the sacrifice of *Śunaḥśepa*. The *Śatapatha* is a monumental classic of the science of the sacrifice, far more detailed than the Babylonian liturgy. The Israelite and Phoenician religions also contained sacrificial traits. There are vital difference between the Vedic and the West Asiatic systems of sacrifice. But sacrifice, as the supreme concern of human life, was cultivated only in the period of the Brāhmaṇas. The interpretations of Mahidhara points out that the Vedic texts of *Yajurveda* were interpreted to support violently horrible practices. Violence and slaughter characterized the sacrifice in the Brāhmaṇa period. The *Kuṭadanta Suttra* of the Digha *Nikāya* contains testimony for this. Hence there appears to be a two-fold cause of the reaction against the sacrificial system— (1) Its complication and mechanisation were bound to evoke rationalistic and philosophical criticisms. (2) Its violence was bound to lead to an ethical and pietistic revolt. As times showed, the Upaniṣads heralded the intellectual protest, and the ethical humanitarian ground of reaction was prepared by the great sage of the clan of the Sākyas.

The speculative tendency is uppermost in the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣadic Absolute was the supracosmic parallel of the psychic *ātman*. According to Western notions this is the culmination of

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subjective religion, because the notion of soul is carried to the highest immanental and transcendental levals. The various deities who might have been worshipped by the people then i.e., in the Upaniṣads, as is clear from the *bhāsya of* Śamkara, are the imperfect manifestations of the Absolute. The conception of the Absolute marks the death of all religions, provided we exclude from the contents of religions the deepest and highest mystical vision. Religion or upasana as Śāmkara says proceeds on the duality of the worshipper and the worshipped. The monistic idealistic teaching demonstrates that even the creator, cosmic God is an inferior impermanent reality. The *Mānḍukya Upaniṣad* contains a distinction between the God of religions (the third stage of consciousness), and the Absolute of mysticism (the fourth stage of consciousness). The doctrines of Uddālaka Āruni and Yājnavalkya are a severe challenge to all objective religion conceptions.

The popular objective foundations of the Vedic religion were sought to be destroyed by the Upaniṣads. The various *devalokas* were all subordinated to the non-spatial psychic Brahmaloka. A new hypothesis may here be pointed out. The various opinions of the various Upaniṣadic teachers as to the location of the Absolute in the sun, moon, *vidyut*, etc., may be actual historical references in the sense that these deities might have been worshipped when as supreme deities. The *Brahmajāla Sutta* of *Digha Nikāya* contains allusions to such worship. Instead of supporting the popular religious notions and practices, as has been done for Christianity in the Middle Ages by scholastic philosophers, the Upaniṣads carried an indirect revolt against all objective religious practices.

They also protested against the aristocracy of birth. Highest knowledge of spirituality was being imparted to Satyakama of low birth. Hence the superiority of the Brāhmaṇs, which is so prominent in the Brāhmaṇa texts, in so far as they even claimed exemption from royal control, was undermined. The Vedantic knowledge is stated to have descended from the Kṣattriyas to the Brāhmaṇas. Pravahāṇa Jaivali, the Ksatriya, imparts education to both Śvetaketu and his father Uddālaka Āruni.

The Upaniṣads tried to minimise the importance of Yajna in a two-fold way (1) The *Munḍaka* outspokenly derides the ritualistic system as futile and as being preached by the ignorant people. Sometimes they show that study and meditation are the highest kind of Yajna. At times the pure life is conceived as Yajna, as in the Orphic and the Pythagorean sects. Thus the ritualistic sacrifice is substituted by intellectual sacrifice.

The attitude of the Upaniṣads towards the Vedas is one of compromise. As is clear from the *Munḍaka* and from the speech of Sanatkumara, the Vedas were given an honoured place, though not accepted as the final word for emancipation. But anyhow the traditions of Vedic scholarship were continued in the various residences of the Upaniṣadic Āchāryas and their *antevāsins*. These centres were economically very potent, as is clear from the munificent offerings to Raikva and Yājnavalkya. If in the case of the later Buddhistic religion it is argued that the economic prosperity of the Viharas was a corrupting influence, if in the case of Christianity it is argued that the growing secularisation and wealth of the church was a factor of clerical decline necessitating various monastic reforms: it may be probable that the Vedic religion too would have suffered a decline due to the enervating influence of the economically

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almost self-sufficient Vedic scholarship centres and a priesthood rich in cattle. There is a tone of sarcasm in the statement of Yājnavalkya—*gokāmā eva vayam* (which may be called eudaemonistic ethics).

The Upaniṣads thus attacked the strongholds of Vedic religion. Another attack came from the Sophistic and ethical movements of the 7th and 6th centuries B. C. Just as Socrates and his successors Plato and Aristotle attacked the Greek religion and wanted to set up an ethical and idealistic standard, so also Buddha tried to establish his Aryan truths on the inalienable foundation of a very profound concern for human miseries. Buddha wanted to remove the sufferings of the masses not by carrying on a wholesale political and economic revolution, but by providing the psychological remedy of a deep unconcern for the world and its allurements. He wanted the eradication of *tṛṣṇa* and the destruction of the five *upādānaskandha*. The teachings of Buddha may have been partly idealistic, being constructed against the background of the Upaniṣadic metaphysics, but so far as the Tripiṭakas and their actual teachings are concerned, the doctrines of *nirvāṇa* Anātmanism, dynamic nature of the transitory world characterised by the *Pratityasamutpāda* were in no way favourable to the Vedic religion. Buddha did not carry on an open crusade against the Vedic savants and their cherished beliefs and dogmas. He tried to ennoble the prevalent violent sacrificial system. He provided for sacrifice of grains, etc. and tried to moralise the sacrifices like the Hebrew Prophets by giving the highest importance to ethical acts. He opposed the contemporary renowned scholars of Brahmanism on three-fold bases: (1) He severely challenged the claim of attainment of unity with *brahmā* (m). of the Brahmins. He also derided the search after *brahman* as a futile endeavour. He propounded that neither the rsis nor their ancestors up to the seventh in ascending order had a glimpse of *brahman*. He condemned the invocation of gods and the enchanted songs sung in their praise at the time of sacrifices. (2) He claimed that he preached the way to supracosmic vision, to supreme knowledge and to *nirvāṇa*. It is mentioned in the Upaniṣads and occasionally even in the *Ṛgveda* that the supreme end of human life is not study or reflection, but self realisation. Buddha always claimed to have been the realised and enlightened Arhat and Tathāgata. According to legends and myths, the brahmanic scholars paled into insignificance due to the super-normal powers and rowess manifested by Buddha. Further, the latter was a keen dialectician and debator and it was very difficult to corner him. (3) Buddha hit at the gross worldliness of the contemporary Brahmin scholars and priests. Even the king Ajātaśatru and Prasenajit were struck with the purity and holy living of the Buddhist monks and their austere meditations continued life-long as distinguished from the small duration of the *brahmacarya* of the other religious systems.

The teachings of Buddha were in consonance, to a certain extent, with the teachings of the Veda and Upanisads in the ethical spirit, although ethics were greatly preponderant in his system. As contradistinguished from him were the grossly materialistic and hedonistic Cārvākas, the nihilistic and deterministic teachers like Kaccāyana, Keśakambala, Gośāla, and the relativists Mahāvira, Belatthaputta, and some others. These had absolutely no connexion with the Vedic religion. The Carvakas desired the Vedic texts as works of cheats. According to the naturalists (*svabhāvavādi*) and the mechanists there was no purpose in

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nature. But Buddha held that there was some superior rationality in the world-process and hence he taught that good and evil bore their respective fruits. Gośāla's determinism meant the fruitlessness of all actions, vicious or virtuous. Makkhali said:

> "Beings become depraved without cause or conditions; they become morally pure also without cause. Our attainments do not depend on efforts or action, either of our own or of others. There is no human energy or power that is effective. All things that have life, creatures, and souls, are without inherent force. They are bent this way and that by the necessity of their specific nature."

This meant a challenge to the Brahmanical claim of good cations being the equipments for heaven. According to the Upaniṣads actions constitute the essence of a man and survive him as Yājnavalkya narrated to Jāratkārava.

Ajita Keśakambala denied the value of charity, sacrifices and oblations to fire. He denied the existence of hereafter. The Vedic and the Upaniṣadic thoughts accept a hereafter, be it in the sense of an emancipated transcendental state or a heaven of the popular conception. Ajita condemned deities, ridiculed the Brāhmaṇas and Śramanas who claimed to have realised the truth and in the spirit of utter materialism he reduced the human existence to the four elements.

Pūrṇa Kasyapa's doctrines, represent gross epicureansim, and were entirely destructive of Vedic and Upaniṣadic ethics.

Prakruddha Kaccayana taught the existence of seven groups—Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Happiness, Misery and Life. The acceptance of "life" shows Kaccayana was not materialistic. He advanced to the vitalistic conception in the Bergsonian spirit. Of course, vitalism is greatly enunciated in the Upaniṣads (cf. the supremacy of the Prāṇas over senses and the elements) and in the Taittiriya (pranam brahman).

The sceptical and problematic doctrines of Sanjaya are comparable to the *syādvāda* of the Jainas as based on a conception of the manifold nature of Reality. It is to be noted that the Upaniṣads and the Vedic sacrificial formulae inculcate the notion of faith as vitally essential for success in the domain of spiritual wisdom.

An important factor in this critical and sophistical movement was seen in the teaching of Mahāvira. The substitution of an omniscient God by powerful omniscient Tirthankaras, and the formulation of a scheme of evolution of the world essentially different from Vedic and Upaniṣadic cosmology show that Jain tenets are antithetical to the traditional system.

In its classic form of a realistic dualism the Sāmkhya is anti-Vedic in the sense that it tries to construct a system of evolution instead of accepting the existence of a supracosmic creative agency as accepted in the form of Hiranyagarbha or Prajāpati in the Veda and the Brāhmanas. As distinguished from the Buddhists, the Sāmkhya accepted the validity of the Veda as a *pramāṇa* and is anxious to establish its Vedic origin, a claim which has been seriously challenged by *Śmakara*. We have tried to show later that the Sāmkhya system of thought had a Vedic origin and developed alongside with the Upaniṣads and was a potent factor for the rise of Buddhism. But the *Sāmkhya Karika* is very critical of Vedic sacrifices and calls them impure. It regards, nor sacrificial works, but discriminative knowledge, as the true means to liberation. Thus, besides the Brahmanical sacrificial mechanism.

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Upaniṣadic Absolutism, Buddhist and the contemporary rationalism, another source of attack against the Vedic religion came from the Sāmkhyas.

Although it is possible to trace the roots of the Buddhist concepts of *Karman*, Yoga and *tapas*, and of the Buddhist theory of monastic life and of rebirth in the Upaniṣads, it cannot be doubted that the system of early Buddhist thought bears the indelible stamp of the unique and powerful personality of Buddha. The ethical idealism and monasticism of early Buddhism testify to the moral temperament and austere personality of the founder. One of the greatest factors in the success and spread of Buddhism was the noble, sublime and compassionate character of the founder of the faith. Buddha is comparable in the mode of his life to the prophets who brought about an ethical reformation in Judaism in the sixth and fifth centuries B. C. and to Zoroaster who brought about a moralisation of the ancient Persian religion. According to Edward Caird, other subjective religions like philosophical Stoicism and the Ethical Monotheism of the Jews in the days of the Prophets and the Psalms, represent the divine being who is the unity of object and subject under the guise of an abstract subject. Buddhism carries the opposition of the subject and the object to such an extent that it cannot admit their unity under any guise whatever and hence it is a religion without a God. Against the concept of the scriptural revelation as maintained by the Vedic and Upaniṣadic teachers Buddha stood for the sanctity of personal life. Against the creed of dull and complicated sacrificialism Buddha advocated the dedicated pursuit of moral endeavours. Against the superficial moral code of some of the Tirthaka teachers Buddha championed the cause of superior ethical idealism and rigorism by basing his moral teachings on the creed of collective sadness and universal malady which characterize the real nature of the phenomenal world.

Buddha was to a great extent an individualist. He stood for vindicating the claims of moral endeavours of the *ashtāngika mārga*. He did not believe in surrender to any scriptural code or to any preiesthood. He did not accept the notion of doctrinal revelation. He refused to acknowledge any person as his preceptor. He was an individualist because he claimed to have found out a way of deliverance by virtue of his own efforts. He claimed himself to be his own teacher. Upaka Ājivaka was surprised to see the lustre and clam on the face of Buddha and he enquired of him about his teacher. Buddha replied that he himself was his own teacher. He exhorted the people to concentrate their efforts for the extinction of suffering. He was an individualist who taught the immense importance of personal efforts against the mediation of any priesthood. It is certainly true that th roots of spiritual individualism are contained in the Upaniṣads because the latter also do not enshrine the role of priesthood for the attainment of emancipation but the individualism of the Upaniṣads is tempered by the overwhelming strees on the revelatory character of the mystical formulas through repetition of which the aspirant is supposed to attain the supreme reality. Buddha was an individualist to the extent that he taught a norm of emancipation free from the influence of any theistic godhead or any divine doctrinal scripture or any priesthood. He himself claimed to be not a dispenser of salvation but a teacher of the moral creed and the way of emancipation. Buddha's individualism was more radical than that of Martin Luther and John Calvin. The latter only dispensed

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with papal interference in the matter of Biblical interpretation. Buddha taught the sanctity of personal effort to a much greater degree because he dispensed with the Vedic scriptures altogether. Buddha's radical individualism was a further break away from the Upaniṣadic tradition.

Sometimes attempts have been made to exaggerate the legacy of the Upaniṣads upon Buddhism. Radhakrishnan ascribes to Buddha the role of a democratic teacher of ethical universalism. He says:

> "Buddhism helped to democratise the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, which was till then confined to select few... It was Buddha's mission to accept the idealism of the Upaniṣads at its best and make it available, for the daily needs of mankind. Historical Buddhism means the spread of the Upanisad doctrine among the people...Such democratic upheaval are common features of Hindu history. When the treasures of the great sages were the private property of a few. Ramanuja the great Vaishnava teacher proclaimed the mystic texts to even the pariashs.

It is not necessary to controvert the ascription of this role of a democratic populariser of Upaniṣadic idealism to Buddha because Radhakrishnan himself contradicts this statement of his at another place. He says...."the religion of Buddha is an aristocratic one. It is full of subtleties that only the learned could understand, and Buddha had always in view the Samanas and the Brahmanas..... Democracy is a modern motive of social reform. We have seen that the fundamental theme of the Upaniṣadic teachings- brahmātmāikyavada- is repugnant to Buddha. Some of the conceptions and propositions which are common to the Upanisads and Buddhism receive a great extension in the later schools of thought. Hence it is not correct to hold that early Buddhism is only a restatement of the doctrine of the Upanisads from a new standpoint. If the primary mission of Buddha was to democratize the spiritual idealism of the Upanisads it would mean that the whole historical evolution of the philosophy and religion of Buddhism which is a story of steady drift away from the Upanisadic religion and philosophy is a tragic epitaph on his tomb. But such stupendous mistakes history seldom makes.

Buddha was conscious that he had discovered a new way of emancipation. His supreme quest was for the extinction of pain and suffering. His system is characterized by the insistence on an ethical norm. It does incorporate vital elements from the contemporary systems of thought. Some of the schools from which Buddhism borrows contemporary systems of thought. Some of the schools from which Buddhism borrows might not have assumed the crystallized intellectual shape in the sixth and fifth centuries B. C. which they did later. It is certainly true that some dominant conceptions of Indian culture which are contained in the Vedas and the Upanisads are taken up and incorporated by Buddha in his system. But it is not only a gross exaggeration but a mistake to state that early Buddhism is only the extension and fulfilment of the teachings of the Upanisads. In spite of some common concepts and ideas, the difference in the orientations of the Upanisads and the Tripitakas is immense and vital.

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CHHANDOGYA UPANISHAD

"The Khandogya Upanishad," says Max Muller, "belongs to the Sama Veda. Together with the Brihad-Aranyaka, which belongs to the Yajur Veda, it has contributed the most important materials to what may be called the orthodox philosophy of India, the Vedanta, *i.e.* the end, the purpose, the highest object of the Veda. It consists of eight adhyáyas or lectures, and formed part of a Khándogya-Bráhmana, in which it was preceded by two other adhyáyas."

This Upanishad contains the celebrated sentences, "One without a second," "All this is Brahma."

Sankaraṣ Introduction

The Chhandogya Upanishad comprises eight chapters, and commences with the words:— "Om, this letter, etc." Of this work a brief commentary according to the order to the text is compendiously given for the benefit of enquires.

The Chhandogya Brahmana of the Sama Veda, where of this Upanishad forms a part, contains ten chapters (prapáthakas); of these the first two are called the *Chhándogya Montra Bráhmana*; the rest constitute the *Chhándogya Upanishad.* S'ankára, having commented upon the *mantra* portion, now begins with the Upanishad, which will account for the abruptness and brevity of this Introduction.

Its connection. [The performance of] the ceremonies prescribed [in the Vedas] when conjoined with a knowledge of the gods, fire, life, and the rest, becomes the cause of transition to the Brahmaloka by a luminous path, (*archirádi márga*): without such knowledge it leads to the Chandraloka (region of the moon) by a darksome path (*dhumádi márga*). Those who follow the impulses of their passions, losing both these paths, are doomed to inextricable degradation. But as by neither of these two paths can absolute beatitude be obtained, and as a knowledge of the non-dual soul independent of ceremonies is necessary to destroy the cause of the threefold mundane transition, this Upaniṣad is revealed.

By a knowledge of the non-dual soul, and by no other means, is absolute beatitude obtainable; for it is said: "Those who beheve otherwise (*i.e.*, in duality) are not masters of their own selves, and inherit transient fruition; while he who acknowledges the reverse becomes his own king." Moreover a believer in the deception of duality suffers *pain* and bondage (transmigration), as the guilty suffer from the touch of the heated ball; while a believer in the truthful soul without duality, like the not guilty escaping unscathed from the touch of the said ball, absolves himself from all liability to pain and bondage: hence a knowledge of the non-dual cannot be co-existent with works.

When a belief in such texts as, "The being one without a second;" "All this is the divine soul," once grows in the mind

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to annihilate all distinctions about action, actors and fruitions, nothing can withstand that belief. If it be said, that a belief in ritual ordinances will prove prejudicial to it—this is denied: Since rites are enjoined to one who is conscious of the nature of actor and recipient and is subject to the defects of envy, anger and the rest, he alone is entitled to their fruits. From the injunction of ceremonies to him who knows the Vedas, may it not be inferred that the conscient of the non-dual is also enjoined to (perform) ceremonies?—No; because the natural distinctive knowledge of actor, recipient and the rest which is included in ceremony, is destroyed by [a proper understanding of] the Srutis: "The being one without a second;" "All is the Divine soul," etc. Therefore actions are enjoined to him only who is ignorant, and not to the conscient of the non-dual. Accordingly it has been said: "'All those (who are attached to ceremony) migrate to virtuous regions; he, who reposes in Brahma, attains immortality."

In this discourse on the knowledge of the soul without duality the object and exercise of the mind in both cases being the same, are also related certain auspicious forms of adoration (*upasaná*), [1st such] the recompense of which closely approximate to salvation, [2nd such] the subject of which founded on the Srutis, "Om is mind", "Om is corporeal," is Brahma differing but slightly from the non-dual, [and 3rd such as] are connected with ceremony, although their recompense is transcendent.

The knowledge of the non-dual is an operation of the mind, and inasmuch as these forms of adoration are modification of mental action, they are all similar; and if so, wherein lies the difference between the knowledge of the non-dual and these forms of adoration? The knowledge of the non-dual is the removing of all distinctive ideas of actor, agent, action, recompense and the rest engrafted by ignorance on the inactive soul, as a knowledge of the identity of a rope removes the erroneous notion of a snake under which it may be [at first] perceived; while upasana (adoration) is to rest the mind scripturally upon some support, and to identify the same with the thinking mind;— (a process) not much removed from this transcendent knowledge. Herein lies the difference.

Since these forms of adoration rectify (the quality of) goodness (satva), display the true nature of the soul, contribute to the knowledge of the non-dual, and are easy of accomplishment from having supports, they are therefore primarily propounded; and first of all, that form of adoration which is allied to ceremony, inasmuch as mankind being habituated to ceremony, adoration apart from it is, to them, difficult of performance.

Sankara's Commentary

1. *Om! this letter should be adored.* The letter Om is the most appropriate (*lit.* nearest) name of the Deity (*paramátma* or supreme spirit). By its application, He becomes propitiated, as men by the use of favourite names. From its perfect applicability and definite and comprehensive character, the sound Om exclusively is here pointed out by the particle इति "the", "this". It is further, emblematic of the divine soul, as images are of material objects. Being thus a designation and a representative of the Supreme Spirit, it is known in all the Védántas as the best means towards the accomplishment of His adoration.

2. The earth *constitutes* the essence of all substances; water is the essence of the earth, and annual herbs of water; man *forms* the essence of annual herbs, and speech, is the essence of man; Rig is the

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essence of speech, Sáma of the Rig, and of the Sama, the Udgitha is the essence.

3. The Udgitha is the quintessence of all these essences; it is the Supreme, the most adorable, the eighth.

4. What? what is the Rig? What? what the Sama? What? what the Udgitha? These are questioned.

5. Rig is speech, Sama is life, and Om, this letter, is the Udgitha. Verily this and that, speech and breath (*prána*)— Rig and Sáma, —make a *mithuna* (couple).

6. The Mithuna unites with the letter Om, as couples uniting together gratify each other's desires.

7. He verily becomes the grataifier of desires, who, knowing it thus, adores the undecaying Udgitha.

8. Verily this is an injunctive term. Whatever is enjoined, Om is surely repeated; hence this injection is called Prosperity. He verily becomes the gratifier of desires, and promoter of prosperity who, knowing all this, adores the undecaying Udgitha.

9. Through its greatness and effects is the three-fold knowledge maintained; for the worship of this letter is Om recited, Om exclaimed, Om chanted.

10. Both those who are versed in the letter thus *described*, and those who are not, alike perform *ceremonies* through this *letter*. Knowledge and ignorance are unlike each other. What is performed through knowledge. Through faith, through Upanishad is more effectual. This verily is the description of the letter.

The Udgitha as Recited by a Dog

1.Next the canine Udgitha. Verily, Vaka, son of Dalba or (alias) Glaba, son of Mitra, has gone forth to study the Vedas.

2. [In mercy] to him appeared a white dog. Other dogs approached it and said, "O Lord, pray for abundance of food for us; we wish to consume the same."

3. To them said the white dog: "Come ye here unto me tomorrow morning". At the appointed time did Vaka, son of Dalba- [alias] Glába, son of Mitrá, — act up to the injunction.

4. As those who wish to pray through the Vahishpavamana, [hymns] collecting together, proceed [to their work], so did they [the little dogs] come together and, taking their seats, bark out:

5. "Om ! Let us eat. Om ! Let us drink. Om ! may the resplendent sun, who showers on us rain and supported all animated beings, grant us food. O Lord of food, deign to bestow food unto us; do deign to grant us food!"

How to Obtain Rain

1. In rain should the five-formed Sáma be adored; the forward wind as *Hinka'ra*, whatever could collects as *Praste'va*, the raining [itself] as *Udgitha*, the lightning and rolling of clouds as *Pratihara* and the cessation of the rain as *Nidha'na*.

2. He who, knowing thus, adores the five-formed Sáma by identifying it with rain, can command the rain to fall [at his pleasure], and for him doth rain pour [forth its treasures].

Advantages of Knowing the Gayatra

1. The mind is Hinkára, speech Prastáva, the eyes Udgitha, the ears Pratihára, and Prána Nidhana: [thus] is this Gáyatra Sáma connected with life [Prána].

2. He, who knows the Gáyatra to be thus connected with Prána, becomes possessed of life [Prána], enjoys the full limit of existence, his career becomes refulgent, he becometh great in dependents and cattle, and great in noble deeds; and his duty is to be noble-minded.

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The Gayatri

1. Verily all this creation is Gáyatri. Speech is Gáyatri; by speech is all this creation recited and preserved.

2. That Gáyatri is verily this earth. And on this earth are all creatures sustained; that they exceed not.

3. That which is the earth is likewise the body of the animated creation. In that body are the animal functions sustained; that they exceed not.

4. That which is the body is likewise the heart which is within it. In it are the animal functions sustained; that they exceed not.

5. That Gáyatri is verily composed of four feet, and possesseth six characteristics. Regarding it has this verse been recited:

6. "They [the creations] constitute the glories of the Gayatri; to which is the soul [Purusha] superior. He has the creation for his first foot, and his own immortal self constitutes the other three."

7. That Brahma, [i.e., the being indicated in the Gáyatri] is verily the space which surroundeth mankind. That which surroundeth mankind is of a truth the space which existeth within mankind.

8. That which existeth within mankind is of a truth the space which existed within the heart. It is omnipresent and eternal. He who knoweth this attains eternal and all-sufficient treasures.

All this is Brahma

1. All this verily is Brahma, for therefrom doth it proceed, therein doth it merge, and thereby is it maintained. With a quiet and controlled mind should it be adored. Man is a creature of reflection, whatever he reflects upon in this life, he becomes the same hereafter; therefore should he reflect [upon. Brahma.]

2. [Saying] "that which is nothing but mind, whose body is its life, whose figure is a mere glory, whose will is truth, whose soul is like space [A'kasa,] which performeth all things and willeth all things, to which belong all sweet odours and all grateful juices, which envelopes the whole of this [world], which neither speaketh nor respects anybody.

3. "Is the soul within me; it is lighter than a corn, or a barely, or a mustard, or a canary seed, or the substance within it. Such a soul is within me, as is greater than this earth, and greater than the sky, and greater than the heaven, and greater than all these regions [put together.]

4. "That which performeth all things, and willeth all things, to which belong all sweet odours and all grateful juices, which envelopes the whole of this [world], which neither speaketh nor respecteth anybody, is the soul within me; it is Brahma; I shall obtain it after my transition from this world." He who believeth this, and hath no hesitation, will verily obtain the fruit of his reflection; so said Śándilya— [the sage] Śándilya.

Satyakama

1. Satyakáma Jabala enquired of his mother Jabála: "I long to abide [by a tutor] as a Brahmachárin; of what gotra am I?"

2. She said unto him, "I know not, child of what gotra you are. During my youth when I got thee I was engaged in attending on many [guests who frequented the house of my husband and had no opportunity of making any enquiry on the subject,] I know not of what gotra you are. Jabála is my name and Satyakáma thine; say, therefore, of thyself, Satyakáma, son of Jabálá [when any body enquireth of thee]."

3. He repaired to Haridrumata of the Gautama gotra and said, "I approach your venerable self to abide by your worship as a Brahmachárin."

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4. Of him enquired he [the tutor :] " Of what gotra are you, my good boy?" He replied: "I know not of what gotra I am. I enquired about it of my mother and she said, 'In my youth when I got thee I was engaged in attending on many, and know not of what gotra you are; Jabálá is my name and Satyakama thine; I am that Satyakáma son of Jabálá."

5. Unto him said the other, "None but a Bráhman can say so. You have not departed from the truth, and I shall invest you [with the bráhmanical rites.] Do you collect, child, the necessary sacrificial wood?" Having ordained him, he selected four hundred head of lean and weakly cows and said, "Do you, child, attend to these." While leading the cows, he [the neophyte] said, "I shall not return until these become a thousand." Thus he passed many years, until the cattle had multiplied to a thousand.

Creation of the Vedas

1. Prajápati reflected on regions, and from the reflected, extracted their essences, viz., Fire from the earth, Air from the sky, and the Sun from heaven.

2. He reflected on the three gods, Fire, Air and the Sun, and from the reflected extracted their essences, viz., the Rig from Agni, the Yajus from Váyu [air,] and the Sáma from the Sun.

3. He reflected on the three-fold knowledge and from the reflected extracted its essences, viz., [the word] Bhu from the Rig, [the word] Bhuvah from the Yajus, and [the word] Sva from the Sáma.

Transmigration

Thereof he, whose conduct is good, quickly attains to some good existence, such as that of a Bráhmana, a Kshatriya or a Vaisya. Next, he who is viciously disposed, soon assumes the form of some inferior creature; such as that of a dog, a hog, or a Chándala.

One only without a second

1. "Before, O child, this was a mere state of being (sat), one only, without a second. Thereof verily others say: 'Before this was non-being, one alone, without a second; from that non-being proceeds the state of beings.'"

2. He continued: but of a truth, O child, how can this be? How can being proceed from non-being? Before, O child, this was only being, one only; without a second.

3. "It willed 'I shall multiply and be born.' It created heat. That heat willed 'I shall multiply and be born.' It created water.

"Therefore wherever and whenever any body is heated or perspires, it is from heat that water is produced.

4. "The water willed, 'I shall multiply and be born'. It created aliment. Therefore wherever and whenever rain falls, much aliment is produced; varily it is from water that aliment is produced.

"Thou art that"

1. "As the bess, my child, intent upon making honey, collect the essence of various trees from different quarters and reduce them to one uniform fluid.

2. "Which no longer retains the idea of its having belonged to different trees; so, my child, created beings, when dead, know not that they have attained the Truth.

3. "They are born again in the form in which they lived before, whether that be of a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a bear, a worm, an insect, a gnat, or a musquito.

4. "That particle which is the Soul of all this is Truth; it is the universal Soul. O Swetaketu, thou art that." "Will it please my Lord, to explain it again unto me?" "Be it so, my child," replied he.

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The Moon Escaping from Rahu

1. "From blackness I attain multicolor, from multicolor I attain blackness. Like unto the horse which shakes off all dust from its coat, or the moon which escapes from the mouth of Ráhu, I shall purify my body, and becoming free (by the aid of dhyána), attain, verily attain—the uncreate Brahmaloka."

This chapter is supposed to contain a hymn of triumph. Max Muller.

Claimed Authorship of the Upaniṣad

1. Verily this was related by Brahmá to Prajápati, by Prajapati to Manu, and by Manu to mankind. Having studied the Veda in the house of a tutor, and having paid to the Guru what is his due, one should dwell with his family in a healthy country, reading the Vedas, bringing up virtuous sons and pupils, devoting himself with all his senses to the Universal Soul, and injuring no created being. Having lived thus as long as life lasts, he attains the Brahmaloka. Thence he never returns, verily thence he never returns.

CHRISTIANITY AND UPANISADS

The Upaniṣads can give guidance not only in the Indian Christian conceptions of God and Jesus, but even in acquiring new insight related to the Indian Christian understanding of human person and the world.

Christ is the unifying principle, the norm by which all Scriptures including the Bible are read. Jesus Christ is both Judge and fulfiller of all religions. He is the norm to reject what ever in non-Biblical Scriptures would detract from obedience to God. In Him can be seen the recognition and guarantee of the fulfilment of whatever truth, goodness and genuine aspiration for human society, are found in them.

Thus Prasannabhat, tries to show us how Christ is pre-figured in the Hindu Scriptures. Quoting the Bible and the Upaniṣads, he shows that in both Hinduism and Christianity there are (a) the process of detaching oneself from bondage, (b) the process of leading humans into the wilderness (c) the process of God's self-manifestation to humans (Svet. Up 5.8.3.8, 3.9, Is. Up. 1; Katha Up. 1.2.18, Svet. Up. 3. 20. Katha Up. 2.1.12-13., 2.3.13, 2.2.15, Mund Up. 2.2. 10; Svet 6.14), (d) the process of transforming the recipient or the state of enlightenment, (e) the state of being one with God (Is. Up. 6-7; Kena 2.1.15; Gal. 2.20; Eph. 2.19; Gal. 6.15; 1 Pet 1.23; Eph. 1.3; 1 Pet. 4.6; 2. Pet 1.4) (f) the state of worshipping God in spirit and truth (Mund. 3.1.4).

Also he shows that there are certain ideas similar to Christian teaching in the Hindu Scriptures, like: (a) Kena Up. 1.31 Cor 11.9 the eyes have not seen....(b) Svet Up. 3.3 Lk 13.34b God wants to keep his children under his "wings" (c) Aita. Up. 1.1.1-3 Gen. 1.1.2-7 the creation story (d) Mund. Up. 3.1.7 Lk 17.21 the Kingdom of God is within human persons, (e) Mund Up. 3.1.9 Mtt. 5.8 the pure will see God (f) Katha Up. 2.2.15; Mund Up. 2.2.10; Svet. Up. 6.14-Rev. 21.22-25 the sun shines not there......God himself is the light thereof.....etc. And he further says that the divine experience of the Upaniṣadic risis can never contradict the Christian revelation, but rather it finds its full expression in the Christian revelation: Christ is the fulfilment of Hinduism.

Vandana Mataji thinks that we should undertake '*Dhwani*' (i.e. experiential and metaphorical) interpretations of non parabolic new Testament texts and this she does by interrelating her Christian faith with Hindu religious traditions around the focal point of specific themes. Through such a method one is able to identify diverse relationships between the

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thoughts of Biblical texts and Upaniṣadic texts as we have already noted above. The following interpretation of the baptism of Jesus provided by the Mataji may further clarify her method:

> When christ heard the Father's voice saying: "*Thou art my Beloved son*' (Mtt. 3.17; Mk. 1.11; Lk.3.22) it was 'the Sematic equivalent' or nearest, to the Guru's words, to the disciple: '*Tat Tvamasi*' that thou art', the *upadesa* Mantra of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (6.87). And like the disciple who had known now his deepest self. He answered in His Heart: 'Abba'.......the equivalent of aham *Brahmasmi*, the fundamental *mahāvākya* of the Bṛhadaraṇyaka Upaniṣad (1.4.10).
>
> And with this response in His Heart, Jesus 'know' Himself, awoke as it were to being the '*Chit*' of *Saccidananda*-the Hindu mystery' nearest to the Trinity- or the Being— Consciousness-Bliss....
>
> The Father is the '*Aham Asmi*'— the same 'I am' as Moses had heard on mount Horeb (Exod. 3.14)......Deep in his heart the Rishi of India had also heard the same 'I Am' as moses....I am Brahman (*Aham Brahmāsmi*).

Jesus is the *Pleroma* of God, the plentitude, the *Poornam*, 'In Him dwells the fullness of God corporeally' (Col. 2.9). This is a new meaning or a new interpretation the Mataji sees in the *Shanti Patha* of the Isa; Upaniṣad: 'Poornamadha, Poornam idam (Fullness there (beyond); fullness here) i.e. : the fully Divine (there) is fully human (here).

The Upaniṣads have the beautiful phrase 'dwelling in the cave of the heart' and this expresses the Lords, abiding in humans. Quoting Mundaka Up. 2.7; 5.9. Taitt. Up. 2.1 she relates the meaning of baptism of water and the spirit to this cave experience. The great discovery the baptised Christian makes is : the God of heaven and earth dwells within the heart.

Jesus said: 'Whosoever drinks this water will get thirsty again: but anyone (anyone not of any particular religion, race, caste), who drinks the water that I shall give will never be thirsty again; the water that I shall give will turn into a spring inside him, welling upto eternal life' (in. 4.13-14). According to Vandana Mataji Upaniṣadic verses like Taittiriya 2.1.1 Kaṭha 2.2. 13 "lights up" those verses of John. For example, Kaṭha Up. 2.2.13 reads 'Only the wise who perceive Him as abiding in the soul, attain eternal bliss, eternal peace; and no others'.

If we have faith in Jesus we pass from death to eternal life. The prayers *'Mrtyor' ma amrtam gamaya* (from death lead me to life) (Br. Up. 1.3.28) is fulfilled by Jesus as explained in Jn. 5.24 and 26. Jesus is the bridge of Immortality of Mundaka Up. 2.2.5.6. Further in her view the cry of our ancestors "*Tamaso mā jyotir gamaya*' (from darkness lead me to light) (Br. Up. 1.3.28) was heard and fully answered by Christ and Chandogya Up. 3.13.7 hinted at it in the following words: 'now the light which shines higher than this heaven, above all the above every thing in the highest worlds...verily, that is the same as this light which is here within a person (Purusa). And to pray *Asato ma sat gamaya* (from the unreal lead me to the real) (Br. Up. 1.3.28) is to pray for the grace of realising Sat, the only Reality which is both transcendent and immanent. In this context Vandana mataji further says:

> Just as transcendence and immanence go together, so unity and otherness go together. Our otherness with God is based on our Advaita, non-duality, with Him. By discovering that I am (not the small I but my real I, the Atman) I know that I am He. All in John as in the Upaniṣads lead us to this oneness

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with the supreme Atman who is at once the Innermost and the Uppermost.....'I am in the Father and you in me and I in you' (Jn. 14.20). The realisation of this supreme In-dwelling is the work of the spirit of Truth, for he dwells with you and shall be with you' (Jn. 14.17), the spirit who alone can cry in us 'Abba Father'. Then with Christ we can say, 'Aham Brahmasmi' in a very real sense.

According to the Mataji has sign of Jesus walking on the waters (Jn. 6.16-21) teachers us "the secret of reaching the Further Shore where there is only one 'I': the only 'I' that can speak the ultimate meaning of life, the Self beyond the self" *Avidya* consists of duality and duality engenders fear and the Upaniṣads consistently teach that when a person sees the Atman he fears no more. Jesus said : Do not be afraid: it is I, That is, reaching the Further Shore, having crossed the waters of egoism and having found the One Self, there is no more a within or a without, there is only One Self (Ps. 29.3-4).

The Spirit of Atman is the One-ing Principle within God as the Christian revelation of the Trinity makes clear and the Spirit also unites human person to God and makes the two one, till there is no more duality (Jn. 17. 26).

The 'I am He' of Jn. 13. 19 is explained by the Mataji in the following way:

> . . . Not only does Jesus tell us that it is God who is washing our feet through him, but that He is ever willing to wash everyone's feet, anyone's feet for any and everyone is also God ...with a name and form.

The Johannine 'Advaita' shows:

> It is only through 'the pierced and open one' (Jesus) that it is possible for man to know oneness in its total reality. 'He who is in the sun and in the fire and in the heart of man is One. He who knows this is one with the One' (Maitri, Up. 6.17) and because He is one, He is our bridge to eternity (Svet. Up. 6.19) if we take refuge in this pierced open heart.

And the conclusion of her is that Our lord is the centre of all Scriptures as well as "looking at Christ Crucified, some of these Upaniṣadic texts become more meaningful and at the same time render the Christ heart more luminous.

Yesudas Tiwari has collected some beautiful flowers from the rich garden of the Sruti particularly from the Upaniṣads on the theme Om (Shatpatha Br. 1.6.1.1.-11.; Taittiriya Ar. 1.8 Chand. Up. 1.1.1-2; 1.5.1; 2.23.3; Mund Up. 2.2.3-4; Pras. Up. 5.5.1-5. Māndukya Up. 7; Katha Up. 1.2.15-17 489). His observation is" Om as 'symbol' of God has been the object of meditation and devotion in the Upaniṣads. Similarly Christ as 'Sacrament' and 'sign' of the invisible God has been the object of Christian faith and devotion. Equally worthnoting are his concluding words: "Upaniṣads make OM, the fundamental Divine affirmation, the centre of meditation. In this they come very close to the theology of the Word, the Logos, which is Christ."

Richard De Smet, tracing the status of the Scriptures in the "holy history" of India Points out the following important features of the Upaniṣads: (a) *The discovery of perfect worship* : The sages of the Upaniṣads searches for the one Absolute which would be identically the efficacious power of the sacrificial formula (*Brahman*), the origination and ruler of the universe (*Parabrahman*) and their own radical ground an inner ruler (*pramatman*) and they discovered it as the pure Consciousness most deeply immanent and

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transcendent in themselves (*Prajnanam Brahma* : Aitareya Up. 3.1.3; Ayamatama Brahma : Mandukya Up. 2: *Tat-Tvam-Asi*: Chandogya Up. 6.8.7; *Aham Brahmasmi*: Brhadararyaka Up. 1.4.10). And to recognise thus the divine Absolute. One without a second, with boundless admiration and exclusive surrender is the highest worship and this is similar to the 'cleaving to the Lord God' prescribed in Deutoronomy 10.20.

(b) *The discovery of the highest love*: The supremacy of God in terms of love is declared in the same Upaniṣads with an emphasis similar to that of Deuternomy 6.5. It is for the love of the Atman that everything else is dearly loved. It is the Ātman, indeed that should be seen, heard about, thought on and deeply pondered (cf. Brhad. Up. 2.4.5)

(c) The *choice of renunciation for the sake of the Atman*: It is the transcendence of the Absolute which determines the Upaniṣadic adoption of complete renunciation. Because the infinite is in the finite and yet altogether different from it, its blissful realisation lies in the very shunning of all the finite and thus the Upaniṣadic sages adopted complete detachment for the sake of this attainment; (Brhad. Up. 4.2.22). The steps of the renouncer's spiritual life are scholarship (*panditya*), child likeness (*balya*), silence (*mauna*) and finally, putting away these three successive steps, the state of perfect conformity with the Brahman (*Brahmana*) as the inner and universal Atman (Brhad Up. 3.5).

(d) *The method of regressive analysis*: The important discoveries of the Upaniṣads concerning the transcendence of the Divinity prevented from arising the question whether God the Brahman-Ātman really loves us or not. The Absolute is identified as pure, alone, unrelated, devoid of mind and heart, non-dual, undifferentiated, a non-agent, unnamable, undefinable, ineffable, even unknowable and as perfect Being Consciousness and Bliss, it is the prime Mover of our being and activity.

The Spiritual search of the Upaniṣads concentrates on Brahman; once it is known, everything is known. Brahman as the universal cause, possesses in itself the whole positivity and value of its effects. Brahman is eminently each one and all of them; It is 'the Real of the real (*satyasya satyam*)' (Brhad. Up. 2.1.20). Each 'small' reality, being an effect, is in its own small way Brahman or rather a pointer to Brahman which has to be transcended. Regarding the method of the Upaniṣads De Smet says: "the method of affinities and identifications now takes the form of a regressive analysis which goes from effects to their immediate cause, then to their mediate causes, and therefrom to the supreme and universal cause.

The regressive analysis can proceed either along the path of the external world to reach the all-powerful and all-knowing Cause Brahman or along the path of the mind to reach the supreme spiritual inner Cause, the Pramatman. Regarding the relation between the two great conceptions Brahman, the ground of all realities, and Atman, the ground of the thinker himself, the Upaniṣads would conceive them as one and the same wonderful and supreme Reality (Brhad. Up. 4.4.25; Ait. Up. 5.3; Mund Up. 2.2.5; Svet. Up. 1.16; Chand. Up. 3.14.1.3; 7.25.1; Brhad. Up. 1.4.10; 3.7.23; 4.3.20-21; Chand. Up. 6.8-16; Prasna. Up. 4.10; Svet. Up. 1.7). These identity statements need not be taken as teaching monistic pantheism, rather they are expressions of the Upaniṣadic mentality of spiritual interiorisation and mystic realisation.

(e) *Nirguna Brahman corresponds to the Christian notion of God*. The internal

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unity of a saguna (qualified) subject is not perfect but composed of two elements the substance and its *gunas* (qualities) where as the internal unity of a *nirguna* (qualityless) subject is simplicity itself the distinction between 'having' and 'being' cannot easily be made in Sanskrit. Hence many Upaniṣadic texts concerning Brahman remain ambiguous and many be arranged in two series of *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa*. The *saguṇa* series comprises those texts which affirm that Brahman has qualities. powers, actions, etc. The *nirguṇa* series either deny any such attribution, or state that Brahman is reality, knowledge, bliss etc. The *saguṇa* series is anthropomorphic and the nirguna series corrects this tendency The notion of the nirguna Brahman Atman aptly denotes the Fullness of all perfections in absolute simplicity and, therefore, the transcendence and the unicity of the universal Cause, which is truly one only, without a second" (*ekam eva advitiyam*).

The current translation of *saguṇa* as 'personal' and *nirguṇa* as 'impersonal' is quite incorrect and unfortunate. In fact. Sanskrit has no proper equivalent for 'person'. In Christian understanding person means any 'distinct and complete subsistent whose nature is characterised by intelligence and free-will' whether this subsistent be finite or infinite. If that is so "it is evident that nirguna Brahman verifies this definition and corresponds perfectly to the notion of God as defined in the great Councils of the Christian Church-abstracting of course from his definition as Holy Trinity. De Smet's position is further clarified from the following statements:

> I know that the Indian conception of *nirguṇa Brahman* does, not clearly cannote the possibility of an interpersonal exchange between that pure Absolute and man, but I also recognise that what it directly denotes is identical with the personal. God as defined by the great councils, excepting, of course, his Trinitarian aspect...
>
> If God is *saguṇa*, He is internally complex, namely, consisting of basic substance (dravya) endowed with a number of distinct complements or accidents (*guṇas*) which somehow shape Him as a limited individual. The truth of course, is that the divine Being is devoid of any complexity., which does not mean that He is deprived of any absolute perfequti 29F 4r Suat. He is, by pure identity of subsistence, Being, Truth, Beauty, Intelligence, Love, Bliss, Power, etc. Thus the *nirguṇa Brahmana* verifies most perfectly the notion of 'person', so perfectly even that He is three persons in one Being absolutely simple as being. And each one of these persons is the *nirguṇa* Brahman.

De Smet does not mean that the concept *nirguṇa* Brahman of the Upaniṣads and Śankara's Advita Vednata implies the Trinitarian mystery of Godhead. Only through divine revelation we can realise that the one personal God is not a single person but three persons. What he means is, the *Nirguṇa* Brahman so perfectly verifies the 'notion of person' that even the mystery of three persons can be well accommodated in that concept so that each one of the three persons is understood as the nirguna Brahman.

(f) *The relation of the universe to Brahman*: De Smet points out that the Upaniṣads emphasis the total dependence of nature, human person and even the gods upon Brahman. Nothing can be or work or think apart from Brahman as well as nothing can be known. Also, the Upaniṣadis bring out the point that

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because every effect in similar and even identical with its cause, the universe manifests Brahman and this they do without negating the transcendence of the unmanifest Brahman. "The one inner Atman of all things is corresponding in form to every form, and yet is outside" (Kaṭha. Up. 5.10). In the later Upaniṣads, Svetasvatara and Maitri the inferior status of the universe or manifest Brahman is explained in terms of illusion. This way of thinking later gave rise to the theory of cosmic illusion which is not found in the main bulk of the Upaniṣads.

(g) *The conceptions of the individual*: The Upaniṣadic conception of human society as well as individual being is hierarchical in nature. Human person is conceived as a hierarchy of atmans and this idea is systematized in the doctrine of the five sheaths (pancakosa) of the Taittiriya up. 2.1.5. The first sheath the gross body (*annarasamaya*), is said to be filled with the second (*praṇamaya*), the second with the third (*manomaya*), the third with the fourth (*vijananamaya*) and the fourth with the fifth (*anandamaya*). Each inner sheath is said to be other than, interior to and the atman of its containing sheath. De Smet sums up the Upaniṣadic understanding of human person in the following words:

> . . . Man is not an entity closed itself but rather the play field of a hierarchy of psychic cosmic functions at the top of which stands the divine Energy-consciousness which is Fulness. Existence and Bliss imperishable. His individuality radiates from his self awareness which posits him as an 'I' (*aham*) encountering a world of objects and responsibly active in their midst. But he can discover that his very individuality is, as it were, open upwards and shot through with the transcendence of a universal Atman Brahman apart from which it has no consistency and towards which it is directed to find there its blissful fulfilment.

In De Smet's view the consistency of Upaniṣadic person is hardly holistic since it resides in the unity of layers or sheaths linked by inner causality and yet, as these layers are reabsorbable not their inner cause, they are not altogether perishable.

In evaluating the Upaniṣadic teachings as a whole De Smet has the kind words that the Indian mentality as found in a correct conception of god as the *nirguṇa* Brahman-Atman to whom everything owes its origin, subsistence and final destiny, as well as in the notion of the universe as a manifestation of God, is 'naturally Christian'.

Swami Abhishiktananda's approach to the Upaniṣads is important because he is the one who initiated the school of 'Hindu-Christian meeting point within the cave of the Heart or 'the Christian Vedantic theology of experience' of which an important exponent today, as we saw above, is Vandana Mataji. The meeting point of Hinduism and Christianity can be actualised only within the cave of th heart. In the deep level of experience and not at the level of intellectual conceptions. The cave of the heart, for Abhishiktananda is the place of the ultimate encounter where the spirit of human persons becomes one with the Spirit of God. We must realize "......in the depth of our own being both the immediate experience of the ultimate 'non-duality' of existence of divine sonship in the unity of the Spirit which lies at the heart of our Christian faith" In his view

> The confrontation, or rather the mutual discovery of their spiritual riches by the votaries respectively of the Bible and the Upaniṣads, should take place on the level and

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> in the light of the highest experience itself, and not simply at the level of theological these (including dogmas), not even at the level of the Scripture, because even the Scriptures are conditioned in their formulations by the mythico-conceptual world in which the seers themselves lived.

Abhishiktananda believed that to attain genuine Hindu experience we have to approach the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣads guide us to "an awakening to an unsuspected depth in oneself, an awaking to oneself, to things, to the mystery which when projected, is called God." The Upaniṣads should be read with an attitude of waiting on the Spirit to be enlightened. If it is in group that the reading takes place, the method suggested by him is:

> At the beginning someone reads the text. Others listen or follow in their own books. A time of silence follows in which all try to empty their minds of any distracting thought or desire in order to become as completely as possible open to the Spirit. Then comes the time of sharing, putting questions to other, or rather, to the spirit in others, explaining with simplicity one's own reactions to the passage which has been read.

The Upaniṣadic teaching can be imparted only in the intimacy of the gurudisciple relationship (Mund. Up. 1.2.12-13). The Upaniṣads invite us to an awakening (Kena Up. 2.4; 4.4), an awakening to the Atman which is Brahman (Ch. Up. 8.3.4; 12.37; Muṇḍaka Up. 2.1.1; Svet. Up. 3.8). The quest for the Self is the central theme of the Upaniṣads (cf. Katha Up. 4.1; Ch. Up. 3.11.1-3; Kath Up. 2.11; Mand Up. 6; Kena Up. 4.13; Br. U p. 4.5. 14ff; Ch. Up. 7.23-25; Br. Up. 1.4 Ch. Up. 6 etc.) The intuition of Saccidananda spontaneously arose from the heart of the Indian seers when they tried to find some way of referring to the mystery of Being that transcends thought. Equally the word signifies the mystery of the divine presence in th inner most sanctuary of a person's being. Abhishiktananda explains the Upaniṣadic experience of Sat, Cit and Ananda in the following way; In human person's depths there is the fundamental intuition of his/her being. It is precisely there that he/she meets God, in the mystery at once of his/her own being and of God's. A person then realizes being as himself/herself as well as infinity beyond himself/herself. Being, *Sat*, Thus in its very immanence is infinitely transcendent. A person is, and he/she knows that he/she is. This is the mystery of pure awareness. *Cit.* of Self. *Sat* and *Cit*, being and awareness of being are not 'other' to each other. Their relationship is absolutely non dual, an advaita. When pure self-awareness is sufficiently realized, the whole being is flooded with an inexpressively sense of completion, peace, joy and fullness and this is what *ananda* is. Evaluating the advaitic experience of Saccidananda of the Upaniṣads Abhishiktananda points out that it is essentially monistic and terminates in unbroken silence.

Now, the important point which Abhishiktananda asserts is that the Hindu experience of Saccidananda should be remodeled to attain the Christian experience of Saccidananda. According to him in Christian Saccidananda Being. Sat opens itself to give birth eternally to the Son and in him to countless creatures, each of which will for ever manifest God. And moreover being is communion, *koinonia*, communication of love. According to Christian Saccidananda Self-awareness, *Cit*. only comes to be when there is mutual giving and receiving and

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bliss. *Ananda* is effected only in the communication of love. Christian Saccidananda is no longer a monad, but communion. Christian Saccidananda is not disappearance in Brahman but beyond that by the grace of God finding oneself in God new. In Christian Saccidananda. Sat is Father, who is not yet known. It is *Cit*, the Word, the Son who makes him known. Jesus Christ the Cit, is the self-awakening of the Father, the Sat, Being. In Christian terms Cit is not merely an aspect or mode of Brahman, but a real procession, a real birth, first in eternity and subsequently in time. It is in Father's self-awareness and presence to himself in the Son, as he is the representative Son of man, is the representation of the created beings in *Cit*; the created beings awake to Being through the Son. Ananda the Holy Spirit is the expression of love in God. love between God and humans, and love between one person and another. Abhishiktananda is of the opinion that if once the advaitie experience of Saccidananda could be remodelled to attain such a Christian experience of Saccidananda, then the renewed experience of Saccidananda would be the Trinitarian culmination of advaitie experience and both Christianity and Hinduism would be mutually benefited by such a mutual integration.

As the Trinity opens up new vistas of meaning in the intuition of Saccidananda, Saccidananda in its turn also greatly assists the Christian in his/her own mediation on the central mystery of his faith. It will help believers to contemplate the mystery of Father, Son and Holy Spirit in a new depth, in deep interiority. In particular, the intuition of Saccidananda could be an aid in penetrating the mystery of the Spirit which, according to St. John's Gospel, relates chiefly to God's presence to humans in their hearts. Commenting on St. John's Gospel, which he calls the Johannine Upaniṣads, especially the seventeenth chapter, Abhishiktananda points out that in fact advaita is present in the Gospel already. What is present in the Gospel is the advaita of the Spirit. The Advaita of the Spirit of the Gospel signifies that in the very unity which made Jesus Christ one with the Father, all created beings are also one with each other and with Him, they are "coming in Him from the Father, and returning in Him to the Father, in the advaita of the Spirit. The Vedāntic concept Sacidananda inspires the Christian to explore this advaita of the Spirit. And thought he process of exploration of the advaita of the Spirit of the Gospel, the Vedantic Saccidananda attains new depths of meaning as Christian Saccidananda.

Following the line of Abhishiktananda, M. A. Amaladoss also has pointed out that the quest of the Upaniṣads was for the discovery of the Atman and their emphasis on the Unity of Being. The most striking theme of St. John also is 'Unity' or 'Oneness' (Jn. 10.30; 10.38; 14.11; 17.10; 5.19; 5.26 etc.).

While considering the possibility of understanding Trinity as Saccidananda, it should be remembered that much before Abhishiktananda, Brahmabandhav Upadhyaya tried in a remarkable manner to interrelate these concepts. The difference between Upadhyaya and Abhishiktananda lies on two points: First, while according to Abhishiktananda a re interpretation of the Hindu Saccidananda as Christian Saccidananda is necessarily, Upādhyaya holds that with regard to the concept of the Supreme Being, the Vedantic and Christian doctrines are identical, Secondly, if for Abhishiktananda, Saccidananda signifies both the inseparable aspects of the mystery of God in Himself as well as the mystery of the divine presence in the inner most

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sanctuary of an individual's being. in Upadhyaya's view Saccidananda represents God in Himself as unrelated alone.

Referring to various Upaniṣadic verses, Upadhyaya points out that in the doctrine of the nature of God the Vedantic conception and Catholic belief are exactly the same. Vedanta conceives the nature of God as *Sat* (positive being). Chit (intelligence) and *Anandam* (bliss). There are references in the Upaniṣads to the only one Eternal Being who is the cause of all other beings. For example Aitareya Up. 1.1.1a says "in the beginning there was only one being; nothing else existed. He points out that Parabrahman is Sat (Being) for nothing cannot be a cause. For explaining *Chit* Upadhyaya quotes Aitareya Up. 1.1.1b : "He beheld; shall I create the *lokas* ? What He infers from this is that the Upaniṣadic risis had a very clear conception of the universe existing ideally in the intelligence of God from eternity. The further explanation he gives for *Chit* on the basis of the Upaniṣads is as follows:

> Parabrahman, the Supreme Being, is essentially *Chit*. For Him to be is to know. It is written in the Upaniṣads the He grows by brooding (*tapas*) and His brooding is knowledge. He reproduces His self as Sabda Brahman (Logos) by *Ikshanam* (beholding). The knowing God is mirrored as the known God in the ocean of *Chit*.

To show Brahman as *Anandam* Upadhyaya describes the narrative in the Taittiriya Upaniṣad is which through the directions from his father Varuna. Brgu come to the knowledge that Brahman is Bliss (The third Valli of Taitt. Up.) and then writes : "Brahman is Bliss. He is blessed, ineffably blessed by His very nature. He knows Himself and from that self knowledge proceeds His eternal beautitude....Upadhyaya's explanation of the Christian doctrine of Trinity is as follows:

> God comprehends Himself by one act of eternal knowledge. The knowing self is the Father, the known self or the self-begotten by His knowledge is the Son; and the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of reciprocal love proceeding from the Father and the Son.

Comparing Sat-Chit-ānandam, the nature of Parabrahman with the Christian doctrine of the nature of God Upadhyaya says that both are "exactly the same" because according to both the "God is the only eternal being; He is purely positive for the particle 'not' cannot be predicated of Him. He knows Himself and reposes in Him-self with supreme complacency. Trinity is Sat-Chit-ānandam because in the Trinity the Father's knowledge is fully satisfied by the cognition of the logos, the Infinite Image of his Being, begotten by thought and mirrored in the ocean of His substance and His love finds the fullest satisfaction in the boundless complacency with which He reposes on his Image and breathes forth the Spirit of bliss.

Upadhyaya also believed that the Vedantic concept Maya is the best to explain the Christian doctrine of creation. Referring to the Upaniṣads he writes :"The *Upaniṣads* say that creation is an overflow of the bliss (anandam) which sweetens the Divine bosom: it is not a product of necessity but of superabundance. Again, referring to different Upaniṣads he says that creation is by the free determination of the Atman:

> In the Aitareya Upaniṣad it is written that the Atman alone lives from eternity, before all, with all and after all. He created this world by *sankalpa* (free determination of

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will). So it is in the Taiteriya, Chandogya. This *sankalpa* plainly indicates that be is *mukta* (free internally as well as externally) in the creative act. If there had been any necessity, there could be no free determination (*sankalpa*).

The Vedantic term Maya involves three truths : (a) God is not necessarily a creator; (b) creatures are non-beings, transformed as it were into being; (c) the transformation is caused by the mysterious power of the will of God. Upadhyaya then declares that this Vedantic doctrine of Maya which explains creation and the Christian doctrine of creation are identical because, according to the Christian doctrine of creation also, God does not create out of necessity but through the over flow of his perfections; creation has no being in itself; what it has is derived being and creation is the effect of the dine thought. He even that the term Maya can express the meaning of the Christian doctrine of creation in a far better way than the Latin root *creare*.

Upadhyaya has also tried to explain the person of Jesus Christ in terms of the Vedantic human as represented in the five sheaths (*kosas*) of Taittiriya Up. 2.2.1. According to him the difference between the person of Jesus and other persons lies in the fact that while in the case of each human being the five sheaths are presided over by a created personality (*aham*), in the person of Jesus they are presided over by the person of the Logos Himself.

Though J. N. Farguhar appreciates the Upaniṣadic conceptions of "Brahman as the spiritual Self of the universe and of the identity of Brahman and the individual self as the "Fountain head of all the greatest thinking that has been done in India," in his view, the conception of Brahman-Atman as actionless has resulted in his view, the conception of Brahman-Atman as actionless has resulted in the following defective ideas: (a) He is above morality as being beyond good and evil which would imply also that the method whereby a person realizes his/her identity with Brahman is not a moral process; as it is a process of knowledge and realization and not of action. (b) He is impersonal in the sense that He is self-conscious thought, but not will; (c) He is not communicating with humans on account of being beyond the reach of thought and voice. He cannot be thought of as creating the universe in the real sense. These defects can be rectified through the following Christian teachings: The God of the Christian thought remaining equally transcendent, spiritual and absolute as the Brahman of the Upaniṣads is at the same time perfect in moral character able to act in controlling the moral order of humans and the universe. Supreme Personality as expressed in the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God: and clearly and definitely conceived as the Creator of the universe.

The Vedāntic doctrine of identity of the soul and God, though can rightly assert human beings greatness and his/her kindship to God, has the following defects. (a) is fails to deal seriously with human being's moral nature, (b) it makes love for God and union with God impossible (c) if this doctrine is to be held in its fullness God must be construed impersonally. Christ's doctrine of human person which is the final truth of which Vedanta offers a partial adumbration, holds that "each human being is a child of God, made in the image of his Father, possessing a spiritual nature that is finite, yet parallel with the divine in its capacities. The conclusion of Farquhar is : "Christ provides the fulfilment of each of the highest aspirations and aims of Hinduism.....In Him is focused every ray of light that

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shines in Hinduism. He is the Crown of the faith of India.

According to A. J. Appasamy only the two later Upaniṣads *Katha* and *Svetasvatara* are theistic as they teach *bhakti* or devotion to a personal God while others contain doctrines of *advaita* or even atheistic dualism. Śankara insisted on the impersonal character of Brahman, as in many of the passages of the Upaniṣads which are meant to describe Brahman; Brahman is spoken of as being without attributes. It is Ramanuja, who following the line of bhakti, interpreted God as a Personal Being endowed with the attributes of power, knowledge, bliss, love and freedom from evil. Christianity is essentially a *bhakti marga* and Christian thought in indian should be developed in the context of the philosophy of Ramanuja.

In studying the world-view of Upaniṣads, P. D. Devanandan finds that the Upaniṣads though do not teach the world is an illusion, recognize the monistic principle of the sole reality of the Brahman. "The conclusion from the sole reality of the Brahman in the universe seems to have given the world a status of relative reality, and not that of a shadowy illusoriness, in Upaniṣadic times. Still "the main doctrine of Hinduism, with regard to the nature of God is that the Ultimate Reality is essentially impersonal. As such it is absolute, apart from the world, untouched by the happenings of the universe, in quiescent, eternal rest. So "the time is come when thoughtful Indians should realize the inadequacy of the Upaniṣadic assumptions to furnish the living inspiration and the theological theory which modern Indian must needs possess if she is to succeed in her attempts to remodel Hindu life and society. The classical theology of Hinduism cannot give an ideological basis for the new anthropology emerging in Independent India which gives importance to human life and history and where it is failing to find a solution the revolting of God in Jesus Christ has got an answer to give : when God become human person, when an individual is God's creature as well as a person and when God is human person's creator as well as having personality, that effect a revolutionary significance for human life and history.

Anjilivel V. Mathew feels that thought the picture of God given in the Upaniṣads is most illuminating, a Christian reader misses in it the conceptions that God is love; as well as being just, He is a God of judgement, as also He works in history. Like Farguhar, Appasamy and Denandan he also pictures non-dualism and theism as opposites and says: "non-dualistic view is not the only view of God and creation found in the Upaniṣads. There are passages in these great works....which may more appropriately be interpreted from a theistic standpoint". About Jesus he has got to say the following: "The disciples of Christ found in him the truth of the Upaniṣadic statement *Purusho vava yajna*—man is the sacrifice (Chand .3.16.1) and the sacrificial blood of the Son of God cleanness man from all sin and from all *Karma*. The Father-Son relationship is explained by Matehw thus : "He claimed to be one with the Father not.....in the philosophical sense used by the Upaniṣadic rishis who said: *Aham brahma asmi; that tvam asi.* He claimed to be one with the Father in a sense in which no one else could claim to be.

From the above survey we are able to identify that diverse Christian approaches to the Upaniṣads are possible. Compared to the Non-Catholic thinkers, the Catholic thinkers take a more positive attitude towards the Upaniṣads. In the Non-Catholic circle Nirguṇa Brahman is still misunderstood as the impersonal Absolute

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and Advaitic standpoint of the Upaniṣads is considered wrongly as opposite to theism (J. N. Farquhar, A. J. Appasamy. P. D. Devanandan, Anjilvel V. Mathew). Hence the relevance of the writings of Brahmabandhav Upadhyaya, P. Johanns and R.C. De Smet which tell us that the Advaita Vedantic thought of the Upaniṣads gives a correct doctrine of God as the Absolute Personality. The Upaniṣads and Sankara proclaim the absolute independence or unrelatedness or transcen-dence of God which is the foundation of theism. Further, the Christian doctrine of Trinity can be understood in terms of Saccidananda (Brahmabandhav Upadh-yaya, Abhishiktananda). Thus Jesus could be conceived as Chit; and also as Om (Y. D. Tiwari, Abhishiktananda, Vandana).

Regarding the world, we saw P. D. Devanandan's thought that the Upaniṣadic understanding of it lacks any purposivenes, whereas according to Brahmabandhav Upadhyaya, the Vedantic doctrine Maya best explains the Christian doctrine of Creation. De Smet shows that the Upaniṣads emphasis the total dependence of Nature and human person upon Brahman. Also the Upaniṣadic notion that the universe manifests Brahman without negating the transcendence of the unmanifest Brahman is 'naturally Christian'. Abhishiktananda and Vandana are for a theology of experience: we should have the Upaniṣadic experience and in that experience should bring forth the Trinitarian experience as the culmination of Advaitic experience. A 'Christological interpretation' of the Non-Biblical Scriptures also is suggested (Prasannabhai, Vandana, NBCLC Research Seminar on Non-Biblical Scriptures 1974). But the more desirable thing to be accomplished would be the opposite: An Upaniṣadic or Vedāntic experience and interpretation of the Trinity and Jesus.

The Cosmogony and Metaphysics of the Upanishads

At this stage the following questions seem to arise. What is Eeswara? What is Brahma? What is nature or its form? What is the Individual Self and what is its relation to Eeswara or Brahma? Can the intellect furnish answers to these questions or are the answers merely imaginary? What is the relevancy of these answers in the Upanishads whose subject, is only the attainment of happiness? All these questions need to be answered.

In the science of Ethics the Individual Self to whom the science undertakes to show the way to happiness must be taken to be a real thing whether it be really so or not. In the same way, while prescribing for the Individual Self, some rules of conduct, we must take for granted that the world is going on in conformity with some laws. And we do actually see that the world is going on in conformity with some laws. It is therefore in and through the intellect that we know that a power that makes the world to confirm to these laws i.e. a power that controls, governs or rules this world must exist. This power is called Eeswara or the Ruler. Our intellect can also decide that he must be only one. Now this world which of course includes the Individual Self the objective world seen by the Individual Self as the subject and the Ruler must have arisen from one and the same primeval cause; for, otherwise there would be no unity of laws which govern the world and also no cooperation between the different parts of the world. But cause and its product cannot be different in substance (See Vyāsa Sutra 2/1/14 and its commentary). Therefore, the Individual Self, the Eeswara and the primeval cause named the Brahma or Sat in the Upanishads must be one in substance, all the Individual Selves also must really be

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one in substance and the material objective world seen by the Individual Self must also be the Brahma in substance. All this we can decide upon and be convinced of by the help of our intelligence.

But it is impossible for the human intellect to take decisions with regard to the original form or nature of the Brahma or the Eeśwara. The Upanishads have however supposed that (1) that the sleeping condition of the Individual is the nature or form of the Brahma or the Eeswara and that (2) the Individual Self is the evolved or the unfolded or the blossomed or the expanded form of the Brahma. These two propositions are clearly stated in the following verse: I shall describe by half a verse that which has been described by books at great length. The Brahma is without duality and is of the nature of sleep. The Individual Self is the Brahma itself in blossom. I have tried to prove hereafter in paragraphs 49 to 60 that these are the theories which the authors of the Upanishads hold. These cannot be known by pure intelligence. Śree Śankarāchārya also says in his commentary on Vyāsa Sūtra 2/1/6: Translation Though we have said previously that the Brahma being real thing, means of knowing it other than the Vedas are possible about it, that is only a vain or empty or an unrealisable desire. Because this thing cannot be directly perceived being devoid of form and other qualifications and no inference can be made about it on account of want of distinguishing characteristics. When I say that these propositions cannot be known by or are beyond the reach of pure intelligence I mean that they cannot be rigorously proved and brought home to the human intellect either by direct perception or by inference but that they are of the nature of suppositions and that supposition which is the least objectionable and agrees most with known facts is to be accepted. But 'supposing' is also a function of the intellect and seeing whether any guess or supposition agrees most with known things and is least objectionable is also a function of the intellect. From this stand-point every thing can be known by intellect alone. This is the opinion of Śree Vyāsa the author of the Brahma Sūtras and of the Upanishads also. These propositions in the Upanishads given above must in fact have been arrived at by this method.

About the first of these proposition we have the following passage in the Chhāndogya 6/8. It is this: When this Individual Self is said to be sleeping, then he is, my dear boy, really merged into the *Sat* i.e. the Brahma. He is then merged in himself; he is therefore said to be Swapiti. He is really merged in himself. While interpreting this passage Sree Śankarāacharya has taken the word 'Iva' (meaning 'as if') to be understood after 'apeetah'. In his commentary on the Vyāsa Sūtra he says: In sleep when both the conditions or attributes have gone away and the distinction caused by those conditions or attributes disappear, the Individual Self, as if merges in his own self (or form). Therefore he is then said to have merged within himself. But it is not necessary to take 'Iva' to be understood here; for we get a meaning even without this.

It appears that Śree Śankarāchārya was afraid that if this word 'Iva' is not added the passage would mean that sleep itself is the condition deserving attainment. But there is no reason for this apprehension. The subject of the sixth chapter of the Chhāndogya Upanishad is to give proof of the proposition that the Individual Self is identical with the Brahma or Sat and therefore no interference can be drawn from it, about the condition that ought to be attained by the

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Individual Self.

For obviously that is not the subject-matter of that chapter. That is the subject-matter of the seventh and the eighth chapter, sleep has been described as not deserving of enjoyment (Chhāndogya Upanishad, 8/11). And another fact to be specially noted is that in the seventh chapter of the Chhāndogya Upanishad, it is proved that the Individual Self is greater than the Brahma or Sat and thus that the Individual Self knowing the Brahma and therefore realising the Unity of Selves, is much greater than the Brahma.

We have therein the sentence which means that the Smara i.e. the Individual Self is greater than 'Ākaśa' i.e. the Brahma. In Taittireeya Upanishad 1/5/2 the Moon is said to be greater than the Sun. That is no doubt a veiled statement and really means that the Waking State of the Individual Self knowing the Brahma and therefore realising the Unity of Selves; is greater than sleep which is the same thing as Brahma in the primeval or unorganised state. In Taittireeya Upanishad 2/7, the Sat that is organised or manifested Brahma i.e. the Individual Self arising from Asat that is the unorganised or unmanifested Brahma, is called Sukrita i.e. well formed (beautifully or skillfully formed) and this statement is immediately followed by the sentence which means that the Individuality is the sweet juice giving joy and that the Brahma becomes happy (joyful, joyous) by obtaining only that juice. This shows that the opinions of the Upanishads is that the manifested or organised Individual Self is superior to unmanifested or unorganised Brahma. In Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad 2/3/1-6 also the Soul in the right eye i.e. the Waking State of one who sees the Unity of Selves, has been described as follows: The form i.e. the lustre of this Soul in the right eye is like that of the cloth dyed with turmeric or like that of the white shawl or like that of the bright red Indragopa insect, or like that of the white lotus or like that of the continuously flashing lightning. The splendour of one who knows this is like that of the continuously flashing lightning. Now therefore there is the direction Neti Neti. The first 'Na' means 'not than this' and the other 'Na' means 'is other greater'. Thus the two 'Nas' means "none other is greater than this i.e. the soul in the right eye." (Śree Śankarāchārya has interpreted this to mean that the soul in the right eye is shining with the light of his desires that is he is always unhappy. But this meaning is unacceptable. For that would be a contradiction of the statement in the preceding sentence that he is the essence of the Amrit i.e. the immortal or happy supreme Soul and also contrary to the fact that in Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 4/2, he is described as one deserving attainment. (I have split Yathāsakṛid-vidyuttam into Yatha and Asakṛidvidyuttam for the continuous joy of one who knows the Brahma can be compared with the lightning flashing continuously and not with the lightning flashing only once and disappearing. For this very reason I have taken the reading Asakṛidvidyutteva for Sakṛidvidyutteva). (Some others interpreted Neti Neti to mean that "this is not Brahma" "this is not Brahma". But that is incorrect; for the meaning of these words is given by the Upanishad itself and it is quite different). This passage clearly says that the Waking State of one who knows the Brahma is higher than unmanifested Brahma, that is, the sleep; for, the words Neti Neti can refer only to the Soul in the right eye. For these two reasons namely that (1) the sleep has been said not to deserve attainment and that (2) the Waking State of one knowing the Brahma is said to be superior to sleep, it is not necessary to take the word 'Iva' to

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be understood in the sentence. There is no difficulty in interpreting the sentence without importing Iva in it. For even without Iva we can interpret it to mean that in sleep the Individual Self merges into the unorganised, unmanifested Brahma not deserving attainment and enjoyment and does not merge in the organised and manifested Brahma deserving attainment and enjoyment and that interpretation shows that the nature of the unorganised unmanifested Brahma is like the condition of the Individual Self during sleep.

We have got a statement in Praśna Upanishad 4/6-9 similar to that in the Chhāndogya 6/8 discussed above. It is thus: When this deity i.e. the Individual Self is overpowered by Teja (heat) he does not see dreams and then in the sleeping state this body gets this happiness //6//. Oh my dear boy, as birds go to the tree of their residence, in the same way, all this goes to the Supreme Soul (during sleep) //7//. This conscious Individual Self, who sees, feels touch, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, knows and does acts, goes (during sleep) to the Supreme inexhaustible self and merges into it. This also shows that, the nature or form of the Individual Self during sleep is the same as that of the Brahma, of Course, of the unorganised unconscious Brahma.

In Māṇḍukya Upanishad the Brahma is said to have four feet, namely the waking, the dream, the sleep, and the waking state of one who knows the Brahma. These are the several states of the Brahma. According to a passage in Taittireeya Upanishad discussed in paragraph 54 the Brahma is of two kinds, the organised or manifested and unorganised or unmanifested. Now, the waking state, the dream, and the waking state of one who knows the Brahma are the organised states. Of course, the sleep is proved to be the unorganised state of the Brahma. Therefore the attributes of Brahma namely those being a ruler, creator etc. are assigned to the self in sleep, in the following passage in the Mandukya Upanishad. The passage is this: Here having described in the first two sentences, the condition of the self during sleep, in the third sentence the self experiencing sleep is described to be the ruler all knowing the controller in the inner depth the material cause of all, the efficient cause of all and the destroyer of all beings. This proves my proposition that the condition of the unorganised Supreme Brahma is like that of sleep.

In Kaṭha Upanishad 4/3 we have the statement: That is the Brahma which remains after this that is the Ahankāra by which one knows the form (i.e. light Roopa), taste, smell, sound, touch and sexual joy are taken away. After Ahankara is taken off, the condition without the sense of duality like that of sleep remains. This we experience is sleep itself. This passage therefore is clear evidence that the nature of sleep and that of unorganised Brahma is the same.

Thus the passages quoted above prove that the nature of the unorganised Brahma is the same as that of the sleep. Now we shall consider a very important question about this unorganised Brahma. That question is whether this condition of the unorganised Brahma having no consciousness of duality is described as such in the Upanishads. Some say there is no pain during sleep and that therefore the sleep and consequently the condition of unorganized Brahma is blissful. It is said in the Panchadaśi in the chapter named Brahmānande Yogānandah: "Hear, there is no pain during sleep therefore only joy is left for you."

But this argument is not convincing. For, even granting that there may be joy

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in the condition of sleep, there is then no consciousness of that joy. It follows therefore, that the joy in the waking state is the real joy, and it is not right to say that the condition of the unorganised Brahma, which is just like that of sleep, is joyful. In the Upanishads also, this condition of Brahma is not described as joyful. Those passages that appear to describe this Brahma as joyful really mean quite a different thing. That meaning is that the Brahma gives conscious joy i.e. joy during the Waking State, to the living man who knows Brahma. The passage does not mean that the unorganised Brahma is itself joyful. I have shown in my commentary on this passage why this meaning is unacceptable. The reason given there is mainly that in Bṛihadāranyaka 1/4/3 the unorganised Brahma is expressly described as "not enjoying" its condition.

In Taittireeya Upanishad 2/9 it is not said that Brahma itself is joy. The wording is 'Brahmanah Ānandaḥ (joy of Brahma) and that clearly refers to the joy of he Individual Soul knowing the Brahma described in the preceding Khanda and named therein also, as the joy of the Brahma. The joy referred to in the Taittireeya Upanishad 3/6 is the joy not in the Brahma but that in the Individual Self. For evidently in discussing the subject here the author wanted to follow a certain natural order of things and according to that order of things and according to that order of things the joy in the Waking State follows food, vitality, mind, and knowledge and the so called joy during sleep that is really of the nature of absence of pain and which is the same as the joy in the unorganised state of the Brahma, follows the joy in the individual's Waking State.

Moreover just as in the case of the statements etc. we do not construe them to mean that Brahma is Anna or that the Brahma is Prana but that Anna is Brahma and that the Prana is Brahma, we must also construe his sentence to mean that Anand is Brahma and not that Brahma is Anand. It is obvious that the propositions that the Brahma is Ānand and that the Anand is Brahma are two different propositions and that the former need not be true even if the latter be true. In the latter proposition the Ananda is said to be Brahma because that is a condition of the Brahma deserving of attainment. If we add to these passages the passage in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad: He did not rejoice, therefore one who is alone does not rejoice; therefore he desired to have a companion.) it is clearly proved that the Upanishads did not intend to describe the unorganised Brahma unconscious of duality as joyful in the Katha Upanishad 5th Valli: Some thing that the Brahma which is previously described by the words Etadvaitat is undescribable greatest bliss; but how shall I know whether the Brahma is conscious of it or not or is clearly conscious of it or not.

What is stated is only that some (and not the author) regard the Brahma to be indescribable joy but that proposition is in fact refuted here by the author by the question and by the statement in the next verse that all things including, of course, happiness, are consciously perceived when the Brahma is shining i.e. in the Waking State, implying thereby that happiness without consciousness of it is no happiness at all. In conclusion it is proved that the Upanishads do not regard unorganised Brahma as joyful.

We shall now show that according to the opinions of the Upanishads, the Individual Self is only the blossomed form of the Brahma. The whole of the sixth chapter of the chhāndogya Upanishad is devoted to proving the proposition that the Individual Self is the same as the creator

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of the world. Whether the arguments given there in support of the proposition are convincing or not, the proposition itself is clearly stated in the statement 'Tatvamasi' (you are that) and in the sentence: This deity i.e. the Brahma entered these three other deities in the form of the Individual Self which is no other than itself and evolved names and forms i.e. the bodies) and also in the statement तत्सृष्ट्वातदेवानुप्राविशत् in the Taittereeya Upanishad 2/6 (Chhāndogya Upanishad 6/3/3).

Having created all this he entered it). The Upanishads hold further that the Individual self is the unfolded, manifested, blossomed, evolved, improved, or developed form of the Brahma, which implies that the condition of the Individual Self has not been brought about by illusion. In the following paragraphs we shall discuss the passages which prove this proposition.

There is the following very important passage in the Taittireeya Upanishad (2/7): "This Brahma was unevolved in the beginning. Thence arose the evolved Brahma. The unevolved Brahma itself made itself evolved. Therefore (i.e. because the unevolved made itself evolved) it is called well-formed. Here the verse ends.

It appears from the sentence यस्मादेवं तस्मातद् ब्रह्मैव सुकृतं स्वयं कर्तृ उच्यते in the commentary on this Upanishad that Śree Śaṇkarāchārya has interpreted Sukritam (well-formed) to mean Swayam Kartri (forming himself). But Sukritam can never mean Swayam Kartri. It is clear that Śree Śaṇkarāchārya was afraid that the correct interpretation of Sukṛita will demolish his theory of Maya (illusion) for the result of illusion can never be called Sukrita (well formed) Śree Śaṇkrāchārya was also afraid that the correct interpretation of Sukṛitam would prove the superiority of the Individual Self to the Supreme Self (Brahma), for then Sukṛitam would be the adjective of Sat i.e. the evolved Individual Self. We can suppose that the compound in Sukṛita is Bahuvreehi and so dissolve it or can suppose that Kṛita means Kaṛtri, so as to make it an adjective of the Brahma meaning one whose action is good. But even in that case the question would arise as to what that good action is. And that good action can be no other than that described here namely the evolution of Sat from Asat. In this way also the evolution of the Individual Self from the Brahma would be proved to be a good thing and thus the Individual Self would be proved to be superior to the Brahma, and then the next sentence यद्वैतत्सुकृतं रसो वैसः will have to be applied to well-formed Individual Self and it would be incorrect to apply it to the unevolved Brahma.

In this i.e. the Sat, that which has been well-formed i.e. the individuality is really the Sweet Juice. This Brahma becomes joyful only by obtaining that sweet juice." This passage proves that the Individual Self is formed by the evolution of the Brahma and that this evolution is a good thing. This is obviously theory of unfolding, development, or blossoming and not the theory of illusion; for, in the theory of illusion, the result of illusion is described as bad and undesirable. Moreover nobody says that illusion is brought about or made. Illusion is said to happen. Here, the description is like that of a bud that has been blossomed into of flower and is giving forth good scent. Or if we were to given another illustration from modern science we can give the illustration of carbon being developed into a diamond; for the substance in carbon and the diamond is the same but the former is black while the latter is bright and shining. Carbon becomes a diamond by evolution or development is a change.

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But the reply is that change is not always bad and is never unreal. Change may be good also. It can never be unreal. A change may not be permanent but it is always real. The word Sukrita undoubtedly shows that the question before the Upanishad is how to make the diamond in the form of the Individual Self more beautiful and shining by rubbing it and by giving it prismatic shape and not how to bring it back to the state of charcoal in the form of Brahma.

It is clear that this is a veiled statement and that what is named Āditya here is the Individual Self; for it is in the Waking State of the Individual Self, that all beings and elements and desires arise i.e. are experienced by the Individual Self. I interpret the word Ulūlavaḥ to mean sounds expressing joy following the commentator of Śree Śankarāchārya. Again Śree Śankarāchārya has interpreted it to mean sounds reaching far off or distant places. In this very passage there is the wording Sādhavo Ghoshāḥ (Good sounds). That suggests that Ulūlavaḥ means sounds expressing joy. Moreover there is no propriety here in saying that the sounds reached distant places, but there is propriety in saying that the sounds were expressive of joy or of sorrow and it is an occasion for joy that the unevolved became evolved. Now we can translate the passage. There is a direction that the Āditya i.e. the Individual Self is the Brahma. This is the explanation of that direction. This (Brahma) was unevolved in the beginning. That became evolved. It produced itself. Thus it developed into an egg. It slept for a period equal to one year. (The human foetus remains in the womb for nine months and that of other animals for even ten months. Therefore a year is mentioned here as an approximation.) That egg then broke, (the human egg breaks in the womb before the child comes out of the womb) and split into two portions, one being of silver and the other of gold /1/. The silver portion is this Earth, if we speak about the cosmos, i.e. the body (if we speak about the foetus). The golden portion is the heaven if we are to speak about the cosmos i.e. the portions in the fetal egg other than the body. The internal covering are the clouds and the mist. The arteries in the unbelical cord are the rivers. The liquid in the egg is the sea /2/. Now that which was born from this egg is this Āditya i.e. the Individual Self. When he was born there arose sounds expressive of joy and also there arose all elements and beings and all desires i.e. the joys. Since that time, at the time of its rising i.e. at the time of its every return i.e. a the time of its waking every day, sounds expressing joy, all elements and beings and all desires i.e. the joys arise. At the time of reaping the fruit of good acts good sounds i.e. sounds of fame go to and make happy the wise man who attends upon this Āditya i.e. the Individual Self, for service regarding it as the Brahma i.e. him who does acts for the good of all individual selves regarding all individual selves as really one". This passage also means that the Individual Self is evolved form of the Brahma and that this evolution is a good thing.

We have also the following passage in the Aitareya Upanishad 3/2. He who knows the most manifested self of the eater of food, eaters of food having been described in the previous Khanda Tasya means 'of the eater of food') enjoys that manifestation. He knows the most manifested self amongst all the creepers, trees and those that breathe (Here we have to take the word Teshu to be understood) (It is thus) We see the flowing liquid in the creepers and the trees and we see the mind also in those that breathe. But the most manifested soul is in those that

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breathe because we see the flowing fluid (blood) in them and do not see the mind in the others. The most manifested soul is in men because man is most endowed with intelligence and speaks what he knows, (knowingly), sees what he knows, (knowingly), knows tomorrow i.e. makes provision for tomorrow, he knows good condition and bad condition and being thus endowed, he desires eternal things such as fame by means of this perishable body. But the knowledge of other animals is limited to hunger and thirst. They do not speak knowingly, they do not see knowingly, they do not know tomorrow, they do not know good or bad condition. They are only such. For they can have only that much knowledge, as their intelligence can give. "In this passage the higher and higher manifestations i.e. unfolding of the self have been described and it is also suggested that man should enjoy the highest manifestation that is seen in him. This clearly implies that this manifestation is a good thing. This inference is supported by the statement. 'This man is indeed well-formed. This man is really well-formed' in this very Upanishad (4/2). This supports the theory of development or evolution and not the theory of illusion for in theory of illusion the change is described as bad.

In Muṇḍakopanishad the unevolved Brahma is first described in 2/1 by such words as "having no mind" and "having no life" and then the evolved Brahma is described in 2/2. That is in fact the description of the Individual Self and in it the Individual Self is said to be superior to the unevolved Brahma. The description is as follows: "Here in the body is placed this manifested Brahma named Mahat moving in the cave (This is the cave described in Katha Upanishad 3/10-11) near the intellect. It is moving i.e. doing acts, it is breathing and it closes and opens its eyes, that is, alternately wakes and sleeps; know this which is the superior of the two i.e. he manifested and unmanifested Brahma." This verse as interpreted by me is the description of the Individual Self. According to the interpretation of Sri Sankaracharya, it is the description of the Supreme Self i.e. Brahma. Our interpretations differ because I interpret 'Atra' to mean 'in the body' and he interprets it to mean 'in the Brahma'. Anyhow, the word Āviḥ shows that the Brahma manifests itself in the form of the Individual Self. And the word सदसद्वरेण्यम् shows that some one of the i.e. the manifested and the unmanifested forms, is superior and intellect can agree only to the conclusion that of the two the manifested form is the superior one. Therefore, this passage shows that the Individual Self is the manifestation is a good thing.

In some passages, the manifestation of the Brahma in the Individual Self is expressed in another way i.e. by saying that the Individual Self is the essence of the Brahma. This is done in a passage in the Brihadaranyaka (2/3/5-6). The passage is as follows: 'Now about the formless (non-material). The life and the Brahma in the body is eternal i.e. imperishable, has motion and is called 'Tya'. The self in the right eye is the essence of that non-material, eternal, moving 'Tya'. This is the essence of 'Tya' / 5/ (See paragraph 49 for the omitted portion and its translation). Now therefore, there is the direction Neti Neti i.e. there is nothing else higher than this. (See paragraph 49). Therefore it i.e. the self in the right is called the essence of the essence; because life is the essence of Brahma and the self in the right eye is the essence of life. (We have a similar description in the Brihadaranyaka (2/1/20) (Note-Some may like to translate his portion as follows:-Life is the truth or the

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essence of life. But this is wrong. For this is the description of 'Esha', the last but one word in the passage and that 'Esha' as the context shows can stand for nothing else than the self in the right eye). Now we have already shown that the self in the right eye). Now we have already shown that the self in the right eye is the Waking State of one who regards all selves as one. The essence of anything is its most important part, a part that performs its specific function and is never an illusion. It follows that it is wrong to say as Śri Śankarāchārya does that the Individual Self is the illusion of the Brahma.

We have a similar very important statement in the Aitareya Upanishad. It is as follows: "Now about the creation of the essence. The cosmic powers i.e. the Sun, water, air etc. are the essence of Prajapati, the Creator/Rain is the essence of the Cosmic Power/Plants are the essence of the Rain/Food is the essence of plants/ Semen is the essence of food/Progeny is the essence of semen/Brain is the essence of the progeny/Mind is the essence of the brain/(Hridaya has been used in the sense of Brain in Taittireeya Upanishad 1/6. There it is said to be situated between two 'Tālukā's or palates, one situated where the uvula hangs and the other where the hair form a circle separating the forehead and the vertex of the head. Speech i.e. the volition-order is the essence of the mind. (The mind orders the body to do an act; that order is here called speech. This is proved by the fact that action is said to be the essence of the speech and that action can be the essence of volition-order only). Action is the essence of Speech/This action is the duty of man/The man who does this duty is the Brahma Loka i.e. has the condition of highest bliss/He is possessed of food i.e. gets by his actions sufficient food for himself and for others also. Because he is possessed of food, he is possessed of gold also i.e. joy also. He becomes possessed of joy in that world i.e. he world after death. He who knows this, appears as a giver of joy to other beings also. This passage which purports to say that action, the final essence of Prajapati i.e. the Brahma, is the giver of joy, clearly supports the theory of evolution and not the theory of illusion.

It says "The Brahma grows by its *Tapas* i.e. will-power. Thence was produced food i.e. heat, air, water and earth. The food gave rise to Life, and Life gave rise to mind which is Satya i.e. which consists of the Triad i.e. the seer and the seen as described in Taittireeya Upanishad 2/6 and the action of 'Seeing'. Thence Societies came into existence and also joy from actions'. This passage clearly states that Brahma grew and finally developed into joy. It is not proper to call growth an illusion. It ought to be called unfolding and blossoming.

There are many other passages besides those quoted above, that say that the Individual Self and the world arose from the Brahma without saying clearly whether that is a good thing or a bad thing. They may be said to favour both the theory of illusion and theory of evolution. Here therefore the question arises "By what unquestionable evidence did Śri Śankarāchārya prove his theory of illusion"? He says in his commentary on Vyasa Sutra: It has been argued in the Sūtra (2/1/14) that the whole world is an illusion." In his commentary on the Sūtra तदनन्यत्वमारंभणशब्दादिभ्यः (2/1/14). Śree Śankarāchārya quotes several passages than only mean that all things are the Brahma without quality. Those passages do not say how 'duality' arose from the original oneness, whether it arose from illusion or by evolution. Śree Śankarāchārya came to the conclusion by his own process of reasoning that the duality and

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plurality arose from the primaeval oneness by illusion. That process of reasoning is as follows—"There are three types of statements in the Upanishads. (1) First there was only one Brahma without a second. (2) The many arose from that one. (3) One should act realising that the Brahma is all pervasive. These statements in the Vedas prove duality and plurality to be false and the one Brahma alone to be true. The false duality and plurality cannot arise from the one by anything except illusion. This is Sree Sankaracharya's process of reasoning and he has expressed this in the sentence. Hence if this proposition of Upanishads that everything is the Brahma is known, it demolishes the natural idea of the Individual Self, as the knowledge of the rope etc. demolishes the knowledge of the serpent etc.

From this anology of the rope and the serpent given here, it is clear that, according to Śree Śankarāchārya's process of reasoning oneness alone being true, duality and plurality must be the result of illusion. Śree Śankarāchārya asks "How can the unchangeable Brahma develop? This can be completely answered by the counter question "How then can an illusion arise in that unchangeable Brahma?" Sree Sankaracharya also argues "Nor is the theory of evolution intended independently to explain any particular fruit i.e. object or purpose? This again is completely answered by the statement in the Aitareya Upanishad 'अश्नुते ह्याविर्भूयम्' quoted in paragraph 55 according to which the developed form of the Brahma is the purpose of evolution and is to be experienced. In "ना या ब्रह्मणि चिति यां व्यष्टिस्तां चितिं जयति तां वृष्टिं व्याश्नुते य एवं वेद व एवं वेद." in Kaushitaki Upanishad 1/6 also, it is clearly stated that he who knows that he is the Brahma, enjoys the oneness that is in the Brahma and also the plurality that is also developed in the Brahma i.e. he enjoys both the oneness and the plurality at the same time. Moreover plurality that is real can arise from oneness by evolution also and it can also give rise to actions or dealings and both oneness and plurality can be real because though cause and effect be one in substance they also differ in some respects from each other (This is shown in the Vyāsa Sūtra 2/1/6 and in Śree Śankarāchārya's commentary on the same). For example, water develops into ice and ice floats on water and carbon develops into a diamond and that diamond can reduce carbon to powder. In short the rise of plurality from oneness can be explained by illusion as well as by evolution.

But an illusion is unreal and always bad while evolution is real and can be good. And as the Upanishads describe the rise of plurality from oneness as a good thing, it must be concluded that the Upanishads advocate the theory of evolution. The word Pariṇāma in the Vyāsa Sūtra 1/4/26 also shows that, Śree Vyāsa too held the same view. The word Vyākaravāṇi in the sentence in the Chhāndogya Upanishad 6/3/2 expressly supports the theory of evolution. It is also noteworthy that the analogies to the creation of the world such as growth of the tree from the seed emanation of the sparks from the fire etc. given in the Upanishads, are examples of evolution, and that there is not a single example of illusion given by the Upanishads.

One might at this stage ask "What is the necessity of discussing whether the Upanishads support the theory of evolution or the theory of illusion?" The reply is as follows:— Śree Śankarāchārya's theory of abandonment of all acts depends upon the theory of illusion. Śree Śankarāchārya says that plurality being the result of illusion, plurality and of course the acts that depend upon it should

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be abandoned. He says in his commentary on Vyāsa Sūtra 2/1/14. When the idea of the reality of the individual self becomes refuted, all natural dealings depending upon it get demolished (i.e. no act can or need be done). "The condition of oneness in which no actions are done deserves attainment and the characteristics of one who has attained that oneness (i.e. abandonment of actions) are the only means to attain that condition." This is what Śree Śankarāchārya states in "सर्वत्रैव ह्यध्यात्मशास्त्रे कृतार्थलक्षणानि यानि तान्येव साधनान्युपदिश्यंते" in his commentary on Bhagawadgeetā while describing the Sthitaprajna. According to him, therefore, abandonment of all actions is the means in and through which alone, one can attain this oneness or Advaita. Such is the reasoning of Śree Śankarā-chārya and that, of course, depends upon his theory of illusion. It is for this reason that it is necessary to show that the Upanishads do not advocate the theory of illusion and that they really advocate the theory of evolution. It must be here noted that the logical conclusion of the theory of evolution is good action; for as suggested by Aitareya Upanishad 3/2 quoted above, the evolved condition is one deserving of enjoyment and good action is quite necessary for that purpose. Therefore it is that, as shown in paragraphs 80-82, the Upanishads advocate good actions i.e. a combination of action and knowledge everywhere.

It is not necessary to discuss independently if the theory of illusion is true or the theory of evolution is true. For the real question before the Upanishads and ourselves is how to attain bliss during the state of duality which already exists, as bliss can be experienced, even according to Upanishads; during the state of duality only. Thus the real question before us and the Upanishads is not how this state of duality arose; and in fact this question is hardly one which can ever be satisfactorily solved by the human intellect.

It may be asked why, if the intellect cannot decide whether duality is the result of illusion or evolution, the Upanishads have described the evolution theory. The answer to this question has already been given in paragraph 27th *supra*.

Here it may be objected as follows:-The Upanishads say "Though you see duality and plurality everywhere, you must nevertheless regard oneness as true". Does this not prove that duality and plurality are false and an illusion? The answer is as follows:-There can be a change in the characteristics of things due to different conditions without a change in the substance itself. It is in fact just this which is at the root of all plurality. Hence the statements about Advaita i.e., oneness, from the standpoint of substance does not controvert the plurality based upon differences in conditions. Oneness is true from the standpoint of substance and plurality is also true from the standpoint of differences in conditions. And since difference in conditions and the resulting plurality can be brought about even by evolution it does not necessarily require the theory of illusion to explain plurality. This is well illustrated by the example of water being transferred into ice and of carbon into diamond by evolution.

But the natural conception of man, based upon the real plurality from standpoint of differences in conditions, that there is plurality in respect of substance also, is an illusion. This has been expressly stated by Śri Vyāsa in his Sūtra, "आभास एव च" (2/3/50). The one Brahma having no parts got into different conditions in the shape of different bodies: and it is an illusion to infer from this

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plurality based upon difference in conditions that there are many Brahmans or Jeevas.

The Upanishads say that this illusion must be abandoned. But that does not prove that plurality based upon difference in conditions is also an illusion. Even if the illusion about many Jeevas be abandoned, the plurality based upon difference in conditions does not disappear, for that plurality also is real. And hence the dealings based upon that plurality do not stop and cannot be stopped. This is just like the fact than the child who first thinks an image in a mirror to be another child but later on understands that what he sees is only an image of himself, does not cease thereby to see the image in the mirror. This has been pointed out by Śri Śankarāchārya himself in the following passage:. Even though our proposition of everything being Brahma is accepted, the division between the enjoyer and the enjoyed can be explained, for this is actually seen in the world. For example, we see that even though, the foam, the wave, the ripple and the bubble are not different from the sea whose substance is water, they are none the less in a sense different from one another and we see them acting and reacting upon one another. Though the foam, the waves, the ripples and the bubbles are not different from the sea, they do not thereby cease to be different from one another and though they are different from one another they do not thereby cease to be the same as the sea. In the same way here also the enjoyer and the enjoyed are different from one another and also the same as the Brahma.

Now we shall discuss some other points about the Brahma mentioned in the Upanishads. The Upanishads say that the Brahma created the world after seeing i.e. thinking. This seeing has been mentioned in "तदैक्षत बहुस्त्रां प्रजायेयेति" (Chhāndogya Upanishad 2/6/3) "स ऐक्षत लोकान्नु सृजा इति" (Aitareya Upanishad 4/1/1) (Prasna Upanishad 3/6/3). That this thinking is real and that, therefore, the Brahma is 'sentient' has been argued in the Vyāsa Sūtra (1/1/5) and in Śri Śankarāchārya's commentary on it. But in truth the verb 'Iksh' (To see; To think) has been used in the passages quoted above in a secondary sense and not in the primary sense. For in the Chhāndogya Upanishad 6/2/3 the verb 'Ikshati' has been applied to the nonsentient things like the 'Tejas' (fire or heat) and 'Āp' (water) also and it is certain that it has been used there in the secondary sense, and, therefore, it would not be incorrect to suggest that it must have been used in the secondary sense when applied to the Brahma also.

Moreover the Brahma though sentient, cannot really think in that sleep-like condition before the rise of duality. (See paragraph 49). The Brahma has been described in the Mundaka Upanishad as "having no life" and as having no mind. It is clear that the Brahma which has no mind, can not really think. However it is said "to have seen" i.e. "thought". The reason for this is the same as that given in the Vyāsa Sūtra "रचनानुपपत्तेश्च" (2/2/1) that is, that the constitution or structure of the universe appears like one devised by intelligence. It is for this very reason that in the above passages the Brahma is said to have thought and that the Brahma is said to be all knowing in the Maṇḍukya Upanishad also in the secondary sense.

It is the theory of the Upanishads that the Brahma is both the material cause and the efficient cause of the universe. I have already quoted the passage "आसद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्। ततो वै सदजायत। तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत" from Taittireeya Upanishad 2/7 (See *supra* paragraph 54). That passage states this

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proposition very clearly. The sentence तपसा चीयते ब्रह्म ततोन्नमभिजायते (Mundaka Upanishad 1/1/8) and "यथोर्णनाभिः सृजते गृण्हतेच (Mundaka Upanishad 1/1/7) have the same meaning. Some statements such as ततेजोऽसृजत (Chhāndogya 6/2) show the Brahma to be the efficient cause and other statements such as यथा पृथिव्यामोषधयः संभवन्ति (Mundaka Upanishad 1/1/7) show the Brahma to be the material cause of the Universe. The proposition that the Brahma is both the material and the efficient cause of the Universe, is stated in a very interesting manner in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad 3/8. There Gārgee declares her intention to ask two questions and after having got an answer to her first question, says that she would now ask her second question and asks it. But curiously enough the language of the second question and its answer is exactly the same as that of the first question and its answer. This can be explained only by supposing that one of the questions is about the material cause of the Universe and the other about its efficient cause. The meaning of the two answers given by Yājnavalkya, therefore, is that the Ākāśa i.e. the Brahma is the material as well as the efficient cause of the Universe. After these two answers, Gārgee asks the third question i.e. a supplementary question-arising out of the previous two answers, and it is "What does the Ākāśa depend upon?" The answer to this question given by Yājnavalkya is "एतद्वैतदक्षरं ब्राह्मणा अभिवदंति etc." This means that Brāhmaṇāḥ i.e. the philosophers who think about Brahma say that this Brahma is inexhaustible. The purport of this is that the Brahma is never exhausted howsoever large the Universe it creates by being its material and efficient cause and that, therefore, it is not required to depend upon anything else. After this answer Yājnavalkya describes at great length how the Brahma rules the whole Universe and then concludes by the words "नान्यदतोऽस्ति द्रष्टृ etc." that the Individual Self that sees, hears, thinks and knows is not different inexhaustible Brahma. He also adds that the Ākāśa, the first of the five Mahābhootas named 'Ākāśa, Vāyu, Teja, Āp and Prithvee', depends upon this inexhaustible Brahma, called Ākāśa previously in.

This has been stated very beautifully in the language of mathematics in "पूर्णमदः पूर्णमिदं पूर्णात्पूर्णमुदच्यते। पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते।" (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 5/1/1). That means "That i.e. the unevolved Brahma i.e. the Creator and the Ruler is infinite. This i.e. the unevolved Brahma i.e. the Individual Self is also infinite. An infinite can be taken out from an infinite, and when an infinite is taken out from an infinite the remainder is also infinite i.e. we can take out an infinite any number of times from an infinite and still the remainder is always infinite. The purport is that whatever the number of Individual Selves that come out of the Supreme Brahma, the Supreme Brahma being inexhaustible still, stands as a remainder to rule the Universe, and the individuals not substantially different from itself."

Hitherto, we have described the Supreme Brahma; we shall now describe the Individual Self. Though the Supreme Brahma is the material and the efficient cause of the Universe and rules the Universe, it is not conscious of itself and of others. The Individual Self makes up this defect. Katha Upanishad says (5/14-15): That which has been described in this Upanishad previously by the words 'That is this' i.e. the Supreme Brahma is thought by some to be the greatest undescribable bliss. But, Oh, how shall I know whether that Brahma is conscious of that bliss or not, or whether that Brahma is distinctly

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conscious of that happiness or not. The purport is that one cannot know it. //14// In that condition of non-duality neither the sun nor the moon nor the stars nor the lightening shines i.e. is seen, how then the "fire". When that self shines i.e. is in the Waking State, then only by the light of the self all this shines i.e. is seen //15//. The purport of all this is that bliss is also experienced only when the self shines i.e. is in the Waking State which is a condition of the Individual Self alone and that the Individual Self alone has knowledge and consciousness. (The same verse occurs in Mundaka 2/2/10).

So far the theory of the Upanishads has been shown to be that the Brahma is the material and the efficient cause and the ruler of the Universe and, of course, of the Individual Selves, and is thus superior to the Individual Self. But the Upanishad also says that Brahma in the condition of Advaita or oneness or non-duality, having no mind cannot consciously experience joy, that the Individual Self alone having mind and intelligence can consciously experience joy and that, therefore, the Individual Self, of course; the Individual Self who knows the Brahma, is superior to the Brahma. For instance, in the 7th Chapter of the Chhāndogya Upanishad in the first twelve Khaṇḍas (parts), Ākāśa i.e. the Brahma, is shown to be superior to words, speech, mind, objective, attention, concentration, and intelligence, the manifestations of the Individual Self; but in the thirteenth part Smara i.e. the Individual Self is shown to be superior to the Ākāśa. In Bṛihadāraṇyaka also, the Individual Self, of course, the Individual Self knowing the Brahma, has been declared superior to the Brahma by the words 'Neti Neti' (See paragraphs 49 and 57). The same proposition is declared in Muṇḍaka Upanishad.

It is on account of this two-fold relationship between the Brahma and the Individual Self that in some places the Brahma is said to be Upāsya; and in some places the Individual Self is said to be 'Upasya'. The meaning of the Upāsanā of the Brahma is that one should assimilate into himself the attributes of the Brahma, namely, the attributes of being without desire and the attributes of non-duality or Advaita. The meaning of the Upāsanā of the Individual Self is that the Waking State should be kept up as long as possible i.e. the period of life of oneself and others should be lengthened as long as possible. It is quite clear that both these Upāsanās are necessary; in fact, they are supplementary to each other. For happiness cannot be consciously enjoyed without the Waking State and that necessitates the Upasana of the Jeeva; and there can be no happiness even in the Waking State without the abandonment of desires and without the conviction of the unity of selves; and this necessitates the Upāsanā of the Brahma. Moreover one can show abandonment of desires and the conviction about the unity of selves by doing acts for lengthening the lives of other Jeevas; and to lengthen one's own life, one has to abandon desires and to love others as one loves oneself regarding them as one's own selves.

It should be noted here that the Upāsanā of the Jeeva does not mean unrestricted enjoyment of sensual such. Independent thinkers may at times differ from books; therefore, the appointed wise men who think independently are necessarily authorised to change the injunctions of the Vedas and the Manu Smriti. It should also be noted that the passage does in no way limit that "Sammarsa" of the wise men to the interpretation of the Vedas and the Manusmriti. Moreover the word Sammarsinah is used twice; and, therefore, in both the places it

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must have the same meaning. In the former place it must mean "independent thinking" as it is to be applied to actions not enjoined in the Vedas and the Manu Smṛiti and, therefore, in the latter place also it means 'independent thinking.'

COURSE AFTER DEATH

In connection with a description of the passage of the soul after the death of the body, we are introduced into a new subject, that of the existence of certain psychic nerve currents inside us, known as the *nadis*. There are certain *nadis* in our bodies, which exist very subtly in the astral layer of our personality and control not only the entire physiological system but also our minds and breathing process, the entire personality. Those who are versed in the science of *Hatha-yoga* will know very well the importance of these *nadis*.

These nerve currents are supposed to be filled with certain subtle juices which are referred to here as *animna*, very subtle exudation which controls the humours of the body. The point that the Upanishad makes out particularly here is that there is a tremendous connection between the sun and these nerves.

It is not that the sun is spatially very far from us. We have a false notion that the stars in the heaven and the sun in the sky are very far and that they have no connection at all with us here on earth. This intervening space which is the apparent cause for this seeming disconnection is not empty. It is a vital fluid. The ordinary physical notion of the commonplace astronomers that space is not organically connected with the individual has to be given up. In fact, higher aspects of astronomy going into the realm of astrology will tell us that space is not a disconnecting element. If it is, there would be no influence of the planets upon us. They exert a tremendous influence, not merely in a mechanical manner as the law of gravitation does, but in a very very living and organic manner.

This subtle substance in the nerve currents is of different colours. It may be brownish-yellow, or white, or blue, or yellow proper, or red. These are the types specially mentioned here, though there can be many other permutations and combinations of these colours, because we cannot actually count the number of this nerve currents in the system. There are several thousands of *nadis*, but the principal among them are hundred and one in number. It is believed from the standpoint of this section of the Upanishad that the colours of these nerve currents inside us are due to the influence of the sun upon us. Variegated influences are exerted upon us in respect of the constitution of our personality by the rays of the sun. Even after the sun sets at night, it continues to influence us. The influence of the sun does not cease merely because it is mid-night. It is a tremendous influence exerted upon the whole earth. Night and day make no difference for this. When the effect of the sun through its rays has an impact upon the bile in our system, these juices become brownish yellow in colour. When there is phlegmatic element mixed with this bile, it is supposed to be whitish in colour. When the wind element also is included within it, that means to say when the wind humour is a little more predominant, it assumes a blue colour. When there is an equal distribution of the phlegmatic matter and the bile element it becomes yellow, while the reddish element is due to the preponderance of the red corpusles in the blood influencing these juices in the system.

Now the idea is that the colours of these juices in the nerves are imported, as

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it were, from the colours in the sun. They are the reflections, as it were, of the sun's rays experienced by us through our own nervous system. So the Upanishad says that these colours are in the sun and they are in the *Nadis*. But what about the causes there of? These colours,—brownish yellow, or white, or blue, or actual yellow, or red—are the colours of the sun's internal structure. We know the sun's rays have colours and these are responsible for the colours of the juices which flow in the nerve currents.

Just as a national highway, passing through villages, connects one section of villages on one side to another section on the other side, even so the sun's rays seem to be travelling throughout space like highways, as it were, emanating from the sun touching the heavens on one side and influencing the individuals and the whole earth on the other side. These rays of the sun are like passages or highways in the entire space. They touch this world and also the other world. They enter even the minutest thing in this world, like x-rays penetrating through objects, and we are not excluded from the influence of these subtle rays of the sun. They penetrate through the nerves inside us, they get refracted back into space and return to the sun, so that they convey a message to the sun, as it were, as to what our predicament is here.

Thus we see there is a real living connection between the sun and ourselves here. The rays are like messengers coming from the sun, conveying to us the message from the sun and taking our message from here and conveying it back to the sun, like postmen. This kind of work, the rays of the sun perform much more effectively and vitally than the postal department does! The sun there and ourselves here belong to one family, an undivided family. So, we are like brothers. Most undivided families have division among the members and the undividedness is only an imagination. Really the members of the family are divided. But, here the connection is not mere imagination. It is a real inter-connection of vital forces in us with the sun and with everything between the sun and ourselves. So we can imagine what integral connection we have really with the atmosphere and the heavens and the stellar system in spite of our apparently being here as if separated and disconnected. This disconnection is a misconception in our minds.

It is these nerve currents that are responsible for the withdrawal of the mind into itself in deep sleep. What we call deep sleep, the composure of the mind, the withdrawal of the mind from all sense activity and the retiring from all dream experience also, where one knows nothing,—that experience is brought about by the travel of the various rays of the mind through these nerve currents to the centre of the heart. There the mind then lies sleeping, and inactive, doing nothing and knowing nothing. So these *nadis* have some part to play even in the activity called psychic sleep. In the state of deep sleep we are overpowered by a supernal light.

There are various opinions as to what happens in deep sleep. They differ one from the other. One of the theories is that we fall asleep on account of the fatigue of the senses which results in the exhaustion of the mind searching for happiness in the world. The other doctrine is that the bilious element in our system gets roused up due to the activity of the sun's rays during the day and they make us fatigued in a different way altogether, compelling us to fall asleep. The third theory is that when the mind goes back to its source, it is overwhelmed by the light of the Atman. This getting blinded by that light is in a way equal to seeing nothing. It is seeing

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darkness, as it were, as perhaps when we gaze at the sun for a long time we see not the brilliance of the sun any more but only pitch darkness. This is a very mystical doctrine of sleep which tells us that we are confronted by the brilliance of the Atman when we go to sleep. And, therefore, on account of there being nothing to see, objectiveness being withdrawn completely, we fall into a mood of so-called unconsciousness, merely because there is nothing for the senses to do and there is nothing for the mind to think. So when there is nothing to sense and nothing to think, what is our condition? It is a falling back into an oblivion of all kinds of experiences.

Now we are introduced to the principal subject of this section. The other points mentioned in connection with these nerves are introductory to the main point which is the theme of the section, namely the departure of the soul after death.

When a person becomes weak due to old age and is awaiting impending death, people get anxious about his condition. They sit round him thinking that he is about to leave this world. And then they query 'do you recognise us?', 'do you know I am your father?', 'I am So and so related to you, do you recognise me?' 'do you know I am your son?', and so on. He is able to reply to these people in a sensible manner as long as the *Pranas* do not depart from the body and as long as the mind is capable of working in a normal fashion in respect of the body. But when the mind is compelled by the *Pranas* to withdraw itself into its source, no sensation, no thought, no recognition remains whatsoever. Then what happens to that person?

The very same rays of the sun about which we have discussed in the earlier *Mantras* in this section, with which we have such an intimate connection, become the passage of the soul for its ascent into the higher regions. These rays of the sun are the roads or the paths, as it were, for the soul when it rises upwards after the departure from this body. This description is in connection with the death of a purified person who is expected to attain liberation by progressive stages, called by the name *kramamukti*, gradual liberation. Such a person chants Om at the time of death. Everyone will not chant Om, at this crucial moment. Those who are accustomed to such a practice throughout life, who have led a very discipline life of spiritual contemplation throughout their career on earth, will be able to recollect this practice at the time of passing, when usually the mind gets confounded due to the action of natural forces.

How much time does the soul take to jump into the sun? It takes as much time as the mind will take to go to any place? That means it does not take much time. The so-called distance of 93 million miles between the sun up there and the individual here on this earth, makes no difference to the soul. It does not take any time at all to reach the sun. Such is the quickness of its action. The soul is taken to the sun at such speed through the passage of the rays. The moment it thinks, it is there. So quickly it is taken there.

This sun is the glorious passage to *Brahmaloka*, the realm of the Creator. This is the entrance to the glorious immortal abode of Brahma. And also it is the halting and checking place as it were, for the unknowing persons. Those who do not carry an 'accepted passport' are turned back from the sun. Everyone cannot go there. The knowers go there and the unknowers return. The latter will not even be allowed to touch that spot. So the sun is the check-post where there is a filtering of souls, as it were. The purified ones are allowed to go beyond and the unpurified

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ones are kicked back to the earth. He is an entrance to the region of Brahma to the purified ones and also a closed door to those who are unprepared for this ascent.

One hundred and one are the principal nerve currents in this body. One among these hundred and one, moves vertically, as it were, towards the crown of the head. This is usually called the *sushumna-nadi* in Yogic language. If our *pranas* and minds can travel through this central nerve current called the *sushumna* and up through the crown of the head, we attain immortality. And this is *kramamukti*, gradual liberation.

But if the *pranas* depart not by this central nerve through the crown of the head, but through other orifices in the body, then there is rebirth. It may be in this world or it may be in some other lower world, according to the particular passage which the *pranas* seek at the time of exit. No liberation is possible unless the movement is through *sushumna-nadi*. So here one part of the discussion of this important subject of the Atman in the heart, is concluded.

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DHYĀNABINḌU-UPANISHAḌ

Even if sin should accumulate to a mountain extending over many yojanas (distance), it is destroyed by ḍhyānayoga. At no time has been found a destroyer of sins like this. Bījākshara (seed-letter) is the supreme bindu. Nāḍa (spiritual sound) is above it. When that nāḍa ceases along with letter, than the nāḍa-less is supreme state. That yogin who considers as the highest that which is above nāḍa, which is anāhaṭa, has all his doubts destroyed. If the point of a hair be divided into one-hundred thousand parts, this (nāḍa) is one-half of that still further divided; and when (even) this is absorbed, the yogin attains to the stainless Brahman. One who is of a firm mind and without the delusion (of sensual pleasures) and ever resting in Brahman, should see like the string (in a rosary of beads) all creatures (as existing) in Aṭma like odour in flowers, ghee in milk, oil in gingelly seeds and gold in quartz. Again just as the oil depends for its manifestation upon gingelly seeds and odour upon flowers, so does the Purusha depend for its existence upon the body, both external and internal. The tree is with parts and its shadow is without parts but with and without parts, Āṭmā exists everywhere.

The one akshara (letter Om) should be contemplated upon as Brahman by all who aspire for emancipation. Pṛṭhivī, agni, ṛgveḍa, bhūḥ and Brahmā—all these (are absorbed) when Akāra (A), the first amsa (part) of praṇava (Om) becomes absorbed. Anṭariksha, yajurveḍa, vāyu, bhuvah' and Vishṇu, the Janārḍana—all these (are absorbed) when Ukāra (U), the second amsa of pranava becomes absorbed. Ḍyur, sun, sāmaveḍa, suvah and Mahesvara—all these (are absorbed) when Makāra (M), the third amsa of pranava becomes absorbed. Akāra is of (pita) yellow colour and is said to be of rajoguna; Ukāra is of white colour and of saṭṭvaguṇa; Makāra is of dark colour and of tamoguna. He who does not know Omkāra as having eight angas (parts), four pāḍas (feet), three sṭhānas (seats) and five ḍevaṭās (presiding deities) is not a Brāhmaṇa. Praṇava is the bow. Āṭmā is the arrow and Brahman is said to be the aim. One should aim at it with great care and then he, like the arrow, becomes one with it. When that Highest is cognised, all karmas return (from him, *viz.*, do not affect him). The Veḍas have Omkāra as their cause. The swaras (sounds) have Omkāra as their cause. The three worlds with (all) the locomotive and the fixed (ones in them) have Omkāra as their cause. The short (accent of Om) burns all sins, the long one is decayless and the bestower of prosperity. United with arḍhamāṭrā (half-metre of Om), the praṇava becomes the bestower of salvation. That man is the knower of the Veḍas who knows that the end (*viz.*, ardhamatra) of pranava should be worshipped (or recited) as uninterrupted as the flow of oil and (resounding) as long as the sound of a bell. One should

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contemplate upon Omkāra as Īsvara resembling an unshaken light, as of the size of a thumb and as motionless in the middle of the pericarp of the lotus of the heart. Taking in vāyu through the left nostril and filling the stomach with it, one should contemplate upon Omkāra as being in the middle of the body and as surrounded by circling flames. Brahmā is said to be inspiration; Vishṇu is said to be cessation (of breath), and Ruḍra is said to be expiration. These are the ḍevaṭās of prāṇāyāma. Having made Āṭmā as the (lower) araṇi (sacrificial wood) and praṇava as the upper araṇi, one should see the God in secret through the practice of churning which is ḍhyāna. One should practise restraint of breath as much as it lies in his power along with (the uttering of) Omkāra sound, until it ceases completely. Those who look upon Om as of the form of Hamsa staying in all, shining like crores of suns, being alone, staying in gamāgama (ever going and coming) and being devoid of motion-at last such persons are freed from sin. That manas which is the author of the actions (viz.), creation, preservation and destruction of the three worlds, is (then) absorbed (in the supreme One). That is he highest state of Vishṇu.

The lotus of the heart has eight petals and thirty-two filaments. The sun is in its midst: the moon is in the middle of the sun. Agni is in the middle of the moon: the prabhā (spiritual light) is in the middle of agni. Pitha (seat or centre) is in the midst of prabha, being set in diverse gems. One should meditate upon the stainless Lord Vāsuḍeva as being (seated) upon the centre of Pītha, as having Śrīvaṭsa (black mark) and Kaustubha (garland of gems) on his chest and as adorned with gems and pearls resembling pure crystal in lustre and as resembling crores of moons in brightness. He should mediate upon Mahā-Vishṇu as above or in the following manner. (That is) he should meditate with inspiration (of breath) upon Maha-Vishṇu as resembling the aṭasī flower and as staying in the seat of navel with four hands; then with restraint of breath, he should meditate in the heart upon Brahmā, the Grandfather as being on the lotus with the gaura (pale-red) colour of gems and having four faces: then through expiration, he should meditate upon the three-eyed Śiva between the two eyebrows shining like the pure crystal, being stainless, destroying all sins, being in that which is like the lotus facing down with its flower (or face) below and the stalk above or like the flower of a plantain tree, being of the form of all Vedas, containing one hundred petals and one hundred leaves and having the pericarp full-expanded. There he should mediate upon the sun, the moon and the agni, one above another. Passing above through the lotus which has the brightness of the sun, moon and agni, and taking its Hrīm bīja (letter), one leads his Āṭmā firmly. He is the knower of Veḍas who knows the three seats, the three māṭrās, the three Brahmas, the three aksharas (letters) and the three māṭrās associated with the ard'hamāt'rā. He who knows that which is above bind'u, nād'a and kalā as uninterrupted as the flow of oil and (resounding) as long as the sound of a bell—that man is a knower of the Veḍas. Just as a man would draw up (with his mouth) the water through the (pores of the) lotus-stalk, so the yogin treading the path of yoga should draw up the breath. Having made the lotus-sheath of the form of arḍhamāṭrā, one should draw up the breath through the stalk (of the nādis Sushumnā, Idā and Pingalā) and absorb it in the middle of the eyebrows. He should know that the middle of the eyebrows in the forehead which is also the root of the nose is the seat of nectar. That is the great place of Brahman.

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Postures, restraint of breath, subjugation of the senses ḍhāraṇā, ḍhyāna and samāḍhi are the six parts of yoga. There are as many postures as there are living creatures; and Mahesvara (the great Lord) knows their distinguishing features. Siḍḍha, bhaḍra, simha and paḍma are the four (chief) postures. Mūlāḍhāra is the first chakra. Svāḍhishthāna is the second. Between these two is said to be the seat of yoni (perineum), having the form of Kāma (God of love). In the Ādhāra of the anus, there is the lotus of four petals. In its midst is said to be the yoni called Kāma and worshipped by the siddhas. In the midst of the yoni is the Linga facing the west and split at its head like the gem. He who knows this, is a knower of the Veḍas. A four-sided figure is situated above agni and below the genital organ, of the form of molten gold and shining like streaks of lightning. Prana is with its sva (own) sound, having Svāḍhishthāna as its aḍhishthāna (seat), (or since sva or prāṇa arises from it). The chakra Svāḍhishthāna is spoken of as the genital organ itself. The chakra is the sphere of the navel is called Maṇipūraka, since the body is pierced through by vāyu like manis (gems) by string. The jīva (ego) urged to actions by its past virtuous and sinful karmas whirls about in this great chakra of twelve spokes, so long as it does not grasp the truth. Above the genital organ and below the naval is kanda of the shape of a bird's egg. There arise (from it) nādis seventy-two thousand in number. Of these seventy-two are generally known. Of these, the chief ones are ten and carry the pranas. Ida, Pingalā, Sushumnā, Gānḍhārī, Hasṭijihvā, Pūshā, Yaśasvinī, Alambusā, Kuhūh and Śānkhinī are said to be the ten. This chakra of the nādis should ever be known by the yogins. The three nādis Ida, Pingala and Sushumnā are said to carry prān'a always and have as their ḍevaṭās, moon, sun and agni. Idā is on the left side and Pingalā on the right side, while the Sushumna is in the middle. These three are known to be the paths of prāṇa. Prāṇa, Apāna, Samāna, Udāna, and Vyāna; Nāga, Kūrma, Kṛkara, Ḍevaḍaṭṭa and Ḍhananjaya; of these, the first five are called prāṇas, etc., and last five Nāga, etc. are called vāyus (or sub-prāṇas). All these are situated (or run along) the one thousand nādis, (being) in the form of (or producing) life. Jīva which is under the influence of prana and apāna goes up and down. Jīva on account of its ever moving by the left and right paths is not visible. Just as a bali struck down (on the earth) with the bat of the hand springs up, so jīva ever tossed by prāṇa and apāna is never at rest. He is knower of yoga who knows that prāṇa always draws itself from apana and apāna draws itself from prāṇa, like a bird (drawing itself from and yet not freeing itself) from the string (to which it is tied).

The jīva comes out with the letter *Ha* and gets in again with the letter *Sa*. Thus jiva always utters the mantra 'Hamsa', 'Hamsa'. The jiva always utters the mantra twenty-one thousand and six hundred times in one day and night. This is called Ajapā Gāyaṭrī and is ever the bestower of nirvana to the yogins. Through its very thought, man is freed from sins. Neither in the past nor in the future is there a science equal to this, a japa equal to this or a meritorious action equal to this. Paramesvari (*viz*., kundalini sakt'i) sleeps shutting with her mouth that door which leads to the decayless Brahma-hole. Being aroused by the contact of agni with manas and prāṇa, she takes the form of a needle and pierces up through Sushumnā. The yogin should open with great effort this door which is shut. Then he will pierce the door to salvation by means of kundalini. Folding firmly the fingers of the hands, assuming firmly the Padma posture,

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placing the chin firmly on the breast and fixing the mind in ḍhyāna, one should frequently raise up the apāṇa, fill up with air and then leave the prān'a. Then the wise man gets matchless wisdom through (this) śakti. That yogin who assuming Paḍma posture worships (*i.e.* controls) vāyu at the door of the nadis and then performs restraint of breath is released without doubt. Rubbing off the limbs the sweat arising from fatigue, abandoning all acid, bitter and saltish (food), taking ḍelight in the drinking of milk and rasa, practising celibacy, being moderate in eating and ever bent on yoga, the yogin becomes a siddha in little more than a year. No inquiry need be made concerning the result. Kuṇḍalinī śakṭi, when it is up in the throat, makes the yogi get siḍḍhi. The union of prāṇa and apāna has the extinction of urine and faeces.

One becomes young even when old through performing mūlabanḍha always. Pressing the yoni by means of the heels and contracting the anus and drawing up the apāna—this is called mūlabanḍha. Uddiyāṇa bandha is so called because it is (like) a great bird that flies up always without rest. One should bring the western part of the stomach above the navel. This Uddiyāṇa banḍha is a lion to the elephant of death, since it binds the water (or nectar) of the ākāś which arises in the head and flows down. The Jālanḍhara banḍha is the destroyer of all the pains of the throat. When this Jālanḍhara banḍha which is destroyer of the pains of the throat is performed, then nectar does not fall on agni nor does the vayu move. When the tongue enters backwards into the hole of the skull, then there is the muḍrā of vision latent in the eyebrow called khecharī. He who knows the muḍrā, khecharī has not disease, death, sleep, hunger, thirst, or swoon. He who practises this muḍrā is not affected by illness or karma; nor is he bound by the limitations of time. Since chiṭṭa moves in the kha (ākāś) and since the tongue has entered (in the mudra) kha (*viz.*, the hole in the mouth), therefore, the mudra is called khechari and worshipped by the siddhas. He whose hole (or passage) above the uvula is closed (with the tongue backwards) by means of khecharimudra never loses his virility, even when embraced by a lovely woman. Where is the fear of death, so long as the binḍu (virility) stays in the body. Binḍu does not go out of the body, so long as the khecharimudra is practised. (Even) when binḍu comes down to the sphere of the perineum, it goes up, being prevented and forced up by violent effort through yonimudra. This bindu is two-fold, white and red. The white one is called sukla and the red one is said to contain much rajas. The rajas which stays in yoni is like the colour of a coral. The binḍu stays in the seat of the genital organs. The union of these two is very rare. Bindu is siva and rajas is sakṭi. Binḍu is the moon and rajas is the sun. Through the union of these two is attained the highest body; when rajas is roused up by agitating the sakti through vayu which unites with the sun, thence is produced the divine form. Sukla being united with the moon and rajas with the sun, he is a knower of yoga who knows the proper mixture of these two. The cleansing of the accumulated refuse, the unification of the sun and the moon and the complete drying of the rasas (essences), this is called mahāmuḍrā. Placing the chin on the breast, pressing the anus by means of the left heel, and seizing (the toe of) the extended right leg by the two hands, one should fill his belly (with air) and should slowly exhale. This is called mahāmuḍrā, the destroyer of the sins of men.

Now I shall give a description of Āṭmā. In the seat of the heart is a lotus of eight

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petals. In its centre is jīvātmā of the form of jyotis and atomic in size, moving in a circular line. In it is located everything. It knows everything. It does everything. It does all these actions attributing everything to its own power, (thinking) I do, I enjoy, I am happy, I am miserable, I am blind, I am lame, I am deaf, I am mute, I am lean, I am stout, etc. When it rests on the eastern petal which is of sveta (white) colour, then it has a mind (or is inclined) to ḍharma with bhakti (devotion). When it rests on the south-eastern petal, which is of rakta (blood colour), then it is inclined to sleep and laziness. When it rests on the southern petal, which is of krshna (black) colour, then it is inclined to hate and anger. When it rests on the south-western petal which is of nila (blue) colour, then it gets desire for sinful or harmful actions. When it rests on the western petal which is of crystal colour, then it is inclined to flirt and amuse. When it rests on the north-western petal which is of ruby colour, then it has a mind to walk, rove and have vairagya (or be indifferent). When it rests on the northern petal which is pita (yellow) colour, then it is inclined to be happy and to be loving. When it rests on the north-eastern petal which is of vaidurya (lapis lazuli) colour, then it is inclined to amassing money, charity and passion. When it stays in the interspace between any two petals, then it gets the wrath arising from diseases generated through (the disturbance of the equilibrium of) vayu, bile and phlegm (in the body). When it stays in the middle, then it knows everything, sings, dances, speaks and is blissful. When the eye is pained (after a day's work), then in order to remove (its) pain, it makes first a circular line and sinks in the middle. The first line is of the colour of bandhuka flower (Bassia). Then is the state of sleep. In the middle of the state of sleep is the state of dream. In the middle of the state of dream, it experiences the ideas of perception, Vedas, inference, possibility, (sacred) words, etc. Then there arises much fatigue. In order to remove this fatigue, it circles the second line and sinks in the middle. The second is of the colour of (the insect) Indragopa (of red or white colour). Then comes the state of dreamless sleep.

During the dreamless sleep, it has only the thought connected with Paramesvara (the highest Lord) alone. This state is of the nature of eternal wisdom. Afterwards it attains the nature of the highest Lord (Paramesvara). Then it makes a round of the third circle and sinks in the middle. The third circle is of the colour of paḍmarāga (ruby). Then comes the state of ṭurya (the fourth). In turya, there is only the connection of Paramāṭmā. It attains he nature of eternal wisdom. Then one should gradually attain the quiescence of buddhi with self-control. Placing the manas in Āṭmā, one should think of nothing else. Then causing the union of prāṇa and apāna, he concentrates his aim upon the whole universe being of he nature of Āṭmā. Then comes the state of ṭuryāṭīṭa (*viz.*, that state beyond the fourth). Then everything appears as bliss. He is beyond the pairs (of happiness and pains, etc.). He stays here as long as he should wear his body. Then he attains the nature of Paramāṭmā and attains emancipation through this means. This alone is the means of knowing Āṭmā.

When vāyu (breath) which enters the great hole associated with a hall where four roads meet gets into the half of the well-placed triangle, then is Achyuta (the indestructible) seen. Above the aforesaid triangle, one should meditate on the five bīja (seed) letters of (the elements) pṛṭhivi, etc., as also on the five prāṇas, the colour of the bījas and their position. The letter य is the bīja of prāṇa and resembles the

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blue cloud. The letter र is the bija of agni, is of apāna and resembles the sun. The letter ल is the bīja of pṛthivi, is of vyana and resembles bandhūka flower. The letter व is the bīja of jīva (or vayu), is of uḍāna and is of the colour of the conch. The letter ह is the bīja of ākāś, is of samana, and is of the colour of crystal. Prāṇa stays in the heart, navel, nose, ear, foot, finger, and other places, travels through the seventy-two thousand nādis, stays in the twenty-eight crores of hair-pores and is yet the same everywhere. It is that which is called jīva. One should perform the three, expiration, etc., with a firm will and great control: and drawing in everything (with the breath) in slow degrees, he should bind prāṇa and apāṇa in the cave of the lotus of the heart and utter praṇava, having contracted his throat and the genital organ. From the Mūlāḍhāra (to the head) is the Sushumnā resembling the shining thread of the lotus. The nāḍa is located in the Vīṇāḍaṇda (spinal column); that sound from its middle resembles (that of) the conch, etc. When it goes to the hole of the ākāś, it resembles that of the peacock. In the middle of the cave of the skull between the four door shines Āṭmā, like the sun in the sky. Between the two bows in the Brahma-hole, one should see Purusha with śakṭi as his own Āṭmā. Then his manas is absorbed there. That man attains kaivalya who understands the gems, moonlight, nāḍa, bindu, and the seat of Maheśvara (the great Lord).

The Dream Self

Which you see in the state of dream is the Atman. That is Brahman about which I am going to speak to you. That Being which rejoices and is happy in the state of dream is the Atman which is fearless and which is immortal. This is the Reality about which I have spoken earlier and into which you seek initiation."

Well, to some extent there was satisfaction of Indra's doubts. The physical body does not affect the conditions in dream. "Yes, this must be so", he thought and went back, cool, calm and composed in heart. But he was blessed with the capacity to ratiocinate and investigate into what he was told. On the way before he reached his palace in heaven, he again had a doubt.

"How could this be?", he thought within himself. "That which is in dream is the Atman! can it be like that? Yes, if the body is blind the dream person need not be blind. And if the bodily individual has any other defect such as crippleness, etc., this defect does not affect the dreaming individual. Perhaps even if the physical body is amputated, a limb cut off or affected very seriously, the dreaming individual is not so affected."

Now Indra had another doubt. Even if it be that the dreamer is not affected by the defects of the physical body, there is some other defect in dream. One is not always perfect in dream. The point whether the physical body affected the dream body or not is irrelevant. What is pertinent here is that the dreaming individual has the same problems as the waking individual. There is the same pleasure and pain dependent on unreliable factors both in the waking and dreaming body. One feels as if one is chased or driven away or being killed even in dream. One feels sorrow and grief and passes through unpleasant experiences in dream also. Can this then be the Atman? Naturally, it cannot be, because it is not perfect. It is affected by the same changes which the waking body is subjected to. One cries, weeps and sobs when one has painful experiences in dream also. This dreaming Atman is no good. This was the trend of thought which Indra had in his

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mind when he was half way to his city in the heavens.

Again with sacred firewood, Indra approached Prajapati as a humble disciple. Prajapati queried: "This is the third time, you went away satisfied, O Indra. Now again you have come. What is wrong?"

Indra mentioned once again all his doubts. "This dreaming individual is no good at all", said he. "The dreaming person can be sorry, can be affected in a serious manner like the waking one and he has even the experience of destruction, death etc. What is the good of this Atman? This is my doubt. Please teach me the real Atman."

"Another thirty-two years, you stay here leading a life of discipline. Let me see then if I can tell you something more about the Atman." —said Prajapati. This is the third time that he was asked to live a life of self-control. Indra must have been a tenacious person, no doubt, to stay like this for the sake of the great knowledge which he sought, by the acquisition of which he aspired for mastery over all the worlds and fulfilment of every kind of desire. So, he according to the injunction of Prajapati, stayed there, the latter's abode, for another thirty-two years, leading a life of intense discipline, austerity and *tapascharya*. After these thirty-two years, Prajapati instructed Indra again.

"Now, I will tell you something different. I will point out the Atman which is not affected by the physical body, nor conditioned by the sorrows of dream, and which is blessed in its own state. What is that? He who is the deep sleep state, that is the Atman. This is the immortal, this is the fearless, this is the Atman. Which one? That which is in the state of deep sleep"—said Prajapati.

Now, that which is in the state of deep sleep has no experience of sorrow of any kind. It does not feel that it is affected by anything. It has no grief. It does not feel that it dies. So in a sense it is all right. The sleeping state is a state of freedom from all the turmoils of both the physical and psychic life in the waking and the dreaming states.

Listening to these instructions of Prajapati, Indra was satisfied for the time being. So, he left Prajapati's abode and went back home thinking that he had known the Atman. But, on the way he again had doubts. He did not reach home. He had great fear.

"What sort of Atman is this that is in sleep? It is as if it is not there at all ! It is a zero, an annihilation, a negation of all things! This Atman is a darkness which knows neither its own self nor others. What kind of thing is this sleep? Neither it knows that it is, nor does it know that anything else is. It is like complete annihilation, as it were. How could self-annihilation be the Atman? This kind of Atman is no good. That which does not know its own Self! What sort of Atman is this?" With these doubts, Indra again went back to Prajapati.

With sacred fuel in hand, Indra came to Prajapati as a disciple once again to learn the truth about the Atman. Prajapati asked, "O Indra, why have you come back again? You went away satisfied after receiving my instruction." Indra replied: "This Atman in deep sleep that you spoke to me about, does not know anything at all. It is an ignorant Atman. This is a state of apparent self-annihilation. I cannot believe that this is the immortal Atman, by knowing which one becomes the lord of all the worlds and fulfils all desires, and about which you made a proclamation in your court. Kindly teach me about that Atman."

"Another five years of discipline is necessary. So stay here for another five years", said Prajapati. According to the advice of the great master, he lived there

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again for five years with intense discipline, and sought initiation again. So, one hundred and one years of *Tapas* did Indra perform in the abode of Prajapati for the sake of this Supreme Knowledge. Even now people say: "Indra, such a powerful person with such a brilliant intellect, had to live a life of tremendous austerity for one hundred and one years for the sake of this Atman-knowledge!"

What to speak of other ordinary people! How much discipline is necessary! How much preparation is called for! And what intense austerity has to precede this seeking of knowledge from a teacher! This shows the need for the requisite preparation for the reception of this knowledge. It cannot come easily. After these preparations on the part of Indra and his having completed one hundred and one years of tremendous *Tapas*, Prajapati instructed about the final truth about the Atman.

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ECONOMY

The Upaniṣads contain the teachings of ancient Indian sages who lived a simple and economically contented life in the forest hermitages. Their main occupation was not economic but cultural and spiritual. They devoted themselves to learning, teaching and meditation about the ultimate reality which was found by them to be spiritual i.e., transcendent of all secular values including wealth. This transcendent nature of ultimate spiritual reality has been repeatedly emphasised in the text of the Upanishads. This spiritual truth of life and existence is the greatest discovery of human quest. It is miracle of Indian genius to have revealed so clearly the deeped spiritual secret of life in the earliest times of human speculation and to have make it the first finding of India which could not be even the last finding of world thought during thousands of years after the Upanishads. Not to say of discovering the spiritual truth of life in such concrete form, the later world, both in India and outside it, has not been able to appreciate and adopt in social life, this gross spiritual truth which alone can lead mankind to salvation by eliminating evil and promoting good, beauty and joy in life.

With such as early discovery of the spiritual truth of life it was not possible few the sages of India to prescribe a life of indulgence in wealth and pleasures of secular life for themselves or for others. It was in a life inclining towards asceticism that such a discovery could be possible and with this discovery a life of indulgence was unthinkable. Only a moderate secular life could be consistent with such a discovery. That the sages of Upanishads recognised and recommended for people. All that there recognition of secular values implies is that these values are not to be denied as with their denial even spiritual pursuit will not be possible, or we may say even life will not be possible. Importance of food for life has been recognised in the Upanishad mainly in this form of a necessity of life. Acquisition and collection of abundant food grains has been recommended only for security of future and for feeding guests. Food-grains as a wealth have no-where been appreciated in the Upanishads as a came to be later by those who could grow or acquire it in such abundance.

The Upanishadic view of wealth or economic value is as moderate as the view about food. Food is necessary for life. Denial or depreciation of it is unwise and impractical. On the other hand, the Upanishads have indicated the unwisdom of denying the value of food by parables which have been narrated in the previous chapter. But, as wealth is not so necessary as food the Upanishads have not extolled it. Particularly the Katha Upanishad, has depreciated it in the context of the dialogue of Nachiketas with Yama, the God of death. This depreciation of wealth is intended to dispel the common delusion of excessive or exclusive love of wealth and discourage lust for it. Its purpose is to

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reveal that spiritual reality is above and beyond wealth. It aims at defining the cultural limitations of wealth, that man cannot be satisfied with wealth and cultural values cannot be acquired by it.

But there are several instances in the Upanishads which indicate that the sages of Upanishads attached due importance to wealth or economic value as a means of life, though not as a means to pride and glory as lovers of wealth do. The Upanishadic view of wealth is moderate and reasonable as is the view about food. It is not extremely ascetic, though it seems to border on ascetism particularly in the examples of Nachiketas who declined wealth and Yājnavalkya who is depicted as renouncing his possessions along with his two wives. Food is recognised in the Upanishads as a necessity, wealth is not such a necessity. But wealth also is not regarded as unreal or illusory. It has not been condemned, as sometimes the senses are condemned. The illusion which obscures spiritual reality from our vision is not the wealth itself but our excessive love of it and consequent vanity and indulgence. Wealth is a means to luxury and comforts, which deviate a man from the path of morality and spirituality. It is an external possession with which we can identify our being when we are not able to acquire any thing higher. But such identification is deluding. Wealth is external to our being which is constituted more intimately by internal spiritual excellence. It is more external to body which, though physical, is integral to our being. Hence wealth is not so much emphasised as food in the Upanishads.

The Isha Upanishad present a balanced attitude towards wealth also like all other secular, social and ethical values. In its very first verse it warns us against covetting wealth. Lust for wealth is natural and irresistible. Hence the Upanishad explains the real status of wealth in life. It suggests that wealth is not a real value of life, because it is external. We treat wealth as our possessions, but it is not really our own, as it always remains external to our being. The value of wealth is only an instrumental value as a means to higher ends of life. It can serve as a valuable means only when it is integrated with a spiritual attitude to life. Spiritualisation of wealth and other means of life is the opening gospel of Isha Upanishad. Spirit is a common (and not individual) reality. Spiritual commonness of experience is the secret of delight in life. So common happiness is an objective test of spiritualisation of wealth and other material means of life. In modern language such an attitude to economic value can be designated as economic socialism which alone can ensure social justice. There is no place for greed and personal aggrandisement in such an economic view. Hence the Isha Upanishad advises economic contentment and abandonment of greed.

A verse (number 15) towards the end of the Isha Upanishad indicates the illusion which is likely if the opening gospel of the Upanishad is not followed. Amassing of wealth makes a man vain and deludes him away from truth. Infatuation of wealth blinds one's vision of truth. A cup or cover of gold conceals the truth from his vision. It is only vision of spiritual reality or grace of God which can remove this golden covering and can help a truth-loving man to see the truth. This can be possible only when one looks on the world as the Kingdom of God and enjoys things with contentment and without greed, as a sacred gift from God, and understands that wealth of world is not his property and is also not integral to his being.

This balanced economic view of the Isha Upanishad first presents the principle of right economic adjustment which can

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also be conducive to spiritual salvation, then in the end it also indicates the delusion which results from lust of wealth and also the need of dispelling this delusion for realisation of truth in life. This view of Isha Upanishad reconciles material life with spiritual salvation of man.

The Kena Upanishad is primarily devoted to the revelation of the supreme spirit which supports and sustains the dynamics of vital, sensory and mental life. There is no occasion for consideration of any other thing in its brief and concise text.

The Kaṭha Upaniṣad contains a profound treatment of both material and spiritual values. It also is dominantly spiritual. The occasion for the consideration of the value of wealth arises in it when Yama offers a boon of abundant wealth, along with other material pleasures of life, to Nachiketas for he failed to receive the latter as a guest immediately as the latter arrived at his place and felt himself guilty of keeping a quest waiting for three days. This gift of wealth included cattle, horses, chariots elephants besides gold. All these make for glory and happiness in life. Yama offered to Nachiketas these material temptations to dissuade him from asking about the secret of death and life after death. Nachiketas was the son of a saint who gave away his cows in charity. His ascetic and philanthropic heritage gave him a culture on account of which he could not be tempted by material wealth and pleasures. So he declined the material offers of Yama and gave arguments which evince his spiritual culture. He insisted on asking ultimate spiritual questions to Yama. Nachiketas does not actually deny or condemn wealth, but he exposes the limitations and futility of it in a manner which borders on ascetism. He associates limitation of wealth with the limitation of life in regard to duration. Life is not endless. It is a limited duration. When life ends, pleasures of wealth and senses also end with life. Death terminates life and destroys all meaning of it. Moreover wealth alone cannot satisfy man. Wealth is an external possession of man and cannot be identified with his inner being. Love of wealth increase one's craving for it and deviates him from the path of spiritual quest. Hence Nachiketas declines Yama's offer of wealth and other material pleasures of life, those who devote themselves to the pursuit of wealth and revel in material pleasures of life are regarded by Nachiketas as blind persons being led by the blind. Both of them do not see the real goal and real path of life. Those who are obsessed by love of wealth pass from death to death in life after life. They never come to the path to spiritual salvation.

First Yama tests the spiritual fortitude of Nachiketas by offering him temptations of material wealth, but when he finds Nachiketas firm in his spiritual faith and untempted by wealth and pleasures, he congratulates Nachiketas for his detachment from wealth which binds numerous persons by its charm. Yama is surprisingly pleased with Nachiketas for being above those persons who are mostly involved in the pursuit of wealth without understanding its futility and limitations. After testing the spiritual sincerity of Nachiketas, Yama reveals to him the spiritual secret of immortal life beyond death which he so insistently inquired of from Yama.

The parable of Nachiketas seems to have an ascetic reflection in his recognition of the limitations and futility of wealth. But this limitation of wealth is not tantamount to condemnation and denial of wealth. In fact it reveals the inadequacy and insufficiency of wealth for complete fulfilment of life. There is even a

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recognition of the place and value of wealth life in Katha Upaniṣad. Nachiketas wittily suggests that wealth will come to him just as a gift of mere audience with Yama. While recognising the limitations and futility of wealth, Nachiketas does suggest in his witty remark the due place and value of wealth. The charitable attitude of his father also indicates the recognition of the due place and value of wealth, which was counted in terms of cows in ancient India. This economic propriety can be maintained only by observing contentment and philanthropy which is exemplified by Uddalaka, the father of Nachiketas. This moderate economic view with a tinge of ascetism is the right attitude towards wealth and pleasure, which is consistent with the spiritual aspirations of man. Such an attitude is coherent with the spiritualisation of material means and limitation of wealth by contentment which have been propounded in the first verse of the Isa Upaniṣad.

Much in the manner of Nachiketas does another sage decline the gifts of wealth offered by a king and chooses to inquire about some deeper spiritual secrets of life which were supposed to be known to that king only. His story is narrated in the Chhandogya Upaniṣad in its fifth chapter part three. It confirms the recognition of higher spiritual values as superior to wealth on the part of sages of the Upaniṣad though they accepted wealth also as a necessary means of living. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad contains in a chapter, a significant valuation of wealth in comparison to spirit. It regards the spirit as the central navel of life and considers wealth as the circle of the wheel of life. It signifies that wealth is a peripheral value while spirit i the central value of life. This valuation is elucidated by the example of a person who is robbed of all his possessions but who is secure with his body and soul. In such a situation we understand that the man is deprived only of external possessions which are only of peripheral value.

The sages of Upaniṣads lived a simple and contented life bordering on asceticism. There actual life and also their expressed attitude towards the place and value of wealth in life presents a moderate economic view which is a mean between austerity and indulgence in wealth. It is true that this view inclines towards ascetism which is the only precaution against delusion of economic excess. It is evident that such a view has no indication of the negation of economic value, as may be surmised by those who find the philosophy of the Upaniṣads as world negating.

The foremost example of such a balanced economic view is to be found in the life of Yajnavalkya who was the greatest saint of Upaniṣadic times. There are three narratives of Yajnavalkya found in the Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣad. The first narrative is found in the third chapter of the Upanishad. The story runs that Janaka the king of Videha performed a great sacrifice in which he proposed to give large charities to Brahmins. Numerous learned Brahmins gathered in this sacrifice. King Janaka desired to know as to who among them was the ablest in spiritual discourse. He ordered one thousand cows to be kept ready to be gifted to the winner in the contest. The horns of the cows were mounted with gold.

King Janaka declared in the gathering of the Brahmins-"Revered Brahmins! He who is the greatest spiritualist among you may drive away with him these cows." Yājñavalkya was reputed to be the greatest among sages to those days. Hence none of the Brahmins dared to drive away the cows. Yājñavalkya asked his disciple

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Samashrava to drive away the cows with him. Upon this the other Brahmins present there protested and questioned how does Yājñavalkya declare himself as the greatest spiritualist amongst all Brahmins gathered here. One Ashwala among them challenged Yājñavalkya with the question "Are you the greatest spiritualist among us all?" Upon this Yājñavalkya politely replied, "We bow to the spiritualist; at present we desire only the cows". Upon this Ashwala challenged Yājñavalkya for a discussion about spiritual questions which is described in the Upanishad.

The narrative of Yājñavalkya indicates the positive and balanced attitude of Upaniṣadic spiritualism towards wealth. Even a great spiritualist like Yājñavalkya regards wealth as a considerable value in life. It does not signify greed for wealth. But it certainly indicated due regard for it as a necessary value in life. The attitude of Yājñavalkya is modest about both spiritualism and wealth. It is in this modesty that the secret of synthesis of economic value with spiritualism consists.

The second narrative of Yājñavalkya is found in the fourth chapter of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. Once Yājñavalkya came to the court of king Janaka. King Janaka asked Yājñavalkya whether he came for the cattle or for discussing subtle spiritual questions. 'For both, your majesty' replied Yājñavalkya. With this reply Yājñavalkya proceeded upon discussing subtle spiritual questions with king Janaka. King Janaka felt enlightened at every stage of this discussion and was pleased to gift a thousand cows to Yājñavalkya. Yājñavalkya accepted them with the remark, "My father was of the view that one should not accept a gift of wealth from a disciple without affording him satisfactory enlightenment." Presuming king Janaka's satisfaction with the preaching, Yājñavalkya accepted the gift of one thousand cows from the king.

The second narrative also depicts the same balanced view of Yājñavalkya about economic value and spiritualism which is presented in the first narrative. This view is not an incoherent combination of wealth and spiritualism, but it is a coherent synthesis of them according to moderate secularism and dominant spiritualism which implies austerity, contentment and integration of moderate wealth with spirituality as indicated in the first verse of the Īśa Upaniṣad.

The effective inclination of this synthesis of economic and spiritual values towards ascetic austerity is expressed in the third narrative concerning Yājña-valkya. This narrative is contained in the second chapter of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad and is thus prior to the two narratives stated above. This third narrative concerns the declaration of Yājñavalkya before his two wives about his intention to renounce the life of a house-holder. It is interesting to note that the two other narratives which are later to this one depict Yājñavalkya as accepting cows with golden horns from king Janaka as a gift for his great spiritual knowledge. These later narratives indicate that there is no incoherence of moderate wealth as a means of living with spiritual aspiration. But the narrative of Yājñavalkya's renunciation of house-holder's life reveals strongly the inadequacy and futility of wealth for spiritual salvation, understood here as immortal being. Yājñavalkya proposed on this occasion, a division of the wealth between his two wives. Upon the Maitreyi, who was less materialistic and more spiritualistic among his two wives, asked "My lord can I attain immorality by wealth?" Upon this Yājñavalkya replied, 'No', immortality cannot be attained by

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wealth. With this wealth, your life will be like the life of a person with material means, i.e., it will be physically happy but spiritually deficient. Upon this Maitreyi said, "Then, what shall I do with this wealth. Kindly instruct me about way of immortal being." Upon this Yājñavalkya proceeded to instruct Maitreyi in spiritual secrets of life.

This narrative reveals the limitation and futility of wealth according to Yājñavalkya and the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. It reminds us of the narrative of Nachiketas contained in the Katha Upanishad. Nachiketas also wanted to know from Yama the secret of immoral life. As son of a sage he himself expressed to Yama the limitation and futility of wealth. But he admired the utility and actual value of wealth in life which he wittily expressed in his dialogue with Yama. In case of Yājñavalkya also, his recognition of the utility of wealth as a necessary means of life is evident in his earlier acquisitions of wealth and his later continuance to accept gifts of wealth from king Janaka.

The tale of a cynical saint named Raikva contained in the Chhandogya Upanishad also affords an evidence of the recognition of economic value in the Upanishads. As the Greek philosopher Diogenes lived in a tub, Raikva lived in a cart. Diogenes is reported to have snubbed Alexander the Great. Raikva also snubbed king Janashruti in a similar manner. Janashruti was a philosophic king like Janaka. He was bounteous in his charity. He used to offer abundant money and food in charity. Raikva was a cynical saint, probably a Shudra, of Upanishadic times. King Janashruti heard of his fame from royal cranes flying over his place. Impressed by his fame, he sent his attendants to search him. After long search they found Raikva sitting under his cart and scratching his body. King Janashruti came to him and offered him six hundred cows, a necklace and a chariot and asked him to instruct him about the deity whom he (Raikva) worshipped. Raikva refused these offerings with his characteristic cynicism. Then the king offered him a thousand cows and much more money along with his daughter. Upon this Raikva agreed to instruct the king, chiefly by the offer of increased wealth, though he was moved by the offer of kings daughter as spouse.

This tale of Raikva also affirms the recognition of secular values including wealth and sex on the part of Upanishadic sages, like Yājñavalkya. It confirms the economic view of Yajnavalkya who was the greatest sage of Upanishadic times. With all his cynicism, Raikva was moved by kind's offer of increased wealth and his daughter. Shankara has interpreted the face of the princess as a symbol of learning. The king also gifted those village to Raikva in which he used to live or roam. Shankara has pointed in passing that Raikvas instructed the king who offered him wealth. Shankara's remark also recognises the relation between wealth and Raikva's inclining to instruct the king. That the cynical sage appreciated wealth is evident from the anecdote. He is also reported to have accepted the estate offered to him by the king.

The anecdote of Raikva also confirms the recognition of economic value in the Upanishad. King Janaka also was fond of holding philosophical symposia in his court and of giving wealth to learned sages participating in them. It shows the interest of sages in wealth, though it might be only for needs of living. It cannot prove the lust for wealth on the part of Upaniṣadic sages But it does prove that they recognised the value of wealth at least as a means of living. Their voluntary participation in profitable assemblies in courts and willing

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acceptance of wealth offered indicates their due appreciation of the value of wealth. Some stories, like that of Ushasti Chakrayana, also confirm more anxious appreciation of the value of wealth on account of urgency caused by greater scarcity of means in life.

It was customary for kings of ancient India to offer wealth in charity to sages who lived in forests and devoted themselves to spiritual pursuit. They were considered to be a liability of kings for maintenance and protection. Kālidasa has confirmed this royal responsibility through an utterance of Sita at the time of her banishment. Kings used to visit their hermitages to see that they were well-provided. Janaka as a philosophic king devised a more intellectual way of giving wealth to sages. This philanthrophy of ancient Indian king was a mode of economic adjustment according to the division of duties in Indian society. Sages and Brahmins devoted to spiritual and intellectual pursuit. They were relieved of the duty to earn living, so that they could wholly devote themselves to spirituality and learning. This economic adjustment promoted learning in ancient India. No other ancient country can pride like India in a whole class of people which devoted exclusively to spiritual and intellectual quest. What is specially to be noted about this unique Indian tradition is that his enlightened class of ancient India sincerely and seriously devoted itself wholly to spiritual and intellectual quest. It lived for this quest and lived on the honour it received in the society which treated spiritual and intellectual value with great regard. Such a pursuit cannot be possible with greed and wealth. The ancient Indian sages and Brahmins lived a simple life of contentment. The charities of king, and other people show only their bounteous nature and do not prove the greed of the receivers. Greed developed only in priests who where concerned with religious rituals but not in sages who devoted to spirituality and not in scholars who devoted to learning. Numerous saints and scholars lived in modern times whose austerity and disregard of wealth disprove all accusations of greed so far as they are concerned. The cynicism of Raikva also is an example of austere saintly life. The acceptance of wealth from kings by sages does not prove their greed for wealth, but only their recognition of wealth as a necessary means of life. Prevalence of mendicancy in India also proves that wealth was recognised only as a means of living by pursuers of spirituality. Besides charity they lived on natural food, fruit and unsowed corn. They also picked grains from fields, which was left over by farmers.

All this proves the moderate economic view of Upanishadic sages which is according to the injunction about spiritualisation of secular values by contentment and abandonment of greed. This view presents a restricted and qualified recognition of economic value which is consonant with ultimately spiritual view of life.

The tale of Ushasti Chakrayana elucidates the recognition of secular values, particularly of food and wealth, as a necessity the urgency of which is keenly realised in the circumstances of starvation and scarcity. It is contained in the first chapter of the Chhandogya Upanishad and is thus prior to the tales of Raikva and Yājñavalkya, even as secular values as urgent necessities are prior to secular values as means for higher values. Sage Ushasti lived in misery with his young wife. He was starving because the region in which he lived was struck by hail-storm and the crops there were destroyed. On the point of starvation he begged of food from an elephant keeper. He gave him some of

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the boiled pulses which he himself was eating. The elephant keeper hesitated to offer him such a thing due to cultural considerations. But Ushasti accepted those pulses because he thought he could not live without them and save his life. After eating those pulses Ushasti planned to go to a king who was organising a grand sacrificial ceremony. Ushasti expected that the king would appoint him as the chief priest and he would get some money for it. Ushasti overwhelmed all other priests by the excellence of learning and was chosen as the high priest by the king. Ushasti agreed to it on the condition that king would give as much money as he would give to all other priests combined.

This anecdote of Ushasti indicates the point at which scarcity and starvation generate a little greed also even in a saintly person. Except for the keenness for food and money created by scarcity and starvation Ushasti's expectation of money in gift from king is not basically different from the attitude of Yājñavalkya and other sages who used to attend spiritual symposia in the court of king Janaka for gifts of wealth.

The tales of Yājñavalkya, Raikva and Ushasti all found in the Chhandogya Upanishad elucidate the recognition and appreciation of economic value in different situations of lives of the sages. They substantiate the positive view of Upanishads according to which economic value has its moderate place even in saintly life and is consonant with the spiritual ideal of life.

The Chhandogya Upaniṣad contains in its first chapter-a worship according to seasons by which one obtains enjoyments in life according to various seasons. One who worships cattle obtains ample cattle-wealth.

But all these economic inclinations of sages of the Upaniṣads are not inspired by greed for wealth and lust for material luxuries of life. They are motivated only by their simple recognition of wealth and food as a necessary means of living for spiritual pursuit. They sought only a little wealth with an attitude of contentment, and often with an attitude of austerity and contempt only for making life and their spiritual pursuit possible. The principle of contentment and spiritualisation of mundane means which is explicitly stated in the very first verse of Isha Upanishad was implicitly implied in the economic approach of all sages of the Upanishads. This can be the only sensible economic approach which is consonant with a dominantly spiritual view of life like the one contained in the Upanishads. It is also the most sensible approach for mankind at all times, if it appreciates spiritual salvation as its highest end. Such as end can be attainable only by restricting material ambitions and adopting moderation and contentment as the condition of advancement towards spiritual goal of life in which alone life can find its highest and final fulfilment.

There is no indication in all these anecdotes of Upanishadic sages of condemnation of wealth or economic value as an unreality of illusion. The sages who accept wealth from kings do not covet it, but neither do they seem to regard it as an unreality or an illusion. It is only in the context of excessive temptation of wealth that 'maya' came to be used as a synonym for wealth in popular parlance. Wealth as tempting 'maya' does not, in fact, means unreality but an axiological illusion in which it is over appreciated by wrong valuation of life. The moderate economic attitude of Upanishads recognises the actual importance of wealth as a means of life and instructs to transcend temptations of earthly luxuries in order to advance towards the higher spiritual goal of life in

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which mundane wealth will be integrated with spiritual value and will be thus transformed into a divine gift of bounteous supreme spirit which is also the supreme reality. Such spiritual integration of wealth will express itself in economic and social justice free from aggrandisement and exploitation which can be regarded as the highest economic ideal of a civilised and highly human society.

EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Empirical Psychology is a science of recent growth, and thus we must not expect to find a full-fledged empirical investigation of mental science in the days of the Upanishads. We must, on the contrary, be content with what little information is supplied to us under that head in the various Upaniṣads. Thee Upaniṣadic philosophers believed that the mind for its formation was dependent upon alimentation. The mind was supposed to be manufactured out of the food that we take (S.I.a). "The food that we eat", says a passage, "is transformed in three different ways: the heaviest part of it becomes the excrement, that of medium density is transformed into flesh, and the subtlest part goes to form the mind" (S.I.b). "Just as in the churning of curds, the subtlest part rises up and is transformed into butter, so when food is eaten, the subtlest part rises up and is transformed into butter, so when food is eaten, the subtlest part rises up and is transformed into mind" (S.I.c). Later, even in the days of Bhagvadgita, we find that the three different mental temperaments, the Sattvika, the Rajasa, and the Tamasa were supposed to be due to the different kinds of food that we eat (XVII. 8-10). When once it was believed that the qualities of the food consumed formed the quality of the mind of the customer, it was natural to insist, in the interest of the highest morality, upon a kind of *Katharsis* in alimentation. "When the food is pure," says a passage (S.2), "the whole nature becomes pure; when the nature becomes pure, memory becomes firm; and when a man is in possession of a firm memory, all the bonds which tie a man down to the world become unloosed. It was because he (Nārada) had his impurity destroyed, that the venerable Sanatkumāra pointed out to him the way beyond darkness." The way which leads us beyond darkness, therefore, must be sought for in purity of alimentation, which involves in its train the purity of mind.

Attention involves Suspension of Breath

One of the acute observations which these ancient seers made concerns the fact that in the process of attention we always hold our breath, and seem neither to breathe out nor to breathe in. When we speak, we neither expire nor inspire (S.3.a). When we do an action which involves voluntary effort, as, for example, "producing fire by rubbing two sticks together, or running a race; or bending a bow and stringing it, we neither exhale, nor inhale" (S.3.b). Our attention in such acts is concentrated on the action itself, and it cannot be diverted to such subsidiary processes as those of breathing out and breathing in. This is what in the Kaushitaki Upaniṣad is called the "inner sacrifice", which goes after the name of its discoverer, the sage Pratardana, and is called the Pratardana sacrifice. Pratardana said, that while a man is speaking, he is not able to breathe, and therefore may be said to sacrifice his breath in his speech; on the contrary, while a man is breathing, he is not able to speak, and may be said to sacrifice his speech in his breath. "These two endless and immortal oblations," said Pratardana, "man offers

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always, whether waking or sleeping. All other oblations have an end, for they consist of works. Knowing this, the ancient sages did not offer the ordinary sacrifice" (S.3.c). In this passage, a justification is found for not performing the ordinary sacrifice when one knows that an inner sacrifice is ever going on inside him.

Analysis of Fear

Another curious observation which these seers made may be mentioned in passing. This concerns the analysis of the emotion of fear. It is only when a feeling of otherness gains lodgment in us (S.4.a) that we come to entertain the emotion of fear. The primeval Ātman feared, as he was alone; but "on finding out that there was no other person whom he should fear, he became fearless; for it is only from (the idea or existence of) a second that fear proceeds" (S.4.b). It is in this way that all feeling of fear departs from a man who recognises his own true Self, because this recognition implies that beside his own true Self there is no other entity which might cause fear.

The Claim of Will for Primacy

Another very important point in connection with the psychology of the Upaniṣads is the conflict manifested in the Chhandogya Upaniṣad between the respective claims for primacy of the Will or the Intellect. Here we have in brief the indication of a future quarrel between Voluntaryism and Intellectualism. The following passage most eloquently describes the stress which the seer first lays on Will as the primary reality: "All these therefore.....centre in will, consist of will, abide in will. Heaven and earth willed, air and ether willed, water and fire willed. Through the will of heaven and earth, rain falls; through the will of rain, food wills; through the will of food, the vital airs will; through the will of the vital airs, the sacred hymns will; through the will of the sacred hymns, the sacrifices will; through the will of the sacrifices, the world wills; through the will of the world, every thing wills. This is Will. Meditate on Will. He who meditates on Will as Brahman...he is, as it were, lord and maser as far as Will reaches—he who meditates on Will as Brahaman" (S.5). The seer of this Upaniṣad is evidently imbued with the all-pervading power of Will. It seems that this passage among others must have influenced the philosophy of that admirer of the Upaniṣads, Schopenhauer, who laid so much stress on Will as the *Dingansich*. We may compare the following passage from The World as will and Idea (Book I). "If we observe the strong and unceasing impulse with which the waters hurry to the ocean, the persistency with which the magnet turns ever to the north pole, readiness with which iron flies to the magnet, the eagerness with which the electric poles seek to be reunited, and which like human desire, is increased by obstacles; if we see the crystal quickly take form with such wonderful regularity of construction...if we observe the choice with which bodies repel and attract each other....if we observe all this, I say, it will require no great effort of the imagination to recognize, even at so great a distance, our own nature. That, which in us pursues it ends by the light of knowledge, but here in the weakest of its manifestations, only strives blindly and dumbly in a one-sided and unchangeable manner, must yet in both cases come under the name of Will." According to the doctrine which is com-mon to this Upaniṣad and Schopenhauer, the whole world seems to be filled with the force of will; and "what appears as *motivation* in human beings is the same as what appears as *stimulation* in the vegetative life and as *mechanical process* in the

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inorganic world"—motivation, stimulation, and mechanical process being different manifestations of the same force of Will.

The Claim of Intellect for Primacy

As against this primacy of Will, the seer of the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad goes on in the very next section of that work to affirm the primacy of Intellect. The affirmation of Will is the thesis, to which the seer opposes the affirmation of Intellect as the antithesis: "Intellect is better than Will. For it is only when a man thinks that he wills....All these centre in Intellect, consist of Intellect, abide in Intellect. Therefore, if a man does not think, even if he knows much, people say of him, he is nothing....But if a man thinks, even though he knows little, people indeed desire to listen to him. Intellect is the centre, Intellect is the self, Intellect is the support of all these. Mediate on Intellect. He who meditates on Intellect as Brahaman...he is, as it were, lord and master as far as Intellect reaches— he who meditates on Intellect as Brahman" (S.6.a). The seer of this Upaniṣad is here definitely asserting the supremacy of Intellect over Will: Voluntarism here makes way for intellectualism. This conclusion is supported by another passage from the Maitri Upaniṣad, where the writer speaks of the mind in its reflective aspect as being the fount and source of all mental modifications whatsoever: "He (man) sees by the mind alone; he hears by the mind; and all that we call desire, will, doubt, belief, disbelief, resolution, irresolution, shame, thought, and fear,—all this is but mind itself" (S.6.b).

Classification of Mental States

This intellectualistic way of thought finds its culmination in the Aitareya Upaniṣad, where, by a bold stroke of genius, the seer of that Upanisad makes a noteworthy classification of the various mental functions, at the basis of which, he says, lies Intellection. This passage is remarkable as being the earliest contribution to a classification of mental states: "Sensation, perception, ideation, conception, understanding, insight, resolution, opinion, imagination, feeling, memory, volition, conation, the will-to-live, desire, and self-control, all these are different names of Intellection" (S.7). It is remarkable that the seer not merely mentions the different levels of intellectual experience such as sensation, perception, ideation, and conception, as different from one another, but also recognises the other two characteristic forms of experience, feeling and volition; makes a distinction between volition which need not involve the idea of activity, and conation which does; as well as recognises the process of imagination and memory. Finally, the intellectualistic trend of thought in the seer is apparent from the way in which he makes Intellect the fount and source of all mental activity whatsoever.

Intellectualistic Psychology and Idealistic Metaphysics

It is no wonder if this intellectualistic psychology makes room for an idealistic metaphysics. The intellectualistic seer of the Aitareya Upaniṣad is an idealist as well. In the very section that follows the one we have quoted, the author goes on to point out how intellect is the backbone, not merely of psychical functions, but of reality itself: "This god Brahma, and this god Indra,.... these five great elements (earth, air, ether, water, fire).... creatures born from the egg, from the womb, and from perspiration, sprouting plants, horses, cows, men, elephants, whatsoever breathes whether moving or flying, and in addition whatsoever is immovable—all this is led by Intellect and is supported on

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Intellect. The world is led by Intellect. Intellect is the support. Intellect is the final reality" (S.8.a). This is as outspoken an Idealism as Idealism can be. This author says that all the movable and immovable objects in this world, all those creatures which walk or fly, all the elements and gods exist by virtue of intellect and in intellect. This is in the very spirit of Berkeley who says in his "Treatise", "All the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world have not any subsistence without a mind; that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit: it being perfectly unintelligible and involving all the absurdity of abstracting to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a Spirit." Of like import is the passage from the Maitri Upaniṣad which tells us that it is the inner self which governs "external" existence, that, in short, the inner Prana is the source of the existence of the Sun-a knowledge, which, the passage says, is given only to a few (S.8.b).

ESCHATOLOGY

What becomes of men after death? This question leads us to that doctrine which, if not the most significant in the Indian conception of the universe, is yet certainly the most original and influential, the doctrine of the transmigration of the soul, which from Upanishad times down to the present has held a foremost position in Indian thought, and exercises still the greatest practical influence. Mankind, as Sankara somewhere expresses it, is like a plant. Like this it springs up, develops, and returns finally to the earth. Not entirely, however. But as the seed of the plant survives, so also at death the works of a man remain as a seed which, sown afresh in the realm of ignorance, gives rise to a new existence in exact correspondence with his character. Each life with all its actions and sufferings is on the one hand the inevitable consequence of the actions of a former birth, and conditions on the other hand by the actions committed in it the next succeeding life. This conviction begets not only a real consolation in the sufferings of existence, which are universally seen to be self-inflicted, but is also a powerful incentive to habitual right conduct, and the instances from Indian epic and dramatic poetry are numerous in which a sufferer propounds the question, What crime must I have committed in a former birth? and adds immediately the reflection, I will sin no more to bring upon myself grievous suffering in a future existence.

This conception, mythical as it is, nevertheless contains a germ of philosophical truth, which it is ye difficult to draw out in detail. For, properly speaking, the entire question "What becomes of us after death?" is inadmissible, and if anyone could give us the full and correct answer we should be quite unable to understand it. For it would presuppose an intuition of things apart from space, time and causality, to which, as forms of perception, our knowledge is for ever limited. If we determine, however, to do violence to truth, and to conceive in terms of space that which is without space, the timeless in terms of time, the causeless from the point of view of causality, then we may to the question, "What becomes of us after death?" (which is as it stands incorrectly put, because it assumes the forms of time) give three

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answers, inasmuch as we have only the choice between (1) annihilation, (2) eternal retribution in heaven and hell, and (3) transmigration. The first supposition is in conflict not only with a man's self-love, but with the innate certainty more deeply rooted than all knowledge of our metaphysical being as subject to no birth or dissolution. The second supposition, which opens up the prospect of eternal reward or punishment for an existence so brief and liable to error, so exposed to all the accidents of upbringing and environment, is condemned at once by the unparalleled disproportion in which cause and effect here stand to one another. And for the empirical solution of the problem (itself strictly speaking inadmissible) only the third supposition remains, that our existence is continued after death in other forms, other conditions of space and time, that it is therefore in a certain sense a transmigration. The well-known argument of Kant also, which bases immortality on the realisation of the moral law implanted in us, a result only attainable by an infinite process of approximation, tells not for immortality in the usual sense, but for transmigration.

Although therefore the doctrine of the soul's migration is not absolute philosophical truth, it is nevertheless a myth which represents a truth for ever inconceivable for us, and is accordingly a valuable substitute for the latter. Could we abstract from it the mental framework of space, time and causality, we should have the complete truth. We should then discern that the unceasing return of the soul is realised not in the future and in other regions, but here already, and in the present, but that this "here" is everywhere, and this "present" is eternal.

These views agree essentially with those of the later Vedanta, which clings to belief in transmigration. This belief, however, is valid only for the exoteric *aparâ vidyâ*; for the esoteric *parâ vidyâ*, the reality of the soul's migration falls to the ground with the reality of the universe.

We propose now to endeavour to trace the origin of this remarkable doctrine in the light of the Vedic texts. We must first, however, guard against a misunderstanding. When it is said occasionally of the fathers that they "move along, adopting the external form of birds"; or when the soul of the Buddhist mother at death enters into a female jackal in order to warn her son on his journey of the unhealthy forest; when the dead pass into an insect that buzzes round the last resting-place of the bones; or when the fathers creep into the roots of plants; these are popular representations, which are on a level with the entrance of the *Vetâla* into the corpse, or the yogin's animating of several bodies, but have nothing to do with belief in transmigration. They have as little to do with any such doctrine as the ancient Egyptian idea that the dead can return and assume any form at pleasure (which Herodotus in ii. 123 seems to interpret erroneously of the soul's migration), or the seven women in Goethe's poem, who appear by night as seven were-wolves. Superstitious ideas like these have existed amongst all peoples and at all times, but do not imply belief in transmigration, nor have they given rise to such teaching, least of all in India. Indeed, they have exercised scarcely any influence upon it; since, as we shall show, the theory of transmigration rests on the conviction of due recompense awarded to good and evil works, and this was at first conceived as future. Only later, for reasons which the texts disclose to us, was it transferred from an imaginary future into the present life. If therefore this recompense involves at times existence as an animal or plant, this is merely an incidental consequence on

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which no stress is laid from first to last; though it is true that this circumstance appeared to the opponents of the doctrine from the very beginning to be its especial characteristic, and has called forth their derision since the times of Xenophanes.

Ancient Vedic Eschatology

In no Vedic text earlier than the Upanishads can the doctrine of the soul's transmigration be certainly traced, although the Upanishads themselves ascribe it even to the Ṛigveda. The artificial manner however in which this is done is in favour of the view that we have to do with a doctrine of recent origin, for which a confirmation was sought in the ancient sacred texts. Three passages have to be considered.

In Brih. 1. 4. 10 it is said of *Vâmadeva*, the poet of Rigveda IV., that he (by virtue of a *śâstra-dṛishṭi*, an inspired conception, as Bâdarâyana says, quoting this instance) recognised himself as Brahman; and as a proof of his knowledge of Brahman alleged his acquaintance with his former births as Manu and Surya:—"Knowing this, Vamadeva the rishi began:-

I was once Manu, I was once the sun."

More clearly in Ait. 2. 4 the authority of Vamadeva is invoked in order to prove that a third birth after death follows on the first birth (as a child), and the second birth (by spiritual education):-"After he has completed what he has to do, and has become old, he departs hence; departing hence, he is once more born; this is his third birth. Therefore says the rishi:-

> While yet tarrying in my mother's womb,
> I have learnt all the births of these gods;
> Had a hundred iron fortresses held me back,
> Yet like a hawk of swift flight I had escaped away.

So Vâmadeva spake though he still lay thus in his mother's womb." The quotation from the hymn of Vâmadeva admits of interpretation here only if we understand by the hawk the soul, and by the iron fortresses the bodies through which it wanders.

That neither quotation of Vâmadeva has anything to do with the doctrine of the soul's transmigration, needs no elaborate proof: In the first Indra glorifies his magical power, which enables him to assume all manner of forms. In the second is depicted the cunning hawk of Indra already in his mother's womb, as he leaves his fortified dwelling-place, in order to fetch the soma from heaven; or perhaps the wise soma itself relates how it, borne away by the hawk from its iron strongholds, "as a hawk" (*i.e.* carried by it) comes down to earth.

At first sight the doctrine in question appears to be more closely related to a third quotation. In the great transmigration text it is said in a reference to the way of the gods:—"And thou hast indeed failed to comprehend the word of the seer, who speaks thus:-

> Two ways, I heard, there are for men,
> The way of the fathers and the way of the gods;
> On the latter everything meets
> That moves between father and mother."

This translation is correct in the sense of the Upanishad, but not in the sense of the original, which is found in Rigv. X. 83. 15 (overlooked by all former translators) in a hymn celebrating Agni in his twofold character as sun by day and fire by night. In view of this connection, it can hardly be doubtful that by the two ways that unite all that moves between earth and heaven day and night are to be understood, and thus the passage is to be rendered:—"I

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have heard from my forefathers that there are two ways alike for gods and men." They are all subject to the laws of day and night.

The hymns of the Ṛigveda therefore know nothing yet if a migration of the soul, but teach for the good a continued existence with the gods under the control of Yama, in he evil a journey only dimly indicated into the abyss. The standpoint of the Atharva hymns and of the Brahmanas is the same; only that the conception of a recompense for works is carried out in detail. This recompense however lies always solely in the future, and in the Upanishads for the first time is transferred into the present. A brief glance at the ancient Vedic eschatology will confirm this.

Immortal life with the gods is represented in many hymns of the Rigveda, especially the older, as a peculiar gift of the grace of the gods, to confer which Agni, the Maruts, Mitra-Varuna, Soma, and other gods are entreated, and which is offered in particular to the generous worshipper. Later on it is Yama, the firs man, who has found the way for many descendants to that glorious height, and who there sits enthroned as the gatherer together of men. In order to attain to him the soul must successfully pass by the two spotted blue-eyed broad-nosed dogs of Yama, which apparently guard the entrance to the heavenly world and do not submit everyone. Here is probably to be found the first race of a judgement of the dead, as it is put into practice by Yama in the late Indian eschatology. Elsewhere these dogs is assigned the office of wandering up and down amongst men, and dragging off those appointed to be. According to X. 165. 4 the dove (*kapota*) is Yama's messenger of death. Mention is made also of the fetters of the catch-net (*paḍbiśam*) of Yama, so that for the singers of the Ṛigveda he already represents also the terrors of death. Usually however in these older times Yama is conceived as the ruler in the kingdom of the blessed, as he sits enthroned afar, in the midst of heaven, in the bosom of the ruddy morning, in the highest heaven, in eternal light. There he sits, drinking with the gods, under a tree with fair foliage, there the dead gather around him, in order to see Yama, or Varuna; they leave imperfection behind them, and return to their true home, to the pasturage of which no one will again rob them, where the weak is no longer subject to the strong, where in immortal life in association with Yama they "delight themselves at the banquet" with the gods. Stress has frequently been laid on the sensuous character which is thus borne by the ancient Vedic pictures of the future life. But on this point it may be remarked that a conception of the joy of heaven on the analogy of that of earth is natural to man and inevitable (so far as he shrinks from an absolute denial of its existence); that even Jesus represents the kingdom of heaven as a festal gathering, where they sit down to table, and drink wine; and that even a Dante or a Milton could not choose but borrow all the colours for their pictures from this world of earth. In other respects great differences are shown in the ancient Vedic descriptions of the other world, varying indeed according to the individual character of the poet, -from the fancy of the poet of Atharvav 4. 34, that runs riot in a vulgar sensuality (who indeed already sufficiently reveals his disposition by the manner in which he praises his rice-pap and the gift of it to the Brahmans; the whole might almost be regarded as a parody), to the more spiritual perception of the beautiful verses, Rigv. IX. 113. 7-11, of which we give a rendering with the omission of the refrain:-

7. The kingdom of inexhaustible light,

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Whence is derived the radiance of the sun,
To this kingdom transport me,
Eternal, undying.

8. There, where Yama sits enthroned as king,
Among the holiest of the heavenly world,
Where ever living water streams,
There suffer me to dwell immortal.

9. Where we may wander undisturbed at will,
Where the third loftiest heaven spreads its vault,
Where are realms filled with light,
There suffer me to dwell immortal.

10. Where is longing and the consummation of longing,
Where the other side of the sun is seen,
Where is refreshment and satiety,
There suffer me to dwell immortal.

11. Where bliss resides and felicity,
Where joy beyond joy dwells,
Where the craving of desire is stilled,
There suffer me to dwell immortal.

There also "the fathers" dwell in company with the gods, and like them are invoked to draw near and partake of the sacrifice. To the fathers as well as to the gods are ascribed the wonders of creation, the adornment of the sky with stars, the bringing forth of the sun, etc. They therefore stand generally on an equality with the gods, and though occasionally there is found as early as the Ṛigveda an indication of a different abode of the fathers, no distinction of different degrees of blessedness, such as a later text assumes for the fathers, the unbegotten gods and the gods of creation, is as yet recognised.

Of the fate of the wicked obscure indications only are contained in the Rigveda. They are "predestined for that abyssmal place," are hurled by Indra and Soma into the pit, or into bottomless darkness, into the grave, or into the outer darkness. Perhaps also the expression should be quoted "the blind darkness" (*andham tamas*) frequently employed by the Upanishads, into which already, according to Rigv. X. 89. 15, 103. 12, the demons are to be plunged. They however do not understand by the "joyless regions veiled in blind darkness" into which the ignorant pass after death an imaginary hell, but this world in which we live.

The eschatological views of the Ṛigveda meet us further developed in the hymns of the Atharvaveda and in the Brâhmanas. More exact accounts are given of the fate of the good and the wicked. Verses such as Atharvav. 5. 19. 3, 13 remind us already of the later descriptions of hell:-

Those who spit at Brâhmans,
Or cast on them the mucus of the nose,
They sit there in pools of blood,
Chewing their hair for food.

The tears that rolled down from his eyes,
Bewailing himself, tormented,
Which the gods quaff as their drink,
Such are appointed for thee, torturer of Brâhmans.

In greater detail the Brâhmanas describe "the world of the pious" (*sukṛitâm loka*). These rise again in the other world, their body complete with all its limbs and joints (*sarvatanu, sarvânga, sarvaparus*). This new body is stronger, and in the other world in proportion to the faithfulness with which they have observed the rites of sacrifice, many of the pious need to take

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food once only in fourteen days, in four, six or twelve months, or a hundred years, or finally they are able altogether to dispense with it. Thus they live in perpetual intercourse, in fellowship with the worlds and with living begins (*sâyujyam, salokatâ, sarūpatâ*), with the gods, with Aditya, with Agni, Varuna and Indra, or even with the impersonal Brahman. In Satap. Br. 10. 5. 4. 15 indeed it is said already of the wise:— "He himself is free from desires, has gained all that he desires, no longer does desire (entice) him to anything. Concerning this is the verse:-

> By knowledge they climb upwards,
> Thither, where desire is quenched,
> No sacrificial gift reaches thither,
> Nor penance of the ignorant.

For that world cannot be won by sacrificial gifts nor by asceticism by the man who does not know this; for only to him who knows this does that state belong." Here already in place of works and asceticism knowledge makes its appearance, and in harmony with this emancipation instead of the glory of heaven. Transmigration therefore is not presupposed, for there is no mention of transmigration earlier than the Upanishads. Probably however the germs of it are latent already in the Brahmanas, as we propose now to show.

ETHICS OF THE UPANIṢADS

The problem of the Upaniṣads is not primarily that of human conduct; it is the widest and most fundamental ethical problem — that of the nature and meaning of reality. The ethical problem in a certain sense arises only incidentally, but it does arise, and nowhere in Hindu literature, with the possible exception of the *Bhagavadgītā*, have we more important data for its study. Further, the philosophical speculation of the Upaniṣads has an essentially religious bearing. It was not from sheer delight in intellectual exercise that these thinkers undertook to explore the hidden depths of reality. The Indian mind has no doubt at all times delighted in speculation for its own sake, but the great impulse to it came from practical needs, chiefly perhaps from a sense of the finitude and unsatisfyingness of the phenomenal world and of the failure of a ritual religion to satisfy the demands of the intellect and the heart. Just as in his thinking about the nature of reality Spinoza was actuated by the desire to discover something which would give him 'a joy continuous and supreme to eternity', so the writers of the Upaniṣads were actuated by the desire to find a means of deliverance from the evils of life. With them it was not as with Spinoza and many other thinkers an ethical quest, but it was practical one. There was the same desire for release from the meshes of the lower and for escape to the highest; and the quest had the same religious character. Nor does this fact in any way invalidate the inquiry. The tendency in some modern text-books of ethics is to regard ethical experience as something that can be studied by itself without reference to the wider implications of human existence. Some psychological analysis is deemed sufficient as a basis for the whole ethical structure, and the relation of ethics to religion on the one hand and to metaphysics on the other hand is dealt with summarily in concluding chapters, as if the problems of the reality and nature of the human soul, its immortality, and its relation to God were not in the highest degree determinative of the lines which human conduct should follow. Whatever else one may have to say of the ethical thinking contained in the Upaniṣads, this at least must be admitted at the outset that it is conducted in full view of the

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wider implications of human existence.

Karma and Samsara

We may plunge boldly into the heart of our subject and begin with the statement that the conceptions of *karma* and *samsāra* are of fundamental importance for the ethical thought of the Upaniṣads. We found in early writings foreshadowings of the former conception, and in a less marked way of the latter. In the Upaniṣads they find a place among the conceptions by means of which it is sought to make experience intelligible. Upto the time when the Brāhmaṇas were written it was believed that life continued after the death of the body, not in this world but in worlds that may be designated heaven and hell. Such a belief involved belief in the existence of a soul separable from the body. Only in a vague and tentative way was the suggestion made separable from the body. Only in a vague and tentative way was the suggestion made that the soul might become re-incarnate in this world, though the idea had emerged of successive births and deaths in another world. We do not know through what process the belief was developed that the souls of men and animals and even plants might become embodied in any of the infinite variety of forms that life takes on earth, but in the Upaniṣads, though not definitely in all of them, such teaching is laid down, not tentatively or controversially but dogmatically. This belief did not drive out the earlier belief in the possibility of rebirth in another world, which persisted alongside of it. Further, it is laid down in the Upaniṣads that each successive birth is determined by works done in previous lives.

According to his deeds and according to his knowledge he is born again here as a worm, or as an insect, or as a fish, or as a bird, or as a lion, or as a boar, or as a serpent, or as a tiger, or as a man, or as something else in different places.

Those whose conduct has been good, will quickly attain some good birth, the birth of a Brahman, or a Kshatriya, or a Vaiśya. But those whose conduct has been evil will quickly attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog, or a hog, or a *chandāla*.

The doctrine of work and transmigration in their relation to each other has thus been set forth in its simplest form. The process is far more complex than these quotations taken apart from their context might lead us to imagine. The latter passage concludes a section in which we are told that the path of transmigration is entered upon by those who live in a village practising sacrifices, works of public utility, and alms.

They go to the smoke, from smoke to night, from night to the dark half of the moon, from the dark half of the moon to the six months when the sun goes to the south. But they do not reach the year.

From the months they go to the world of the fathers, from the world of the fathers to the ether, from the ether to the moon. That is Soma, the king. Here they are loved (eaten) by the Devas love (eat) them.

Having dwelt there till their (good) works are consumed, they return again that way as they came, to the ether, from the ether to the air. Then sacrificer, having become air, becomes smoke having become smoke, he becomes mist.

Having become mist, he becomes a cloud, having become a cloud, he rains down. Then he is born as rice and corn, herbs and trees, sesamum and bean. From thence the escape is beset with most difficulties. For whoever the persons may be that eat the food, and beget offspring, he henceforth becomes like unto them.

Then follows the passage last-quoted. This, with the paralled passage, *Bṛihadāraṇyaka U.* vi, 2, is the most

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important statement of the doctrine of *karma* and *samsāra* is the Upaniṣads.

The interpretation of this passage is all its details is by no means easy. The 'path of the Devas'. The fathers figure in all the Vedic writings from the *Rig Veda* downwards. They were human beings, 'seers who made the paths by which the recent dead go to join them', dwelling now in the third heaven. They feast with the gods and along with them share in the sacrificial offerings of men. Worship and prayer are offered to them, it being in their power to bestow such blessings as the gods themselves bestow. They are believed to be endowed with immortality, and in a variety of ways functions belonging to the gods are attributed to them. In this we have nothing but a description in exaggerated terms of the glory of the blessed dead in heaven. In the time of the Brāhmaṇas a distinction came to be drawn between heaven and the place of the fathers, the door of the one being in the North-East and that of the other in the South-East. In the passage before us certain kinds of deeds are said to lead by way of the world of the fathers, and this way is contrasted with the path of the Devas, which leads to the conditioned Brahman, a path which is entered through knowledge and through the practice of faith and austerities. The truth is that here we have an older conception of retribution crossing the conception of retribution as meted out in a new life lived in this world. They are conceptions that are inconsistent with each other, and yet in a curious way they are here bound together.

It is not necessary to study the passage in all its details. We may ignore the purely mythological elements in it, only remarking that the *Pitriyana*, or way of the fathers, is involved in darkness, as contrasted with the *Devayana*, or path of the gods, with which the preceding section deals, which is in light. The point of greatest interest for us lies in the fact that in the account of the way of the fathers a double conception of retribution seems to be involved. It is said that certain persons dwell with the Devas till their works are consumed. At the same time it is the works that they have done that determine the character of their new life on earth. Max Muller, following later Vedantic interpreters of the Upaniṣads, says that 'besides the good sacrificial works, the fruits of which are consumed in the moon, there are other works which have to be enjoyed or expiated, as the case may be, in a new existence'. But it is difficult to find any satisfactory ground for this distinction among kinds of works in the context. It is more likely that we have here the combination of two entirely distinct conceptions of retribution. There is the conception of retribution as attained in another sphere of existence, crossed by the conception of retribution in another life on earth. There are further complications still, which for the present we may pass over, as they concern the student of religion rather than the student of ethics. Attention is drawn to this particular complication because it is interesting to see the doctrine of *karma* and transmigration in this, one of its earlier definite formulation, interwoven with older beliefs.

What is of importance for us here is not the process whereby transmigration takes place, but the fact that it is now definitely believed to take place - that it is believed, in the case of any given individual, that the actions that the performs in this life will determine the form of another birth on earth that he must inevitably undergo. It is impossible to quote largely from passages where the doctrine is expounded. The Self is likened to a caterpillar, which, when it has reached the end of a leaf, draws itself together

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towards another leaf. So, it is said, the Self, having thrown off this body and dispelled all ignorance, approaches another body and draws itself together towards it. The assumption is that there is an immortal part in the Self. The constitution of this immortal part is dealt with in one important passage:

> A person consists of desires. And as is his desire, so is his will; and as is his will, so is his deed; and whatever deed he does, that he will reap.
>
> And here there is this verse: "To whatever object a man's own mind is attached, to that he goes strenuously together with his deed; and having obtained the end of whatever deed he does here on earth, he returns again form that world to the world of action.

Whatever a man desires to that he becomes attached, towards that he goes. There is a saying that what one desires in youth one will have to satiety in old age. The thinkers whose speculations are recorded in the Upaniṣads have put this idea in far more sharp and definite form. For example: He who desires the world of the fathers, by his mere will the fathers come to receive him, and having obtained the world of the fathers he is happy, etc... Whatever object he is attached to, whatever object he desires, by his mere will it comes to him, and having obtained it he is happy.

Form all this it is clear that the roof of the self that manifests itself in the various forms that in individual being takes in successive births is desire. Also it will be observed that this self is not regarded as in any way involving the existence of a not-self. It is not in opposition to a stubborn material which it can shape or modify only within limits in accordance with its own purposes. As we shall see later the not-self has no independent being; indeed in a real sense it does not exist. In desiring, the self is shaping its own destiny absolutely. There is an interesting passage in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, where it is said that at death, speech, eye, mind, hearing, the body, the hairs of the body, the hairs of the head, the blood, and the seed — in short all that goes to constitute the self in its phenomenal aspect — are dispersed. What remains? The answer was given as a great secret to Yājñavalkya: Take my hand, my friend. We two alone shall know of this; let this question of ours not be discussed in public. Then these two went out and argued, and what they said was *karman*, what they praised was *karman*, viz. that a man becomes good by good work, and bad by bad work.

Nevertheless men are actually bound to the world by desire. At the root of this attachment is ignorance, the ignorance that involves belief in a plurality in the universe that does not exist. The distinctions that we imagine to exist are fictitious. One of the passages in which this is most clearly laid down is in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka*.

> For when there is as it were duality, when one sees the other, one smells the other, one hears the other, one salutes the other, one perceives the other, one knows the other; but when the Self only is all this, how should be smell another, etc.; How should he know him by whom he knows all this? How, O! beloved, should he know (himself) The Knower?

It is not merely in the realm of sense experience that this false duality is assumed. It is a distinction equally falsely made between the Self and God. This is the point of the discourses of Uddālaka Āruṇi with Śvetaketu, in which through many similes he teaches him the identity of the Self with ultimate Reality — "Thou, O Śvetaketu, art it'. If one but knows this,

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if he is freed from the ignorance that sees diversity where there is nothing but unity, if one understands that in all the variety of existence revealed to us through the senses and through the intelligence there is given nothing distinct from the Self, then ignorance has given place to knowledge, that knowledge which is itself deliverance.

It may seem at first sight that this is to make very high claims for knowledge. Assuming the truth of the doctrine that all diversity is illusory and that Reality is one and undifferentiated, we might seem to be justified in raising the question whether merely knowing this doctrine could be sufficient to deliver one from the bondage of the illusory world. If the evil in which our life is involved is desire or attachment, is it sufficient in order that the attachment may be broken, that one's eyes should merely be opened to the illusoriness of the objects to which the self has been attached? To put it in another way, can ignorance be the root, or at any rate the only root of attachment, so that if it be severed the plant will die? We are here face to face with a problem that has affinities with that raised by Socrates regarding the identity of virtue and knowledge, for both alike held that at the root of what was essentially evil was ignorance. It may be that the difficulties that beset the problem are to a large extent due to misunderstanding. The experience described in Ovid's words:

Video meliora proboque,
deteriora sequor,

is one that is familiar to every one. Is it possible in the face of such an experience to assert that the lapse was simple due to morance ? It might be replied that, when one sins against the light, there is involved at least momentary self-deception - a momentary forgetting of the truth accepted by our highest self. The fault may be not that knowledge was wanting, but that the knowledge was not so wrought into the web of one's being that it might not on occasion be denied. There is a sense in which moral error, when it is deliberate, involves intellectual error. A lower self rises up and asserts itself, brushing aside the principles by which the higher self would direct its conduct; it rules them out of court. The rational self is borne down for the time being by a violent, unintelligent, lower self. will be necessary to return to this subject later, but it may be stated now that in the Upaniṣads deliverance is the outcome not simply of belief or knowledge of a purely academic kind, but of a knowledge, which is an attitude or activity of the whole self. It is generally taught, further, that there are steps necessary for the attainment of much knowledge; it is not to be mastered by any chance person who may hear it explained.

All this has been said with a view to making clear the rationale of a doctrine which at first seems so strange at that that deliverance is the outcome of knowledge. Yet we must admit at the same time that there are many passage in the Upaniṣads where the claims made on behalf of knowledge are of a much more extravagant kind, as when it is taught that knowledge of particular doctrines, for example the doctrine of the five fires, leads to emancipation. also it should be pointed out that the term knowledge is in a sense a misleading one when applied to the process through which emancipation is medicated. As we ordinarily understand knowledge, there is involved in it a knowing subject and a known object. But the knowledge which is deliverance is a knowledge in which this duality is transcended. It is an experience which can be explained only be imperfect analogies. The most helpful of these a dreamless sleep, a state in which the distinction of

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subject and object disappears.

> When a man, being asleep, reposing, and at perfect rest, sees no dreams, that is the Self, this is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman.

The doctrine of emancipation has been stated here in its simplest and barest form; but throughout the Upaniṣads there are complications and contradictions in the accounts of the process through which emancipation is attained, as there are in the accounts of the fate of the unemancipated. We may turn again to the passage quoted above from the *Chhāndogya Upanishad*, v. 10, which has been regarded as the great text for the Upaniṣad doctrine of *karma* and transmigration. The passage describing the way of the fathers has been quoted. We now quote the passage dealing with the way of the Devas which precedes it:

> Those who know this (even if they still,l be grhasthas), and those who in the forest follow faith and austerities (the vānaprasthas, and of the parivrajakas those who do not yet know the highest Brahman) go to light, from light to day, from day to the light half of the moon, from the light half of the moon to the six months when the sun goes to the north, from the six months when the sun goes to the north to the year, from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon, from the moon to the lightning. There is a person not human— He leads them to Brahman.

The Brahman to whom he is led is the conditioned Brahman, and the deliverance, found in him is not represented in the definite form which the doctrine later took. But it may be noted that the emancipation here spoken of the the outcome of a process which goes on after death. Elsewhere we meet the same idea in other forms. It may be said that emancipation is regarded a attained broadly in two ways, firstly immediately through an act of intellectual intuition, and secondly through a process dependent chiefly on intellectual intuition, but working itself out gradually.

In this brief account of the doctrines of *karma* and *samsara* in their relation to the way of deliverance nothing more has been attempted than a summary of the ideas most generally accepted. But there are many statements relating not only to details but even to fundamentals which would demand attention in any fuller treatment. These we must for the present ignore, contenting ourselves with indicating the general tendency of the thought of the Upaniṣads. Mention should, however, be made of a tendency which becomes more definite in some of the later Upaniṣads. The earlier Upaniṣads represent in the main a strict pantheistic monism; Brahman is all, the all else is illusion, and deliverance is attained in the recognition of the identity of the self with Brahman. In some of the later Upaniṣads, on the other hand, for example the *Kaṭha*, the *Praśna*, and others, there are traces, though sometimes obscure, of the dualistic conception of the Universe which becomes definite in the Samkhya Philosophy. Nevertheless *karma* and *samsāra* remain practically untouched, and deliverance is still attained through knowledge, though not knowledge of the sole reality of Brahma.

Self-deception

The most important question that faces us at this stage of our inquiry is as to the ethical character of the ideal that is held up to man. Is this stage of deliverance, a state that has ethical worth? It will be impossible to consider this question fully until we have discussed the steps through which one arrives at the stage at which deliverance becomes possible, but certain

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points have already become clear to us. It is obvious that in a certain sense ethical categories are inapplicable. He who has attained *moksha* is beyond good and evil. Good and evil exist only for him how is in the stage of *avidya*; he who has been delivered form ignorance is delivered from that immersion in the finite which that ignorance involves.

> As water does not cling of a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who knows it. 'He therefore that knows it, after having become quiet, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected, sees all as Self. Evil does not overcome him, he overcomes all evil. Evil does not burn him, he burns all evil. Free from evil, free from spots, free from doubts, he becomes a (true) Brāhmaṇa; this is the Brahma-world, O King, thus spoke Yājñavalkya.'

Clearly there is room here for the greatest self-deception, and thee are traces of such self-deception in various parts of the Upaniṣads. If he who has attained deliverance be beyond good and evil, then good and evil may be regarded as indifferent to him, and if they be indifferent they may be practised without blame. This is the line of argument that seems to have sometimes been taken. It is similar to that sometimes taken by Antinomians in the Christian Church. If a man be saved he is free from sin; he is lifted up into a relationship with God that removes him beyond the possibility of sinning. So acts, which performed by a unregenerate, would be sinful, may be performed by him without incurring guild. The reply to both is the same — that he who is really delivered will have 'died to sin' in a different sense from that in which the Antinomian understands the situation. He will no longer follow after evil, for evil actions will have ceased to have any attraction for him.

Yet this Antinomian tendency is found in the Upaniṣads, sometimes in extreme form. It comes out in passages like this: He who knows me thus, by no deed of his is his harmed, not by the murder of his mother, not by the murder of his father, not by theft, not by the killing of a Brahman. If he going to commit a sin, the bloom not depart from his face.

While such statements as these are in one aspect simply exaggerations of the idea that for him who has found deliverance all morality is transcended, we doubtless see in them also a reflection of the eschatological conceptions of older writings in which heaven is conceived very sensually. Even in its highest flights of thought, the Indian mind at this time found it difficult to shake off those sensual elements that had come to find a place in its conception of the highest good. On the other hand, highest good of the Upaniṣads is at its best a state of being in which all ethic distinctions are transcended.

Common sense came in and prevented the ordinary, everyday life of ordinary men for thus being denuded of all ethical significance. But it is interesting to note that there is expressed in theory, a separation between the ideal as attained, and everyday life which is comparable to that drawn in the Upaniṣads. Practically, of course, it does not work out. The Stoic has to find a place for the lower goods which he would fain ignore as unworthy of the thought of the sage, and he writers of the Upaniṣads to whom the sole reality is Brahman are compelled nevertheless to recognise the significance of the life lived by men who have not attained deliverance, and to lay down rules for its conduct. this is all the more necessary on account of the fact that it is recognised generally, though by no means in all the Upaniṣads, that deliverance is attainable only as the outcome of a process. It may not be

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attained by any one at any stage of life. No doubt all lower manifestations of human life are in the end valueless. Study, sacrifice morality, austerity, knowledge itself. — all these ultimately count for nothing, but there is a sense in which they constitute a ladder on which one climbs to the height at which they constitute a ladder on which one climbs to the height at which the highest good becomes attainable. So it is of importance that we should study the discipline that is thus demanded of him who would find deliverance.

This discipline may be said to be summed up in the doctrine of the four *asramas*. This doctrine as we find it in the Upaniṣads is not fully formed as we have found it to have been by the time when *dharma* was systematized, but the elements that constitute the life lived in the *asramas* are all recognised. The course of life laid down for the Brahman by this doctrine when fully developed was—(1) the life of a *Brahmachārī* spent in Vedic study in the house of his *Guru*, (2) that of a *Gṛihastha* or householder, living with his wife and begetting children, and performing a great variety of worldly duties, (3) that of the *Vānaprastha*, living in the forest and practising austerities, and (4) that of the *Sannyāsī* or *Parivrājaka*, who, casting away everything, wanders about a homeless beggar. It is not until we come to the late Upaniṣads that we find these four *āśramas* recognised as definite stages in the life of the Brahman who would find deliverance, but in the great Upaniṣads the essential features that characterize life in these different *āśramas* are recognised. In the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka U.*, for example, the elements that enter into the life lived in the *āśramas* are mentioned though they are not represented as belonging to distinct stages:

Brāhmaṇas seek to know him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts, by penance, by fasting, and he who knows him becomes a Muni.

In the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* it would seem that the four stages are recognised, though not according to their order in time or with that definiteness that enables us to recognise them as identical with the *āśramas*.

There are three branches of the low. Sacrifice, study, and charity are the first.

Austerity i the second, and to dwell as a *Brahmachārī* in the house of a tutor, always mortifying the body in the house of a tutor, is the third. All these obtain the worlds of the blessed; but the *Brahma-saṁstha* alone (he who is firmly grounded in Brahman) obtains immortality.

Here we seem to have three of the *asramas*, or rather modes of life which are the basis of the *āśramas*, fairly clearly indicated, a fourth mode being added which perhaps corresponds to the *āśrama* of the *Sannyāsi*.

There is another passage in the same Upanishad in which there is evidence that the different *āśramas* were beginning to be recognised. There it is stated that the way to the attainment of the world of Brahman is by learning the Veda from a family of teachers in the leisure left from the duties to be performed for the Guru, then settling in his own house, keeping up the memory of what he has learnt, and begetting virtuous sons, and (probably as third stage) concentrating all this senses on the Self, never giving pain to any creature except at the *tīrthas*. In this case, the third and fourth stages would be merged in one. In the *Chhāndogya* the householder who practises sacrifices and good works is contrasted with the householder who knows the doctrine of the five fires, and the forest-dweller who follows faith and austerities, the former going by the way of the Fathers and the latter by the way of

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the Devas. Again in the *Bṛihadāraṇayaka* the oblations and sacrifices of the householder and the penance of the anchorite are works that will have an end. But he who knows the Akshara, he is a Brahman. A careful study of the relevant passages will probably lead one to adopt Deussen's conclusion that in the earlier Upaniṣads only three stages are recognised — those of the student, the householder, and the anchorite — those who know the *Ātman* being 'exalted above the *āśramas*'. The first Upanishad in which the four stages are mentioned in their proper order is the late *Jābāla*.

It would seem that the tendency is to regard these stages in the life of the individual as important as a preparation for the attainment of emancipation. Certainly they are not universally regarded as essential. This is indicated by the following passage:

> Knowing this the people of old did not wish for offspring. What shall we do with offspring, they said, we who have this Self and this world (of Brahman)?

Again it is indicated that saving knowledge may be possessed even by the householder, and Nachiketas obtained Brahman while still a boy. Again, Max Müller was of opinion that the doctrine of the *Iśā Upaniṣad* was that works (the stages of student and householder) were necessary as a preparatory discipline before one could become a *sannyasi* as against the doctrine held by many that they were unnecessary.

Let us look at these stages in turn. The first is that of Vedic study, which was the chief business of the *brahmachāri*. The boy was sent to the house of a teacher, probably as a rule at the age of twelve. He approached him bearing fuel as a symbol of his willingness to serve him. The teacher received him and laid upon him various duties. The *brahmachāri* might be sent out to beg, he tended the teacher's fires, and one case is mentioned here he was sent by the Guru to tend his cows. It would seem that all this discipline was intended by the Guru to test the worthiness of the pupil to receive instruction. The nature of the instruction given seems to have varied greatly. Śvetaketu, we are told, studied 'all he Vedas' during his twelve years' apprenticeship, and we gather that 'all' means *Ṛik*, *Yajus* and *Sāman*. It would seem that the committing to memory of the Vedas and hearing the explanations of them given by the Guru were the essential parts of the pupil's intellectual training. These explanations would very with the Guru's own capacity and point of view, and with the estimate he formed of the capacity and worth of his pupil. In some cases, the instruction must have been of a very superficial order, puffing up instead of edifying the pupil. Those who showed special promise would be taken into the deeper questions that the Guru has studied. Satyakāma allowed his other pupils to depart when they has learnt the sacred books, but Upakośala was detained for further instruction when he should be fit for it. It is characteristic of the Indian Guru that he imparts the highest instruction very reluctantly and as a profound secret, only to those whom he considers fit to receive it.

In addition to the Vedic study which he had to undertake, the student was given instruction and had to undergo discipline the purpose of which was to fit him ethically for the duties of life. The mortification of the body was part of this discipline. Further, there were the duties that had to be performed in the service of the Guru which have been already referred to. It was in the leisure left from these duties that the Vedas were to be studied. The period of studentship was one of hard work, in subjection to the Guru, to whom

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he owed the highest honour. The sum of the ethical counsel to his pupil is probably contained in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, in the passage in which the Guru in dismissing his pupil declares to him the true purport of the Veda. The advice is given with a view to the pupil's entrance upon the responsibilities of a householder, but one or two of the points are of interest as bearing upon the relation. of the pupil to the Guru. In his conduct he should follow the example of the Guru and in case of doubt regarding sacred acts and regarding conduct he should conduct himself as Brāhmans who possess good judgement conduct themselves in the same matter.

The period of studentship was not such a definite one as this brief sketch might seem to indicate. A student might remain in the house of the Guru for an indefinite period, and we read of men at all periods of life coming to teachers with fuel in their hands seeking instruction. Even the god Indra is said to have come thus as a pupil to Prajāpati. The teacher again was not in all cases a Brahman belonging to a family of teachers. So important is the part played by kings and Kshatriyas generally in the exposition of the ideas which are expressed in the Upaniṣads, that some have maintained that the Upaniṣads represented at first a movement among the Kshatriyas against the ritualistic lines on which the thought of the Brahmans moved. Again, a father might play the part of Guru to his son, as did the father of Śvetaketu when the latter returned from his course of study with his mind swollen with empty knowledge. The important point to observe is that while there was great variety in the form that studentship took, the need of a teacher seems to have been universally recognised. This comes out in the following quotation: For I have heard from men like you, Sir, that only knowledge which is learnt from a teacher leads to real good.

So, regarding the knowledge of the *Ātman* it is said:

Unless it be taught by another, there is no way to it.

Having finished his studentship, the young man normally entered upon the second stage of life, that of the *gṛhastha*, or householder. 'Do not cut off the line of children', is one of the injunctions given by the Guru to the departing *brahmachārī*. This was the most important motive to the entrance upon the second stage — the continuance of one's line. In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* it is said that man owes debts— to the gods, sacrifies, to the seers, study of the Vedas, to the Manes, offspring, and to man, hospitality; and there persists to the present day belief in the supreme importance of having a son to survive one and perform those ceremonies that are due to the Manes. In the *Bṛihadaraṇyaka Upanishad* the world of men is distinguished from that of the Fathers and that of the Devas, and it is said that 'this world can be gained by a son only, not by any other work.' When a father dies, 'if there is anything done amiss by the father, of all that the son delivers him, and therefore he is called *Putra*, son. By help of his son the father stands firm in this world (the world of men.)

The householder must also continue his Vedic studies, and he must perform sacrifices. The latter duty will require somewhat closer attention. It is not easy at all points to determine what was the attitude of the composers of the Upaniṣads to sacrifice. In places it seems to be disparaged, but probably in general he feeling was that sacrificial ideas and practices were so firmly rooted in Indian thought and life that it was hopeless to attempt to eradicate them. We have always to remember in studying the Upaniṣads that, while they teach as the highest

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doctrine the way of complete and final emancipation, they nevertheless recognise lower stages of attainment and attach worth to the means by which these are reached. It is characteristic of the Hindu mind all down, though history that it has been willing to compromise, and, indeed, in its recognition of the position of the 'weaker brother' it has sometimes tended to do less than justice to the stronger brother. The value of the sacrifice is limited, but still it has its value. They are fools who consider sacrifice and good works as the best, but through them the lower world of the fathers is attained, and so far they are good. So sacrifice is frequently mentioned as one of the essential duties of the householder without any qualification, the implication being that the sacrifices as they were laid down in the Brahmanas were approved. But, on the other hand, we sometimes find the sacrifices treated allegorically. The worshipper no longer, as in the Brahmanas, climbs up to heaven as on a ladder on the steps of the ritual, but the various aspects of the ritual are allegorized, sometimes ethically. There is a very striking passage in the *Chhāndogya Upanishad* in which the sacrifice is thus allegorised. The *dīkshā* or initiatory rite is here stated to consist in fasting and abstention from pleasure, and the gifts to the priests in penance, liberality, righteousness, kindness, and truthfulness. Again we have such a passage as this:

Understanding performs the sacrifice, it performs all sacred acts.

So sacrifice was recognised, probably as a concession to the less enlightened. The more enlightened, if they recognised it at all, would give to it such an allegorical interpretation.

The householder must practise, along with sacrifice, certain more strictly ethical virtues. The *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad* (V, 10, 3) speaks generally of works of public utility and alms, but elsewhere there are more detailed lists of ethical virtues and vices.

> A man who steals gold, who drinks spirits, who dishonours his Guru's bed, who kills a Brāhman, these four fall, and as a fifth he who associates with them.

A king boasts that in his kingdom there is no thief, no miser, no drunkard, no man without an alter in his house, no ignorant person, no adulterer, much less an adulteress. The duty of hospitality is inculcated:

> Let him never turn away (a stranger) form his house, that is the rule.

Among other ethical qualities mentioned are right-dealing, self-restraint and tranquility, while pride is condemned. In the later *Maitrāyaṇa Upaniṣad* there are given lists of evil that are the results of the qualities of 'tamas' (darkness), and '*rajas*' (passion). The results of the former are: bewilderment, fear, grief, sleep, sloth, carelessness, decay, sorrow, hunger, thirst, niggardliness, wrath, infidelity, ignorance, envy, cruelty, folly, shamelessness, meanness, pride, changeability. And the results of the latter are: inward thirst, fondness, passion, covetousness, unkindness, love, hatred, deceit, jealousy, vain restlessness, fickleness, unstableness, emulation, greed, patronising of friends, family pride, aversion to disagreeable objects, devotion to agreeable objects, whispering, prodigality. These qualities are connected with philosophical conceptions foreign to the earlier Upaniṣads, but we may take it that the evils named were regarded as such by the composers of the Upaniṣads generally.

When a man had fulfilled his duties as a householder he might enter upon the third stage of life — that of the *vānaprastha* or anchorite. Yājñavalkya, for

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example, is said to have abandoned the life of a householder and the have gone into the forest. This was not yet by any means a well-defined state of life. The form that it should take was not laid down with any definiteness. It was fairly generally, though by no means universally, recognised that *tapas*, austerity, was of value as a means towards the attainment of the knowledge of the Ātman. It would seem that throughout the Upaniṣads *tapas*, which might be practised at any stage, takes the place of what later came to be the third *āśrama*. The householder and the student are mentioned as alike practising *tapas*. Again, in so far as a distinct stage of life in which the individual withdraws to the forest seems to be recognised, the precise function of it as a stage does not appear with perfect clearness. It is not clearly marked off from what came to be recognised as the fourth *āsrama*. The experience referred to by Yājñavalkya in the following passage has as close affinities with the fourth as with the third *āśrama*:

> When Brāhmanas know that Self and have risen above the desire for sons, wealth, and worlds, they wander about as mendicants.

Here there seems to be no distinct intermediate stage between that of householder and that of *sannyāsi*. On the other hand, there cases recorded that correspond more closely to the idea of the anchorite, who went to the forest and practised austerities as a preparation for the attainment of the knowledge of the Self. Wishing for the world of Brahman, it is said, mendicants leave their homes. King Brihadratha performed the highest penance with uplifted arms in the forest, and yet did not know the Self. It is generally taught that the practice of austerities in itself leads only to the world of the fathers, and there seems to have been difference of opinion, at any rate in the later Upaniṣads, as to whether *tapas* had any value as a means to the knowledge of the Self. But to this subject of *tapas* we shall return later.

In the later Upaniṣads the life of the *sannyāsī* is dealt with in great detail, but in the classical Upaniṣads, as has been said, this stage is not clearly separated from the third. It became recognised in later times as a form of life in which the individual cast off all ties of family and caste and became a homeless wanderer, and it was entered upon as the last stage in the process leading to the knowledge of the Self. In the older Upaniṣads this was the state rather of him who had attained this knowledge — the *Brahmasaṁstha*, or *Muni*.

Metaphysical Speculation

The Upaniṣads are not a text-book of ethics. It has become clear to us that in their ethical as well as in their metaphysical speculations they present us with a wealth of ideas often far from consistent with each other. In our consideration of these ideas it is well that we should bear in mind the fact that in morality practice is older than theory. Morality was not invented by moral philosophers, and opinion is greatly divided as to the extent to which it has been influenced by them. Moral philosophers have always had before them in their speculations, as a fact that cannot be ignored, the moral life lived about them. This actual moral life and the vaguely understood ideals that underlie it they may criticise at many points; they may even, as Plato did in the *Republic*, propose to replace alteration of moral values as Nietzsche has proposed, but in any case the new will inevitably bear marks of the influence of the old. The philosopher of India were familiar with a system of morality, if system it can be

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called, of very variegated texture, and if they failed to supply in its place a system in any way perfect, it was more their misfortune than their blame. They did not set out primarily to justify or reform the morality of their time; their purpose was of a different kind; and if the stubborn material of which morality is built did not yield to them as we may think it ought to have done, and if they were constrained to fit it into their greater structure as it could be fitted in, we must remember the limitations under which they wrought.

These thinkers were, most of them, possessed of one dominating conception that of the identity of the Self and Brahman. The beginner in the study of the Upaniṣads may wonder why this did not dominate everything, but the fact remains that there were other ideas, often conflicting no doubt, yet stubborn, that demanded a place alongside this idea. As metaphysicians these thinkers might be convincted of the sole reality of the Atman, and in the light of this grand conception all else might be regarded as illusion — study, sacrifice, and penance, as well as the ordinary duties of everyday morality. In the highest flights of their thought and imagination they might realise and fearlessly declare this. Yet the practical life lived about them, and the intellectual conception by which it was justified, continually obstruded themselves upon them; and if they often admitted these conceptions to a place to which logic did not entitle them, we have to remember that even the philosophers of Upaniṣads were human. It is well, then, that we should consider in the first place the influence of the dominating conception of the Upaniṣads upon ethical thought, and then the ways in which other conceptions crossed it.

It has already been indicated that while emancipation is conceived to be attained through knowledge, and while this knowledge is apt to be regarded after the manner of a purely intellectual intuition, it is probably more accurate to interpret it as an activity, or perhaps better a passivity, of the whole being. Any one might apprehend intellectually the idea that the Self is Brahman, but such a purely intellectual apprehension would not involve emancipation. For this, belief of some kind would be necessary, and belief is not a barely intellectual act, but one that involves also feeling and volition. If this be so it is clear that to attain emancipation something more is necessary than merely hearing the dogma enunciated, 'Thou art that', more even than the understanding of the whole philosophy of which this statement is the highest expression. In particular it is essential that there should be some preliminary education of the will. And the education of the will would differ essentially from that which has been common in the West, at any rate in regard to the kind of direction which should be given to the will. The Christian believes in a Kingdom of Heaven, of which the kingdoms of this world are in their measure reflections, and the qualities that fit one for citizenship in the Kingdom of Heaven fit one in the measure for citizenship in an earthly kingdom. The morality of the West has been profoundly influenced by some such conception as this. In the light of the doctrine of the Ātman, on the other hand, social morality has no such eternal significance. The will has to be directed with a view to the attainment of a certain end, but the end is external to the means, and when it is attained the means have no longer any significance. This is a fundamental distinction between the point of view of Christianity and the Upaniṣads. The

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Christian believes that in ethical experience he is in touch with that which is essentially real, while the writers of the Upaniṣads believed that so far as morality was necessary at all, it was necessary only as a step on which one might climb to something higher, over which one might climb to reality, but which in itself belonged to the sphere of the Unreal. The attainment of Brahman was believed to be possible not for him whose will was directed in accordance with the highest social ideals, but by him whose will was turned away from all this.

The end is knowledge of the identity of the Ātman and Brahman, or realisation of this identity, mediated through belief, as it may perhaps be more accurately put. What ethical presuppositions or ethical preparation does such a belief involve? We may pass over some of the more elementary and fundamental duties which are frequently insisted on, such as truthfulness, abstention from murder, theft, and the like. Whether these duties are recognised in practice or not it is hard to conceive any system of morality that denies their importance. The more flagrant breaches of these duties are not only sins but crimes. But there are other points in the morality of the Upaniṣads that are more distinctive and instructive. As a positive hindrance to the attainment of the end there is sensuality. Human nature is prone to seek its good in those things that bring pleasure or minister to comfort, and it is a familiar psychological fact that immersion in the pleasures of sense renders understanding of and belief in the value of spiritual ideas difficult. In a very special manner do they operate as hindrances to the attainment of the end as it is conceived in the Upaniṣads. For whatever helps to strengthen belief in the existence of the individual self as an independent being, and in the reality of the phenomenal world stands in manifest contradiction to the great principle in which the end is expressed. Let us look at some of the passages in which this thought is set forth.

> The good and pleasant approach man; the wise goes round about them and distinguished them. Yea, the wise prefers the good to the pleasant, but the fool chooses the pleasant through great and avarice.
>
> ....
>
> Fools dwelling in darkness, wise in the own conceit, and puffed up with vain knowledge, go round and round, staggering to and fro, like blind men led by the blind.

The Hereafter never rises before the eyes of the careless child, deluded by the delusion of wealth. 'This is the world', he thinks, 'there is no other'; — thus he falls again and again under my (i.e. Death's) sway.

Another aspect of the case is put, when Sanatkumara pours scorn on worldly men who 'call cows and horses, elephants and gold, slaves, wives, fields, and houses greatness.' For, he says, 'there is no bliss in anything finite.

Not only are pleasure and the things that minister to pleasure hindrances to the attainment of end, but everything that breaks in on the caln. of the soul, entangling it with world, is likewise evil — 'hunger, thirst, sorrow and passion. Similarly pride is a hindrance to the highest knowledge.

> You are worthy of Brahman, O Gautama, because you are not led away be pride. Come hither, I shall make you know clearly.

All appetites and passions, by whatever name we designate the various expressions of the feeling side of our nature, all

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must be restrained. In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* there is a figure remarkable because of its close likeness in some points to Plato's figure in the *Phaedrus*:

> Know the Self to be sitting in the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the intellect (*buddhi*) the charioteer, and the mind the reins.
>
> The sense they call the horses, the objects of the senses their roads.
>
> ....
>
> He who has no understanding and whose mind (the reins) in never firmly held, his senses (horses) are unmanageable, like vicious horses of a charioteer.
>
> But he who has understanding and whose mind is always firmly held, his senses are under control, like good horses of a charioteer.
>
> This figure is used in connexion with philosophical terminology different from that used in the earlier Upaniṣads, but the main idea of the passage is characteristic of the classical Upaniṣads generally. Other passages of similar import are the following:
>
> He who has not first turned away from his wickedness, who is not tranquil and subdued, or whose mind is not at rest, he can never obtain the Self (even) by knowledge.
>
> and
>
> He therefore that knows it, after having become quiet, subdued, satisfied, patient, and collected, sees self in Self, all as Self.

So far the teaching of the Upaniṣads about morality is consistent with their conception of the end to be attained. There is no place for 'the world' in this philosophy, and the lower elements in human nature are not to be tamed in order that they may be harnessed to work that is conceived as properly belonging to them, but they are to be destroyed as evil. The teaching of the Upaniṣads regarding austerity does not seem at first sight to take us far from the same line of thought. For the subduing of the passions, ascetic practices or practices of an allied kind have been followed by many under the influence of the higher religions. But the history of *tapas* in India shows that the motive to it was not always the subduing of the passions. We have found that in the earlier history of Indian religion tapas was praised without reference to its ethical value. The practice of certain forms of self-mortification and the self-infliction of pain are practices common to primitive religions, and the motive has been the acquisition of powers, generally of a magical kind. It is to motives such as this rather than to ethical motives that the first appearance of the idea of *tapas* is to be attributed. It is unscientific to condemn any principle or practice merely on the ground of its history. But in the Upaniṣads, while *tapas* is, no doubt, practised as a means to the subduing of the passions, it still bears in many places, if not in most marks of its history. What we may call the ethical motive to *tapas* is apparent in the case of Yajnavalkya when he departed into the forest, and doubtless in many other instances the motive is at least partly ethical. But it would seem that much more commonly the old idea of *tapas*, as a means to the attainment of power, is dominant. We see this, for example, in the well-known passage in the *Chhāndogya Upaniṣad*, where it is related that Upakosala practised austerities until the sacrificial fires were moved to teach him.

The teaching of the Upaniṣads on tapas is, indeed, confusing. In places it is reduced to a mere figure. In one place the

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highest penance is said to consist in sickness, the funeral procession, and the funeral pyre, the idea evidently being that sufferings deliberately undertaken are of less value than the inevitably experiences of life and death. Again, in some places where the virtue of asceticism is recognised it is held that it leads only to a finite reward:

> Whosoever, O Gargi, without knowing that Akshara (the imperishable) offer oblations in this world, sacrifices and performs penance for a thousand years, his work will have an end.

Again, especially in the later of the classical Upaniṣads, we find greater claims made for *tapas*. Bhṛigu was taught by his father to seek to know Brahman through *tapas*, and having performed *tapas* he understood one truth after another till he recognised bliss as Brahman. In the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* it is said that the Self is to be sought through truthfulness and penance, and that the roots of the Self are selfknowledge and penance. In the *Praśna Upaniṣad* the way to the Self is said to be through 'penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge', while in the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* it is said that 'those who practise penance and faith in the forest, tranquil, wise, and living on alms, depart free from passion through the sun to where that immortal Person dwells whose nature is imperishable'. Perhaps all that we are justified in saying regarding *tapas* in the classical Upaniṣad is that while at time it seems to be practised as a means of gaining control over the passions, at other times it is regarded as a means for the acquisition of supernatural power: while there is also to be seen a tendency to regard it as having no value at all.

It has been remarked already that there is no logical place for social morality in a system of thought, the dominating conception of which is that of the identity of the self and Brahman. This is in some measure recognised in the predominantly negative character of many of the duties which are most highly esteemed. The highest life is one in which social life with all its ties and interests is renounced, and among the highest virtues are those qualities that mark a loosening of the hold that these ties have on the individual. Yet we have to face to fact that the state of the *gṛihastha* is one that is considered honorable; frequently even it is spoken of as essential in the life of him who would attain saving knowledge. This becomes all he more remarkable when we consider that the great end of the *gṛihastha's* being is the begetting of a son. It might seem that, if the highest good be deliverance from *saṁsāra*, then the bringing into the world of beings who should be involved in the circle of *saṁsāra* would be above all things to be condemned. This difficulty does not seem to have been raised in this acute form; but if it had been raised the reply would probably have been that in begetting children one is not starting new beings on the round of *saṁsāra*, but providing bodies for beings who are already on it. But in any case the fact remains that the recognition of the duty of perpetuating the race is based upon a conception which stands in no direct relation to the fundamental conception of the Upaniṣads, but rather stands in contradiction to it, viz. the conception of the existence of the departed in the world of the fathers. These two conceptions of the destiny of the departed—as living on in a world apart from this, and as reincarnated in this world—appear side by side in the Upaniṣads, and there seems to be no consciousness of any contradiction. The contradiction has persisted in Hindu thought and practice in spite of all

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attempts to explain it away. Considered psychologically, the recognition of the place of the *grihastha* is a concession to the facts of human nature. Whatever life may be to the philosopher, to the average man it is good, and no philosophy will persuade him that the natural lived in the family is something to be eschewed. There were ardent youths like Upakosala whose whole being was devoted to the attainment of the knowledge of the Self, but the thinkers of the Upaniṣads were forced frankly to recognise that for the normal man the attitude of mind that made saving knowledge as they regarded it possible, would be attainable only after the first freshness of life had gone. They believed that at the best the life lived in the world was lower life, leading to no abiding good. Through it the higher stage might be reached, but in itself it has no value in relation to the higher stage.

> Knowing this (the Self) the people of old did not wish for offspring. What shall we do with offspring, they said, we who have this Self and this world (of Brahman) .... For desire for sons is desire for wealth, and desire for wealth is desire for worlds. Both these desires only. He is the Self to be described by No, No.

And so they accepted the traditional justification of the householder's duties, contradictory thought it was to their central doctrine.

The case is similar with the ethical duties of liberality and hospitality, frequently enjoined in the Upaniṣads, as we found them to be in the Law Books. The ground for the duty of liberality is to be found in the obligation recognised as early as the *Ṛig Veda*, of bestowing liberal gifts on the sacrificing priests. There we fond an element that contributed to the doctrine of *karma* in the idea of *ishṭāpūrta*. Gifts to the priests are still recognised in the Upaniṣads as essential in connexion with the sacrifice, and are put on the same plane as the sacrifice itself as part of the householder's duty. It was probably, partly at least, as an extension of this duty of giving to the priests that liberality and kindness to others in general came to be praised. This is suggested by the passage quoted above in which the sacrifice is treated allegorically, where it is said:

> Penance, liberality, righteousness, kindness, truthfulness, these from his *Dakshiṇās*.

The rise of mendicant class subsisting on alms would also contribute to the development of the virtues of liberality and kindness, for the recognition of the duty of withdrawing from the world and subsisting on alms implies a corresponding duty of satisfying the needs of a mendicant. So alms-giving figures prominently as a virtue.

The ground for the duty of hospitality is probably different. We found that it too was recognised in the *Ṛig Veda*, and it is probable that it is to be traced back, as has been said in the last chapter, to the idea common among primitive peoples that the stranger has certain powers over one for good or evil, and the failure to entertain him hospitably may lead to his bringing bad luck to a household. There are few traces of such an idea in the Upaniṣads, but it is possible that we find it lingering in such a passage as this:

> Let him never turn away (a stranger) from his house, that is the rule. Therefore a man should by all means acquire much food, for (good) people say (to the stranger): 'There is food ready for him.' If he gives food amply, food fairly, food is given to him amply. If he gives food is given to him fairly.

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If he gives food meanly, food is given to him meanly.

So there is recognised in the Upaniṣads in these various ways the duty of kindness towards others, the duty of liberality, hospitality, and alms-giving, each of these virtues having a different root. All this doubtless helped on very greatly to a recognition of the more important social virtues, which can find no justification by reference to the central conception of the Upaniṣads.

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FLORA AND FAUNA : SYMBOLISM

One of the important things about the symbolic tree is its inverted position. Obviously, the inversion is intended for bringing out Brahman's exalted position. Brahman is admitted as the cause of everything. It was, therefore, natural for it to lie beneath all its effects which constitute the world. It could, for instance, be conceived as the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhyas or the Nature of Aristotle. In this case, however, it would have been difficult to account for the spiritual values and upward tendency of the world. To meet the difficulty, while the Sāṅkhyas brought in the Purusa, Aristotle introduced God. But any duality in the original principal was not acceptable to the Upaniṣadic sages. Basing themselves on the idea of monotheism scattered in the Vedas, they admitted Brahman as the sole cause of the world.

The admittance, however, involves several difficulties. These may be put briefly as the obvious contradictions of eternity and flux, unity and multiplicity, delightfulness and wretchedness etc. obtaining between the cause and the effect. The symbol of inverted tree resolves these contradictions to a great extent.

In the first place, placing the root of the tree upward and its branches downward accounts well for the origin of the world form such a lofty being as Brahman and its tending downward. If a tree is turned upside-down, it would naturally grow downward, though, otherwise, it must have soared upward. The suggests that there is something in the very scheme of creation which, despite the fact that it has its origin in Brahman, makes it debased. The scheme may be taken to have its root in the creative joy in Brahman. The joy probably lies in the sportive desire to see oneself in a position one ordinarily is not in. In the present case, it may be supposed to consist in moving from being to non-being, from consciousness to inconscience and from bliss to destitution.

In the second place, symbol of tree is well suited for explaining the idea of unity in diversity which characterises the Upaniṣadic view of the Reality. Brahman is non-dual while the world is a system of staggering diversities. How could non-dual Brahman be the sole cause of the diversities? Any example form the inorganic world does not help us much in resolving the paradox. An inorganic object can become many only through division which is diminutive of it. If this were to apply to the emanation of the world from Brahman, not only would the latter have suffered diminution, but the former also would have been only a jumble of utterly fragmentary entities. Then individual wholes would have been impossible on the scene of the world. Since the facts are entirely different, some pattern other than the inorganic should be brought in to serve as the model for the relationship between Brahman and the world. Tree is one such model, fig, at that being the most appropriate one. In the case of it, a single

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seed sprouts and grows into a tree branching and leafing around abundantly, all the leaves and branches being steeped in the original root and yet doing little to impair its wholeness. None of them can afford either to dissociate itself from the root ar even extricate itself from he latter's properties. Similar is the case with Brahman and the world. The world has emanated from Brahman without impairing the latter even in the least and has to keep itself constantly centred round that nucleus.

Finally, tree stands also for constancy in change. Its fruits, leaves, twigs and even branches comes and go, but the root and the trunk remain constant normally beyond an individual's memory or, indeed span of life. This duality of the tree's life is very well reflected in the description of the Brahman-tree as 'eternal', *avyaya*, on the one hand and "not remaining the same even the next day", *aśvattha*, on the other. The two strands, however, depart from each other later on and are adapted separately in the *Śvetāśvatara* and the *Bhagavadgītā*. The former makes use of the simile of tree to bring home to us the idea of constancy of the Supreme Being in the heaven as follows:

> Then whom nothing is higher, nothing lower; than whom nothing is smaller, nothing greater. That one stands like a tree established in the heaven. By the *puruṣa* is filled all this.

The *Bhagavadgītā*, on the other hand, makes use of the same tree for conveying the idea of the utterly phenomenal character of the world which is meant only to be felled by the axe of detachment.

If we trace the antecedents of this symbol in the Vedas, we would find only two instances in which Brahman has explicitly been put in the form of tree. One of these is to be found in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* where Brahman is said to be the *palāśa* tree. This occurs in the context of enkindling the sacrificial fire with *palāśa* wood. Since *palāśa* is Brahman, it is argued, enkindling of fire by means of its wood is to be regarded as equivalent to enkindling it by means of Brahman, *palāśa*, indeed, is very much prone to ignition. Brahman also is regarded as luminous. Its luminosity becomes manifest as soon as the mind is devoted to it, in the same way as the *palāśa* wood is ignited as soon as it is brought into contact with fire. On account of this functional resemblance, *palāśa* is chosen as a symbol of Brahman here.

Another use of tree as a symbol of Brahman is to be found in the *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa*. It refers to Brahman as the forest and the tree out of which both the heaven and the earth were manufactured. It describes Brahman as the resort of the act of manufacturing also. This expression comes as an answer to the following question put just in the preceding mantra.

> What probably was the forest and what, indeed, the tree out of which they manufactured the heaven and the earth ? O wise men, ask it also through the mind as to what he took to be his resort while supporting the creations.

Much before the question was put in this form, however, the identity of the manufacturer was indicated in the *Ṛgveda* from which this mantra is quoted verbatum. In a hymn to Viśvakarman, the primeval Father of the world is said to have acted as the *hotṛ* priest offering the creation to fire and then to have concealed himself at the first instance and subsequently to have entered into the lower creatures. At last, the question is put as to what served as the resort and what as the material when he did all this. It is by way of reformulating this question that the images of forest and tree have been introduced in the mantra. Forest is to

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symbolise the place of manufacturing while tree the material. The answer to the question is implied in the account of the one god who, having eyes all around, months all around, arms all around, feet all around, is said to blow the heaven and the earth by means of his omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient Creator which assumes the form of the creation, comprising the heaven and the earth. He serves as both the efficient and the material cause of the world besides providing the background of the creative act.

Tree, of course, has been recognised already, in the Rgveda as the resort of living beings, source of fruits and wood and as something constant and wavy. In view of these qualities, it was well on the way of being conceived as a symbol of the world as well as the human body. This has actually been achieved in that famous mantra in which two companion birds, having beautiful wings, are described as sitting on the self-same tree, one of them eating sweet fruits while the other observing it without eating. When this tree is traced back to its deepest root, it comes close to being conceived, root and branch, as Brahman itself. The following mantra prepares the background for thus development:

> On which all the mead-eating beautiful birds live and procreate, it is to the top of this tree that the sweet fruit is said to belong. He cannot obtain it who does not know the Father.

Taking his stand on the solid ground, the author of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* has only to state the whole thing clearly and inverse the position of the tree so as to remove the conceptual difficulties referred to above.

The Four-Footed (Bull?)

Four-footed animal is another organic symbol used several times to bring out certain features of Brahman. It occurs in detail twice in the *Chāndogya*. In both the occurrences, the symbol is introduced so as to make intelligible a certain axiomatic statement about Brahman. At first it occurs towards the end of the third chapter of the Upaniṣad. At the outset there is an instruction that one should meditate on mind as Brahman if the spiritual approach is intended and on space if the divine approach is preferred.

But, being abstract, mind does not have much to meditate on. Meditation gets considerably facilitated by concreteness and responsiveness on behalf of its object. These can be expected easily of an organic being. Accordingly, the Mind-Brahman is conceived as four-footed. Speech, *prāṇa*, eye and ear are its four feet. What are conceived as feet are obviously the means of sustenance of mind. For, speech feeds it with words, *prāṇa* with life, eyes with visual stimulus and ears with the auditory. Mind come into contact with the external world through these four sensory and vital functions in the same way as an organic being moves in the world with help of its feet. If the feet were removed, the being would become immobile. So is the case with mind. Bereft of these four functions, it would be rendered inactive.

Akin to mind's is the case of space. It also is abstract and irresponsive. On account of this, when used a symbol of Brahman, it needs to be rendered into an organic being. Accordingly, the Space-Brahman also is presented as four-footed. Fire, air, the sun and the directions are its four feet. Obviously the choice is guided by their correlation with the entities representing the feet of Mind-Brahman.

Fire is related with speech, air with *prāṇa*, the sun with eyes, and the directions with ears. This relationship is not arbitrary. It is based on the necessity of relationship between the external world

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on the one hand and the organs on the other. An organism is a miniature of the universe. If there is air in the universe, it is represented by breath in the organism. If there is the sun in the universe, it is represented by eyes in the organism. If there is fire in the universe, it is represented by speech in the organism. If there are directions in the universe, they are represented by ears in the organism. In fact, these organs are shaped through the organism's effort to adjust itself to these forces of the external world. It is by virtue of the correspondence that organs serve as our avenues to the universe.

The Upaniṣad, however take the above relationships in exactly the reversed order. While the *Chāndogya* ascribes the origin of sense organs to the desire of the Ātman to adjust itself to different universal forces, the *Aitareya* attributes the origin of the forces to the corresponding sense organs of the primeval *puruṣa*. In keeping with the latter view, in the present context itself, while the two sets of feet as connected with the respective forms of Brahman are given equal status at the outset, later on speech etc. are regarded as more fundamental than fire and the rest of the forces. Thus, while speech is said to be a foot of Brahman, fire is said to be only its illuminer and heater. Similarly, while *prāṇa* is said to be the other food of Brahman, air is taken to be just its illuminer and heater. So also is the case with the eye and the ear.

Another account of the same organic conception of Brahman, though with certain variations, is to be found in the teachings imparted to Satyakāma jābāla by certain agencies elsewhere in the same Upaniṣad. When Jābāla raised the number of his teacher's kine from four hundred to one thousand through his/devotion and careful tending, a bull, besides asking him to return to his teacher's residence, offered to instruct him in the mystery of Brahman. He talks of one foot of Brahman, named "shining", which, according to him, has four phases, the east, the west, the south and the north. Then he refers jabala to fire and asks him to learn from it. The fire instructs him in the mystery of the second foot of Brahman known as "endless." As phases of this foot, he points to the earth, the atmosphere, the sky and the ocean. Then comes a swan which imparts him instruction in the secret of the third foot of Brahman known as "luminous." As phase of this foot, he enumerates fire, the sun, the moon and lightning. At the end comes the diver-bird with its instruction in the mystery of the fourth foot of Brahman which it calls "psychic" and enumerates as its phases *prāṇa*, eye, ear and mind.


To work out a comparison between the two accounts, it is important to note first that the four teachers of this view of Brahman seem themselves to be related each with one of the feet. Fire has already been presented as one of the feet of Space-Brahman as conceived in the previous account. As regards the swan, Śaṅkara takes it rightly as the sun. The basis of the substitution, according to him, is weightiness and flight which are common to both. As regards the bull and the diver-bird, if Śaṅkara's explanation is accepted, the former represents the directions while the later the air. Thus the four teachers come to be actually the four feet of Space-Brahman. Besides this, if those very teachers are viewed in their psychic forms, as presented in the previous account, they would prove equally well to be the four feet of Mind-Brahman also. Thus the bull would stand for ear, the fire for speech, the swan for eye and the diverbird for *prāṇa*.


Secondly, with regard to the feet and their phases, it is to be noted that what the bull and the diver-bird teach is perfectly

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in consonance with the previous account. Mind is the only exception to it. While in he previous account mind is made to represent Brahman in its entirety and speech is taken to be merely a foot of it, in the present account it is made to represent only one of the feet of Brahman, the other three being represented by *prāṇa*, ear and eye. Thus here it is used as a substitute of speech. Why is this substitution?. It is certain that the speech of the previous account corresponds to the fire of Space-Brahman. It is not, then likely that the mind of the psychic foot corresponds to the moon of the luminous foot of the present account? If this is the case, then, in the present equation, Agni would lose the psychic phase corresponding to it. Thus, in either case, there is only a loose correspondence between the four feet of Mind-Brahman on the one hand and the four phases of the psychic foot of Brahman on the other.

As regards the correspondence between the four feet of Space-Brahman and the phases of the shining, endless and luminous feet of Brahman, it is to be noted that while two of the former are found in the luminous foot alone and the third one in the shining foot, there is nothing to correspond to the air of Space-Brahman in any of the phases of the there feet. A tabular account to the detail may help us in understanding the actual position:





Feet of Brahman	*Phases of the Feet*			
Shining	East	West	South	North
Endless	Earth	Atmos-phere	Sky	Ocean
Luminous	Fire	Sun	Moon	Lightning
Psychic	Breath	Eye	Mind	Ear

The points of difference between these two accounts of the feet of Brahman and their phases may be easily explained by presuming certain discrepancies in the preservation of the text. But, as there is no positive evidence for he presumption, to take recourse to it would obviously be unjustifiable. We are, thus, left with the sole alternative that the two accounts are brought out in complete independence. They seem to represent two independent systems of meditation, the former being more systematic while the later more detailed. And this was quite natural on account of the unity of authorship in the former case as against the heterogeneity of the same in the latter. Since the latter was evolved in collaboration of four agencies, some sort of heterogeneity was inevitable.

But, in spite of all the divergences, which, however, are only minor, the total picture presented by the latter account gives us Brahman in two forms, objective and psychic. The former comprises the first three feet of it while the later the fourth. Thus both the accounts present Brahman as an organic being possessed of both the subjective and objective facets. In the former account, the facets are put separately in the forms of Mind-Brahman and Space-Brahman respectively while in the latter they are put together, the objective one in the form of the first three feet and the subjective one in the form of the fourth.

As regards the significance of the representations, each one of them

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resembles an animal, particularly the bull. The resemblance lies in their four-footedness. Rightly does Śaṅkara point out that fire, air, the sun and the directions are attached to Space-Brahman somewhat in the same manner as a bull's feet are attached to his body. It is probably on account of this resemblance that bull is made a symbol of the directions in the story of Satyakāma and has been entrusted with the task of initiating him in the mystery of treating the directions as the first foot of Brahman. He could do so successfully by virtue of being himself identical to that very phase of Brahman which he had to explain. The addition of the psychic feature imbues it with life and personality. But the account is by no means intended to reduce Brahman to a theriomorphic figure. It seems rather to be meant for bringing home to us an organismic conception of the Reality. When the same Upaniṣad, a little earlier, made the well known observation, "All this verily is Brahman", and described the latter as the doer of all deeds, cherisher of all desires, enjoyer of all smells and tastes, it became obligatory on in to show how the world could be conceived as a part of Brahman and, at that, a vital one. The present accounts seem to be given by way of fulfilling that obligation.

One thing highly significant to note is the order in which the four feet of Brahman have been put here. The first foot comprises the directions which stand for the totality of space. The second foot consists of he earth, the atmosphere, the sky and the ocean which all are born of space. The third foot is formed by the four luminaries, fire, lightning, the sun and the moon which obviously are products of the constituent elements of the second foot. The fourth foot consists of the four most essential organs and functions of the organism, namely breath, eye, ear and mind and signifies the highest organic development over the earlier constituents of the universe. Putting of these entities and functions as successive feet of Brahman may be taken to signify the successive footsteps of Brahman falling on the path of cosmic evolution. In view of this possibility, the account boils down to the view that Brahman's feet are symbolic of the successive steps of evolution which the Absolute takes in course of self-expression beginning from the extension of space to the emergence of the self-conscious organic being.

As regards the antecedent of the symbol, it may be found, to some extent, in the Ṛgvedic *Hymn* to *Puruṣa*. This hymn also puts the primeval purusa as four-footed, with the difference, however, that while in the Upaniṣad all the feet of Brahman are said to constitute the world, in the *Ṛgveda* only one of them is regarded as responsible for the creation of it while the rest of them are supposed to lie immortal in the heaven. Another significant point worth noting is that though the Samhitā puts the primeval Being as a *puruṣa*, it described him as fourfooted. If he is a *puruṣa*, he should naturally be only two-footed. Putting of a two-footed person as four-footed, is suggestive of the fact that theriomorphism has nothing to do in this case. Likewise should be the case of Upaniṣadic account also. On the other hand, what seems probable is that since quaternity is an established symbol of wholeness, description of Brahman as four-footed is intended for bringing out the organic relationship of the world with Brahman in its whole dynamism.

The Pair of Goats

In the symbolic exposition of Brahman, animals are used not only indirectly and in parts but also directly and as a whole.

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The most important example of it is to be found in the *Śvetāśvatara*. According to it:

> There is a goat, red, white and black in colour producing numerous issues resembling herself, which a he-goat sleeps beside enjoying while another he-goat forsakes on account of her having been enjoyed with.

This verse has been a matter of great controversy at least since the time of Badarayana. The main point of controversy has been raised by the Sankhyas by taking it as a mater-of-fact statement of the basic postulates of their philosophical system. They have accomplished this by taking the word *ajā* in the mantra purely as a negative compound meaning the "unborn". Likewise, they have taken the words meaning red, white and black in the sense of the three guṇas, *rajas, sattva* and *tamas* respectively. In keeping with the above scheme of things, they take the word *aja* in the sense of the unborn which in their terminology is known as Purusa Thus, in their view, the mantra means that three is the primary principle of Prakṛti on the one hand and that of Puruṣa on the other. The Prakṛti produces the forms after herself. There are some Puruṣas who enjoy the Prakṛti of the above description while there are others who forsake her totally. As regards the possibility of taking the whole account in the matter-of-fact sense of a goat giving birth to several kids and being accompanied by a he-goat and deserted by another one, the Sāṅkhyas negate it on the ground that in the context of pure metaphysical deliberation, account of animal life is completely inadmissible.

But Bādarāyaṇa refutes this interpretation by pointing out that it is based on a partial view of the account. According to him, such accounts should be adjudged in their entirety and as supported by related material. In his view, what Sāṅkhyas take in the sense of the three guṇas, signifies the three elements, fire water and earth which have practically been given the colours red, white and black by the *Chāndogya*. Thus, according to him, this mantra does neither describe the romance and procreative act of a goat nor refer directly to the supreme metaphysical being, the Un-born. It rather combines the two extremities, the gross material and the metaphysical for the sake of figurative exposition. He characterises this way of exposition as *kalpanopdeśa*, imaginative dilation. In his view,

> Just as in the world there be a goat naturally of red, white and black colours and having numerous and similar kids, and which a he-goat may sleep with romantically while another one may forsake on account of its being enjoyed exhaustively, even so this tri-colour root cause of all things, comprising light, water and earth, gives birth to numerous and similar mobile and immobile beings and is enjoyed by the ignorant but forsaken by the wise.

We find a confirmation of the above Vedāntic rather than of the Sāṅkhya viewpoint if we consider the antecedents of the account. In fact, throughout the whole of the Vedic literature the word *aja* means both, the un-born and a he-goat. Within the range of the first meaning also the word stands for the universal as well as for the individual. In the tenth book of the *Ṛgveda*, there is a question as to what was the germ beyond the heaven and beyond this earth and beyond even the gods and the *asuras* which the waters bore first and where all the gods were seen together. In answer to this, the seer observes that the germ which the waters born as their foetus and to which all the gods converged, was the one placed in the navel of the *aja*. The one is said to be the sole resort of the creation. Obviously, here *aja* means the ultimate source of the

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cosmos which in itself is irreducible. As against it, there is yet another mantra in the same book in which aja signifies the immortal being lying within each individual. Agni is asked to heat and purify the being and take it to the world of the pious.

Here it may be suggested that the whole cult of sacrificing a he-goat, *aja*, with the belief that it would reach the heaven, may possibly by a symbolic enactment of the soul's journey to the same destination. If this is true, one of the reasons behind the choice of he-goat as a symbol would obviously be the common use of the word *aja* for he-goat on the one hand and for the immortal essence of the individual and the universe on the other. It is true hat the word *aja*, denoting the essence of the individual and the universe, is derivatively not the same as the one meaning he-goat. In the former sense, it is to be derived from a + √*jan*, be born, while in the latter sense i comes form √*aj*, urge. But, in spite of being derived from different roots, the words coincide in accent as well as in form. It is the coincidence which is probably one of the reasons for the symbolisation of the Eternal by the he-goat.

Another reason for the choice of the symbol seems to be the he-goat's disposition to bleat excessively. Due to this characteristic feature, it was natural to make it a symbol of *vāk*, speech. The *Śatapatha* puts *vāk* expressly as *aja*. According to it, while the Creator created the *puruṣa* out of his mind, the horse out of his eyes, the sheep out of his ears, he produced the he-goat out of the *vāk*. As regards *vāk*, in the Vedas it has closely been associated with fire. As already made out, fire was an established symbol of the *ātman*. in the Veda. Thus, it was quite easy to use the he-goat as a symbol of the *ātman*. Directly also *aja* is related with fire.

The symbolisation of the Creator by the he-goat, indeed, is based on *vāk* serving as the common bond between the he-goat and the Creator. If the he-goat bleats excessively, particularly in the state of impregnation, the Creator is said to have produced the creation out of his word. Besides it, both are abundantly creative. It is needless to say anything about the creativeness of the Creator. But it would certainly be interesting to note how the *Śatapatha* mentions the outstanding procreative capability of goat. The Brāhmaṇa takes cognisance of the fact that goat procreates thrice a year and gives birth to two or three kinds each time. It is the medium of procreation through which the he-goat accomplishes his procreative act. Similarly, *vāk* is taken to be creative medium through which he Creator creates the world. Thus the he-goat become a symbol of the Creator while the goat stands for the medium of the creation. This idea finds direct support in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* which recounts the primeval creative process thus: In the beginning the Atman alone was there. He was of the same size as a man and a woman embracing each other closely. He divided himself into two which became the husband and the wife. Apprehending incest, the female tried to hide herself somewhere. When she assumed the form for a cow, her counterpart became a bull. Thus were born cows. When she assumed the form of a mare, her counterpart became a horse. Thus were born horses. When she assumed the form of a goat, her counterpart became a he-goat. Thus were born the various species.

In view of what has been side above regarding the symbol, the two he-goats of the original account may be taken by symbolise the Ātman, both in its individual and transcendent forms. The individual *ātman* is not anything absolutely different

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from the transcendent foms. Rather it is the transcendent Ātman having assumed the limitations of individuality so as to make the creation possible. To put it in another way, assumption of a certain form by the creativity of the Ātman serves as a determinant of the Ātman in assuming the form by the creativity of the corresponding individual *ātman*. Thus it is the individual *ātman* which is engrossed in the personal enjoyment of the creativity, taking the latter as the creative counterpart of it. As against it, the transcendent Ātman keeps itself absolutely above the enjoyment, since it treats the creativity as only a form of its own self. The goat of creativity is only the *tapas* of Prajāpati. When subjected to individual determinations, the *tapas* assumes the form of cows, mares, and goats which are to be indulged in by the individual *ātman* forming their counterparts as bulls, horses and he-goats.

As regard the three colours attributed to the goat of creativity, they as Bādarāyaṇa maintains, refer to the trinity of forms the creativity assumes as light, water and matter, as put by the *Chāndogya* rather than to the three guṇas, as suggested by the Sāṅkhyas. The Sāṅkhya doctrine of gunas presupposes a trinity of distinct essential qualities while the symbol of the tri-colour goat permits only an apparent variation in the mode of functioning of the creativity. This criterion applies more to the divine creativity, having light, water and matter as three modes of its functioning, than to the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhyas said to have the three guṇas as its essential constituents. This explanation finds support also in one of the opening mantras of the Upaniṣad which puts the creativity as the self-power of the Divine hiding herself in her own attributes.

Procreation is the universal way to propagation of organic life. It is, therefore, natural to think that Brahman also would have produced the world in a way akin to that. But the acceptance of this view would involve either of the two difficulties: 1. duality of male and female principles, 2. incest. It is probably with a view to eliminating these difficulties that the primeval Being is put in the neuter gender by the Vedic seers. As regards mating, it has been substituted by *tapas* which signifies exertion, introversion and contemplation. There is a direct contrariety between sex-enjoyment and *tapas*. If the one is self-diffusive, the other is self-conserving; if the one is divisive, the other is unifying; if the one requires a duality of persons, the other is wholly non-dualistic. It was particularly in view of the last feature of tapas that the Upaniṣadic sages took recourse to it rather than to sex in explaining the organ of the world as well as in determining the way to the realisation of Brahman. As is the nature of the metaphysical reality, so would be the way to its attainment. If one wants to know Brahman, one would have to follow the way of Brahman, *brahmacarya*.

But, being non-divisive, the device of *tapas* would result in creatures which are only reflective and repetitive. If this path of creation is followed indefinitely, it would bring out only eternal repetition of the Being's reflections. In order to be divergent, it needs to adopt the opposite device of procreation. It is why as soon as Brahman has projected itself through *tapas*, the process of procreation sets in. If *tapas* helps in the projection of Brahman, procreation leads to its diversification. Both the devices are complementary of each other. Indeed, it is this dual process of creation which is suggested by the symbol of two he-goats, indulging sexually with the goat while the other abstaining from the same.

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The Pair of Birds

If sex is the way of propagation and continuation of the organism as a species, food is the means of preserving the individual of the species. It is the most fundamental need of organic life. Accordingly, the organism has been made a symbol of Brahman from the viewpoint of its food-seeking instinct also. The *Muṇḍaka* talks of two birds, having beautiful wings, being united as companions and sitting on the self-same tree. The one of them is said to eat the sweet fruit while the other to just observe without eating. This account is so picturesque that it may apparently seem to signify a bare matter-of-fact spectacle. Indeed, it was taken as such by some scholars even at the time of Bādarāyaṇa. If we think over the account minutely, however, we would not miss the symbolic characters of it. For, in the immediately following mantra, the non-eating bird is said to be the lord, magnificent in form and capable of making the other bid rid of all anxieties only by its sight. In the still next mantra, the same bird again is said to be the creator, master, *puruṣa* and source of both, sin and virtue, and led him to perfect harmony. From these details, it is obvious that the account signifies something deeper than mere matter-of-fact description of a pair of birds and that the signification relates to the primeval source of the creation and the state of perfect harmony.

This symbol also is rooted in the *Ṛgveda*. In fact, the first of the three mantras referred to above is almost a verbatum quotation from the Saṁhitā. Now the question is whether at least the *Ṛgveda* did not give this account only as a factual description of the bird's behaviour. This doubt, however, does not hold good. For, just an in its Upaniṣadic occurrence this mantra is followed by a couple of mantras explanatory of its symbolic character, even so already in its Ṛgvedic occurrence it is followed by a couple of similar mantras. According to the first of these:

> The mighty guardian of the creation, the wise, has entered into me, the naive, exactly where the beautiful winged birds hymn about the portion of immortality without winking in the assembly.

The second mantra reads as follows:

> On which all the mead-eating, beautiful birds live and procreate, it is on the top of this tree that they say the fig is luscious; he would not obtain that who does not know the Father.

The Father here is the mighty guardian of the universe who enters into the individual and assumes the form of the principle of immortality. As such, what is put here as tree, is, indeed, the psycho-physical organism. In this motif, the beautiful birds would signify the sense organs which go around the organism in search of self-fulfillment, make din and noise around it but are normally obstructed by the outer appearance. If, on the other hand, the motif is considered on the universal scale, the world itself would be the tree, the organism the bird and the Father or the cosmic guardian, said to have entered into the seer, would be the principle of supreme beatitude embodying itself in the sweetness of the fruit. In the immediately following mantra, the same guardian is envisaged as the principle of immortality lying inside the world and forming the secret of the mantras.

Now, if the ideas embodied in all the four mantras were considered together, it would not be difficult to discover that in this account one of the birds is identified with the guardian, the guardian with the

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Father and the Father with the immortality. What apparently seems to be a mere companion of the fruit-eating bird and thus is expected to share in the act of eating, is really the guardian of the fruit. As the guardian, he sees to it whether the fruit is being enjoyed properly. In the next turn, the guardian is viewed as associated with the tree of the world not fortuitously but as its father. Lastly, when the world is conceived as a mantra, the Father becomes the supreme principle of immortality. To put it inversely, what is realised by the seer as the principle of immortality in the inmost of his being, proves to be the Creator of the world. It is only due to ignorance that the Creator is taken to be a partner of the individual in the enjoyment of life. The bird can be aware of the guardian only when it stops eating the fruit.

The *Muṇḍaka* presents this idea in a clearer form. According to it, when the fruit-eating bird frees itself eating and looks around, it sees a person who is golden in colour, and is the creator, ruler and source of the creation, it gets rid or sin as well as of virtue and attains to supreme harmony. Obviously, the *puruṣa* referred to here in this mantra is the same who in the Rgvedic account in envisaged as the guardian, father and immortality.

This symbol shows how one and the same Brahman can assumed so diverse forms as the subject and the object, the supreme spiritual beatitude and the world, the guardian and the eater. It shows how the diversity of creation does by no means impair the non-duality of the original Being. The dualist's argument that the account of the two birds and the tree as disparate entities goes to prove the duality of the Being, gets set aside if we consider the account in its wholeness as occurring in the *Ṛgveda*

The Pair of Drinkers

This allegory occurs in the *Kaṭha*. The relevant mantra reads as follows:

> Drinking *ṛta* in the world of beatitude, there are two (beings) who have entered into the secret place in the highest of the upper sphere. Knowers of Brahman talk of them as shade and light. So also do those who worship the five fires as well as those who sacrifice thrice in the Nāciketas fire.

It is significant to note that both the beings are left unnamed here. This is in sharp contrast to the previous account in which the two beings are clearly described as birds. It is indicative of the fact the *Kaṭha* has very much in view the abstract character of both the beings. Even then, both of them are described as drinkers. The drink which both take is *ṛta*. The scene of drinking is set in the highest and most mysterious place the human mind can conceive of. The beings are characterised as shade and light.

From the fact that the scene of drinking is the highest point in the scale of being, it is evident that one of the drinkers in no less than Supreme while his shadowy companion is just an imitation of him. The Supreme Being is evidently Brahman while the companion my be taken to be the individual *ātman*. It is interesting to observe that, though supreme, the Being is said to indulge in the act of drinking in the same way as the shadowy one. Thus, in regard to the act of drinking, this account goes counter to that of the two birds discussed above. Why then is it that the same Brahman is said at one place to abstain from eating and at another to be the only real drinker? If some sort of distinction is sought to be made between the acts of eating and drinking, it loses the point in view of the fact that just in the preceding mantra, Brahman is described as one who has priesthood and

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nobility both as cooked rice and Death itself as the sauce.

Several explanations have been offered for this obvious disparity. Śaṅkara explains it on the analogy of a group of umbrella-bearers. If two persons are going together, only one of whom has an umbrella, both of them may loosely be said to be umbrella-bearers. The present account also may be taken to be somewhat akin to the above. Thus, according to Śaṅkara, it is the individual self which is the actual drinker or eater while Brahman is attributed that act only figuratively. But, if this is the case, how to account for the description, as referred to above, that Brahman makes priesthood and nobility its cooked rice and Death its sauce? Another attempt at solving this tangle is made by Rāmānand. He regards both of them as drinkers, but with a marked difference. In his view, while he *ātman* is the actual drinker, Brahman assumes that role by way of sportive enjoyment he gets in course of entering into the creation and seeing himself through all its vicissitudes. Thus, in his view, the *ātman* and Brahman both enjoy the fruit of action, white this difference, however, that while the former enjoys it actually, the latter enjoys it only in his determination, *saṅkalpa*. But the point that goes counter to this solution is that, against his assumption, it is Brahman's enjoyment which is suggested in the Upaniṣad as real and not *vice versa*. Thus, if Śaṅkara's solution fails on account of basing itself on a faulty generalisation, Rāmānanda's meets the same fate due to making a reversal in the actual position. That solution alone can be acceptable which, instead of superimposing itself on the text, actually sprouts out of it.

When we approach the text directly from this viewpoint, we find that the main difficulty these authorities have created for themselves lies, on the one hand, in their interpretation of rta as *karma-phala*, "fruit of action" and, on the other, in their assumption that Brahman would become impure if it participates in experiencing the processes of world actually. As regards the former, it is needless to point out that the world rta denotes originally the supreme principle of harmony guiding the process of the world rather than mere *karma-phala*. The law of *karman* is just a part of *ṛta*. Similarly, the phrase *sukṛtasya loke* does not necessarily mean the world attained by good deeds. It may better be taken to mean the world of supreme beatitude. This is evident from what the *Taittirīya* has to offer on this world. According to it.

> Non-existent verily was all this in the beginning. From that verily was produced the existence. It made itself by itself. Therefore, it is called "the well made." What, of course, is well made, that, indeed, is the essence. It is by getting the essence that one is delighted.

Thus the phrase *sukṛtasya loke* should be taken to mean the highest state of being in which Brahman dwells self-contained. It is from this state of self-being that the stream of Becoming issues under the direction of the principle of harmony. What in put here as *ṛta*, is the principle of harmony serving as the dynamics of Becoming. Moreover, if *ṛta* were to mean *karma-phala*, its consumption would have been indicated by a verb denoting eating rather than drinking. Fruits normally are eaten. Thus, it seems better to take the clause under discussion in the sense of "drinking beatitude" rather than to mean "eating *karma-phala*" in the world of good deeds.

This interpretation find support from a consideration of the compound *chāya-tapau*, "shade and light." Fortunately the compound occurs once more in the *kaṭha*

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itself. Giving an idea of the various forms in which Brahman is realised in relation to the *ātman*, the mantra says that it is understood as light while the *ātman* as shade in the world of Brahman. From this, it is evident that the state in which Brahman and the *ātman* are said to drink *ṛta* must be the same *brahma-loka*. This loka is further characterised in the *Chāndogya* as one having reached which the *ātman* does not return to the mundane world. This suggests that the *brahma-loka* is a state of existence well beyond the constrictions of the law of *karman*.

In fact, instead of taking it in isolation, if we consider the present mantra in its proper context, we would be in a better position to understand its signification. The context naturally consists of the mantra immediately preceding and following it. As regards the first, it is to be noted that the preceding section of the Upaniṣad closes with the account that Brahman is the arch eater devouring even priesthood and nobility with the help of Death as sauce. This is obviously an account of the phenomena of dissolution. But, does dissolution imply complete annihilation of the world, including individual selves? It is probably with a view to removing this apprehension that the mantra under discussion seems to have been introduced. According to it, in the state of dissolution, the individual self, instead of being completely lost in non-being, co-exists with Brahman as its shade and drinks rta in its company. Now he next question is whether this state of things is only consequent upon dissolution. The real purport of the rest of the section, as well as of the Upaniṣadic thought as a whole, lies in removing this doubt and suggesting the proper way out. It maintains that instead of waiting for the dissolution and subjecting oneself of the horrors of the disolvent agency as also having to wade through the sea of the unknown, one can find just within oneself the chariot as well as its owner, the driver as well as the reins, the horse as well as the path, nay, even the destination itself. Being described as the highest footstep of visnu, the destination ought to have been farthest away from us. But, surprisingly enough, it is just inside our heart, as our inmost being. It is by reaching here through introversion that one can have the closest view of Brahman and experience the highest beatitude which lies in the organisation of the being. Here one can live in perfect harmony of the Being and drink, as it were, the immortalising juice of rta, the harmony of the dynamics of Becoming. Dwelling in this state, one, as the individual, would be like the shade of Brahman and, as the Ātman, one would be the very light which is Brahman.

In view of the above, Brahman itself would have to be accepted as the real enjoyer of *ṛta*. There is no harm in it either. If Brahman can be regarded as the source, support and final resort of the creation, as the *Taittirīya* puts it, what impropriety is there if it is described as the drinker of the rta?

But the above interpretation appears to contradict the view of Brahman as expressed through the bird abstaining from eating. While in the present mantra the being supposed to symbolise Brahman is said to drink rta alone with the individual self, in the other mantra the bird taken to symbolise the same Brahman is described as abstaining from eating completely. One may be tempted at account for the divergence in terms of difference of viewpoint among the sages themselves. But this suggestion does not hold good particularly in view of the uniformity the sages show in regard to the fundamental ideas about Brahman and the Atman. As already made out with respect

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to the Ātman, all divergence of opinion is due to the difference of phase a particular sage keeps in mind on a particular occasion.

This principle is fairly applicable in the present instance also. Obviously there is a marked difference of relationship between the two beings on the one hand and the two birds on the other. While the beings are related with each other as light and shade, the birds are said to be equally beautiful-winged and friendly companions. In the light-and-shade relationship, what the original one does, the shadowy is bound to do the same. This is not necessary in the case of the friendly companionship. Here one may eat while the other may abstain from eating. This difference of relationship is evidently due to the difference of states between the two accounts. While the ground of the light-and-shade relationship is said to lie in the highest point of the upper sphere where the highest footstep of Visnu falls, the two birds are described as sitting on the tree of the world or the organic body. As such, whereas the ground of the beings is metaphysical, that of the birds is mundane.

This conclusion is further supported by the *Katha's* account referred to above in which the two entities are said to be realised quite differently on different planes of existence. According to it, Brahman appears in the *ātman* as in a mirror, in the world of Fathers as in a dream, in the world of Gandharvas as in waters and in the world of *brahman* a light and shade. If so, there does not seem to be anything unjustifiable in thinking of the relationship between Brahman and the individual self on the plane of the world as that between two companions. Although not stated in the above mantra, this relationship seems to be the highest probability on account of coming in direct contradistinction to the metaphysical one.

This contention gets illustrated by the fact that man ordinarily has been thinking of God as a being akin to himself sitting at the apex of the world, making his dispensations from there and in himself remaining absolutely unaffected by the events of the world. This view of God may be characterised as individualistic. The symbol of the two birds brings out specially this feature of God. As distinct from it, there is another view of him under which he has been regarded as the creator, sustainer and destroyer of the world. This is the universalistic view of him. The description of Brahman as the arch eater comes under this type of ideas. In the third type, the individual and the world get wholly subordinated to him, so much so that both of them appear to have become one with him, amalgamating their substance in him and thus remaining merely as his shadows. This may be characterised as the absolutistic conception of God. The account under discussion presents a beautiful example of it. Instead of going counter to one another, these are just complementary viewpoints of the Reality. While the first one is prompted by the innate requirements of the individual psychology and the second one by philosophical elaboration on the law of causation, the third one is rooted in deep spiritual experience.

The Eater and the Food

Symbols grow from the particular viewpoints one takes in regard to a certain object, event, complex situation or principle. In a way, they are just embodiments of the viewpoints themselves. This is very well illustrated by the symbol of the great eater referred to above. Since Yama was the god of death, it was natural for Brahman to have been put as the death of death or the eater of

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everything, including death. The same principle is exemplified still more beautifully by the anecdote of a *brahmacārin* approaching Śaunaka Kāpeya and Abhipratārin Kākṣaseni for food just when they were being served their dishes. When they refused to oblige him, he confronted them with a mysterious claim to the food. He says that there is one Being who, though acting as the guardian of the creation and pervading it, is not seen by the mortals. According to him, it swallows all the four great goods, fire, the sun, the moon and waters in the form of air, and their respective spiritual counterparts, i.e., speech, eye, mind and ear in the form of *prāṇa*. He observes that all food whatever is meant ultimately for the Being who presently as the *brahmacārin* has been denied that. He attributes the denial to the ignorance of the people about the Being.

When challenged like this, Saunaka Kapeya comes forward with the claim that he, as well as several others, meditated on that Being. He describes it as follows:

> He is the *ātman* of gods, the creator of beings, with golden teeth, the eater, above all ignorance; he is said to be so great in his magnificence that he eats what is not food, without himself being eaten.

Just as in the game of dice, a dice of higher value comes back not only by itself but along with all the dices of lesser value which it has subjected to its domination, observes Śaunaka, even so if fire, the sun, the moon and waters are eaten by air on the physical plane, and speech, eye, mind and ear eaten by *prāṇa* on the spiritual plane and thus are treated as food by their respective eaters, than all the ten together are treated as food by that Being who is Brahman itself. Moreover, since Brahman is inclusive of all these ten entities consituting the world, it can also be regarded as the food. Thus it may be taken as the food as well as the eater. The point is further clarified by the analogy of dice. Just as the dice krta is not only the winner of all the ten points but, by virtue of being itself equivalent to all those points, it is regarded also as the amount won in that process, even so Brahman is to be understood as the food and the eater both.

The anomaly with the position held by the *brahmacārin*, however, was that he identified himself with Brahman as eater alone and demanded food from Śaunaka and Abhipratārin so arrogantly. What Śaunaka taught him was that he should have considered himself as food as well. Inclusion of this viewpoint alone can make one's outlook wholesome and help in developing a balanced personality. Anything short of that is bound to create imbalance and generate arrogance. He alone can relish the whole world as food who at the same time is capable of offering himself to the world as food.

Besides the above, there are a few more instances of symbolisation of Brahman by food. One of them occurs in connection with the teaching of Sanatkumāra to Nārada. When Sanatkumāra explained the significance of strength as a symbol of Brahman, Nārada asked him if there was anything more appropriate than that. Then Sanatkumāra initiated him into the mystery of food. The reason, as advanced by him for the suppression of strength by food, is that it is from the latter that the former arises. By way of experimentation, the teacher suggests that a person may live for ten days completely without food and observe the effect of it on his person. In the first place, if he survives at all, he would be incapable of seeing, hearing, thinking, knowing, doing and understanding. But, if he is given food after that, he would have these capabilities restored to him. Thus, if food constitutes the source of all sorts of energy, physical,

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mental and spiritual that we possess, why should it not be regarded as something supreme for us and meditated on as such with a sense of finality? Indeed according to Sanatkumāra,

> He who meditates on food as Brahman, he verily attains to that world which is rich in food and drink; he moves freely as far and wide as food.

Thus, it is evident that food is made a symbol of Brahman here on account of serving as the source of vitality in us which, in its turn, energizes all the functions or our life. The example of food is enough to give us an idea of the principle constituting the source of all sorts of energy in the world. If that principle comes to be called Brahman, food would serve as an apt symbol of it.

What the *Chāndogya* says in regard to the individual, the same is said by the Taittiriya about the entire organic world. It also suggests that food should be meditated on as Brahman. The argument for the suggestion is that food is more comprehensive and primary than any of the organic beings. According to it, all organic beings are born of food, grow by food and ultimately get dissolved in food. As Brahman is the source of the universal energy, the rationale offered by the *Taittirīya* is more appropriate.

So far as food is regarded as the source and support of life, it remains well within its own range. But, so soon as it gets life dissolved in itself, it starts an altogether novel function which lies in transcendence of the earlier one. The transformation in the function brings a radical change in the nature of the functionary itself. What was meant for eating initially, comes to assume the role of the eater subsequently. Here food becomes the eater. It is due to this twofold possibility in the function of food that its equivalent world in Sanskrit is derived from the root √ad in a twofold sense, that which is eaten by creatures and that which eats the creatures. What is taken as food as little earlier, when assimilated to the body, becomes a part and parcel of the eater. Thus, if we trace even the life of the eater itself back to the point of its origin, it would coincide with a certain amount of food consumed by a certain center of vitality. It is in view of the convertibility of the food into the eater and of the eater into the food that the enlightened sage of the *Taittirīya* sings the Sāman:

> I am the food .... I am the eater.

If this can be true of food, how much more can it be true of Brahman? If something finite is capable of so radical a transformation, why not Brahman which is infinite? As such, all the basic constituents of the universe, such as fire, the sun, the moon, water and air, being the food of Brahman, must be proceeding towards transformation into Brahman, the eater. The same should hold good on the individual scale as well. Speech, eye, mind, ear and breath, which are being gradually consumed by Brahman dwelling in the heart, must ultimately be transformed into Brahman, the consumer. Thus the process of the world is to be regarded as one of transformation of the food into the eater. Obviously, this is complementary of the process of objectification under which Brahman manifests itself in the form of the world. Likewise, the cosmic movement in its entirety may be regarded as comprising the twofold process of objectification and withdrawal. What is the object now, may become the subject in due course. Accordingly, what is world at present, may be transformed into Brahman in future. It is in view of the possibility of transformation of the object into the subject and *vice versa* that the food, as well as the eater, has been made a symbol of Brahman here.

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Prāṇa

The organic relationship of Brahman with the world is also brought out by symbolising the former by certain physiological functions. *Prāṇa* is most important among them. It is used as a symbol of Brahman several times in the Upaniṣads. The reason for the choice is its functioning as the principle of life and consumer of food. As the principle of life, *prāṇa* plays a crucial role in the phenomena of birth and death also. Does anything of the individual survive death ? If so, where and in what form? These are some of the questions which have been taxing the human mind long since. An answer to these has been given in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* though the analogy of a snake leaving behind it its slough:

> As the slough of the snake lies dead and deserted on the anthill, even so does this body lie. But this disembodied *prāṇa* is Brahman itself, is light indeed.

Thus *prāṇa* is taken to survive death. Particularly in the case of those who have realised Brahman, it, after death, is supposed to merge in and become one with Brahman. The possibility of merger and unification brings *prāṇa* close to Brahman in this imagination of the Upaniṣadic sage and prepares the background of the symbol.

As the principle of life, *prāṇa* is made a symbol of Brahman at another place in the same Upaniṣad. When *Yājñavalkya* came to king Janaka in course of his usual wanderings, the king requested the sage to give him some instruction. The the sage asked the king to tell him what other learned people had taught him. The king told him that there was one Udaṅka Śaulbāyana who had taught him that *prāṇa* was Brahman. The king further added that since Śaulbāyana appeared to be a well brought up and educated man, he took the instructions seriously. Another argument that the king puts forward in support of the equation is that an individual, if left by *prāṇa* becomes worthless. But the sage asks him if the teacher told him anything about the support of *prāṇa* as Brahman. When the king answers him in the negative, the sage tells him that this instruction presents Brahman as one-footed. On the insistence of he king, he observes that *prāṇa* itself is the abode of this Brahman, space is its support and dearness is its innate nature. According to the sage, mediation on Brahman as the four-footed being would bring stability to the meditator's *prāṇa*, endear him to all the creatures and elevate him to godhood.

There is yet another instance of symbolisation of Brahman by *prāṇa* in the same Upaniṣad. The account begins with a criticism of food as an exclusive symbol of Brahman. Food, no doubt, gives us strength which is essential for the continuance of life. But the utility of food depends on its being digested by *prāṇa* without the help of *prāṇa*, the food begins to stink. In view of this, *prāṇa* may be regarded as more fundamental than food and thus a more appropriate symbol of Brahman. Sage Pratrda, however, is of the view that since *prāṇa* is prone to dry up when deprived of food, it alone cannot represent Brahman fully. He maintains that since a combination of *prāṇa* and food both leads life to the final end, they together can form a befitting symbol of Brahman.

The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* regards *prāṇa* as a symbol of Brahman from a different viewpoint. While Pratrda chooses, *prāṇa* to represent Brahman from the individual viewpoint, Bhrgu of the *Taittirīya* does the same from the universal. Having broken the bounds of individuality through *tapa*, he visualises *prāṇa* as the universal principle serving as source, support and

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final resort of all the creatures. In view of this, he took *prāṇa* itself as Brahman for the time being. But, on being asked to practice *tapas* again, when he reaches a higher state in his spiritual pursuit, he comes to understand his limitation in regarding *prāṇa* itself as Brahman. Nevertheless, his one time identification of Brahman in the form of *prāṇa* leaves the latter as a symbol of Brahman for the use of hose trading on the path made by him. What is a provisional reality to the path-maker, serves as a symbol for his follower. Symbolism often thrives on mistakes of the pioneer, if however, they are of fundamental nature.

Another feature of the symbol is brought out in the conversation between Sanatkumāra and Nārada as recounted in the *Chāndogya*. When Narada asked if there was anything more profound than hope as Brahman, Sanatkumara came forward with *prāṇa*. His argument for he suggestion is the convergence of everything towards *prāṇa* in the same way as the spokes converge towards the hub of the wheel. As the hub determines the movement of the spokes, so *prāṇa* determines the course of life of the organic beings. All sorts of human or, indeed, organic relationship are based on the functioning of *prāṇa*. Hence it is regarded as all-comprehending. On account of these characteristics, it is suggested by Sanatkumāra as a symbol of Brahman well in supersession of hope. Obviously, the account strikes a balance between the universal and the individual aspects of the symbol *prāṇa* is an individual as well as universal phenomenon. With all its universality, it is operative within each and every person with utmost individual difference. In view of this twofold function, *prāṇa* is aptly made a symbol of Brahman which, though transcendent, assumes the form of the universe on the one hand and of the individual on the other.

Each act of symbolisation tends o culminate in complete identification of the symbolised content with the symbolic object. This is true in the case of *prāṇa* also. What was only proposed as a symbol of Brahman in the *Chāndogya*, comes to be regarded as a complete symbolic substitute in the *Muṇḍuka*. With reference to *prāṇa*, it describes Brahman as follows:

> Verily it is *prāṇa* which shines everywhere through the beings. Understanding it, the wise does not talk of anything else.
>
> So is the case with the *Kaṭha*. According to it,
>
> The whole of the manifest world, whatever, moves in *prāṇa*. (It is) the great terror, the upraised thunderbolt (as it were). Those know it, become immortal.

Eye, Ear Mind and Heart

Eye is another organic symbol of Brahman referred to in the conversation between king Janaka and sage Yājñavalkya in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. This section follows immediately the one dealing with *prāṇa*. The symbol was suggested to the king by one Barku Varsna. When the sage asked the king whether he teacher told him anything about the abode and support of the eye as Brahman, the king answered in the negative. Then the sage expressed his disapproval of the teaching in the same way as he did in the case of *prāṇa*. He said that the Eye-Brahman, if shorn of the idea of abode and support, is only one-footed. Being requested by the king, he completes the symbol by referring to the eye itself as its abode, space as its support and truth as is inherent nature. What Barku had given as the reason for the symbolisation of Brahman by eye was the latter's capability of seeing which was essential of life. Yājñavalkya takes this reason to be

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inadequate, for, it, according to him, is based on an utterly partial view of Brahman. As would be the view of reality, so would be our reasoning about it. If the view is inadequate, the reasoning also would be inadequate. In the present case, the fact on which Barku lays the foundation of the symbol is the eye's capability of representing things truly. As the foundation itself was shaky, the symbol could not be durable.

Ear is another symbol suggested to the king in this context by one Gardabhīvipīta Bhāradvāja. The reason was the indispensability of hearing in life. On enquiry, the sage again found that this symbol also was incomplete, since it represented Brahman only as one-footed. On request by the king, he mentions ear itself as the abode, space as the support and infinity as its inherent nature. Thus, in supersession of hearing, which was suggested by Bharadvaja as the ground for the symbol, the sage refers to the infinity.

The next symbol suggested to the king in this context is mind. It came one Satyakama Jābāla. The ground for it, as suggested originally, is the indispensability of mind in life. The sage denounces the symbol as well as its ground as inadequate, for, it, in his view, represents Brahman as one-footed. On request by the king, he suggests mind itself as the abode, space as the support and delight as the inherent nature of the symbol. Thus the earlier ground is replaced here by delight.

Finally, there is the mention of heart as a symbol of Brahman. It was suggested by one Vidagdha Śākalya. The ground as suggested here originally is the indispensability of heart in life. But the sage finds this symbol also inadequate without the knowledge of its abode, support and intrinsic nature. When requested by the king, he refers to heart itself as the abode, space as the support, and stability as the inherent nature. Thus, he replaces the original ground by stability.

What interests us in these details is that Yājñavalkya, as well as each one of the six teachers quoted here, admits the symbolic equivalence of the respective organ with Brahman, alone with this difference, however, that while the other teachers propose the organs as complete symbols in themselves, Yājñavalkya takes them as incomplete without a threefold association with as many principles. The first of these principles is the particular organ itself conceived as the abode Introduction of the concept of abode presupposes the distinction between the dwelling and the dweller which seem to have been confused with each other by the teachers. By suggesting the distinction, Yājñavalkya probably means to say that speech, *prāṇa* etc. are not merely tools of respective bodily functions. Each one of them is rather to be regarded as a channel of something much higher. Speech, for instance, is not merely a product of various parts of the vocal organ functioning with the help of air. It, on the contrary, is to be regarded as having its origin in something higher which manifests itself eventually through the organ. So is the case with *prāṇa* and the rest. *prāṇa* is not merely the inhaled air. It is the same higher force manifesting itself through the air. It is, therefore, essential to know that higher force which canalises itself through the organs. Space is the third principle serving as the common background of all these manifestations. It is due to being sat against this background that speech, *prāṇa*, eye, ear, mind and heart and in a position to function. In absence of this background, the stream of the higher force would not come down and the physical channels would inevitably be dried up.

The fourth principle involved here is a

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
group of six factors, namely, intelligence, dearness, truth, infinity, delight and stability as corresponding to speech, *prāṇa*, eye, ear, mind and heart respectively. The factors are really values emanating from the canalisation of the higher principle through the respective physical organs as set against the background of space. It is this principle which assumes the form of these human values when canalised in space through the human life, understanding and expression.


The values may be divided into two groups: I. truth, intelligence and delight and II. stability, infinity and dearness. Factors of the two groups seem to correspond with one another. Thus truth seems to be correlative to stability, intelligence to infinity and delight to dearness. All the six, therefore, are reducible into three of the either group. It is the supernal principle which, having space for its background, manifests itself in the form of truth, intelligence and delight or stability, infinity and dearness. Now we may convert truth, intelligence and delight into the well known triad to sat, cit and *ānanda* which are regarded as the most intimate characteristics of Brahman. Similarly, stability, infinity and dearness may be taken to signify stasis, dynamics and self-fulfillment. Thus, it is Brahman which manifests itself as truth through the eye, as intelligence through the vocal organ, as delight through the mind, as stability through the heart, as infinity through the ear and as dearness through the *prāṇa*.

Whereas the six teachers had taken these organs merely as a means of fulfilling the necessities of life, Yājñavalkya regards them as channels of manifestation of Brahman in the form of the six values. While according to the teachers, the organs symbolise Brahman by virtue of being the sole means of facing the hard reality of life, according to Yājñavalkya, they do that on account of serving as channels of its manifestation. If Brahman supports the world as well as the individual in a metaphysical sense, the organs support the life of the individual in the actual sense: this is the reason put forward by the teachers for the symbolic equivalence. As distinct from the above, in Yājñavalkya's view, the organs are regarded as symbolically equivalent to Brahman on account of serving as actual avenues to the manifestation of Brahman in the form of the values. Thus, whereas the teachers are analogical in their approach, Yājñavalkya is psychological.

It is probably due to being merely analogical that the symbolic Brahman suggested by each one of the teachers is characterised by Yājñavalkya as one-footed. Just as on animal cannot move if rendered one-footed, even so the one-footed Brahman cannot be expected to be serviceable. This exemplifies how a symbol, though started just analogically, proceeds gradually towards substantial equivalence.

The present account of feet of Brahman is closely related to one discussed earlier in this chapter as occurring in the *Chāndogya*. If we compare to two accounts, we would find that the one occurring in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* is more psychological than that in the *Chāndogya*. As regards the latter, its conceptions of Mind-Brahman and Space-Brahman may be put cojointly as under:





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In this symbolic scheme, the entire psycho-physical world is conceived as the four feet of Brahman. A slightly different scheme is suggested by Satyakama Jabala. It may be put as under:

Brahman

East, West South, North	Earth, Atmos-phere Sky, Ocean	Fire, Sun Moon Light-ning	Breath, Eye, Ear Mind
Shining	Endless	Luminous	Psychic

This scheme envisages the horizontal divisions of space as one of the feet, the vertical as the second, the luminaries as the third and the psycho-physical organs as the fourth. Thus, in the scheme also, the psychic and the physical are put together as feet of Brahman but with this difference, however, that whereas in the previous scheme the four psychic principle share equally with the physical entities in constituting the four feet, in the latter scheme they all combine to constitute only one foot. It is obvious that though putting together almost the same principles and entities as in the previous one, this scheme changes the ratio of the psychic and the physical. If in the previous one the psychic manifests itself through the physical in all its forms, in the present scheme it is relegated to only one foot. This difference notwithstanding, both these schemes cover the entire psycho physical world together in symbolising the four feet of Brahman.

This, however, is not the case with the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. Here all the psychic principles are put separately, each being used in itself as a complete symbol of Brahman, taking for its background the space which is the source of all physical entities. The following charts would bear out the point:

Speech-Brahman

Speech	Speech	Space	Intelligence

Prāna-Brahman

Breath	Breath	Space	Dearness

Eye-Brahman

Eye	Eye	Space	Truth

Ear-Brahman

Ear	Ear	Space	Infinity

Mind-Brahman

Mind	Mind	Space	Delight

Heart-Brahman

Heart	Heart	Space	Stability

If we glance over all the charts together, it would be evident that the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* begin where the *Chāndogya* ends its idea of the feet of Brahman. For, while the *Chāndogya* ends with the envisagement of the psychic principles as the last of the feet, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* takes each one of those very principles as the first of the feet in each symbolic scheme. For the rest, it retraces the course of the same Upaniṣad backward. The world *āyatanavat*, dweller, used for the psychic feet in the *Chāndogya* seems to have served as the background of the distinction between the dwelling and the dweller, *āyatana* and *āyatanavat*, in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. The third food in all the six schemes of this Upaniṣad in invariably space. This seems

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to have been suggested by the Space-Brahman of the *Chāndogya*. For he idea of the fourth foot in all the schemes, the Upaniṣad seem to have depended considerably on the *Chāndogya's* Mind-Brahman. For, intelligence, dearness, truth, infinity, delight, and stability, all are conceptual.

Apart from indicating for this section of the Upaniṣad a data later than that for the corresponding section of the *Chāndogya*, which also is supported by the mention of Satyakāma Jābāla as one of the teachers whose views have obviously been improved upon by Yājñavalkya, the above details unmistakably evince the organismic bent of the sages' thinking about Brahman. Starting no matter weather from the side of physical entities or from the side of psychic principles, one cannot stop short of reaching the other end. If one starts from the side of the physical, one would ultimately comprehend within one's symbolic scheme the psychic as well. Conversely, if one starts from the side of the psychic, one cannot but bring the physical also within one's fold. This is all due to the absolutistic character of the concept of Brahman. If Brahman is all and, at that, organic, its conception cannot be complete unless it is made to comprehend the physical as well as the psychic.

FOOD VALUE

Prāṇa or vital being is the primary secular value according to the Upaniṣads. It is the principle of living and is the fundamental basis of man's existence. It supports and sustains all organs and activities of the body. As the principle of living it is the primary condition of all cultural activities and achievements of man. It is also the condition of the spiritual philosophy, i.e. of exploration of spirit and its attainment in life. The allegories of the Upaniṣads have rightly demonstrated the supremacy of Prāṇa over all organs and senses of man.

Prāṇa or vital being depends on food. Though food is assimilated by the vital power of Prāṇa, yet physically it is food which nourishes Prāṇa ad reinforces its vital power. Body without Prāṇa is dead and it decomposes. But Prāṇa withers without food. Food nourishes, sustains and supports it. With all the lofty idealism and spiritualism, the Upaniṣads candidly recognise the basic secular value of food as the sustainer of life and thus as the primary condition of all nature and cultural activities and achievements of man. As the importance of Prāṇa or vital being is demonstrated by parables in the Upaniṣads, so the value of food also is elucidate by parables with crucial messages. Both these parables are contained in the Chhandogya Upaniṣad. One of these appears at the beginning of the Upaniṣad in which sage Ushashti is presented as starving due to drought in the region. He begs of boiled pulses from an elephant keeper to save himself from starvation. He abandons hygienic and cultural considerations in doing so. He acknowledges that he accepts food from an elephant keeper because he could not survive without food.

After saving his life by begged food sage Ushashtic attended a sacrifice organised by a King where it was to be considered as to which deity was to be invoked at the sacrifice. Ushashti proposed there that this deity was *Prāṇa* or vital being. Later he proposed that this deity was food as all people lived by food. Ushashti propounds the general principle that all people live by food. The other parable is found towards the end of the Chhandogya Upaniṣad. It pertains to Shwetaketu who was asked by his father Arun to observe a fast of a fortnight for attaining spiritual enlightenment. After the fast Shwetaketu

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became so feeble that he could not recite and understand the hymns of the Vedas. His father Aruna told him that his vital being was exhausted for want of food even as fire is extinguished without fuel. He asked the son to take food and said that his vitality will revive by food just as dying fire flames up when fed by fresh fuel. The Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣad also supports the moral of the Chhandogya Upaniṣad and says that 'vital being withers without food.' The Chhandogya Upaniṣad also supports the view that vital being seeks food for its sustenance.

Food is the support of vital being. It is also the seed of the body. Food is regarded as Prajapati i.e. the god of generation. Food is transformed into semen and semen is the seed of body from which creatures are born.

Mind also depends of food. The Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad holds that mind is made of food. The Chhāndogya Upaniṣad maintains that mind is material in nature and it is formed of food. Mind is made of the finest element in food, the cruder elements compose other parts of the body. We can find in this material view of mind the ancient traces of the later Samkhya theory and the modern psychology which understand mind as material.

Food is so highly regarded in the Upaniṣads that it is even approximated to ultimate reality. The Brihadaranyaka Upaniṣad on one occasion declares that food is Brahman or supreme reality. The Tattiriya Upaniṣad contains a whole treatise on food. Bhrigu at a stage of the his quest for ultimate reality arrives at the belief that food is the ultimate reality. Man is composed of the essence of food. Bhrigu came to realize that man are born of food and live by food.

Upon this realization of Bhrigu follows the gospel of food which is so prominent in the Taittiriya Upaniṣad. It is the most secular part of Upaniṣad and dispels the views which holds the Upaniṣads to be other-worldly and world-denying. What is more secular and more earthly than food? And what philosophy can be more secular than the philosophy which approximates food to ultimate reality.

The Taittirīya gospel of food contains sacred injunctions regarding food. It exhorts us not to disregard food. And to gather as much food as possible for ourselves and for our guests who are greatly regarded in Indian tradition. The national motto of 'grow more food' adopted by the Agricultural Ministry of India is borrowed from this Taittiriya gospel of food.

The food has also psychological and moral effect on man's mind by its associations. If it is acquired by labour it is good, if it is acquired by exploitation it is evil. One who accepts food from somebody also shares his merit or sin. Here we find a basis for ethical economy which can be the basis of socialism.

Not only food but water also is given due importance in Upaniṣads. The Chhandogya considers it more important than food and it is so in some respects. One can live without food for some days but not without water.

The recognition of the importance of food and water is an undeniable evidence of the realism and secularism which forms the foundation of Upaniṣadic spiritualism.

FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH (VON) SCHELLING (1775 - 1854)

In the history of western philosophical thought it is in the system of Schelling that a direct impact of the Upaniṣadic pantheism can be discovered for the first time. Anquetil Duperron's French translation of Upaniṣads was published in

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1775, the year of Schelling's birth. The major works of Schelling, we know, came to light at the fag end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. As to the circulation of the French translation nothing is definitely known and the Latin rendering was published in 1801-1802. Some of the principal works of Schelling had already been published by this time. The question may naturally arise as to how and when Schelling was influenced by the Upaniṣadic thought.

The first point in favour of the observation we have made is that Schelling had the opportunity of studying the French rendering of the Upaniṣads, and the inference that Schelling actually read those renderings contains a high degree of probability. Further Schelling had a deep admiration for the Upaniṣad—a fact which is corroborated by MaxMüller when he says: "That Schelling and the school should use rapturous language about the Upaniṣads might carry little weight with that large class of philosophers by whom everything beyond the clouds of their own horizon is labelled mysticism". In recording his personal experience in 'The Sacred Books of the East' MaxMüller says that he had the privilege of coming in close contact with Schelling at Berlin when Schelling was a teacher of the Berlin University and MaxMuller a student. To quote MaxMüller again: "My real love for Sanskrit Literature was first kindled by the Upaniṣads. It was in the year 1844 when attending Schelling's lectures at Berlin that my attention was drawn to those ancient theosophic treatises and I still possess my collation of Sanskrit M/SS which had then arrived at Berlin, the Chambers Collection and my copies of commentaries and commentaries on commentaries which I made at that time. Some of my translation which I left with Schelling I have never been able to recover". The intimate personal relation which MaxMüller had developed with Schelling bears out that Schelling had been entertaining for, long a keen interest in and deep reverence for the profound teachings of the Upaniṣads. It is for this reason that he eagerly desired a wide circulation of the Upaniṣads and insisted on MaxMüller's translating those immortal treatises. This attitude of Schelling obviously brings out that he must have had some acquaintance with the Upaniṣads much earlier. We can, therefore, reasonably infer that his philosophy is influenced to a considerable degree by the Upaniṣadic teaching. His pantheism as we shall explain here, will go a long way in ratifying our impression.

Distinct phases of Schellings thought

What we must note at the beginning of our analysis is that in the history of modern western philosophy Schelling's reputation has considerably been on the wane and he has been given very little attention by the critics and historians presumably for the fact that there is no closely knit system which can properly be called Schelling's system of thought. The different phases of his philosophy are found to have recorded the different current of thought and it is difficult to trace any logical connection between the preceding thought and the succeeding one. It is also difficult to ascertain the exact number of phases through which Schelling's thoughts seem to have passed. The programme for a system of philosophy as drawn up by Schelling in his youth (in 1796) helps us know the province of philosophy he wanted to cover. This programme, apparently quite illuminating, amply illustrates a sort of discontinuity in his thought. Starting from all the Fichtean trappings of his early writings down to the posthumously published works such as 'Philosophie der Offenbarung' (Philosophy

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of Revelation) and 'Philosophie der Mythologie' (Philosophy of Mythology) certain distinct phases can be traced. But no such claim, if there be any, can be vindicated that each of these phases constitutes a self-enclosed system. Schelling's works as per his premeditated programme illustrate only the continuity of his philosophising, not the continuity of the thoughts or ideas. Hence his philosophy is just philosophising rather than a finished and coherent system.

In the first phase of his philosophical career Schelling is found to have developed his Philosophy of Nature which led him to the concept of a 'World Soul' which is very much akin to the concept of Brahman developed in the Upaniṣads. In his series of publications on the philosophy of Nature Schelling moves from the objective to subjective, from the lowest grades of nature to the organic sphere. But his 'Transcendental Idealism published immediately after this series shows the influence of Fichte's theory of Science ('Wissenschaftslehre') because here Schelling starts with the ego and proceeds to trace the process of its self objectification. His transcendental idealism, however, culminates in a philosophy of art, for in 1802-03 he lectured on the philosophy of art at Jena and declared art as the key to the nature of reality. This fact alone is adequate to show the marked difference between his outlook and that of Fichte. The philosophical treatises that followed subsequently viz. 'Exposition of the true relation of Nature Philosophy to amended Fichtean views', 'Philosophy of Religion' etc. indicate a departure to a completely new direction of thought. At the early stage of his thought Schelling conceives God as an all-comprehensive Reality. But later he seems to have been influenced by Plato and accordingly holds that the Infinite is the only Reality and the world of finite beings in not real. This evidently contradicts his earlier viewpoint on God and His relation to the finite world. As a matter of fact Schelling seems to be drifting to a different position under the influence of Jacob Boehme - a mystical thinker of the late 16th and early 17 th century. Schelling's earlier conviction of the intellectual perception of the Absolute and the construction of the whole of Nature as the manifestation of the Absolute is replaced by the thought that the origin of the world is to be found in the falling away from God. ('Abbrechen von Gott'). "From the absolute to the real there is no continuous transition; the origin of the sensible world is thinkable only as a complete breaking away from Absoluteness by means of a leap". This position is explained by Schelling in some detail to show that the 'essence' of the finite thing is 'infinite', but considered precisely and exclusively as a finite thing it is an image of an image (i.e., an image of the ideal essence which is itself a reflection of the Absolute) resembling the shadow accompanying the body. In other words, its existence as a distinct finite thing is an alienation from the Absolute, a negation of infinity. Finite things are not, however, simply nothing. They are, in the language of Plato, mixture of being and non-being. Particularity or finitude represents the negative element. Hence the emergence of the world of particular and finite things - i.e., 'Nature Naturata' is a fall from the Absolute. Deviating again, as he does, from his previous theory of the Absolute in relation to the world, Schelling passes on the another conception of God as an actually existing personal Being whom a truly religious man needs and through whose activity or grace man can overcome his state of alienation and be redeemed. This viewpoint is adopted and dealt with

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elaborately in his Philosophy of Mythology and Philosophy of Revelation.

It is, therefore, not surprising that Schelling faces invectives of the critics for not formulating a coherent system of thought. But it must be noted that Schelling advances his own arguments in support of his rapidly changing stand-points. When his Philosophy of Nature was published his own distinctive contribution to German idealism together with his divergence from Fichte was noted by all But when this work was followed by the publication of 'Transcendental Idealism' critics found the Fichtean leanings in it But in Schelling's opinion his transcendental idealism is only a necessary complement to his Philosophy of Nature. Schelling's argument runs thus: 'In knowledge itself subject and object are united: They are one. But if we wish to explain this identity, we have first to think it away. And then we are faced with two possibilities. Either we can start with the objective and proceed towards the subjective, asking how unconscious Nature comes to be represented. Or we can start with the subjective and proceed towards the objective, asking how an object comes to exist for the subject. In the first case we develops the conditions for its own self-reflection on the subjective level. In the second case we develop the the system of transcendental idealism, showing how the ultimate immanent principle of consciousness produces the objective world as the condition of its attainment of self consciousness. And the two lines of reflection are must be complementary. .... It is Schelling's conviction that the mutually complementary characters of the Philosophy of Nature and the system of transcendental idealism manifest the nature of the Absolute as identity of subject and object, of the ideal and the real'.

Schelling tries to justify his position, particularly with reference to the contentions made in his later works, by drawing a distinction between a negative philosophy which deals with concepts and essences, and a positive philosophy which puts emphasis on existence. A true philosophy, he says, seeks to discover the ultimate principle or reality. But the negative philosophy discovers this reality as a supreme essence or absolute Idea. And from a supreme essence or Idea we can deduce only the other ideas. From a 'what' we can not deduce a 'that'. The negative philosophy thus fails to explain the existent world. Positive philosophy on the other hand does not simply deal with God as an 'Idea' as a 'what' or essence, but as a pure 'that' i.e., as pure act or Being in an existential sense. Here God is not understood to be an impersonal Idea, but a creative personal Being, the existing lord of the universe. But as it is impossible to construct any system of thought without concepts, Schelling does not overlook the value of negative philosophy. All that he wants to say is that there is a 'connection or the unity between the two'. It is for this reason that Schelling shifts from the idea of the impersonal Absolute to the conception of a personal God. He justifies his stand by holding the view that the existence of a personal God is based on an act of faith demanded by the will. In other words, a truly religious man definitely needs a personal Deity who should be actually existing, creative and redeeming Being. In Schelling's word - 'the person seeks a person'. This personal God reveals Himself and accomplishes man's redemption. He is not conceived just as a Kantian postulate for synthesizing virtue and happiness. "The longing for the real God and for redemption through Him is, as you see, nothing else but the expression

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of the need of religion. ..... At the end of negative philosophy I have only possible and not actual religion, religion only within the limits of bare reason. It is with the transition to positive philosophy that we first enter the sphere of religion.

It may occur to our mind why Schelling concentrated so much on the study of mythology and revelation and did not abandon his earlier contentions, or why again he did not reshuffle his Philosophical thought in the light of the distinction made between positive and negative philosophy. Possibly Schelling, at the later stage of his philosophical thinking, was very much keen on demonstrating the nature thinking, was very much keen on demonstrating the nature of actual religion and its needs and on relating the history or religious consciousness to the history of divine self-revelation to man. He never intended to annual his earlier metaphysical speculations. He is found to have reiterated his conviction all through that philosophy as a whole must be a combination of positive and negative philosophy. It is true, as Copleston observes, that 'if we look at Schelling's philosophical pilgrimage as a whole, there is obviously a great difference between its point of departure and point of arrival. Since Schelling fails to give us a closely-knit system he does not escape the scathing diatribes of his critics who maintain that his early pantheistic view is replaced in his works on mythology and revelation by a sort of speculative theism. But if we consider Schelling's thought with an initial sympathy with his mentality, it may not be difficult for us to discover that to raise contradiction in thought was not his aim. When he deals with a problem and reaches a conclusion, fresh problems arise for him which again demand the adoption of a new standpoint. But nevertheless, he has tried to synthesize the apparently conflicting points of view and to show that they were really complementary. Of all his earlier writing his Philosophy of Nature has a special importance in that the doctrine of pantheism is demonstrated here with adequate clarity for the first time in the history of western thought and it is here that he sems to have been profoundly influenced by the Upaniṣadic thought. What is therefore chiefly relevant for our purpose is to pause and consider the principal current of thought indicated in his philosophy of Nature.

The possibility and metaphysical grounds of a Philosophy of Nature

From the common sense point of view man looks upon 'Nature' as an objective reality. A rift is thus sought to be maintained between what is subjective and what is objective. Generally speaking the distinction between the objective external world of nature and the subjective inner life of ideas i.e., between 'Nature' and 'Spirit' is considered to be the result of reflection of man. The opposition between Nature and Spirit thus becomes conspicuous and man is set apart of alienated as it were from nature altogether. Schelling's idealistic outlook overcomes this rift and restores or original unity between Nature and Spirit. Schelling explicitly states that a philosopher must exhibit that Nature is 'visible spirit' and Spirit 'invisible Nature'. In his view nature is ideal through and through in the sense that it is an immediate manifestation of the Absolute. - A unified Self-organising, dynamic and teleological system which moves and develops as it were, to the emergence of consciousness and to Nature's knowledge of itself in and through human spirit. Now this picture of Nature, Schelling holds, helps us remove the

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supposed antagonism between Nature and Spirit, the real and the ideal. Schelling is of opinion that both Spinoza and Leibnitz are found to have had an inkling of this truth that the ideal and the real are ultimately one, although their modes of explanation of the relation between the ideal and the real are somewhat different and also faulty. Spinoza has explained the correspondence between them by means of parallel modifications of thought and extension of one infinite substance, while Leibnitz has recourse to the theory of 'Pre-established harmony'. Schelling thinks that Spinoza finally leaves the modes unexplained and Leibnitz only makes an inexplicable postulate of pre-established harmony. But in spite of their faulty explanation they have vaguely suggested the ultimate unity of the real and the ideal, of Nature and Spirit which a philosopher must exhibit. Schelling has conviction that the intelligibility of Nature of per-supposed in all scientific enquiries. In all scientific investigation Nature is forced to respond whenever any question is put to it. This clearly indicates that Nature conforms to the demand of reason and thereby makes itself intelligible and in this sense it is ideal.

Now the question may be raised as to what exactly is the justification of the view of Nature as outlined by Schelling. The ultimate justification is for him a metaphysical theory about the Absolute. To quote Schelling:— "The first step towards philosophy and the indispensable condition for even arriving at it is to understand that the Absolute in the ideal order is also the Absolute in the real order.' The Absolute, in other words, is the pure identity of subjectivity and objectivity and this identity is reflected in the mutual interpenetration of Nature and Nature's knowledge of itself in and through man. Schelling's observations sometimes appear to be confusing and misleading for the hold that nature as a system of particular things i.e., 'Nature naturata', considered as the symbol or appearance of Absolute in the ideal order (i.e., of 'Nature Naturans' — to use Spinoza's term), is said to be outside the Absolute. It is not unlikely for the critics to infer from this proposition that Schelling makes a distinction between the unchanging Absolute in itself and the world of particular things. But this is not the actual explanation Schelling intends to advance. It must be taken note of, as we shall consider later, that the Absolute, in Schelling's view is an all-comprehensive Reality. For the present we may content ourselves with the general picture of the Absolute as the eternal essence or Idea objectifying itself in Nature and finally knowing itself as the identity of the real and the ideal, of Nature and Spirit. The supratemporal life of the Absolute as pure essence is manifested in the temporal order of this world that stands to the Absolute in itself as consequent to the antecedent. Schelling thus advances a metaphysical justification of the possibility of a philosophy of Nature whose purpose is to develop a systematic ideal construction of Nature by removing the supposed cleavage between the subjective and the objective. Nature which ordinarily appears as lifeless must be shown to have life at all its levels. The Philosophy of Nature must, therefore, demonstrate how nature by virtue of its independent power and potentialities exhibits itself as a living organic unity. Nature, in fact, is nothing but the 'Extinguished Spirit' and the manifestation of the Absolute Ego'. We shall now see how Schelling proceeds to conclude this way and with what results.

Analysis of Philosophy of Nature

In analysing Nature Schelling has dealt with three different concepts viz. (1)

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Organic Nature, (ii) Inorganic Nature and (iii) Reciprocity between the organic and inorganic Nature.

In the organic sphere Nature is creative. There is slow but ceaseless activity in the bosom of Nature. Now this activity lying at the basis of Nature expands itself in the phenomenal world and is infinite and unlimited, for Nature is, as supposed by Schelling, the self-objectification of the Infinite Absolute. Had there been no opposition to this eternal act, Nature would than have created everything at a time and everything would have been in finite. That is to say, this finite world of experience would not have been created. Hence it can be reasonably inferred that the act of creation or the urge of the organic nature to create is thwarted by some opposing force, which force is also within the Nature itself. Schelling does not make any categorical observation as to what this opposing force is. But in all probability he wants to say, it is matter or material force as is demonstrated later in the philosophy of Bergson.

Organic Nature thus appears o involve two opposing forces, one of which helps and the other hinders the act of creation. The opposition if found to exist in all organic objects as a result of which only like beings are produced and no organic being is capable of creating any object basically different from it. The aim of Nature is not to produce infinite variety of individual and particular objects; it proceeds onwards in its ceaseless creative urge only for the preservation of organism as a class. The particular individual being is ignored as it were having been regarded only as a means to an end. In its creative activity Nature exhibits the adaptation of means to an end. The particular individual organic being is even destroyed as it is deemed necessary for the preservation of a class or race which Nature finally aims at. Organic Nature has three fundamental qualities viz., reproductivity, irritability and sensibility dominating the plants, lower animals and men in varying degrees. There are obviously distinguishable levels within the organic sphere itself. The living organisms whose sensibility plays a dominant role (e.g., in man) belong to the higher level. Again those who display a comparatively strong mark of irritability belong to the second group, and on the lower levels reproductivity is particularly conspicuous whereas sensibility and irritability are comparatively undeveloped and it is clearly manifested in the vegetable kingdom.

As opposed to the organic sphere there is 'Inorganic Nature' which is devoid of creative power. This sphere is just a conglomeration of different material phenomena. Distance from one another, they are only spatially located side by side. The power which holds them together is gravitation existing apart from them. The inorganic sphere bears some resemblance to the organic one in spite of the basic difference between the two, for some amount of activity is traceable even in the inorganic level. The reproductive activity of the organism, for instance, is found in the form of chemical action of different matters (e.g., combustion). In the same way what is irritability and sensibility in the organic sphere is comparable to electricity and magnetism respectively in the inorganic sphere.

It appears from above, as Schelling expressly states, that there is an interaction or reciprocity between the organic and the inorganic level. Without the existence of the inorganic level organic Nature can not function. In other words, it is by depending on the material or the inorganic sphere that organic Nature reveals itself. To make his position clear Schelling refers to the faulty standpoint of

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the materialists according to whom there is a sharp opposition between the mechanical laws of the inorganic and the laws of the organic life. The materialist tends to reduce the higher level to the lower and seeks to explain the organic life in terms of mechanical causality without introducing the concept of finality. In Schelling's view a philosopher is primarily concerned with exhibiting the fundamental and necessary teleological pattern in Nature, and to do this it is necessary to show that the explanation of the lower is always to be found in the higher. It is true that from the temporal point of view the inorganic is prior to the organic, but from the philosophical point of view the latter is logically prior to the former. In other words, the lower level exists as a foundation for the higher level and the latter subsumes the former in itself. Hence there is no point in denying or suspending the laws of mechanics in the organic sphere. Rather these laws serve as the necessary setting in the realization of the ends of Nature in the production of organism. Viewed thus, 'the opposition between mechanism and the organic sphere disappears.

Apart from this argument, as Schelling proceeds to contend, the point of opposition between mechanism and the organic sphere is more easily overcome if Nature as a whole is looked upon as an organic unity. On the lowest level which Schelling calls the first potency (Potenz) of Nature, there is an elementary operation of the forces of attraction and repulsion and their synthesis in matter is mass. AT the higher level i.e., in the second potency of Nature the same forces are found in the phenomena of magnetism, electricity and chemical processes. At a still higher level i.e., in the third potency of Nature again the same forces are found to have actualized their potentialities in the phenomena of sensibility, irritability and reproduction. This is the level of organism. Schelling thus holds that Nature can not at any level be regarded as lifeless. Copleston rightly interprets when he says: "It is a living organic unity which actualizes its potentialities at ascending levels until it expresses itself in the organism." Just as in the organic Nature there is adequate evidence of teleological action in the same way in the inorganic Nature also there is a 'dynamic order' of power.

It is on this ground that Schelling infers that both the organic and the inorganic level originate from one source. A third reality is thus posited who is supposed to hold and regulate these two levels together. Throughout his construction of Nature, as we have seen, Schelling employs the idea of polarity of forces. But to quote Schelling, - "these two conflicting forces lead to the idea of an organizing principle which makes the world a system." To this organizing principle is given the time hallowed name of 'World-Soul'. This World-Soul preserves the existence of the organic and the inorganic Nature and thus holds the entire universe within itself and makes the interaction of the two levels possible.

In other words, both the organic and the inorganic levels are the manifestations of one World Soul who stands related to the former just as a whole is related to its parts. That the organic and the inorganic world are so intimately related is due to the fact that the same force or power is manifested in both. Organic sphere, as we have indicated, is only a higher level than the inorganic. Magnetism, electricity and chemical action dominating the inorganic are also found in the organic level in the form of sensibility. Irritability and reproduction. Hence it is maintained that the force which regulates human thought

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also regulates Nature as a whole.

In other words, the entire Nature covering the organic and the inorganic level is permeated by one unifying Supreme Soul. This concept of World-Soul is considered by Schelling to be postulate or "An hypothesis of the higher physics for explaining the universal organism". In itself the World-Soul is not a conscious intelligence. It is just a creative and organizing principle manifesting itself in Nature and attaining consciousness in and through the human ego. It is the universal spirit or reason the conception of which is broadened by Schelling so as to include the unconscious, instinctive, purposive force manifesting itself in inorganic Natue as well as in the self-conscious mind of man. It is thus pure activity or self-determining creative energy which is common to both uncounscious nature and self-conscious mind. It is the absolute ground or source of all things. Schelling opines, it is the absolute will or ego-the one all-pervading world-spirit in which everything dwells in potency and from which everything actual proceeds. Thus thought and beings, or the ideal and the real are virtually identical in their root. Schelling believes that unless we postulate the world-Soul, we can not look upon Nature as a unified, self-developing super organism.

Schelling's construction of Nature, as we have indicated, in sometimes objected to by saying that it appears to be somewhat fanciful and arbitrary to the scientific mind. But even if we overlook the details of Schelling's theoretical construction of Nature, that is, the allegedly fanciful speculations about magnetism, electricity, chemical process and the like, there is no gainsaying that in its general outlines his philosophy of Nature has an abiding value in so far as Nature is here presented as an immediate and objective manifestation of the Absolute and as a teleological system. Nature is here ideal through and through, not in the sense that it is the creation of the human ego, but because it expresses the eternal 'Idea' and because it is oriented towards self-reflection in and through human mind.

As an ardent sponsor of idealistic philosophy Schelling attempts to explain the world of experience in terms of mind. But in so doing he clearly opposes his predecessor Fichte's conception of Nature according to which Nature is the product of the Absolute Ego and as such it only serves as an impediment or incentive to our will. Reality, according to Schelling, is at bottom a living self-determining process, almost akin to the human spirit. If that is so, Nature can not be conceived as a mere external impediment to the will or as a dead mechanical order. We can understand Nature because it is not lifeless and because there is law, reason and purpose in it. There can be neither dead static substance, nor complete flux in Nature. With Fichte Schelling rejects the old notion of the unchangeable static substance and accepts instead the dynamic idea, the conception of a universal life, of a creative and purposive principle of evolution which proceeds from unconsciousness to consciousness and whose ultimate goal is reached in the self-conscious reason of man. Nature and mind, or being and thought are not the two parallel aspects of the Absolute as Spinoza thought. They are only the different stages in the evolutionary history of the Absolute. Just as in our own selves we rise from the unconscious or sub-conscious stage to clear self consciousness and yet remain one and the same self, so the universal Ego or the World Soul rises from the darkness of unconsciousness to the light of consciousness. In other words, as the principle of organisation and creative force

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it passes from the so-called dead and unconscious products of nature exhibiting unripe intelligence to the self consciousness in man. The graduated scale of the organised objects both in the organic and in the inorganic nature clearly accounts for the fact that the different forces or products of nature are fundamentally the same, for they are all held together by one creative spirit. Hence granting that Schelling in his philosophy of Nature has at times used many figures of speech or fanciful language instead of advancing adequately convincing arguments, the value of his Nature-Philosophy can not, only on this ground, be ignored. Above all else, his acceptance of a teleological viewpoint as against one-sided mechanism, his emphasis on the dynamic and evolutionary conception of reality together with his craving for unity in multiplicity are the distinctive marks of his philosophy of Nature.

From what has been said above it becomes clear that Schelling has established a pantheistic world. view or a composite monism. Thilly very aptly observes : "Schelling's philosophy in its most developed stage is a form of pantheism in which the universe is conceived as a living evolving system, an organism in which every part has its place and subserves the whole. Subject and object, form and matter, the ideal and the real are one together and inseparable. The one is in many and the many are in one. Just as in an organism we can not tear the part from the whole, nor understand the whole without its parts, so reality is an organic whole of interrelated parts". Schelling brings home to us that his reality which as an unconscious blind impulse forms and moves an individual body, becomes conscious of itself later only when it is expressed in conscious minds. While retaining its existence at the unconscious level the same reality reveals itself in numberless individual selves and becomes pure self-consciousness. Individual beings are real in so far as they are rooted in the universal Ego and they are not real as independent isolated individuals.

Impact of this Upaniṣads on Schelling

Now it will be convenient for us to trace the impact of the Upaniṣads on Schelling's thought. In the first section of our work we have made a detailed analysis of the concept of Brahman as found in the Upaniṣads. We have seen that the ancient Upaniṣads adequately explain and establish the doctrine of composite monism or pantheism. The all pervading Reality which is given different names there such as, 'Brahman' 'Atman', 'Bhuma' etc., is known to have exercised its unifying power among the heterogenous phenomena of the world of experience. The Upaniṣadic sages have expressed their earnestness to know this Supreme Spirit. Instead of establishing any devotional attachment to God or the Absolute they have only recourse to a deep intellectual faculty or intuition as the means to know Brahman who pervades the entire universe by holding everything together. Schelling likewise, as we have seen, develops the conception of an impersonal and all-pervading World-Soul emphasizing its unifying and organising power. The quintessence of the Upaniṣadic pantheism is, as we have already found, admirably illustrated in the Chandogya Upaniṣad where it is stated that all this is Brahman; everything orginates from it, is reabsorbed into it and lives in it. Schelling's concept of 'World-Soul' is an exact counterpart of this view.

In the Upaniṣads we have seen that the idealistic thought has been voluntaristic as well as teleological. It is voluntaristic in the sense that Brahman expresses His will to

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be many and thus manifests Himself in the world of multiplicity. It is again teleological in the sense that Brahman creates every thing from within Himself with a view to tasting 'ananda' or aesthetic joy. Schelling in his exposition reflects very much the Upaniṣadic spirit when he advocates that the World-Soul is a pure activity or self-determining creative energy pervading the inorganic as well as the organic nature culminating in human organism and attaining selfconsciousness in and through human ego. Schelling is particularly conscious of the task of a philosopher which consists in tracing the fundamental and necessary teleological pattern in Nature. His Nature-philosophy, as a matter of fact, has given adequate evidence of teleology. Nature at all levels has been conceived to be a living organic unity. Its objective is the production of organism as such and not any specific individual unit of it. Keeping the lower inorganic level with its mechanical laws as the necessary setting or background, this unifying force proceeds in ascending levels in the production of organism finally attaining self-consciousness in and through the human ego. There is, however, a marked difference between Schelling's concept of world-Soul and the Upaniṣadic concept of Brahman in that according to Schelling this universal spirit is in itself unconscious and it attains consciousness later as we have already seen. In the Upaniṣads the creativity and consciousness are indissolubly mixed up in the concept of Brahman and it has been well explained through the concept of *Prāṇa*.

If we penetrate into the later writings of Schelling we find that he looks upon God as a personal Being. But nevertheless the influence of the Upaniṣadic thought is not completely obliterated there, because there also the pantheistic view is retained although in a slightly modified form. Inspired by the writings of Jacob Boehme, as we have indicated earlier, Schelling has, in his later dissertations, introduced the notion of a cosmic fall and has tried to grapple with the problem of the relation between the finite individuals and Infinite Absolute. Individual beings are said to be alienated from the Absolute. The particular finite things as finite constitute the 'Nature Naturata' and it is supposed or have a relative independence or subsistence. This is strictly speaking the stand-point of a fallen creature. But their true center is Infinite Absolute and they are one in essence with Him and can rise above their egoistic point of view to the true center from which they are alienated. In determining the relation between the human spirit and this Absolute Schelling applies the notion of personality to it which is, he thinks, in itself impersonal. He, in fact, adopts this viewpoint with a view to explaining the problem of evil and the problem of freedom of will. We need not dilate on this point here. What we want to emphasize is that although Schelling here puts stress upon the personal concept of God he does not fundamentally diverge from his original pantheistic stand resorted to earlier. His pantheism at this stage is not advocated in the sense that the entire visible world or 'Natura Naturata' is identical with God, nor in the sense that the finite things are non-existent and that there is only the simple undifferentiated unity of God-head. His view is pantheistic in the sense that God is the ground or antecedent and the world is the consequent. As a consequent the world is dependent on God and not identical with Him in the sense that there is no distinction between them. Thus the world is a consequence of the first principle of God and it is a real consequence. The Divine Being manifests Himself and this manifestation is real. Hence God is self-

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revealing and self-manifesting, and all things and beings are anchored in God although distinguishable from Him.

As to the knowledge of the all-comprehensive Reality again, we find Schelling closely approaching the Upaniṣadic viewpoint. Like the Upaniṣads. Schelling also holds that some sort of intuition is necessary for the apprehension of the World-Soul. We can, therefore, make here a brief survey of the Upaniṣadic approach to Reality and this, we think, will enable us to determine to what extent Schelling is influenced by it.

The vast texture of he Upaniṣads is replete with confabulations on the knowledge of Brahman. In fact on the question as to how Brahman is known we do not find any unanimity among the Upaniṣadic writers. The different views reflected there may be categorized thus:-

(1) First, there are some who seem to rule out the possibility of knowing Brahman. To a sciolist this view may appear to be agnostic roughly corresponding to the western view of agnosticism. But it must be noted that the spirit of the Upaniṣadic sages is never agnostic. In other words, the ancient seers never convey the sense of unknowability of Brahman. All that they mean is that Brahman is not known from a limited stand-point (Khanda drsti). It is precisely this spirit that has been given elaborate exposition in different texts. In Keno' Upaniṣad, for example, Brahman is said to be beyond all comprehension ('abang manasagocara'). 'Eyes can not see Him, speech can not comprehend Him, mind can not grasp Him. So He (Brahman) can not be known. He is neither known nor unknown. The Katho' Upaniṣad sounds the same spirit when it is said : "All that can be said is that—He is and nothing more can be ascertained.

(2) Another opinion regarding the knowledge of Brahman which sometimes appears to be prominent is that Brahman can not be known but for the divine grace. It is observed that only those who attain moral perfection can reach Him. In the Katho' Upaniṣad it is clearly stated that none can claim to know Brahman through discussion and debate or through the exercise of piquant intellect or on hearing much about shastric injunctions. The person whom He greets by His own reaches Him.

(3) The path of knowledge or intellectual understanding, however, is not impugned at all. Rather the same Upaniṣad which speaks of divine grace also refers to the power of intellect in the apprehension of the Absolute. In the Katho' Upaniṣad, therefore, we find that emphasis is laid on the intellect as the most effective instrument for the knowledge of Brahman. This idea is echoed in other Upaniṣads also.

(4) Finally intellect and a sort of intuition combined together constitute another method facilitating the realization of Brahman. This view is effectively presented in the Katha and Svetasvatara Upaniṣad. The Katha Upaniṣad upholds that Brahman is not amenable to the sense of sight. The Svetasvatara Upaniṣad declares the that Brahman has created the world and He resides always in the hearts of men, while both these treatises hold that a seer realizes Him through intuition together with reason and thus becomes Amrta.

By the term 'intuition' the Upaniṣadic seers mean 'direct vision, (aparokṣānubhūti) or immediate insight into the hearth of Reality. The term 'aparoksa' is used for the nonsensuous immediate knowledge evidently to make it distinct from sensuous knowledge of object (Pratyakṣa) that is literally presented to the sense. Now this insight or vision is a

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special prerogative only of those seekers of truth whose heart is made serene and purged of all defilements and impurities of life by moral training and prolonged contemplation. Intuitive knowledge thus virtually indicates a state of mind where there is a complete fusion with the Supreme Reality. Whoever knows 'I am Brahman', becomes this all. He who knows that Supreme Reality or Brahman becomes that Brahman.

Now this intuitive apprehension is fundamentally different from conceptual knowledge. In other words intuition is not discursive understanding which operates in our epistemological enquiry. In any knowledge situation there is a duality not only between the subject and the object, but also between the 'knowledge' of the thing and the 'being' or reality of the thing. In the sphere of intuition there is no such distinction. In the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan, — "What is immediately apprehended is different from what is conceptually constructed. The self immediately known in experience is known as a that and not a 'what'. We have in this immediate apprehension a knowledge of acquaintance with being and not knowledge about its essence or nature. .... There is no 'real' but only 'logical' distinction between subject and object in the immediate intuitive awareness of self as as real being". When however, the Upaniṣads speak of intuition as the surest guide to the knowledge of Brahman, they mean by it 'intellectual' intuition and thus the supposed antagonism between intellect and intuition is sought to be obliterated by the Indian sages. The expression 'hṛdā', 'manīṣa' and 'manasā' used simultaneously make it demonstrably clear that there is no opposition between intellect and intuition. Here 'manīṣā' stands for the intellect which is different from discursive understanding in that it signifies an unerring mental faculty which controls, guides and regulates the mind. The point is further explicated by 'manasā' which stands for ratiocination which is operative only when the mind is no longer ruffled by the sensuous desires, passions and inclinations. Thus when the mind with its faculty of intellect is completely free from all that is dross, and becomes pure and serene there arises 'bodhi' or 'Vijñāna' (indicated by the word 'hṛdā') which is intuition proper. This helps one realize Brahman. Hence the passage goes : 'Tat vijñānena paripaśyanti dhīrā Ānandarūpamamṛtaṁ yadvibhāti'.

From what has been said above it becomes clear that in spite of the apparently conflicting views presented by the Upaniṣads on the knowledge of Brahman there is a main stream of thought that advocates a composite process of ratiocination and contemplation (manana and nididhyasana). The idea of divine grace does not appear to have been developed in the ancient Upaniṣads. It only gave rise to a devotional attitude (bhaktivada) wellmarked in the worship of God in the later period. That the reasoning faculty was given much importance in the Upaniṣadic age is quite understandable. But it is equally true that 'contemplation' was recognized as another important factor inextricably linked up with reasoning. It has been repeatedly observed that there is no multiplicity here, and the Absolute as one unifying Reality has to be realized by reasoning and contemplation. This idea is expressed poignantly in the different laconic sayings of the Upaniṣads. Evidently all such statements involve an intuitive element in them.

In Schelling's philosophy the Word-Soul is taken up as a postulate or an hypothesis for explaining the universal organism. But the question precisely here is : how can we be sure of this system ?

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What, in other words, is the guarantee that action or life or will is the principle of things that passes through the stages of evolution? It is true that Schelling's answer to this question is not always the same. But nevertheless at every stage of his philosophy he is found to adopt as the ideal for man, the knowledge of the Absolute through some kind of intuition. Schelling is of opinion that intellectual intuition is the unique endowment of a philosopher. Many western thinkers go along with Schelling on this point. In explaining his position Schelling maintains that point.

A brief reference to some western views on the efficacy of intuition and the actual role of reason in grasping the reality may be given in this connection.

Bradley and Bergson are of opinion that whatever be the object of knowledge-physical or non-physical intellect does not take us to the heart of it. For Bradley, thought is discursive and relational and any intellectual analysis is naturally a falsification of the real in so far as it breaks up the unity into a system of separate terms and relations. This apart, the whole life of feeling and emotion, 'the delights and pains of the flesh, the agonies and raptures of the soul' remain outside of thought. Hence Bradley recommends a higher mode of apprehension than discursive reason and maintains that the unified structure of reality is revealed more in feeling than in thought, — in what he calls the higher unity in which 'thought, feeling and volition are blended into a whole'. It is the creative effort of the whole man as distinct from mere intellectual effort that can comprehend the nature of reality. (Vide : F. H. Bradley : 'Appearance and Reality' — P 70-71 & P 160). Bergson opines that logic with its immobile and dead concepts can not know reality in its fullness; for reality, according to him, is 'Duration' — a movement, a concrete continuity, a life-flow. It is a 'continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future'. It is something that pulsates through our very being. We are, in fact, the conscious expressions of the life-flow from which the whole universe has been derived. To seize this reality in the fullest sense, Bergson holds, we have recourse not to intellect, but to intuition which means 'entering into' it. Intuition is the means whereby we plunge into the stream of flux or 'Becoming' and apprehend it from inside.

What we note in most of such opinions of the west and the east is that though intuition lies beyond intellect, it is not generally supposed to be contrary to it. Almost all the thinkers mean to say that intuition stands to intellect in the same relation as intellect stands to sense. Reflective knowledge is a preparation for the integral experience which we have in intuition. Samkara observes in his commentary on Brahmasutra (iii - 4 - 15) that the fruit of knowledge is manifest to intuition. Plato also agrees on this point when he holds that his 'Dialectic' is a progressive rational enquiry which helps the mind to a direct vision of reality. He says that the vision the 'The Good' is possible only for those who are prepared for it by intellectual discipline and hard thinking. Bergson seems to have been profited by this teaching of Plato, and we find that although he professes an opposition between intellect and intuition, he acknowledges the value of intellect very much because he repeatedly urges that intellect prepares the ground for intuition.

(Vide : Henry Bergson :— 'An Introduction to Metaphysics', — p. 77.

In explaining his position Schelling maintains that the living, moving element in nature, the inner meaning of reality can be grasped not by the scientific under-

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standing with its spatial, temporal and causal categories, but through intuition. In the final stage of his philosophical thinking, however, we find him resorting to a sort of religious mysticism, conceiving the world as a 'fall' from God-a personal Being, and the goal of man as a return to God. Here the human soul strips off its self-hood and becomes absorbed in the Absolute through a mystical intuition. Hence the knowledge of the Absolute in any case is attained through some kind of intuition. Intellectual intuition which Schelling very much insists upon can not, in his view, be imparted by any instruction. Only a negative approach to the Absolute can facilitate the intuitive act of which the soul is capable through its fundamental unity with the Divine Reality. Schelling here clearly follows the Upanisadic approach to Reality

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THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTION OF THE UPANISHADS

All the thoughts of the Upanishads move around two fundamental ideas. These are (1) the Brahman, and (2) the atman. As a rule these terms are employed synonymously. Where a difference reveals itself, Brahman appears as the older and less intelligible expression, âtman as the later and more significant; Brahman as the unknown that needs to be explained, âtman as the known through which the other unknown finds its explanation; Brahman as the first principle so far as it is comprehended in the universe, âtman so far as it is known in the inner self of man. We may take as an example the passages from Śatap. Br. 10. 6. 3, Chând. 3. 14), whose sole fundamental thought consists in this, that the universe is Brahman (*sarvam khalu idam brahma*), and the Brahman the âtman within us (*esha ma' âtmâ antar hridaye,* etc.). Another example is furnished by the story of Gârgya (Brih. 2. 1, Kaush. 4), who endeavours in vain to define the Brahman, until finally he is referred by the king to the âtman for its explanation. The difference between Brahman and âtman emerges most clearly where they appear side by side with one another in brief sayings. The passage Brih. 4. 4. 5 may serve as example :-" truly the Brahman is this Âtman" (*sa vâ ayam âtmâ brahma*).

If for our present purpose we hold fast to this distinction of the Brahman as the cosmical principle of the universe, the âtman as the psychical, the fundamental thought of the entire Upanishad philosophy may be expressed by the simple equation:-

Brahman = Atman.

That is to say—(the Brahman, the power which presents itself to us materialised in all existing things, which creates, sustains, preserves, and receives back into itself again all worlds, this eternal infinite divine power is identical with the âtman, with that which, after stripping off everything external, we discover in ourselves as our real most essential being, our individual self, the soul. This identity of the Brahman and the âtman, of God and the soul, is the fundamental thought of the entire doctrine of the Upanishads. It is briefly expressed by the "great saying" *tat tvam asi*, "that art thou" (Chând. 6. 8. 7 f.); and *aham brahma asmi*, "I am Brahman" (Brih. 1. 4. 10). And in the compound word *brahma-âtma-aikyam*, "unity of the Brahman and the âtman," is described the fundamental dogma of the Vedânta system.

If we strip this thought of the various forms, figurative to the highest degree and not seldom extravagant, under which it appears in the Vedânta texts, and fix our attention upon it solely in its philosophical simplicity as the identity of God and the soul, the Brahman and the âtman, it will be found to possess a significance reaching" far beyond the Upanishads, their time and country; nay, we claim for it an inestimable value for the whole race of mankind. We are unable to look into the

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future, we do not know what revelations and discoveries are in store for the restlessly inquiring human spirit; but one thing we may assert with confidence,—whatever new and unwonted paths the philosophy of the future may strike out, this principle will remain permanently unshaken, and from it no deviation can possibly take place. If ever a general solution is, reached of the great riddle, which presents itself to the philosopher in the nature of things all the more clearly the further our knowledge extends, the key can only be found where alone the secret of nature lies open to us from within, that is to say, in our innermost self. It was here that for the first time the original thinkers of the Upanishads, to their immortal honour, found it when they recognised our âtman, our inmost individual being, as the Brahman, the inmost being of universal nature and of all her phenomena.

The Conception of the Upanishads and its Relation to Philosophy

The whole of religion and philosophy has its root in the thought that (to adopt the language of Kant) the, universe is only appearance and not reality (*Ding an sich*); that is to say, the entire external universe, with its infinite ramifications in space and time, as also the involved and intricate sum of our inner perceptions, is all merely the form under which the essential reality presents itself to a consciousness such as ours, but is not the form in which it may subsist outside of our consciousness and independent of it; that, in other words, the sum-total of external and internal experience always and only tells us how things are constituted for us, and for our intellectual capacities, not how they are in themselves and apart, from intelligences such as ours.

It is easy to show how this thought, which met with adequate recognition first in the philosophy of Kant, but, which existed in less clearly defined form from the earliest times, is the basis and tacit presumption, more or less' consciously, of all philosophy, so far at least as this name is not made to serve as a mere cloak for empirical sciences. For all philosophy, as contrasted with empirical science, is not content to learn to know objects in their circumstances and surroundings, and to investigate their causal connections; but it rather seeks beyond all these to determine their nature, inasmuch as it regards the sum- total of empirical reality, with all the explanations offered by the empirical sciences, as something which needs to be yet further explained; and this solution is found in the principle which it sets forth, and from which it seeks to infer the real nature of things and their relation. This fact, thou, that philosophy has from the earliest times sought to determine a first principle of the universe proves that it started from a more or less clear consciousness that the entire empirical reality is not the true essence of things, that, in Kant's words, it is only appearance and not the thing in itself.

There have been three occasions, as far as we know, on which philosophy has advanced to a clearer comprehension of its recurring task, and of the solution demanded: first in India in the Upanishads, again in Greece in the philosophy of Parmenides and Plato, and finally, at a more recent time, in the philosophy of Kant and Schopenhauer. In a later work we shall have to show how Greek philosophy reached its climax in the teaching of Parmenides and Plato, that this entire universe of change is, as Parmenides describes it, merely phenomenal, or in Plato's words a world of shadows; and how both philosophers endeavoured through it to grasp the essential reality, τὸ ὄν, τὸ ὄντως ὄν, that

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which Plato, in an expression that recalls the doctrine of the Upanishads no less than the phraseology of Kant, describes as the αντὸ (*atman*) *καθ' αυτό* (*an sich*). We shall then see further bow this same thought, obscured for a time under the influence of Aristotle and throughout the Middle Ages, was taken up again in quite a different way, and shone forth more clearly than ever before in the philosophy founded by Kant, adopted and perfected by his great successor Schopenhauer. Here we have to do with the Upanishads, and the world-wide historical significance of these documents cannot, in our judgement, be more clearly indicated than by showing how the deep fundamental conception of Plato and Kant was precisely that which already formed the basis of Upanishad teaching.

The objects which lie around us on every side in infinite space, and to which by virtue of our corporeal nature we ourselves belong, are, according to Kant, not "things in themselves, "but only apparitions. According to Plato, they are not the true realities, but merely shadows of them. And according to the doctrine of the Upanishads, they are not the âtman, the real "self" of the things, but mere *mâyâ*,—that is to say, a sheer deceit, illusion. It is true that the term *mâyâ* occurs for the first time in Śvet. 4. 10; and therefore some writers, whose recognition of a fact is obscured by the different language in which it is clothed, have hazarded the assertion that the conception of *mâyâ* is still unknown to the more ancient Upanishads. How in the light of this assertion they find it possible to comprehend these older Upanishads (Brihad. and Chând.) they themselves perhaps know. The fact is they are penetrated throughout by the conception which later was most happily expressed by the word *mâyâ*. (In the very demand which they make that the âtman of man, the âtman of the universe, must be sought for,' it is implied that this body and this universe which reveal themselves to us unsought are not the âtman, the self, the true reality; and that we are under a delusion if, like the demon Virocana, we regard them as such.) All worldly objects and relationships are, as Yajñavalkhya explains in Brih. 2. 4. 5, of no value for their own sake (as "things in themselves"), but for the sake of the âtman; nay, they exist solely in the âtman, and that man is utterly and hopelessly undone who knows them "apart from the Self" (*anyatra âtmano*). This âtman, he concludes, is Brâhman and warrior, is space, gods, and creatures, "this âtman is the entire universe" (*idam sarvam yad ayam âtmâ*). As when a man touches the instrument' -he at the same time elicits the notes, so when a man has comprehended the âtman lie has with it comprehended all these things:—"Verily he who has seen, heard, comprehended and known the Self, by him is this entire universe known."

Immediately connected with these conceptions, and probably even with this passage from the Brihadâranyaka, is the expression in the Chândogya Up. 6. 1. 2, where that which in the former place was the climax of a development is assumed and becomes the theme advanced for discussion:—"Dost thou then ask for that instruction, by which the unheard becomes (already) heard, the un-comprehended comprehended, the unknown known?" "What then, most noble Sir, is this instruction?" "Just as, my dear Sir, from a lump of clay everything that consists of clay is known, the change is a matter of words alone, a mere name,' it is in reality only clay, —thus, my dear Sir, is this instruction." Here the manifold change of the one substance is explained as mere, word-play, mere name, exactly as Parmenides asserts that all which men

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regard as real is mere name. Later passages employ language that is based on these conceptions, "nor in this even a plurality," and the verses preserved in Brih. 4.4. 19:-

In the spirit should this be perceived,
Here there is no plurality anywhere.
From death to death again he rushes blindly
Who fancies that he here sees difference.

Apt and striking also is the remark of a later Upanishad that no proof of plurality can even be offered, "for no proof is possible of the existence of a duality, and only the timeless âtman admits of proof," (*i.e.* we are incapable of knowing anything outside of our own consciousness, which under all circumstances forms a unity).

It is clear from the foregoing:- (I) That the view which later was most explicitly set forth in the doctrine of *mâyâ* is so far from being strange to the oldest Upanishads that it is assumed in and with their fundamental doctrine of the sole reality of the âtman, and forms its necessary complement; and (2) that this fundamental doctrine of the Upanishads is seen to be in marvellous agreement with the philosophies of Parmenides and Plato, and of Kant and Schopenhauer. So fully indeed is this true, that all three, originating from different epochs and countries, and with modes of thought entirely independent, mutually complete, elucidate, and confirm one another. Let this then suffice for the philosophical significance of the Upanishads.

The Conception of the Upanishads and its Relation to Religion

The thought referred to, common to India, Plato, and Kant, that the entire universe is only appearance and not reality, forms not only the special and most important theme of all philosophy, but is also the presumption and *conditio sine quâ non* of all religion. All great religious teachers therefore, whether in earlier or later times, nay even all those at the present day whose religion rests upon faith, are alike unconsciously followers of Kant. This we propose briefly to prove.

The necessary premises of all religion are, as Kant frequently expounds:— (I.) The existence of God, (2) the immortality of the soul, (3) the freedom of the will (without which no morality is possible). These three essential conditions of man's salvation—God, immortality, and freedom—are conceivable only if the universe is mere appearance and not reality (mere *mâyâ* and not the *âtman*), and they break down irretrievably should this empirical reality, wherein we live, be found to constitute the true essence of things.

(1) The existence of God will be precluded by that of space, which is infinite, and therefore admits of nothing external to itself, and nothing within save that which fills it, *i.e.* matter (the most satisfactory definition of which is "that which fills space").

(2) Immortality will be precluded by the conditions of time, in consequence of which our existence has a beginning in time by conception and birth, and an end in time by death; and this end is absolute, in so far as, that beginning was absolute.

(3) Freedom, and with it the possibility of moral action, will be precluded by the universal validity of the law of causality, as shown by experience; for this requires that every effect, consequently every human action, should be the necessary result of causes which precede the action, and which therefore in the actual moment of action are no longer within our control.

The question as it concerns God, immortality, and freedom, stands on an altogether different footing if this entire empirical reality, the occupant of space and time, and ruled by causal laws, is mere appearance and not a disposition of

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"things in themselves," to use Kant's words; or is mere *mâyâ* and not the *âtman*, the "self" of things, as the Upanishads teach. For in this case there is room for another, a higher order of things, which is not subject to the laws of space, time, and causality. And it is precisely this highei order of things set over-against the reality of experience, from the knowledge of which we are excluded by our intellectual constitution, which religion comprehends in faith by her teaching concerning God, immortality and freedom. All religions therefore unconsciously depend on the fundamental dogma of the Kantian philosophy, which in a less definite form was already laid down in the Upanishads. These last therefore by virtue of their fundamental character lie naturally at the basis of every religious conception of existence.

By the side, moreover, of this their value for religion in general they have a special and very remarkable inner relation to Christianity, which we cannot state more briefly and clearly than by repeating in the present, connection, where this consideration is essential, what has been before said on this subject.

The Upanishads, it was pointed out, are for the Veda what the New Testament is for the Bible. And this analogy is not-merely external and accidental but is fundamental and based upon a universal law of development of the religious life which is acknowledged on both sides.

In the childhood of the human race religion enacts commands and prohibitions, and emphasizes them by promises of reward and denunciations of punishment;—it addresses itself to the self-interest, which it assumes to be the centre and essence of human nature, and beyond which it does not go.

A higher grade of religious consciousness is attained with the knowledge that all actions which depend upon the motives of expectation and fear are of no value for the ultimate destiny of mankind; that the supreme function of existence does not consist in the satisfaction of self-interest, but in its voluntary suppression; and that herein first the true divine reality of ourselves, through the individual self as through, in outer husk, makes itself manifest.

The primitive standpoint of righteousness by works is represented in the Bible by the Old Testament law, which corresponds in the Veda to that which the Indian theologians call the *karmakânda* (the department of works), under which name is comprised the whole literature of the Hymns and Brâhmanas, with the exception of portions intercalated here and there in the spirit of the Upanishads. Both the Old Testament and the *karmakânda* of the Veda proclaim a law, and hold out the prospect 'of reward for its observance and of punishment for its transgression. And if the Indian theory has the advantage of being able to defer retribution in part to the future, and by that means to relieve the conflict with experience that raises so many difficulties for the Old Testament doctrine of a retribution limited to this world; it is, on the other hand, the distinguishing characteristic of the Biblical law of righteousness, that it pays less regard than, the Indian to ritual prescription and in their place lays' greater stress on a habitually blameless course of life. For the interests of human society this advantage is very great. In itself however, and as far as the moral value of all action is concerned, it makes no difference whether a mail exert himself in the service of imaginary gods or in that of his fellow-men. So long as his own well-being lies before him as the ultimate aim, either is simply a means to this selfish end, and therefore, like the end itself, from a moral

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point of view is to be set aside as worthless.

The recognition of this is seen in the New Testament doctrine of the worthlessness of all works, even those that are good, and in the corresponding Upanishad doctrine that altogether rejects works. Both make salvation dependent not on anything done or left undone, but on a complete transformation of the natural mail as a whole. Both regard this transformation as a release from the bonds of this all-embracing empirical reality, which has its roots in egotism.

Why then do we need a release from this existence? Because it is the realm of sin, is the reply of the Bible. The Veda answers: Because it is the realm of ignorance. The former sees depravity in the volitional, the latter in the intellectual side of human nature. The Bible demands a change of the will, the Veda of the understanding. On which side does the truth lie? If man were pure will or pure intelligence, we should have to decide for one or the other alternative. But since he is a being who both wills and knows, the great change upon which the Bible and the Veda alike make salvation depend must be realised in both departments of his life. Such a change is, in the first place, according to the Biblical view the softening of a heart hardened by natural self-love, and the inclining it to deeds of righteousness, affection and self-denial. It is however, in the second place and side by side with this, the breaking forth upon us of the light of the great intellectual truth, which the Upanishads taught before Kant, that this entire universe, with its relations in space, its consequent manifoldness and dependence upon the mind that apprehends, rests solely upon an illusion (*mâyâ*), natural indeed to us owing to the limitations of our intellect; and that there is in truth one. Being alone, eternal, exalted above space and time, multiplicity and change, self-revealing in all the forms of nature and by me who myself also am one and undivided, discovered and realised within as my very Self, as the âtman.

As surely however as, to adopt the significant teaching of Schopenhauer, the will and not the intellect is the centre of a man's nature, so surely must the pre-eminence be assigned to Christianity, in that its demand for a renewal of the will is peculiarly vital and essential. But as certainly as man is not mere will, but Intellect besides, so certainly will that Christian renewal of the will make itself manifest on the other side as a renewal of knowledge, just as the Upanishads teach. "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" is the requirement of the Bible. But on what grounds is this demand to be based, since feeling is in myself alone and not in another? Because," the Veda here adds in explanation, "thy neighbour is in truth thy very self, and what separates you from him is mere illusion." As in this case, so at every point of the system. The New Testament and the Upanishads, these two noblest products of the religious consciousness of mankind, are found when we sound their deeper meaning to be nowhere in irreconcilable contradiction, but in a manner the most attractive serve to elucidate and complete one another.

An example may show the value of the Upanishad teaching for the full development of our Christian consciousness.

Christianity teaches in spirit, even if not always in the letter, that man as such is capable only of sinful, that is selfish actions (Rom. 7[18]), and that all good whether of purpose or achievement can only be wrought in us by God (Phil. 2[23]). Clearly as this doctrinéfor him who has eyes to see—is formulated not so much in individual expressions as rather in the

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entire system as such, yet it has been difficult at all times for the Church to rest satisfied with it. She has sought perpetually an opportunity of co-ordinating her own imperfect remedial measures, and of leaving open a side-door for human co-operation, clearly because behind the sole operative power which makes God the source of all good she saw standing like a frightful apparition the grim monstrosity of predestination. And indeed this presents itself as an inevitable consequence as soon as we connect the Christian conception of the sole agency of God, as profound as it is true, with the, Jewish realism adopted from the Old Testament, which sets God and man over-against, one another as two mutually exclusive subsistences. In this darkness there comes to us light from the East, from India. It is true that Paul also hints at an identification of God with the *αϖτρωπος πϖευπατικος* (1 Cor. 15), it is true that Kant endeavours to explain the marvelous phenomenon of the categorical imperative within us on the theory that the man as real ("thing in itself") lays down the law to the man is phenomenal; but how slight the significance of these timid and groping essays as compared with the profound and fundamental conception of the Vedanta, which makes its appearance everywhere in the Upanishads, that the God, the sole author of all good in us, is not as in the Old Testament a Being contrasted with and distinct from us, but rather-without impairing his absolute antagonism to the depraved self of experience (*jīva*)-our own metaphysical I, our divine self, persisting in untarnished purity through all the aberrations of human nature, eternal blessed,-in a word, our âtman.

This and much more we may learn from the Upanishads,-we shall learn the lesson, if we are willing to put the finishing touch to the Christian consciousness and to make it on all sides consistent and complete.

GARBHA-UPANISHAD

The body is composed of the five (elements); it exists in the five (objects of sense, etc.); it has six supports: it is associated with the six gunas; it has seven dhātus (essential ingredients) and three malas (impurities); it has three yonis (wombs) and is formed of four kinds of food.

Why is the body said to be composed of five? Because there are five elements in this body (*viz.*), pṛthivī, āpas, agni, vāyu, and ākās. In this body of five elements, what is the pṛthivi element? what āpas? what agni? what vāyu? and what ākāś? Pṛthivī is said to be that which is hard; āpas is said to be that which is liquid; agni is said to be that which is hot; vāyu is that which moves; ākās is that which is full of holes (or tubes). Of these, pṛthivī is seen in supporting (objects), āpas in cohesion, ṭejas (or agni) in making forms visible, vāyu in moving, ākās chiefly in avakāśa (*viz.*, giving space). (Then what are the five objects of sense, etc.?) The ear exists in sound, the skin in touch, the eye in forms, the tongue in taste, and the nose in odour. (Then) the mouth (exists) in speech, the hand in lifting, the feet in walking, the anus in excreting, and the genitals in enjoying. (Then) through buddhi, one knows and determines; through manas, he thinks and fancies; through chiṭṭa, he recollects; through ahaṅkāra, he feels the idea of 'I'. Thus these perform their respective functions.

Whence the six supports? There are six kinds of rasas (essences or tastes)—sweet, sour, saltish, bitter, astringent, and pungent. The body depends upon them while they depend upon the body. There are six changes of state (*viz.*), the body

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exists, is born, grows, matures, decays and dies. And there are also six chakras (wheels) depending on the dhāmāni (nerves), *(viz.)*, mūlādhāra, svādhishthana, manipūraka, anāhata, viśuḍḍhi and ājña. Also the guṇas are six-kāma (passion) and others and śama (mental restraint) and others; there being properly—association (with the former) and devotion (to the latter). Then there are seven kinds of sounds, (*viz.*), shadja (sa), ṛshabha, (ri), gānḍhāra (ga), maḍhyama (ma), pañchama (pa), ḍaivaṭa (ḍa), and nishāḍa (ni), which are stated to be seven agreeable and disagreeable ones; and there are seven kinds of ḍhāṭus having seven colours, (*viz.*), śukla (white), rakṭa (red), kṛshṇa (dark-blue or indigo), ḍhūmra (blue), pīṭa (yellow), kapila (orange-red),' and pāṇdara (yellowish white). In whomsoever these substances arise and increase, the rasa (essence) is the cause of the one following and so on (as stated below). (These) rasas are six in number; from the rasas (probably chyme) arises blood: from blood, flesh; from flesh, fat; from fat, bones; from bones, marrow; and from marrow, śukla (the male seminal fluid). From the union of śukla and śoṇiṭa (the female vital energy), occurs garbha (conception in the womb). Being stationed in the heart, it is led. In the heart of persons, (there is) an internal agni; in the seat of agni, there is bile; in the seat of bile, there is vāyu; in the seat of vāyu, is hṛḍya (heart or Āṭmā).

Through having connection at the ṛṭu (season) fit for raising issues, it (the embryo formed in the womb) is like water in the first night; in seven nights, it is like a bubble; at the end of half a month, it becomes a ball. At the end of a month, it is hardened, in two months, the head is formed; in three months, the region about the feet; and in the fourth month, the region about the stomach and the loins and also ankle is formed, in the fifth month, the back (or spinal) bone; in the sixth) the face of the nose, eyes, and ears; in the seventh, it becomes united with Jīva (Āṭmā); in the eighth month, it becomes full (of all organs); in the ninth, it becomes fatty. Śukla belongs to men and śonita to women. Each (by itself) is neutral (or is powerless). (But in their combination) a son is born when the father's seed preponderates. A daughter is born when the mother's seed preponderates. Should both be equal, a eunuch is born. Since females have more of passion, on account of their deriving more pleasure (than males from sexual union), a greater number of females are born. Action corresponds to the mental state (of the actor). Hence the child (born) takes after (the thought of) the parents. From parents with minds full of anxieties (at the time of union) are born the blind, the lame, the hunchback, the dwarf, and the limbless. (From impregnation) during the eclipses of the sun and the moon, children are born with defective limbs. Increase or decrease, similarities or dissimilarities of bodies arise (in children) through the influence of time, place, action, ḍravya (substance) and enjoyment. From a well-conducted intercourse (or union), the child being born with the form of the father possesses, his qualities, just as the image in a glass-reflects truly the original. When śukla bursts into two through the interaction (or blowing against one another) of the vāyu, of both śukla and śonita, then twins (of the same sex) are born. In the same manner when the reṭas (the seminal fluids), *viz.*, (śukla and śoṇiṭa) of both the parents burst into two, then mixed progeny (male and female) is the result. Among mankind, five embryos (only can be formed at a pregnancy in the womb). A womb with one embryo is; common. There are some with two. Those with three are only to be found (as rarely) as one in a thousand. Where

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there is a frequent pouring (of seminal fluid into the womb), a greater number of limbs is produced (in the child). When the pouring (within the womb) is only once, then the child becomes dried up (or contracted). By pouring (within) more than once, couples are (sometimes) born.

Then, (*viz.*, in the ninth month), this (in the body) made of the five elements and able to sense odour, taste, etc., through ṭejas (spiritual fire), etc., which is also made up of the five elements,—this cognizes the indestructible Omkāra through its deep wisdom and contemplation. It cognizes as the one letter (Om). Then there arise in the body the eight prakṛṭis and the sixteen vikāras (changes). Through the food and drink of the mother transmitted through her nādis, the child obtains prāṇa. In the ninth month, it is full of all attributes.

It then remembers its previous births, finds out what has been done and what has not been done, and discriminates between actions, right and wrong. (Then it thinks thus) "Many thousands of wombs have been seen by me, many kinds of food have been tasted (by me), and many breasts have been suckled (by me). All parts of the world have been my place of birth, as also my burning-ground in the past. In eighty-four lakhs of wombs, have I been born. I have been often born and have often died. I have been subject to the cycle of rebirths very often. I have had birth and death, again birth and death, and again birth (and so on). There is much suffering whilst living in the womb. Delusion and sorrow attend every birth. In youth are sorrow, grief, dependence on others, ignorance, the non-performance of what is beneficial laziness, and the performance of what is unfavourable. In adult age, (the sources of sorrow are) attachment to sensual objects and the groaning under the three kinds of pain. In old age anxiety, disease, fear of death, desires, love of self, passion, anger, and non-independence—all these produce very great suffering. This birth is the seed of sorrow, and being of the form of sorrow is unbearable. I have not attained the ḍharma of nivṛṭṭi, (*viz.*, the means of overcoming the cycle of re-birth) nor have I acquired the means of yoga and jñāna. Alas! I am sunk in the ocean of sorrow and find no remedy for it. Fie on ajñāna! fie on ajñāna! fie on the troubles caused by passion and anger; fie on the fetters of samsāra (the mundane existence)! I shall attain wisdom from a guru. If I get myself freed from the womb, then I shall practise sāṅkhya yoga which is the cause of the extinction of all evil and the bestower of the fruit of emancipation. If I get myself freed from the womb, I shall seek refuge in Maheśvara, (the, great Lord) who is the cause of the extinction of all evil and bestower of the (four) ends of life. If I get myself freed from the womb, then I shall seek refuge in that Lord of the world who is the Chiḍāṭmā of all śakṭis and the cause of all causes. If I get myself freed from the womb, then I shall seek refuge in that supreme Lord Bhargaḥ (Śiva, or light) who is paśupaṭi (the lord of paśus or souls), Ruḍra, Mahāḍeva (the great Ḍeva) and the Guru of the world. If I get myself freed from the bondage of the womb, I shall perform great penances. If I get myself freed from the, passage of the womb, I shall worship Vishṇu in my heart who is the bestower of nectar, who is bliss, who is Nārāyaṇa, and who never decays. I am now confined in my mother's womb, and were I freed from its bonds, I shall please the divine Vāsuḍeva without diverting my mind from Him. I am burnt through actions, good and bad, committed by me alone before for the sake of others, whilst those who enjoyed the fruits thereof have disappeared. Through non-belief (unspirituality), I

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formerly gave up all fear (of sin) and committed sins. I now reap their fruits. I shall become a believer hereafter."

Thus does the Jīva (Āṭmā) within the (mother's womb) contemplate again and again the many kinds of miseries (it had undergone), and remembering always the miseries of the cycle of re-births, becomes disgusted (with the material enjoyments of the world), often fainting in the inmost centre (*viz.*, heart) of all creatures at (the idea of) his aviḍyā, desire and karma. Then this being, who had entered many hundreds of female wombs of beings (in the previous births), comes to the mouth of the womb wishing to obtain release. Here being pressed by the yanṭra (neck of the uterus), it suffers much trouble. Moreover it is much affected by prasūṭi (delivery) vāyu. As soon as it is born, it comes in contact with the vaishṇavī vāyu and ceases to remember anything of the past; it also ceases to see far and to be the cognizer of the real. Coming into contact with the earth, it becomes fierce-eyed, and debased. The evil of the eye after it is rubbed with (or cleaned by) water vanishes; and with it, vanishes memory of birth and death, good and bad actions and their affinities. Then how does he understand vāyu, bile, and śleshma (phlegm)? When they are in their proper state, they— produce health: with their disturbance, diseases are generated. It should be known that one becomes capable of knowing through a proper quantity of bile; through having a little more or a little less of it, he comes to know more. When the bile is changed (otherwise), he becomes changed and acts like a mad man. And that bile is agni. Agni influenced by karma is kindled by vāyu, the source (or seat) of virtue and vice, as fuel is kindled within (by fire) from without (by the wind).

And of how many kinds is that agni? It has three bodies, three reṭas (seeds or progeny) three puras (cities), three ḍhāṭus, and three kinds of agni threefold. Of these three, Vaiśvānara is bodiless. And that agni becomes (or is subdivided into) Jñānāgni (wisdom-fire), Ḍarśanāgni (eye-fire), and Koshthāgni (digestive fire). Of these Jnanāgni pertains to the mind; Ḍarśanāgni pertains to the senses; and Koshthāgni pertains to ḍahara and daily cooks (or digests) equally whatever is eaten, drunk, licked, or sucked through prāṇa and apana. Darśanāgni is (in) the eye itself and is the cause of vijñāna and enables one to see all objects of form. It has three seats, the (spiritual) eye itself being the (primary) seat, and the eyeballs being the accessory seats. Ḍakshiṇāgni is in the heart, Gārhapaṭya is in the belly, and in the face is Ahavanīya. In this sacrifice with the three agnis), the Purusha is himself the sacrificer; buḍḍhi becomes his wife; sanṭosha (contentment) becomes the ḍīkshā (vow) taken; the mind and the organs of the senses become the sacrificial vessels; the karmenḍriyas (organs of action) are the sacrificial instruments. In this sacrifice of the body, the several ḍevas who become the ṛṭvijas (sacrificial priests) perform their parts following the master of the sacrifice, (*viz.*, the true individuality), wherever he goes. In this (sacrifice), the body is the sacrificial place, the skull of the head is the fire-pit, the hairs are the kuśa grass; the mouth is the anṭarveḍi (raised platform in sacrifice); kāma (or passion) is the clarified butter; the period of life is the period of sacrifice; nāḍa, (sound) produced in ḍahara (heart) is the sāmaveḍa, (recited during the sacrifice); vaikharī is the yajus (or yajurveḍa hymns); parā, paśyanṭi, and maḍhyamā are the ṛks (or ṛgveḍa hymns); cruel words are the aṭharvas (aṭharvaveḍa, hymns) and khilas (supplementary texts of each veḍa); true words are the vyāhṛṭis.

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Life, strength, and bile are the paśus (sacrificial creatures) and death is avabhṛṭa (the bath which concludes the sacrifice). In this sacrifice, the (three) fires blaze up and then according to (the desires of) the wordly, the, ḍevas bless him. All who are living (in this world) are the sacrificers. There is none living who does not perform yajña (sacrifice). This body is (created) for yajña, and arises out of yajña and changes according to yajña. If this yajña is continued in a direction changed (from the right course, or is abused), then it leads to an ocean of misery.

In this body, there are sixteen side-teeth, having each a membrane (as its root) and fifteen openings. It (the body) is measured by ninety-six digits. There are in it fourteen nādi seats and 108 joints. There are seventy-two tubes seats with seventy-two nādis between them, of which three are important, *viz.*, idā, piṅgalā, and sushumnā, the fourth is purīṭaṭi, and jīvaṭa the fifth. Above jīvaṭa is bile and near bile is Purīṭaṭi. Above the navel, two digits to the left of it, is seated the source of bile. The food taken in is divided into three parts—urine, faeces, and sāra (the essence or chyme). The urine dividing itself into two, spreads to the left below the navel. The faeces is in the right side and is of seven kinds. The sāra is of five kinds and spreads itself over the body. Hence the semen and blood are produced from food and drink. In this body, vāyu which is moving as prāṇa is the Sūṭrāṭma. Through it, one inspires and expires and moves (his limbs). Without it, no limb of the body will be animated. Through vāyu, the current of blood is driven into the nādis from the chakra (plexus) of the heart, and those which can be touched (on the body) are easily discernible. The juicy essences (of food) which arise out of digestion enter the womb which is suspended in the stomach of the mother and coming near the child's head nourishes the child's prāṇa, through the sushumnā (on the head or pineal gland). Sushumnā is the Brahma-nādi. Prāṇa and others are found there. It (prāṇa) descends lower and lower as the time of birth approaches and settles in the heart when the child is born. Through yoga, it should be brought from the middle of the eyebrows to the end of sushumnā (*viz.*, the pineal gland), when he becomes the cognizer of the Real like the child in the womb. In the body of this nature, Āṭmā is latent and deathless, and is the witness and Purusha. It lives in this body, being enveloped (by māyā). Prāṇī (or the jīva having prāṇa) has abhimāna (identification with the body) on account of aviḍyā. Ajñāna which surrounds it is the seed; the anṭaḥkaraṇa (internal organ) is the sprout and the body is the tree. In this tree (of body), there are eight crores of hairs, eighty hundreds of joints, nine hundreds of tendons, eight palams of heart, twelve palams of tongue, one prasṭha, (or two palams) of bile; one ādhaka of phlegm, one kudupa (or ¼ prasṭha) of śukla and two prasṭhas of marrow. One should consider everything as evanescent, like the child in the womb (with its prāṇa, etc.,) stationed in the sushumnā (of the head). Then he becomes freed and gets no more body. If not, an ignorant man becomes subject to the cycle of re-births, etc., is exposed like a worm to the drink of urine and faeces, and undergoes in this body the sufferings of hell. Therefore knowing all this, one should be averse to worldly objects. Thus ends the moksha-śasṭra of Pippalāḍa—thus ends the moksha-śasṭra of Pippalāda. Thus ends the Upanishad.

Geordano Bruno (1548-1600)

An undaunted thinker of the 16th century, Bruno appears to have sharply departed from the dogmatic outlook of the schoolmen of the middle ages. According

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to the Scholastic theologians God, located at a particular point of space, was supposed to have created the heaven and earth some six thousand years before. Both the Catholics and the Protestants bad a belief that heaven and earth had definite limits in space, that the hell was situated beneath the earth, and the angels descending from the heaven and the devils ascending from the hell were all supposed to be intervening in human affairs. The earth was supposed to be stationary around which the sun and the planets moved. These popular scientific and theological beliefs were opposed tooth and nail by Copernicus according, to whom all the planets in our Solar System including the earth move about the sun. It is Bruno who for the first time accepts the astronomical findings of Copernicus with seriousness and formulates various scientific and philosophical principles as consequences of his extension of the Copernican view. Accepting the heliocentric system unreservedly Bruno holds that space has no limits and there is no insuperable barrier separating our world from the extra-mundane region supposed to be reserved for pure spirits, angels and the Supreme Being. Heaven is the infinite universe. The fixed stars are virtually so many suns surrounded by the planets. The earth does not enjoy any central or privileged position in the heavens. It is just a planet revolving round the sun in the infinite universe which is a system of Solar Systems.

Now for Bruno this new view of the world demands a new conception of God. God, in his view, can by no means be believed to have taken His seat upon a throne at a definite point in space outside of the heaven and the earth which. He is supposed to have created some six thousand years before. Since the universe is infinite and since there can not be two infinites, God and the universe are, according to Bruno, identical. The universe does not admit of any beginning or end, but the world has a beginning and an end. Hence Bruno makes a distinction between the universe and the world particularly with a view to escaping the charge of atheism. "God, the Infinite Being or the Universe, is the principle or the eternal cause of the world: 'natura naturans' (nature as a source), the world is the totality of his effects or phenomena: 'natura naturata' (nature as effect). It would, be (Bruno) thinks, be atheism to identity God with the world, for the world is merely the sum of individual beings and a sum is not a being, but a mere phrase. But to identify God with the universe is not to deny him; on the contrary it is to magnify, him; it is to extend the idea of the Supreme Being far beyond the limits assigned to him by those who conceive him as a being 'by the side' of other beings i.e., as a finite being. Hence Bruno loved to call himself 'Philotheos' or lover of the divine in order to distinguish clearly between his conception and atheism. "Vide: History of philosophy by A. Weber and R.B. Perry; P-229. This precaution, however, proved to be abortive, because the inquisitors of Bruno misunderstood him and he had to face grim consequences by being burnt at the stake in Rome in 1600.

Now the question before us is, —how does Bruno actually develop his conception of God-universe f He does not, in fact, give us any definite and consistent view on the point probably because he is found to have wavered between different interpretations. First, he is found to hold the view that just as light emanates from the sun without affecting or diminishing the power of the sun, in the same way the world is an emanation from God on whom it is dependent. To explicate his position

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Bruno opines that God is both the efficient cause and the inward essential principle of the world. As an efficient cause God is supposed to be distinct from what He creates. The relation between God and the world in this case does not appear to be intimate.

Hence as an efficient cause, Bruno says, we know very little of God. But of God as the inward immanent principle we can have a clearer idea of Him and His relation to the world. In this sense God is the underlying reality, the infinite substance of the world. As an immanent principle God is thought of as an inner artificer who shapes and forms the materials from within Himself. Because He is indivisible and immutable, God is present in His entirety at all places and in all things in the universe. Because of His omnipresence everything in nature is alive. Nothing can be totally destroyed, for death is but a transformation of life. When we say that a thing dies we mean that a new thing is produced. The dissolution of a combination means the formation of a new one. As the underlying reality of everything God-universe appears to be both spiritual and material. But matter is explained by Bruno as something spiritual or immaterial or in extended in its essence that does not derive its being from any positive principle outside of itself. On the contrary it is the real source of all forms containing them all in germ and producing them in succession. Thus what Bruno wants to establish is that this God-universe, by unfolding Himself produces a countless number of genera, species, individuals and infinite variety of cosmical laws and relations which constitute the life of the universe and the phenomenal world without subjecting Himself to any law or entering into any relations. It appears, therefore, that by insisting on the principle of unity and identifying God with the universe as a whole, Bruno tries to give a monistic or pantheistic colouring of his thought. But the chief difficulty that is common to all monistic systems arises here also. The question remains how can we prove that all things are at bottom one? How again from their essential unity does the multiplicity arise? To put it otherwise: how can we reduce the many to the one and how can the many be derived from the one?

Troubled with this question Bruno upholds a theory of pluralism which clearly indicates a deviation from his original stand, Having affirmed the ultimate reality of God he maintains in the same breath that the world consists of an infinite number of eternal and ultimate individual units which he calls 'monads'. Each monad has its distinctive or unique character and none can be resolved into any other. Each is both material and spiritual at the same time. In Bruno's view human soul is an eternal monad. Each particular atom is a monad and again the stars and planets are also monads. God is considered by him a monad of monads.

The only merit of Bruno may be said to consist in his contention, that we can not think of God as located at a particular point in space. A man who believes in God can think of Him as present every where (transcending space in some way). God reveals Himself to a man more intimately in the inner experiences of man than in outward events. This, in brief, is probably his only contribution to philosophy. But he does not make any satisfactory attempt at reconciling pantheism with pluralism. It is quite evident that his views of God in relation to the world is full of contradictions and inconsistencies. God can not be at the same time (i) an inexhaustible source from which a universe separate from Him proceeds, (ii) a universal substance of which everything

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consists and (iii) a monad from which all the others are distinct and yet within which they are all included and on which they all depend. If God is finally regarded as a monad of monads, Bruno then must be said to have a stronger tendency towards pluralism controlled and regulated by God than towards pantheism proper. His philosophical system, therefore, has a leaning more to theism than to pantheism.

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HAMSA-UPANISHAD

The word "Hamsa" is very mysterious and has manifold according to different standpoints. It is composed of Ham (or Aham) and Sa (ha), which mean "I" (am) "that". In its highest sense, it is Kālahamsa (or Para-brahman). It is also Brahmā when he has Hamsa (or swan) as the vehicle or Hamsa-vāhana. When Hamsa which is the manifestation of Prāna is applied to the human breath, we are said to exhale with Ha and to inhale with Sa. It is also called Ajapā-Gāyatrī.

Gauṭama addressed Sanaṭkumāra thus: "O Lord, thou art the knower of all ḍharmas and art well versed in all Śāsṭras, pray tell me the means by which I may obtain a knowledge of Brahmaviḍyā. Sanaṭkumāra replied thus:

"Hear, O Gauṭama, that Ṭaṭṭva as expounded by Pārvaṭī after inquiring into all ḍharmas and ascertaining Śiva's opinion. This treatise on the nature of Hamsa which gives the fruit of bliss and salvation and which is like a treasure to the yogin, is (a) very mystic (science) and should not be revealed (to the public).

"Now we shall explain the true nature of Hamsa and Para-mahamsa for the benefit of a brahmachārin (a seeker after Brahman or celibate), who has his desires under control, is devoted to his guru and always contemplates (as) Hamsa, and realizes thus: It (Hamsa) is permeating all bodies like fire (or heat) in all kinds of wood or oil in all kinds of gingelly seeds. Having known (It) thus, one does not meet with death.

"Having contracted the anus (with the heels pressed against it), having raised the vāyu (breath) from (Mūla) Āḍhāra (chakra), having made circuit thrice round Svāḍhishthāna, having gone to Maṇipūraka, having crossed Anāhaṭa, having controlled Prāṇa in Viśuḍḍhi and then having reached Ājñā, one contemplates in Brahmaranḍhra (in the head), and having meditated there always 'I am of three māṭrās,' cognises (his Self) and becomes formless. The Śisna (penis) has two sides (left and right from head to foot). This is that Paramahamsa (Supreme Hamsa or Higher Self) having the resplendence of crores of suns and by whom all this world is pervaded.

"It (this Hamsa which has buḍḍhi as vehicle) has eightfold vṛṭṭi. (When it is) in the eastern petal, there is the inclination (in a person) to virtuous actions; in the south-eastern there arise sleep, laziness, etc.; in the southern, there is the inclination to cruelty; in the south-western, there is the inclination to sins; in the western, there is the inclination to sensual sport; in the north-western, there arise the desire of walking, and others; in the northern, there arises the desire of lust; in the north-eastern, there arises the desire of amassing money; in the middle (or the interspaces between the petals), there is the indifference to material pleasures. In the filament (of the lotus), there arises the waking state; in the pericarp, there arises the svapna (dreaming state); in the bīja (seed of pericarp), there arises the sushupṭi

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(dreamless sleeping state); when leaving the lotus, there is the ṭurya (fourth state). When Hamsa is absorbed in Nāḍa (spiritual sound), the state beyond the fourth is reached. Nada (which is at the end of sound and beyond speech and mind) is like a pure crystal extending from (Mūla) Ādhāra to Brahmarandhra. It is that which is spoken of as Brahmā and Paramāṭmā.

"(Here the performance of Ajapā Gāyaṭrī is given).

"Now Hamsa is the ishi; the metre is Avyakṭā Gāyaṭrī; Paramahamsa is the ḍevaṭā (or presiding deity) 'Ham' is the bīja; 'Sa' is the śakṭī, So'ham is the kīlaka. Thus there are six. There are 21,600 Hamsas (or breaths) in a day and night. (Salutation to) Surya, Soma, Nirañjana (the stainless) and Nirabhāsa (the universeless). The words are: Sūryāya, Somāya, Nirañjanāya, Nirabhāsāya. It is with the pronunciation of these words that the different places in the body are touched, *viz.*, Aṅganyāsas and Karanyāsas are performed. The first word is pointed to the heart with the thumb; the second, to the head, and the third, to the hair of the head. With the last, a kavacha (armour) is made by circling the fingers round the head and then circling one hand over another. This process is carried on again after the pronunciation of Ajapā manṭra which follows. Here Soma (moon) is that which is united with Umā or the emblem of the union of the lower and higher Selves. Sūrya or Sun is the causer of the state of one-ness. Ajapā mānṭra. (May) the bodiless and subtle one guide (or illuminate my understanding). Vaushat to Agni-Soma. Then Aṅganyāsas and Karanyāsas occur (or should be performed after the manṭras as they are performed before the manṭras) in the heart and other (seats). Having done so, one should contemplate upon Hamsa as the Āṭmā in his heart. Agni and Soma are its wings (right and left sides); Omkāra is its head; Ukāra and binḍu are the three eyes and face respectively; Ruḍra and Ruḍrāṇi (or Ruḍra's wife) are the feet kanthaṭa (or the realisation of the oneness of jīvāṭmā or Hamsa, the lower self with Paramāṭmā or Paramahamsa, the Higher Self) is done in two ways, (samprajñāṭa and asamprajñāṭa).

"After that, Unmanī is the end of the Ajapā (manṭra). Having thus reflected upon manas by means of this (Hamsa), one hears Nāḍa after the uttering of this japa (manṭra) a crore of times. It (Nāḍa) is (begun to be heard as) of ten kinds. The first is chini (like the sound of that word); the second is chini-chini; the third is the sound of bell; the fourth is that of conch; the fifth is that of ṭanṭri (lute); the sixth is that sound of ṭāla (cymbals); the seventh is that of flute; the eighth is that of bheri (drum); the ninth is that of mṛḍaṅga (double drum); and the tenth is that of clouds (*viz.*, thunder). He may experience the tenth without the first nine sounds (through the initiation of a guru). In the first stage, his body becomes chini-chini; in the second, there is the (bhañjana) breaking (or affecting) in the body; in the third; there is the (bheḍana) piercing; in the fourth, the head shakes; in the fifth, the palate produces saliva; in the sixth, nectar is attained; in the seventh, the knowledge of the hidden (things in the world) arises; in the eighth, Parāvāk is heard; in the ninth; the body becomes invisible and the pure divine eye is developed; in the tenth, he attains Parabrahman in the presence of (or with) Āṭmā which is Brahman. After that, when manas is destroyed, when it which is the source of saṅkalpa and vikalpa disappears, owing to the destruction of these two, and when virtues and sins are burnt away, then he shines as Saḍāśiva of the nature of Śakṭi pervading everywhere, being effulgence in its very essence, the

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immaculate, the eternal, the stainless and the most quiescent Om. Thus is the teaching of the Veḍas; and thus is the Upanishaḍ."

HUMAN RIGHTS

Upanisadic passages and stories indicate not only man's destiny and duties but also his responsibility and rights. The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* states:

> "Verily, one becomes good by good action, bad by bad action".

This implies that man is responsible for his actions and is embodied with freedom to do either good or bad. What is to be taken or what has to be done is left to him. According to the Upanisads after death man goes to either of the two worlds, the world of fathers or the world of Brahma. Those who do not know these ways that lead to the two worlds become insects etc. On this, one's rebirth depends. But, ultimately one's rebirth depends upon one's conduct in this world.

The highest truth of the Upanisads 'I am Brahman' (aham brahmāsmi) which advocates that one should not be a servant to gods, is certainly an example of the recognition of human dignity by the Upanisads. Similar to this is the other famous saying 'That art thou (tat tvam asi) which implies that there is nothing superior to man, who is in essence is the same as the ultimate reality. While these famous saying assert the identity of man and ultimate reality there are also two other conceptions which prove the basis for human dignity. There are Upaniṣadic passages which assert the eminence of God in man. Sāndilya says that in the heart of every being the Ātman is present. In another place the human being in conceived as the sum of immortality. These conceptions show that in his fundamental essence man is not a passing entity, who is today and no more tomorrow, at the mercy of super-human power or being. He is not subject to anybody and he cannot be destroyed by anybody. So independent and eternal he is a glorious being. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, Yājñavakya explained to Uṣasti cākrāyana that Brahma dwells in all things. Other Upanisads also assert that Brahman is the source of all things. Thus things and beings have a common source and basis; and are not discriminated. So the question that one is inferior to the other does not arise at all.

The *Mundaka* speaks of Brahman as invisible, ungraspable and imperishable having in family or caste. From the fact that the Upaniṣads take particular care to emphasise that Brhaman is beyond caste, it may be argued that not only the metaphysical equality but also sociological equality of man is taught by the Upaniṣads. In the same context the Upaniṣad also says that the wise perceive Brahman as the source of all things. Naturally, there cannot be superiority or inferiority among beings which have the same source.

In the Upaniṣadic society, probably, the most important rights were the right to perform sacrifices and the right to Brahman-knowledge. Regarding the first, it may be concluded that only Brāhmaṇas have the right to officiate as priest, i.e., they only could perform sacrifices. But both Brāhmaṇas and Kṣatriyas could get sacrifices performer i.e., both these classes had right to be sacrificers (Yajamānas). Vājaśravasa, father of Naciketas had a sacrifice performed in which he gifted many cows to Brāhmanas. Janaka and others also had sacrifices performed.

Regarding the right to Brahman-knowledge, we have only two episodes from which we can infer about this matter. This first episode of Jānaśruti and Raikva is briefly as follows:

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> Jānaśruti was a rich man with liberal attitude. He approached Raikva and requested to teach him, by offering six hundred cows, a gold necklace and a chariot. Raikva addressed Jānaśruti, "Oh! Necklace and carriage along with the cows be yours, O Sūdra!" and refused his presents and request thus, Later Jānąśruti offered a thousand cows, a gold necklace, a chariot and a wife for Raikva.

Raikva again addressed him 'O Sūdra and observed that the face of the girl made him to teach, and instructed him. In this story, the text nowhere says that Jānaśruti was a ruler or even a Kṣatriya. It only says that he was a man of great charity and built rest houses everywhere in which food was given freely. From this context and the tenor of narration it is probable that Jānaśruti was an affluent "Sūdra chief and so was addressed as such twice by Raikva. Raikva also does not seem to be a sage of the type of Uddālaka or Yājñavalkya, but a man who wandered about in a cart. But it must also be remembered that he was found in a place where Brāhmaṇas were. So, he probably was a Brāhmana, who was neither a brahmacāri not a householders; and he was ready to have a wife.

The second episode is concerning Satyakāma Jābāla which is briefly as follows:

> In order to be a student of sacred knowledge, Satyakāma Jābāla asked his mother that of what family (gotra) he was. His mother replied him that she did not know as she went about a great deal in her youth as a servant maid (paricāriṇī). To become a student Jābāla went to Gautama and explained what his mother was said on the latter's request. Then Gautama admitted him as pupil after considering him a Brāhmaṇa, since he spoke truth. This story can give two possible differing conclusions: (a) Satyakāma Jābāla spoke the truth. So he was considered a Brāhmaṇa and was admitted for study. From this it can be concluded that whoever spontaneously and always speaks truth is a Brāhmaṇa, irrespective of his parentage. (b) Alternatively it can be concluded that none but a person with the right parentage would speak truth. Satyakāma Jābāla spoke truth, so his parentage was Brāhmanical.

The Upaniṣad makes two points clear: (i) in her youth Satyakāma's mother Jābāla was a servant, who went about a great deal (carantī paricāriṇī). (ii) She did not know of what family (gotra) her son belonged. Even though Jābāla was a maid servant who did not know the gotra of her son's father, the son was admitted as a student of sacred knowledge.

In the *Maitri*, which is a later Upaniṣad, hindrances to knowledge are mentioned. Association of those who are worthy for heaven with those who are not worthy for it is mentioned as the source of the net of delusion (mohajāla). Among the persons unworthy for the heaven are, those who are town beggars, who perform sacrifices for the unworthy, who are the disciples of Śūdras and who though Śūdras know the scriptures. This late passage was written in the period when it was clearly held that Śūdras ought not to study the scriptures; and ought not to become performers of sacrifices and spiritual teachers. Yet the passage also shows that there were Śūdras teachers. There is no such passage in the earlier Upaniṣads.

As mentioned in the earlier section women had the right to property, education and Brahman-knowledge. The early Upaniṣads shows that there were maid servants, female slaves (dāsis) and daughter who was given as wife for a

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teacher by her father. Forcible enjoyment of an unwilling woman seems to have been tolerated.

HUMANISM

The value of Upanishadic spiritualism as a basis of general human relationship of the cordial kind can be understood. It also forms the basis for particular human affections based on relations of blood and biology e.g. relations of parents and children, of husband and wife etc. But in particular human affections some natural spontaneous inspiration works in a more refined form than it works among animals. That is due to greater development of brain and mind among human beings. Greater expression of spiritual reality in man can also be regarded as the reason for it. Higher intelligence and other conditions of human childhood, form a natural occasion for greater expression of spiritual feeling possible for human beings. Particular human affections based on blood and biology are not completely natural, i.e. completely determined by natural conditions of human life and childhood. These are also essentially inspired by spiritual feeling which is an expression and cultivation in human life. These also are modes of spiritual feeling. They are facilitated by relationship of blood and biology only when they are taken to form basis for expression of spiritual feeling and are utilised as occasions for such feeling. Otherwise when spiritual feeling of love is not available to utilize them as occasions for its expressions, these relations cease to have any human meaning. In fact, they are negated by adverse and antagonistic relations. They did not exist in barbaric times of earliest human history and they are many times completely contradicted in the actions and antagonistic relations of husband and wife, parents and children, brothers etc.

So ultimately and originally what appears as a particular human relationship is actually a particular mode of general human relationship. The latter is essentially spiritual and is in the particular context facilitated in particular modes presented by particular relationships determined by blood and biology. The more distant and less determined by blood and biology is the relation and contact of people, the more is the demand for general human relationship which is governed by spirituality in a greater degree. Spirit is the non-individualistic, non-dualistic, blissful essence of human existence. It is transcendent in nature and is not determined by any dualistic modes of intellect, ego, mind, body, senses, objects etc. It is by virtue of this transcendence that it is capable of inspiring general human relationship where no genetic relations of blood and biology are operative as occasions for facilitation of cordial relationship. As the relations governed by blood and biology are very limited, and because they become feeble as the relationship becomes distant, it is only by the general human relationship that cordiality in human society can be possible. In fact, it has been so in the history of humansociety. Till the cords of blood and biology worked effectively human organisation remained confined to clans and tribes. What is understood to be a general human society has developed only when organisation extended beyond the confinement of relationship of blood and biology i.e. when man came to find and feel related to man merely as man. It is this general human relationship which has been developing in society is becoming a deeper and deeper basis of cultural development of society.

This general human relationship of man is based on love and affection which is essentially spiritual in character. The

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fundamental principle of this general human relationship is non-duality which can be understood as non-alienation in terms of modern philosophy and which positively expresses in affiliation and love. This principle is the cardinal tenet of Advaita Vedānta, if it is understood in humanistic terms rather than in terms of metaphysical abstractions. The Īsha Upaniṣad contains this cardinal principle of the Vedanta in a more concrete form than any other Upaniṣad. The very first verse of Isha Upaniṣad states in the most general and the widest form the general principle of life which alone can ensure cordiality of human relations in society. In the general form this principle of integrating objects, acts etc.

One who realises inner integrality and non-duality in spirit finds all beings, after such realisation, to be in a cordial state in their spiritual being. He feels himself to be cordial with all beings. Hence he does not hate anybody. Spiritual non-duality leads to inner affiliation which is the principle of love and prevents alienation which causes hatred. Love and hatred are the two primary poles of social relationship. Love signifies the positive pole of social affiliation and integrity. Hatred forms the negative pole of alienation and hostility.

The above idea is contained in the sixty verse of the Īsha Upaniṣad. This one verse forms the supreme gospel of social life and relationship. The seventh verse elucidates the personal psychological effect of the observance of the principle of affiliation contained in the sixth verse. One who realises inner spiritual non-duality with and among all beings and thus visualises their oneness (integrity) of being, does neither feel infatuation with anything or person, nor does he consequently leave any occasion for sorrow in his life. In fact sorrow is the reflective consequence of infatuation. Infatuation is egoistic identification of one's being with some other thing or person. When this identification is damaged by some inevitability it results in sorrow. Inner spiritual non-duality prevents such infatuation and identification. Thus it prevents sorrow and promotes love and joy in life.

This inner and spiritual non-duality and integrality constitutes the deeper principle of man's being and existence. Externally man appears to be an individual being limited in his physical individuality and isolation. But internally the real existence of man is not contained in this individuality and isolation. It finds its fullness in inner and spiritual non-duality in which individuality and isolation are transcended. This deeper truth of man's existence is elucidated in the parable of Prajapati found in the beginning of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. Prajapati was alone in the beginning of creation, as no creatures had been created till then. He did not enjoy with himself alone. Hence he created the copular world. This parable of Prajapati signifies that the deeper truth of life is joy and it cannot be realised in isolated individuality or individualities. It can be realised only in inner and spiritual non-duality and integrity which can concretely and empirical realised in a diversity of beings.

The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad further elucidates the idea of social non-duality and realisation of fullness of being through it. Supreme spirit desired to multiply in conjugal partners and progeny in whom it could establish inner and spiritual non-duality and integrity. Without such non-duality it feels itself to be incomplete in isolation. It is in spiritual non-duality that it finds fullness of its being. Natural conjugal relationship and bonds with progeny afford a natural facilitation for spiritual non-duality, which

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is to be extended beyond such natural limits for realising greater fullness of being. Realisation of spiritual non-duality is fulfilment of spiritual knowledge and understanding, whereby human beings into a social whole. Forming a social whole is the greatest enrichment and highest fulfilment of the existence of man. It is the maximisation of man's being as a fact of immediate realisation.

Spiritual cooperation is the practical mode of establishing this inner non-duality in concrete life. This mode has been emphasised at several places in the Upanishads, mainly in the context of spiritual learning and spiritual aspiration. But it can be (and should be) extended to other spheres of concrete life. Spiritual cooperation is a general attitude of dynamic non-dualism which is not confined to learning, but which in fact, can be extended to other spheres of social and active life with more concrete and more convincing experience of non-dualistic spiritual delight. Indications of such extension of spiritual cooperation are found in the Upanishads. The Shantipatha commonly found in the Taittiriya and the Shwetashwatara Upanishad contains the famous prayer for common benefit and cooperative learning. It is to be noticed that cooperation is understood in the Upanishads in its deeper and more democratic form as working together and enjoying together the fruit of common enterprise. Togetherness is the truer essence of cooperation. It overcomes the duality of isolation and the unspirituality of alienation. It also facilitates the spirituality of non-duality. It is only in the context of the Upanishadic situation of instruction to disciples that cooperation is taken to apply to learning. Otherwise the words of the Shantipath for cooperation are general in connotation and apply to every kind of activity. The Taittiriya Upanishad contains in its first chapter a prayer in which teacher and disciple (and it can be any other persons) aspire for common attainment of renown and spiritual excellence. In the Shantipatha they also pray to overcome jealousy. It affirms the spiritual non-duality implied in all earnest cooperation. Jealousy is a relative form of alienation which causes duality. Transcendence of jealousy in life facilities expression and experience of spiritual non-duality and infess delight and devotion in our aspirations and enterprises.

Spiritual cooperation which forms the cardinal social tenet of the Upanishads is the fundamental principle of social life and social relations. By its concrete and wider application it can inspire and enrich all particular social relationship. Many social relationships are recognised in the Upanishads also. But in the context of general human relationship it is the regard for guests which is a most remarkable feature of Indian culture and which is most distinctly affirmed in the Upanishads also. The story of Nachiketas found in the Katha Upanishad illustrates the Indian regard for guest in the most illuminating way. Yama, the God of death, observes the rule of hospitality so sincerely that he apologises to Nachiketa for having kept him waiting for three days and grants him three boons for and appeasement. The guest is regarded as godly and is to he treated bounteously. He is deemed to be fiery and capable of burning the host by the fire of his displeasure. The guest is not always a familiar person. He can be a stranger. But he is to be treated cordially. Indian cultural tradition emphasises the observance of hospitality towards strangers who needed food mid shelter. Such need was common in India in the context of travelling in extensive Indian plans. The Taittiriya Upaniṣad affords

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Spiritual confirmation of this custom of hospitality towards strangers when it says that 'one should not refuse shelter to any stranger.' Liberal hospitality is the most general basis of social relations.

All these social relations are considered to be essentially spiritual in the Upanishads. Yajnavalkyas, declares in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad in the context of his spiritual instructions of his spiritually disposed wife Maitreyi that relations are not dear for their own sake, that is not for their social or natural reasons, but for relations breaking for want to spiritual cordiality which underlies them. Without spiritual cordiality they will cease to be; and we see relations breaking for want of spiritual cordiality. Natural bonds and selfish considerations cannot sustain social relations. These can be sustained only by unselfish non-dualistic spiritual cordiality which transcends all empirical conditions though it may foster them as concrete schema of social cohesion.

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I

IDEALS OF THE EDUCATION

What is the aim of the *Upaniṣadic* Education? What is the objective that the teacher tries to fulfil? Can it be said that the aim of this education is directed towards integration of personality of the pupil as an individual tending to the creation of an ideal citizen? Before discussing these facts it is necessary to consider first what the ideal or aim of *Upaniṣadic* instruction is. First of all, it may not be out of place to mention that it was a time when knowledge was considered as a valuable acquisition which brought to the possessor the real satisfaction to his life and it may be noticed that the instructions are imparted by and large to a class of highly trained men who are not satisfied with the popular common place teaching of day to day life, for such teaching is not adequate to satisfy their longing for attainment of the knowledge of the supra sensitive-*Supreme Reality*. "The ideal" says Radhakrishnan "which hunted the thinkers of the *Upaniṣads*, the ideal of man's ultimate beatitude, the perfection of knowledge, the vision of the Real in which the religious hunger of the mystic for divine vision and the philosopher's ceaseless quest for truth are both satisfied is still our ideal."

In the *Upaniṣads*, therefore, an attempt has been made to drive home in the mind of the aspirers the truth that had been hidden so long under the popular teaching. And this truth is taught in technical terms, parables, and enigmatical statements at different times for the sake of easy comprehension.

The *Upaniṣadic* seers look at the world from a novel angle of vision. They reflect not on physical facts that exist outside themselves but on themselves and try to realise that there is a world within and therefore they turn their searchlight inward (*āvṛtta cakṣuh*) trying to fathom the mystery of the self and immortality.

A peculiar characteristic is easily discernible in the *Upaniṣad* that its lessons are addressed to individual pupils by individual teachers. The main purpose is to treat the individual directly and the community indirectly through the individual. The ultimate aim of education is to attain final emancipation, and emancipation can be thought of only from individual point of view and it is for this reason that the teaching of the *Upaniṣads* is individual centered and not community centered. We find the individual his relation to the world and to Reality and his relation to the community is only a means to an end. Thus the *Kaṭhopanisad* says:

> *Yadā sarve pramucyante kāmā ye'sya hṛdi śritaḥ*
> *atha martyo'mṛto bhavatyatra brahma samaśnute*
> *Yadā sarve prabhidyante hṛdayasyeha granthayaḥ*
> *atha martyo'mṛto bhavatyetāvad anuśāsanam*

When all desires that dwell in human heart are given up, then the mortal becomes immortal, and obtains *Brahman*.

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When all the ties of the heart are severed here on earth, then the mortal becomes immortal, here ends the teaching. The knots of the heart, which bind it to the world, are *kāma* (desire), *avidyā* (ignorance), *saṁśaya* (fear and doubt). In the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*. It is declared that

> *Puruṣa evedaṁ viśvaṁ karma tapo brahma parāmṛtam*
> *etad yo veda nihitaṁ guhāyāṁ so'vidyāgranthiṁ vikiratīhasaumya*
> *bhidyate hṛdaya-granthiśchildyante sarvasaṁsayḥ*
> *kṣīyante cāsya karmāṇi tasmin dṛṣṭe parāvare*

"The person himself is all this, work, austerity and *Brahman* beyond death. He who knows that which is set in the secret place (of the heart), he, here on earth, O beloved cuts asunder the knot of ignorance.

"The knot of the heart is cut, all doubts are dispelled and his deeds terminate, when He is seen — the higher and the lower" (Dr. S. Radhakrishnan's translation).

All the knots can be finally cut when the individual self or *Jīvātmā* loses itself in the vision of the Supreme Self *Paramātmā*. In the *Chāndogya*, Sanatkumāra thus instructs Nārada.

> *na paśyo mṛtyum paśyati na rogaṁ nota duḥkhatām*
> *sarvaṁ ha paśyaḥ paśyati sarvamāpnoti sarvaśaḥ*

He who sees this does not see death, nor sickness nor any distress. He who sees this sees all things and obtains all things in all ways.

Lanman says "The great practical aim of all the teaching (of the Upaniṣads) is, by exterminating in the soul all desires and activity, root and branch, to lead to the realisation of the unity of the soul and the Supreme Soul. This realised it is liberated; and death can only do away with what no longer exists for the emancipated soul, the last false semblance of a difference between itself and the Supreme."

We have already noticed that the *Upaniṣadic* teachers usually live in hermitages or penance-groves not far removed from the towns or from the life of people in towns and villages. These forest hermitages are the centres of learning where the children of the rich and the poor live together under the same roof in a very simple manner. The sons of the peer along with the sons of commoners serve their *guru* equally and beg alms for their duality food. The students regard their teachers as *vidyācāryas* or spiritual parents and render him ungrudged service. The forest institutions are residential Universities where the students live in the house of the teachers, perform the prescribed duties and observe sacred vows. The training comprises physical, moral and spiritual discipline. They cannot think of complaining of their life of self-restraint and privations. They willingly undergo the training and thus attain all-round success in their educational career now and could solve the problems of life in their would be life of householder. The ideal is to forego luxury and material comforts now in order to get real happiness hereafter by way of investment.

The basic ideals of the institutions of the *gurukulas* and *āśramas* is to afford opportunity for the intimate contact of teacher and their taught, a contact of mind with mind and spirit with spirit which no other agency can serve as a substitute or equivalent. So far as the importance of the *gurukula* system of education is concerned the remark made by Dr. Altekar is worth quoting "Direct, personal and continuous contact with a teacher of noble character naturally produces great effect on the

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mind of the scholar during the pliable period of childhood and adolescence. The close association with elderly scholars, who had made progress in education and won the applause of their teachers, naturally induces the new entrants to emulate their example. The invisible yet all-pervading influence of established traditions of the institution naturally spurs the student to identify himself with them." It is an established fact that education can flourish only in an atmosphere where mutual cooperation and understanding among the teacher and the taught prevails. Education cannot be regarded as a passive, mechanical, or one sided process, it means rather a joint enterprise among the fellow learners. The reverence on the part of the pupil and the affection on the part of the teacher which brings about a cordial relationship between the teacher and the student is largely responsible for the success of education in these residential type of schools.

Another notable feature of the education of ancient India is that it "Spread downwards; it was not built up from below. Indian civilisation was a product of the country not of the town, of the forest not of the city."

In the *Vedic* age the forest is as it were the powerhouse of wisdom from which the light of knowledge radiates far and wide throughout the country. The forest life affords the opportunity to the student to come in direct contact with nature, contributing to the development of a receptive frame of mind. Rabindranath Tagore remarks, "The current of civilization that flowed from its forests inundated the whole of India."

The aim of the *gurukula* system of education is directed towards the purity and solemnity of life and to instil into the minds of the pupil the spirit of self-help, self-sacrifice, devotion to duty and reverence for the elders. The religious fervour and the reverential personality of the teacher exercises a direct influence in creating a healthy spiritual mood in the minds of the youngsters. Says Dr. Ramaswami Aiyar, "It would be correct to say that these ancient Hindu schools of learning, which ultimately developed into what might be described as forest Universities, pursued a mode of teaching which was neither mechanical nor soulless but which generated in the learners a spirit of anxious enquiry and a quest for truth."

Thus it is crystal clear that the aim of education is to encourage both moral and spiritual interest of the young enlightened and the society associated with them to attain the spiritual kingdom. The true aim of the *Upaniṣadic* education can be realised from the constantly recurring prayer invoked in relation to persons engaged in the quest of knowledge and of the Self: the teacher and the taught jointly pray that

> *saha nāvavatu,*
> *saha nau bhunaktu,*
> *saha vīryam karavāvahai,*
> *tejasvi nāvadhītam astu,*
> *mā vidviṣāvahai.*

May the supreme protect us; may He afford us daily sustenance, may we be given strength and valour for joint enterprises, may our studies be illustrious and crowned with success, and above all, may there be no hatred and jealousy amongst persons following the same path.

A slight probing into this prayer will make man appreciate that there can be no other satisfactory and complete objectives of education as have been disclosed here in this message of the *Upaniṣadic* seers. These are the true purposes of gathering of pupils and teachers, disciples and preceptors.

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The teacher and the student try to build up the intellectual republic which might help them in retaining their fellow-feeling unto the last and develop a keep sense of unity for the achievement of their aspiration. The aim of education is to refine outer and inner life of the individual for the development of his moral, spiritual and intellectual life and to spread the light of knowledge in the right direction. From the invocation verse cited above it can be clearly seen that several aims of education are postulated here which he can be briefly discussed and evaluated.

(a) The protection of self (*saha nāvavatu*) is the first postulate of the aim of education. The primary function of the education is to look into the fundamental question concerning human existence. Education should give us strength to protect us from undesirable impulses and wastage of energies. It should also give us strength to overcome all sorts of trials and tribulations of life, to solve its pestering problems and to face the stern realities of life with ease. It requires self-control to generate the sense of self-respect, self-reliance and self-security; security of self ensures successful existence.

(b) Education should aim at bringing about economic efficiency signified by the motto (*Saha nau bhunaktu*) and elimination of distress and poverty from our society leading to social justice and welfare of the state. Let us all live peacefully and happily in the society by resorting to some means of livelihood according to our tradition. Social efficiency depends largely on economic efficiency. Education should prepare an individual for a useful profession for driving out poverty from the society.

The *Upaniṣadic* seers did not deny or repudiate the economic needs of man, but deliberately set a limit beyond which economic needs should not go. Instead of hankering after more and more of worldly goods, they devoted themselves—once the basic requirements of life were met to the development of a life of intellectual, moral and spiritual culture.

(c) Cultivation of physical competance as embodied in the phrase (*saha vīryam karavāvahai*) is another basic postulate of the aim of education. The *Upaniṣadic* seers are fully aware of the fact that physical efficiency is the corner stone of a complete and successful life. Physical fitness can never stand a man in good stead if it is benefit of mental strength. Hence in the following part of the invocation, it is prayed for.

(d) (*tejasvi nāvadhitam astu*) i.e. may our study be charged with strength and illumination. This prayer purports to acquisition of mental strength and illumination caused by study of sacred lore. Knowledge is the greatest strength of human beings. It has been declared in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* also as

> *"Yuvā syāt sādhu yuvādhyāyakaḥ āśiṣṭho dṛdhiṣṭho*
> *Valiṣṭhah, tasyeyaṁ pṛthvī sarvā vittasya pūrṇā syāt."*

"Let the young man, during his tutelage be a good student, diligent in his studies, disciplined in mind, firm of purpose and strong in body. To such a student comes the wealth of the world in abundance."

The *Upaniṣadic* seers go to the extent of declaring boldly that the knowledge of the Absolute is not attainable by those who are not strong in body, mind and spirit;

Nāyam atma valahinena labhyaḥ

This self cannot be won by any who is without strength. Weakness, lethargy and negligence are to be purged in order to enter the kingdom of higher knowledge.

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All these lead us to think that great emphasis is laid on acquisition of healthy-physique, firmness of mind and disciplined will force. Observes Dr. Ramaswami, "There was a wise insistence upon the cultivation of a strong body as much as on firmness of purpose and the discipline of the will, the latter qualities depending, to no small extent, on healthy physique. The student was enjoined to make himself not only a diligent student, but an *Āsiṣṭha* and *Valiṣṭha*, disciplined and strong."

The *Upaniṣadic* seers stress time and again on the need of acquiring strength, physical, mental and spiritual to realise the supreme goal of life.

(e) The development of personality is another notable postulate of the aim of education. The object of education is to bring out the dormant qualities of intelligence, the rational insight and other intellectual and moral virtues to illuminate the mind of the people. The development of the qualities of head and heart is the constituent element of the formation of personality. Pupils feel and think thus—we should have that education which can illumine our mind and crown our life with success. Let out study be effective and let us be illustrious by diffusing the light of knowledge to dispel the darkness of ignorance.

(f) The last but the unique postulate is to acquire the spirit of tolerance. This postulate is no doubt based on the Hindu view of life. The true ideal of education is the liberation of mind from jealousy and hatred; the elimination of the feeling of pettiness, narrowness and selfishness from the human mind is what may be called the true end of education. The *Upaniṣadic* seer further declares

"*sā vidyā yā vimuktaye*"

That is learning which liberates the human mind. 'The liberation of the human mind to which this concept refers', says Dr. Gajendragadkar, 'is the liberation of the human mind from pettiness, narrowness and subversiveness". The real need of education is to prepare the man to be capable of conquering the narrowness of mind to elevate his feelings and ideals progressively higher until the highest is reached. Education is not regarded as a mere process of transmission of information but as a means to make human mind broader, richer, more compassionate and more society oriented. Unselfish love, compassion and impartiality are the conditions precedent to intellectual salvation. The aim of education is to prepare a man to lead a complete or integrated life in the society and not to nurture a split personality. "The prayer which was to be recited at the beginning of the study of the *Upaniṣads*" observes Kabir, "expresses clearly and unequivocally the demand for an education which would satisfy all elements in man's nature and help him to develop as a harmonious and integrated personality.

May my limbs (*aṅga*), organ of speech (*vāk*), vitality (*prāṇa*), eye (*cakṣus*), ears (*śrotra*), strength (*bala*) and all other organs (*indriyas*) be nourished and perfected; all these are means to the realisation of the Infinite, May I not deny the Great one and may not the Great one forsake me. May I acquire those virtues which reside in a person devoted to *Upaniṣadic* studies."

Education is regarded as a life-long process; life is growth; anything which ceases to grow is bound to decay and wither away. A man claiming to be alive should continue his study and teaching throughout the life. The *Upaniṣadic* seers hold the view that without the twin qualities of studying and teaching the life of a man can never be complete. The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* says

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"rtaṁ ca svādhyaya pravacane ca, satyaṁ ca svāhyāya pravacane ca' ... mānuṣam ca svādhyāya pravacan ca, prajā ca svādhyāya pravacane ca"

Justice, truth, austerity, self-control, tranquillity, sacrifice, domestic duties, the attention to the guests and the obligation to the society are adverted to; but to these must be added the function of the teacher and the student as necessary supplement.

Education is not complete by itself, it must be supplemented by study and teaching throughout life. Inquiry and experience are the life of culture as well as of the law. All the conflicts can be resolved only where there is freedom to inquire and to expound (*svādhyāya pravacana*), to make the journey of life successful. It is, therefore, clear that life without the pursuit both of study and of exposition will remain as incomplete and ineffective as ever.

It was in the light of these objectives of education that the preceptor gives the final instruction or, to use a modern term, delivers the convocation address (*samāvartan*) to the disciples (*antevāsin*) who are going to leave the preceptors' abode or residential institution on the completion of their academic career. In the convocation address preceptor enjoins upon the disciple to face the problem of life and to devote themselves to the service of the community now that their schooling is over. In fact, the instructions given by the preceptor to his disciples in the parting message are equally relevant and valid in the context of present day society as well. The eleventh *anuvāka* of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* contains a short, simple but comprehensive convocation address which runs as follows.

Vedamanūcyācāryo'ntevāsinamanuśāsti, satyaṁ vada, dharmaṁ cara, svādhyāyānmā pramadaḥ, ācāryāya priyaṁ dhanam āhṛtya prajātantum mā vyavacchetsīh, satyānna pamaditavyam dharmanna pramaditavyam kuśalānna pramaditavyam, bhūtyai na pramaditavyam, svādhyāyapravacanābhyām na pramaditavyam, deva-pitr-kāryabhyāṁ na pramaditavyam.

mātṛdevo bhava, pitṛdevo bhava, ācāryadevo bhava, atithidevo bhava, yānyanavadyāni karmāṇi, tāni sevitavyāni, no itarāṇi yānyasmākaṁ sucaritaṁ, tāni tvayopāsyāni, no itarāni.

ve ke cāsmacchreyāṁso brāḥmaṇāḥ, teṣām tvayāsanena praśvasitavyam, śraddhayā deyam, aśraddhyayā' deyam, śriyā deyam, hriyā devam, bhiyā deyam, saṁvidā deyam.

atha yadi te karma-vicikitsā vā vṛttavicikitsā vā syāt ye tatra brāhmanāh sammarśinaḥ, yuktāh āyuktāh alūkṣā dharmakāmāḥ syuḥ, yathā te tetra varteran, tathā tatra vartethāh.

athābhyākhyateṣu ye tatra brāhmaṇāḥ sammarśinaḥ yuktā āyuktāḥ, alūkṣā dharma-karmāḥ syuḥ, yathā te teṣu varteran, tathā teṣu vartethāh.

eṣa ādeśaḥ, eṣa upadeśaḥ, eṣa vedopaniṣat, etadanuśāsanam evamupāsitavyam, evamu caitadupāsyam.

After having taught the *Veda* the preceptor thus instructs the disciple.

satyaṁ vada, dhamaṁ cara, svādhyāyānmā pramadaḥ. Speak the truth, practise virtue or follow the path of duty. Never neglect your obligation to the daily recitation of the *Vedas* i.e., your study. This piece of advice has again been impressed upon the minds of the students in a negative form:

satyānna pramaditavyam dharmānna pramaditavyam, kuśalānna pramaditavyam.

You must not deviate from the path of truth, from the path of duty and from the path of well-being.

Thus the preceptor demands of the departing student adherence to the path

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of truth, the performance of duty and sustained practice of daily study in the next order of life following student life and active participation in public good.

The word *satya* is derived from the root *as* to be, *sattāyām* means existing and '*satya*' means 'conducive to existence' i.e. the quality which is essential for existence. It has been said '*satyam viśvasya jagataḥ pratiṣṭhā*'. Truth is the stay of the whole universe. The Hindu scriptures lay great emphasis on our being truthful. Truth is identified with *ṛta* or moral order '*vad vā ṛtam tat satyam*' in the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, it has been said to be the only *Vrata* observed by the gods:

'ekaṁ ha vai dayāvaām caranti yat satyam tasmāt satyameva vadet."

In the same *Brāhmaṇa* '*satya*' has again been identified with '*dharma*'.

yo vai dharmah satyam vai tat.

tasmāt satyaṁ vadantam āhur dharmaṁ va-datīti dharmaṁ vā vadantam satyaṁ vadatīti

That which is '*dharma*' is indeed 'truth', hence people say of a man who is speaking the truth, he is speaking '*dharma*' or one who is speaking '*dharma*' is speaking the truth.

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* also truth has been identified with '*dharma*':

> *yo vai sa dharmaḥ, satyaṁ vai tat,*
> *tasmāt satyaṁ vadatantamāhuḥ*
> *dharmaṁ vadatīti, dharmaṁ va vadantaṁ*
> *satyaṁ vadatīti*

What is '*dharma*' is indeed 'truth'. Hence people say of one speaking what is true, that he speaks what is '*dharma*', or of one speaking what is '*dharma*', that he speaks what is true. In the *Praśnopaniṣad* it is said "*samūlo vā eṣa pariśuṣyati yo'nṛtamabhivadati.*

Further in the same *Upaniṣad* it is declared *teṣāmevaiṣa brahmaloki yeṣāṁ tapo brahmacaryaṁ yeṣu satyaṁ pratiṣṭhitam.* They indeed possess that *Brahma* world who possess austerity and chastity, in whom truth is established.

The story of Satyakāma-Jābāla in the *Chāndogya* clearly proves that truth is regarded as the highest virtue by the *Vedic-Aryans* in general and *Upaniṣadic* seers in particular.

The exhortation to speak the truth, therefore, finds the first preference over all other obligations in the above quoted convocation address. The importance of the path of truth has been brought to our notice further in a negative way with a view to stressing that even unwittingly or through carelessness we may not depart from it.

One must be true in every respect, in thought, in word and action and even through carelessness one should not deviate from that path. The path of truth referred to here is, therefore, not merely the path of speaking verbal truth but has a deeper significance. '*Satya*' or '*truth*' in the context of the convocation address, says Dr. Gajendragadkar 'took within its sweep a much broader and much more constructive concept.

> *"yad bhutahitaṁ etyetam etad satyaṁ matam mama"*

That which leads to the largest good of the largest number is truth. It will thus be seen that the truth of which the Chancellor spoke in addressing the graduates in ancient days was social truth. Tenets and beliefs and modes of conduct and behaviour—individual and social which led to the largest food of the largest number, were included in the concept of truth; and the injunction to the graduate was that from such truth, he must never depart."

In '*dharmaṁ cara*' the word *dharma* means duty in general and not merely

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religious injunctions. Though the word dharma is identical with *'satya'* as we have noticed under *'satyam vada'* still its the separate mention indicates some other significance in this context. Lord Manu has described *dharma* as

> *dhṛtih kṣamā damo'steyaṁ śaucam-indriya-nigrahaḥ*
> *dhīrvidyā satyamakrodho daśakaṁ dharmalakṣaṇam* (6-82).

Contentment, forgiveness, self-restraint, non-stealing, purity, sense-control, wisdom, knowledge, truthfulness and control of anger—these ten constitute *dharma.* We find mention has been made of all the duties and moral virtues of a man. None-the-less, great importance has been put on self-control directly and indirectly. In fact control over senses, body, mind and thought is the sine-qua-non of success of life. The self-control is referred to here by the term *dharma* which the preceptor demands of the disciple to observe throughout his life. Thus says the *Vaṣistha-smṛti*

> *"brahmaṇāsya tu dehoyaṁ nopabhagāya kalpate*
> *iha kleśāya mahate pretyānanta-sukhyāya ca"*

This body of *Brāhmaṇa* is not intended for enjoying sense-pleasure. It has to be made subject to strict discipline here which will contribute to manifold joys after death. From this it can be inferred that a man can know and realise *Brahman* here in this life itself by the observance of the two fold *dharmas* of the nature of *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* as mentioned in the *kaṭha-upaniṣad.* Thus the *Upaniṣad* requires man to choose the good and realise it by constant and conscious effort.

The word *'dharma'* in the context of the convocation address mentioned earlier has been used in the sense of all social duties or obligations in order to make the social order stable and progressive. *"dhāraṇat dharmamityāhuḥ*, so says the *Mahābhārata.* The *śruti* says, *"dharma viśvasya jagataḥ pratiṣṭhā dharmeṇa pāpamapanudati"*.

Dharma is the foundation of the entire universe, one gets rid of sin by *dharma.*

The supreme object of man which is of the form of attainment of joy and the avoidance of sorrow can be secured by *dharma.* It is said, *dharatīti dharmaḥ: dhṛyate anena iti vā dharmaḥ,* the society is supported by this, hence it is called *dharma.* That *dharma* is the cause of the stability of the Universe is affirmed by the *śruti.*

Therefore that which sustains social structure stable and contributes to its progress is *'dharma'.* The preceptor advises the parting disciple not to depart from such course of conduct in life to maintain social order, happiness and prosperity.

'Kuśala' or 'welfare of the society' the teacher impressed upon the minds of the students that they should never deviate from the path of doing what is good to the society. The students of to-day will be the citizen of to-morrow and in his life as a citizen he is expected to contribute to social welfare. "It would thus be seen, observes Dr. Gajendragadkar, "that when the ancient graduates left the portals of the universities and faced the question mark of life, they were told to remember that as a citizen of the country, as members of a community, it was their duty to assist the process of social progress and social development. In other words, the idea of learning, in ancient days, was not a negative or passive idea. Scholarship did not like to live in an ivory tower in those days. Scholarship regarded itself as an instrument of social service, and in that sense the graduates were asked to behave in accordance with the best traditions of scholarship."

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The necessity of study and teaching (*svādhāya prabacanābhyām na pramaditavyam*) and the performance of the duties to gods and the ancestors (*deva pitṛkāryābhyāṁ na pramaditavyam*) and the perpetuation of the family (*prajātantum mā vyavacchetsih*) is impressed upon the disciples as social obligation to be performed in their after life.

It is said that as soon as a man is born, he is under a debt to gods, the ancestors and the sages. He should, therefore, direct all his attention to make himself free from all these debts. So says the *śruti*

> *jāyamāno ha vai brāhmaṇaḥ tribhir ṛṇa vā*
> *jāyate brahmacaryeṇarṣibhyaḥ yajñena devebhyaḥ*
> *prajayā pitṛbhyaḥ eṣa vā anṛṇi yaḥ putro yajvā brahmacārī.*

The *Smṛti* texts also echo the same injunction and we meet with such statements as-

> *ṛṇaṁ devasya yagena ṛṣīṇāṃ pāṭhakarmaṇā*
> *santayā pitṛlokānaṁ śodhayitvā parivrajet.*

One can pay off his debt to the gods, ancestors and to the sages by the performance of sacrifices, the propagation of the family and the study of the *Vedas* respectively. He must discharge his obligation to the gods, to the sages and to his ancestors before he is entitled to renounce the world.

By this injunction the teacher impressed upon the students who is going to enter into family life or the *gṛhasthāśrama* to consider them as social obligation to be performed carefully and attentively for the preservation of the cultural heritage of the society. These are essential attributes for the growth, development and cultural progress of the society. For the preservation of the cultural heritage and to perpetuate the memory of our forefathers we should not allow our line of progeny to be cut off. It is incumbent on us to show our gratitude to the ancient seers by studying and expounding the knowledge handed down from generation to generation, and to transmit it to our posterity to maintain its perennial flow for ages to come. Thus the state of house-holder is spoken of from one perspective as the highest stage with so many obligations to perform and marriage is as a rule compulsory for all students who come back from the forest academy to their paternal abodes. Education essentially aimed at preparing the individual to discharge all these three debts and free himself from social obligations.

According to *Sanātana Dharmaśāstras* marriage is not looked upon as a mere contract or partnership. It is not a passport to unbridled sexual enjoyment or sheer worldly enjoyment. Marriage is a sacrament. It inculcates in man the sense of social responsibility, self-help and self-restraint. The very fact that wife is termed *sahadharmiṇī* and the etymological import of the word *patnī* (one who helps her husband in discharging religious vows) drives home the truth that marriage is a sacred institution which has a holy sanction. Wife is looked upon not as a means of carnal gratification but as the mother of the race and perpetuatress of the family.

In this connection mention may be made further that the pursuit of wealth and happiness is an eternal aspiration of the human being and therefore one should not be blind but alive to the importance of both and never be negligent in promoting one's well-being *kuśalānna pramaditavyam* or acquiring prosperity by all legitimate means. An honest means of attaining

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prosperity in life of the member of the society promotes the welfare of the community. The teacher wanted the students to be respectful to mother, father and the teacher and be hospitable to the guest. The entertainment of guest is considered to be one of the five *mahāyajñas* called *nṛyajña* which is required to be performed by a householder daily. It is said

> *adhyayanaṁ brahmayajñaḥ pitṛyajñastu tarpaṇaṁ*
> *homo daivo valirbhauto nṛyajño 'tithipūjanam.* (Manu. 3-70)

By this the teacher enjoined on the students to harbour respect and charity in mind. This raises a man from the narrow groove of selfishness to a selfless stature. Unselfish motive is essential for social welfare.

One of the most important pieces of advices is that the disciple must always do what is above reproach and must never do that which is objectionable and censurable. Thus pure conduct and good behaviour are enjoined. Śaṁkara remarks

vānyapi cānyāni anavadyāni aninditāni śiṣṭācāralakṣaṇāni karmāṇi tāni sevitavyāni karttavyāni tvayā, no na karttavyāni itarāni sāvadyāni śiṣṭakṛtanyapi (T.U., 1-11-2)

The training of character and spiritual culture is to be achieved along with all relationship with the life of work at home. One of the essential instructions is to help the poor out of sympathy for suffering humanity. The householder's wealth is not for the selfish enjoyment, but for securing the welfare of all.

It was the aim of education to equip the student properly so that he may be an ideal citizen with the conviction that one and the same spirit pervades all beings. Swami Vivekananda observes, "The end of all education, all training, should be man making. The end and aim of all training is to make the man grow.' Dr. Mahadevan remarks, "Man is not a mixture of elements without an inner coherence. What provides the inner coherence is spirit of self. Man is essentially spirit, with mind, life and body as lower possessions or appearances. In other words, body, life and mind are progressive approximations to spirit which alone is the essence of man as well as of the universe. It is this supreme truth which is proclaimed by the *Upaniṣad* text that says

> *'puruṣanna paraṁ kiñcit sā kāṣṭha sa parā gatiḥ'*

"Higher than the *Puruṣa* there is nothing that is the end that is the final goal. Commenting on this text *Śaṁkara* observes: "There is nothing other than, or superior to the *Puruṣa*; which is the pure consciousness; it is the final limit and goal of all that is subtle, great and inward":

Yasmānnāsti puruṣāccinmātraghanāt paraṁ kiñcidapi vastvantaram, tasmāt sūkṣmatvamahatva — pratyagātmavānāṁ sā kāṣṭhā niṣṭhā paryavasānam. (Śaṁkara on *Kaṭha*, 1-3-11)

If the 'whole man' is *Puruṣa*, then, it is clear that the supreme aim of education should be to enable the individual to discover *Puruṣa*. Education is the instrument which can enable the individual to transcend all mundane experiences and attain the Absolute which is the true, the beautiful and good.

There can be no better aim of education than to proclaim *'asato mā sad gamaya; tamaso mā jyotirgamaya. mṛtyor mā amṛtaṁ gamaya'*

Let our education lead us from unreal to the real, from darkness to light, from death to immortality.

In the same *Upaniṣad* we are informed that not only the moral qualities of truth and faith but also the physical attributes

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of celibacy and austerity in addition to living in the forest and begging of alms are applauded and almost prescribed for the final emancipation. The *Upaniṣadic* seers consider education as a life long process and divide the life of the individual into four stages to each of which different duties and obligations are assigned. These four orders are intended for taking man to perfection through successive stages in a progressive manner without ignoring the problem of livelihood and also to awaken the divine within man and finally to attain emancipation, the supreme goal of human life. Thus this *Upaniṣadic* type of education is far cry from the mere brain building type of education of to-day.

1. Brahmacaryāśram (or Student Life or the Life of Education)

The first stage or *āśrama* according to the four orders of life is *brahmacaryāśrama* or the stage of student life. We are particularly interested in this stage which has a direct bearing on education. The very fact that the student life was called *brahmacarya* bespeaks the great ideal of education. An individual enters into the first stage of life on completion of initiation ceremony which is known as *upanayana* (Holy thread ceremony) and which is performed at a certain age which varies according to the three castes from eight to twelve when his intelligence begins to be seriously active. The word *upanayana* means taking near; or, leading near to the *guru* for instruction, or initiation into the *Vedas*. Young boys are taken near a *guru* for their education. It is regarded as a regular sacred rite to be performed by every householder as preliminary to students' life of their male children. After the investiture with the sacred thread a boy is committed to the care of his preceptor dwelling in the forest which is reckoned as the seat of learning for instruction in the *Vedas* and *Upaniṣads*. In the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* (11-4-2) we find that the gods and the fathers went to *Prajāpati* wearing the sacred thread. We are told in the *Kauṣītaki* (2-7) that the all conquering Kauṣītaki adored the rising sun having performed the investiture with the sacred thread (*yajñopavītam*). The boy who is then considered reborn (*dvija*) is required to stay in the spiritual family of his *guru* till the end of his student career. *Upanayana* is considered a second birth and this second birth is from the gāyatrī as the mother and preceptor as the father. Education is looked upon as sacred. As the physical development begins in the mother's womb so the spiritual development begins in the teacher's residence and his admission to school life is again considered a religious sacrament. It may be noted that the student had to acquire learning by the most sincere service to his preceptor, lasting from twelve to forty eight years according as he aspires to study and master one, two, three or all the four *Vedas*. Thus the students are to serve his teacher for a number of years devotedly with his whole heart in order to come out as a man of learning; or, as versed in the *Vedas* and in other *Dharmaśāstras*. While residing at his *guru's* house he must wear proper girdle, offer prayer to the gods, sages and pitrs (manes), fetch faggot for kindling the holy fire and so on.

The student should have his soul cleansed by the purity of conduct, by *Vedic* rites, self-restraint, strict continence and observance of various vows. He should perform the worship of the morning and evening twilight (*sandhyāvandanam*) of the sun and should tend the sacred fire.

The person leading the *brahmacarya* mode of life should always observe rigid vows and with his senses under control should pay attention to the instructions

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imparted by his preceptor. Reflecting upon the *Vedas* and discharging all the duties, he should pass his days dutifully waiting upon, and serving his preceptor, and always paying deep and sincere regards to him. In short he must live a perfectly holy life.

The rules for the *brahmacārin* formulated by Gobhila, Manu and other law makers also show how painstaking was the life of the student in those days—holding aloft the maxim of plain living and high thinking.

It has been noticed that every individual during his student life is required to observe complete celibacy. The *ṛṣis* consider the preservation of chastity or absolute continence not only conductive to the pupil's physical but also to his mental and moral well-being.

"*Brahmacarya* is chastity in thought, word and deed, always and in all conditions" says Swami Vivekananda, "the chaste brain has tremendous energy and gigantic will-power, without chastity there can be no spiritual strength. Continence gives wonderful control over mankind. The spiritual teachers of men have been very continent and this is what gave them power". Not only that, the sages of yore were fully conscious that the period of adolescent is a period of stress and storm and hence requires proper discipline to control and regulate youth for the development of a balanced and integrated personality. The central theme of this schooling is to make them realise the place of *artha* and *kāma*, in the scheme of their lives and also to face the problems of life in a way that ultimately tends to reach the supreme goal of life, perfection and God realisation.

In the first section of chapter eight of the *Chāndogya* we are informed that the longing for objects of sense gratification such as woman and the like that has grown through long continued indulgence extending over several births is not easy to overcome all at once. It is, therefore, found necessary to enjoin upon students various detailed injunctions as 'celibacy and the like observances and taboos. That *brahmacarya* is the present context stands for celibacy is clear from what *Ācārya* Śaṁkara himself says under the fourth section of the eight chapter of the *Chāndogya* when the term is explained as *brahmacaryena strī viṣaya tṛṣṇā tyāgena* i.e. renunciation of desire for women. Incidentally however, in the *Praśnopaniṣad* we are told that *brahmacarya* is not only disunion of male and female at day time "*brahmacaryameva tat yad rātrau ratyā saṁyujyante*", (*Praśna*, 1-13) where Śaṁkara comments as *yadrātrau saṁyujyante ratyā ṛitu, brahmacaryameva taditi praśastatvādrātrau bhāryāgamanaṁ kartavyam iti yayamapi prāsaṅgikī vidhih.*

If the male and female unite at night that is indeed *brahmacarya*. It can however be presumed that the word *brahmacarya* has been used here in the sense of self-control in sexual indulgence and not complete continence. Of course, this passage of *Chāndogya* refers to the order of the householder and not to the order of student life. *Brahmacarya* is traditionally described as abstinence from the following eight types of activities some of which are mental and some physical:

> *Smaranaṁ kīrtanaṁ keliḥ prekṣaṇaṁ guhyabhāṣaṇam*
> *Samkalpodhyavasāyaśca kriyānivṛtt-ireva ca*
> *Eatanmai-thunamastaṅgaṁ prava-danti manīṣiṇaḥ*
> *Viparītaṁ brahmacaryam-etadevāsta-lakṣṇam.*

'*Brahmacarya* is not' observes Radhakrishnan "sex destruction". There is no gulf between flesh and spirit, but only

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between the fallen and the transfigured flesh. Ancient Indian thinkers were of the opinion that the seed within man and woman is intended for the purpose of creating a body by which another soul may come into physical embodiment. When thus controlled, *brahmacarya* helps creative work of every description. When the seed is wasted in sex excesses, the body becomes weak and crippled, the face lined, the eyes dull, hearing impaired, and the brain inactive. If *brahmacarya* is practised, the physical body remains youthful, and beautiful, the brain keen and alert, the whole physical expression becomes the image and likeness of the Divine."

2. Importance of Brahmacarya

Human life is full of various desires and to satisfy them man spends his energies in diverse ways. Unless these *energies are concentrated in a particular direction methodically* nothing tangible can be achieved in this world. *Brahmacarya* stands as a method of canalizing both the physical and mental energies of man towards the achievement of the highest goal of one's life.

It is only through *brahmacarya* that one can attain the abode of *Brahman*. In other words *brahmacarya* (celibacy) and similar modes of discipline are regarded as the highest means of success for the seeker of *Brahman*.

The *brahmacarya* mode of life was so highly applauded that even the lord of gods Indra had to observe it for 101 years before he could attain the knowledge, par excellence of *Brahman* that *Supreme Reality*.

Sages hoary with age like Sukeśā and others who had already devoted their lives to it, had also lived for a year as *brahmacārī* under the tutelage of Pippalāda before receiving *brahma-vidyā*.

It is stated in the same *Upaniṣad* (1-10) that self-realisation can be achieved only through austerity (*tapas*), celibacy, faith and knowledge.

In the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* it is clearly stated that it is through correct knowledge and through celibacy one can experience the *Self*. It is further stated in the same *Upaniṣad* that not only *tapas* but *brahmacarya* (celibacy) and *Satya* (truth) are considered to be the effective means for the realisation of the *Self*. The highest truth in life can only be obtained by the disciplined life of a student in pursuit of knowledge par-excellence.

The fifth section of the eighth chapter of *Chāndogya* advocates the utility of *brahmacarya*. It has been equated with certain sacrifices. It is not only that *brahmacarya* has been extolled as superior to *yajña* (sacrifice), *iṣṭa* (adoration) *satrāyaṇam* (feeding hermit and the poor), *maunam* (observing silence) *anāśakāy-anam* (fasting), *araṇyāyanam* (going to live in a forest).

Great importance has been attributed to *brahmacarya* to acquire *praṇava* which is recognised as a powerful means of spiritual unfoldment. It is only through a *brahmacarya* that the latent qualities of body, mind and spirit can be drawn out, sustained and developed which ultimately lead to the realisation of the *Supreme Spirit*.

While commenting on the section second of chapter fourth of the *Chāndogya* Śaṁkara quoted the view that the (Goddess of) learning declares that a student observing *brahmacarya* i.e. a *brahmacārin* as one of her six channels, through which knowledge be transmitted.

> *brahmacārī dhanadāyī medhāvī śrotriyaḥ priyaḥ*
> *vidyayā vā vidyāṁ prāhatāni tīrthāni ṣanmama.*

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Manu also expresses the view that knowledge should be imparted only to those who have subdued all his sense, i.e. to *brahmacārins*. *Śruti* also maintains the same view that *brahmacarya* is essential for receiving knowledge:

> *Yameva vidyā śucimapramattaṁ medhāvinaṁ brahmacaryo' papannam yaste na duhyet katamañcana ha tasmai māṁ vrūyaḥ nidhipāya brahman*

It is, therefore, clear that knowledge should be imparted to those who observe the vow of *brahmacarya*. It can reasonably be assumed that some of the moral attributes are looked upon as pre-requisites of the instruction and preparatory means of attaining the highest end of human life, the attainment of the knowledge of the *Supreme Reality*.

3. Two types of Brahmacarins

The *Jābāla Upaniṣad* declares that one may renounce this word whenever he can cut off the attachment to this world. Adverting to the need to go successively through the first three *āśramas* to the final one of *sannyāsa* and also in continuation of the text *brahmacaryaṁ parisamāpya gṛhī bhavet* etc., the *Jābāla-Upaniṣad* says, '*yadi vetarathā brahmacary-ādeva pravrajet, gṛhādvā vanādvā yad ahareva virajet tadahareva pravrajet*. Otherwise, one may become *sannyāsin* from *brahmacarya* or *gārhasthya* or *vānaprastha*, one should renounce the very day one attains detachment towards the world. A man during his student life (*brahmacarya*) can even renounce this world if he feels like doing so. The man who takes recourse to renunciation right from the life of studenthood called *naiṣṭhika brahmacārin* (life long celibacy).

Yājñavalkya the greatest of the *brahmavādins* of the *Upaniṣadic* age towards the end of his discourse with Janaka, king of Videha who approached him as a student desiring to be instructed declares, "The seekers of *Brahman* wish to realise it through sacrifice, gift and austerity of fasting. One who knows *Him* thus, becomes a *muni* or a wise man. Desiring the same end, mendicants give up their homes. For that very purpose the ancient knowers (*of Supreme Reality*) used not to desire progeny. For, they mused thus, "What shall we do with progeny if we do not realise the *Self*; with this thought they used to take the life of mendicancy leaving behind the desire for progeny, the desire for wealth, the desire for the things of the world, since that which is the desire for sons is the desire for wealth, and that which is the desire for wealth is the desire for the worlds."

On another occasion Yajñavalkya while answering the question of Kahola—Kauṣītakeya reiterates the same view. Similarly some other references of *naiṣṭhika brahmacārin* are met with in other *Upaniṣads* as well, viz., C.U., 2-23-1; *Kaṭha*, 1-2-15; *Praśna*, 1-9 and M.U., 3-1-5 where *naiṣṭhika* variety of *brahmacarya* has been recognised as the proper course of spiritual endeavour. The *naiṣṭhika brahmacārins* are known as *sannyāsins* who contemplated on the mysteries of life and move far and wide as the spiritual sentinels of the race, and the torch-bearer of supersensuous knowledge breaking the boundaries of clan and country.

The other type of *brahmacārin* who has a mind to enter into the stages of *gṛhastha* after the prescribed period of *brahmacarya* is known as *upakurvāṇa brahmacārin*. He is so called because he helps (*upakaroti*) the preceptor with something in the shape of *dakṣiṇa* on the day of the student's leaving the school. It is said that:

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Yo'dhītya vidhivad vedān gṛhasthāśramamāvrajet
Upakurvāṇako jñeyaḥ naiṣṭhiko maraṇāntakaḥ.

He who having studied the *Vedas* in prescribed manner enters into the stage of householder is known as an *upakurvāṇa brahmacārin* but a *naiṣṭhika* one stays with the preceptor till death. Baudhāyana says, '*brahmacārī guruśuśrūṣī āmarṇāt*' i.e. a *brahmacārin* is one who serves his preceptor throughout his life, here Baudhāyana refers to the *naiṣṭhika* type of students. According to *Vyāsa saṁhitā* a twice-born who practises the vow of *Vedic* study for 36 years is an *upakurvāṇa*. Mention has been made of *upakurvāṇa* in Manu (2-243 & 244). *Yājñavalkya* (1-49), *Vaśiṣṭha* (chapter 7) and *Viṣṇu saṁhitā* (28-43) as well.

The *Chāndogya* (2-23-1) clearly refers to the *naiṣṭhika* type of students observing life-long celibacy and staying permanently in the preceptor's residential institution by the words *tṛtīyo' tyantamātmānam ācaryakule avasādayan*, i.e. 'The third staying permanently in the house of the *ācārya* till demise. The same passage of the *Chāndogya* refers to the *upakurvāṇa* variety of students by the words *dvitīyo brahmacaryācāryakulavāsī*, the second staying in the preceptor's institution for prescribed period till completion of schooling.

4. Grahsthasrama

The second stage is that of the *gṛhastha* (householder). Normally on completion of the first stage of life or the period of studentship one returns to one's paternal home and gets married. As per arrangement of his parent he is to marry a woman of the same caste and shoulder the responsibilities of life and society. Marriage is to be regarded as a sacrament and the wife as a helpmate in leading a religious life. The wife is not a means for sensual gratification alone but as a means of self-restraint leading to self-purification.

The purpose of the *gṛhasthāśrama* or of a married life is to appease the gods, the *pitṛs* and to perpetuate the line by procreation corroborating to the ancient saying that a man is said to be born with three debts, that is, a debt to the *Ṛṣis* (sages), a debt to the *pitṛs* (ancestors) and a debt to the *devas* (gods). The debt to the *pitṛs* is paid off by the procreation of progeny. One should discharge the first obligation by studying the *Vedas*, the second by performing sacrifice and the third by begetting children. After having discharged the first by living as a student in the house of the preceptor, he should enter into the family life in order to pay off the other two debts. The order of householder is the excellent of all the stages of life, because the householder gets the opportunity to serve for the existence of the followers of other three stages of life. They (house holders) welcome them all with sweet words and give them food with love and respect. Thus the life of the householder is characterised by the special virtue of hospitality, honesty, devotion to religion and social service. According to Manu, just as air is essential to the life of all creatures, so is the householder necessary for the support of those who belong to other three orders. The householder's life is extolled as the most useful stage of life, because the householder who is true to his duty, who is pure and unattached, who earns his livelihood in just and honourable manner and performs the rites and ceremonies as laid down in the *Vedas* can attain salvation. The householder is required to perpetuate and worship the sacred fires and also to perform the *agnihotra* and

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other sacrifices.

Amongst which the five great sacrifices known as *pañcamahā-yajña* are noteworthy. These five sacrifices consist of acts of piety, namely *deva-yajña* or sacrifice to the departed ancestors by offering oblation to them, *ṛṣi-yajña* or the sacrifice to the sages which consists in the study of the *vedas* daily, *nṛ-yajña* or sacrifice to men, which consists in serving his fellow-brothers, in feeding the guest, the poor and the destitute and lastly, the *bhūta-yajña* or the sacrifice to the domestic animals by carefully looking after them.

5. The next stage is that of *vānaprastha*. After the age of fifty a householder is to retire to the forest with his wife relinquishing hearth and home and pass all day in meditating on God. After completing the period of house-holder life, a person is expected to enter into this third stage of life. He is to lead a life of non-attachment and self control. He is not to hoard anything. In the forest he should subsist on wild fruits and roots and should not go-a-begging. He should practise hard austerities and should devote all his time to spiritual pursuit which prepares him for the final stage of his life, namely *sannyāsa*, the fourth and last order of life.

Having attained the fourth stage of life he should renounce all worldly attachment, cares and ties and maintain a spirit of complete indifference. In this stage he should shun the company of his wife also. In the *vānaprastha* stage one is allowed to keep the company of his wife alone but in the last stage *sannyāsa* one should shun the company of his wife also. This injunction is so imperative that sage Yājñavalkya who has realised the *Supreme Spirit*, who figures as the greatest enlightened seer and teacher in the whole range of *Upaniṣadic* lore, who infuses spiritualism in his wife Maitreyī, sage king, Janaka, etc., also shuns his wives Maitreyī and Kātyāyanī when he adopts the monastic order. This fact is clearly established in the fifth and sixth sections of chapter four of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*. *Sannyāsin* should acquire the supreme knowledge so essential for an ascetic so that he may attain supreme bliss or *mokṣa*. Observes Swami Nikhilananda, "The Indo-Aryan seers arranged the *Vedas* to conform to the four stages of life. The *brahmacārī* studied the *Saṁhitā*, the house-holder followed the injunctions of the *Brāhmaṇa*, the forest-dweller practised contemplation according to the *Āraṇyaka*, and the *sannyāsin* was guided by the wisdom of the *Upaniṣads*. According to the Hindu view, all four portions of the four *Vedas* were revealed simultaneously and have existed from the very beginning of the cycle. They are not to be regarded as exhibiting a philosophical development or evolution in the process of thoughts".

From the foregoing discussion it may safely be concluded that the institution of the four stages of human life or *āśramas* is firmly established in the *Upaniṣadic* age for the attainment of the knowledge of *Brahman* which comes a the last stage as a fruit of long struggle of a disciplined life through all its successive stages. And the view held by scholars like Deussen, Rhy Davids and Keays who deny the existence of the four sages of human life in the *Upaniṣadic* age is not tenable. The evidences drawn earlier from the two oldest *Upaniṣads*, the *Chāndogya* and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, go to prove the existence of four *āśramas* in the *Upaniṣadic* age as an institution for education of the people for life beyond.

It is of course true that the acquisition of knowledge par excellence is not always confined to the first stage of life, for it is evident from the story of Śvetaketu in the *Chāndogya* who stays with his preceptor for twelve years but his knowledge is

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proved to be imperfect at the court of the king Pravāhaṇa Jaivali. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* Yājñavalkya imparts instruction to Janaka, Ārtabhāga, Maitreyī and Gārgī at a later stage of their lives. In the *Chāndogya* we also find that five great householders and theologians along with Uddālaka Āruṇi approach Aśvapati Kaikeya quite late in their lives for instruction. The *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* records that Śaunaka a great householder approaches sage Aṅgiras for instruction. For there is the *Chāndogya* we find Nārada approaching Sanatkumāra after the completion of his study in the first stage of his life.

It is, however, evident that the *Upaniṣadic* seers consciously put great emphasis on the first stage, i.e. the stage of *brahmacarya* the significance of which embraces the entire stage of human life. They look upon the whole of life as an education received through disciplines of the successive stages of the four *āśramas* for the ultimate realisation of the *Supreme Reality*.

IDEAL OF THE LIFE

In the previous chapter we discussed certain necessary preliminary questions. We shall now proceed to discuss the question, what is the ideal deserving to be attained by the man which the Upanishads have determined by their method of the inspection of the three states?". That ideal deserving attainment has been described in Bṛihadāraṇyak Upanisad (4/2/1-2) by the precise words, "दक्षिणे ऽ क्षन् पुरुषः" while answering a question about the condition that man reaches by the study of the Upanishads. Now what is the meaning of these words? Even Śree Śaṅkarāchārya in his commentary on the Aitareya Upanishad while explaining, the three abodes of the Soul, which means that the organ which is the abode of the soul during the waking state is the right eye. The words दक्षिणे ऽ क्षन् पुरुषः have been used in Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad 4/2/2 and 2/3/5. In both these places the words अक्षन् पुरुषः (Soul in the eye) mean waking state; for the eyes are open in the waking state only. In Brahmopanishad (Verse 21) and in Nāradaparivrājako-panishad (5/25) there is the statement "the soul is in the waking state when it is in the eye". Thus the words Soul in the eye undoubtedly mean the waking state, and therefore the words the soul in the right eye must mean a special kind of the waking state. That special kind will be determined by the meaning of the word Dakshina i.e. right or by the description in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka 4/2/4. The word Dakshina shows a particular situation in the body. It also means dexterous i.e. one having the correct knowledge and from the description in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka 4/2/4 that the lives in all directions are his parts in these directions, it follows that he regards all beings as his parts, i.e. the lives or the souls of all beings as identical with his own life or Soul i.e. he knows the unity of the Souls. Thus, it follows that the waking state of such a man is named. In the Chhāndogya Upanishad 4/15 and 8/7/4 we have the statement—"This person who is seen in the eye is the real self, said he, "this is blissful, fearless Brahma" and in Chhāndogya 8/12 that purports to explain this statement, i.e., in the description of the best Soul, there is the adjective 'Eating, playing, or making himself merry with women vehicles or relatives'. It is clear from this adjective that this is the description of the 'Waking State'. Moreover in the Chhāndogya 8/7/12, though the physical body, dream and sleep have been shown not to be deserving enjoyment, the waking state has not been shown to be such; it follows therefore that the

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description in Chhāndogya 8/12 is that of the Waking State. Of course, it is the Waking State of one who sees that his self does not dwell in one body only, but that it dwells in the bodies of all beings i.e. of one whose self having flown or oozed out of his body has spread through the bodies of all beings and whose conceited affection about his body has therefore become extinct. This is evident from the words. In the same way this serene Individual Soul arising out of this body attains the highest condition, that is, the state of knowing Brahma and assumes its own real form; and from the words, Not remembering this body contiguous to which the Individual Soul is born i.e. not conceiving this body without which the Individual Soul cannot manifest itself and which always accompanies Individual Soul, to be the self. Moreover the words, This 'best soul' makes himself merry by experiencing the joys, that are in the Brahma Loka, by means of this Divine Eye i.e. the mind, show that the mind of this 'Best Soul' is working and the mind cannot work without the living body and the waking state. In conclusion this condition is proved to be the waking state. It is not the state of dream because it has been already shown not to be deserving of enjoyment in Chhāndogya 8/10. That the Brahma Loka referred to in 8/12/5 in nothing but the "Waking State" of a living man, is proved also by the statement. He who knows this i.e. the unity of Soul goes to Swarga Loka every day; because men experience the sleep, the dream, and the 'Waking State' every day and the sleep and the dream have been proved not to deserve enjoyment and therefore they do not deserve to be called the Swarga Loka or Brahma Loka; thus it is the Waking State of one who knows the Unity of Souls, that alone can be called the Swarga Loka or Brahma Loka and Swarga Loka is here synonymous with the Brahma Loka, the Brahma Loka also having been mentioned in Chhāndogya 8/3/2 as a Loka where men go daily but which they do not obtain i.e. realise or enjoy on account of ignorance. In conclusion 'अक्षिणि पुरुषः' (the soul in the eye) and उत्तम पुरुषः (the best man) mean the Waking State of one who knows the Unity of Souls. It is also certain that this state is not a निर्विकल्प समाधि, (perfect control of mind leaving no subject-object-relationship in consciousness) because it is clearly stated that the mind of the 'best man' is working.

The same thing is stated in Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad 4/3/20-33. The principle sentence therein is—"Whatever fear, for example that of being killed, that of being conquered, that of being cut to pieces as by an elephant or that of falling into a ditch, a man sees while in the waking state, he thinks that to be fear in the waking state on account of ignorance. But now where man like a god or a king thinks, 'This world is myself and therefore I am whole', that is his highest (best) condition i.e. a condition free from pain and most blissful /20/. He sees others but does not think them to be different from himself and thinks that there is only one i.e. himself everywhere and he does play i.e. does acts free from attachment for fruit. This i.e. this condition of his is the Brahma Loka, Oh, Emperor! This is what Yājñavalkya taught to him (Janaka). This is his highest goal. This is highest Wealth. This is the highest condition. This is the highest bliss. Other beings i.e. those who see duality only, live by getting only a very small part of this bliss, (The real meanings of the words Drashtā, Advaita and Ekaḥ should be seen by the help of the description in 4/3/30.) /32/. In this passage it is clearly stated that the knowledge of the Unity of the Souls is the highest condition i.e. a condition that ought to be attained. The

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word Manyate is of undoubted meaning and the action indicated by it is possible only in the waking state. Therefore, it follows undoubtedly that the highest condition described here is nothing but the 'Waking State' of one who sees the unity of the Souls.

The same follows from the description of Bhoomā in Chhāndogya Upanishad. We must try to understand correctly by meaning of Chhāndogya Upanishad 7/23/25. It is said there that the Bhooma i.e. the Great is bliss and that the Bhoomā i.e. the Great is who does not see another. The question is what is the meaning of this language. If we regard this language to be simple, it would mean that the Bhoomā does not absolutely see anything else like the one in sleep. If we regard this languages as poetical and ornamental, it would mean that the Bhoomā sees others, being in the waking state but that he does not regard them different from himself. Which of these two meanings is acceptable? It is really not necessary to discuss this question; for the Upanishad itself has made its meaning clear in 7/25. The passage runs as follows: Now therefore the Bhoomā (i.e. the Great) knowing that he, that is, the Soul alone is below, above, to the west, to the east, to the south and to the north and is all this, makes only this declaration about self "I am below, above, to the West, to the East, to the South, to the North; I am all this" and he makes only this declaration about the Soul, "The soul is below, above, to the West, to the East, to the South, and to the North and is all this". He i.e. the Bhoomā perceiving this, thinking this and knowing this, plays with himself; when he plays with others, enjoys himself when he enjoys a woman, himself rejoices when others rejoice, he rules himself when others rule him and moves through all societies, just as he likes.

Here we should note the words Paśyan, Manvānaḥ, and Vijānan (perceiving, thinking, knowing). They show that the mind of the Bhoomā is working and that the Bhoomā is nothing but the Waking State of one who sees the unity of Souls.

It is wrong to suppose that one in the Bhoomā State does not see anything else, like one in sleep. Because firstly as the Bṛihadāraṇyaka says in—'He did not experience joy therefore a single man does not experience joy. He therefore desired a second', one in such a state does not experience joy and it is therefore that in Chhandogya Upanishad 8/11 the sleep has been decided to be one not deserving enjoyment. The second reason is that thought the sensation of duality may be the same the interpretation of that sensation may differ and cause difference in the result. For example, a child as well as a grown up man has the same sensation from a mirror. However, the child thinks the image to be another child and is angry at the faces made by the child in the image. On the contrary the grown up man understands that what he sees is only an image of himself, never becomes angry at it, and makes use of it for adorning himself and for finding out defects or beauties in his face. If a dog walking over water with bread in his mouth thinks the image to be another dog, it may open its mouth to take the bread in the mouth of the image and will thus lose the bread in its own mouth, but if the dog understands that what it sees in the water is nothing but its own image it will not do so. I short though the actual sensation be the same its interpretations can differ and the actions based upon the interpretations can differ. Thus if one understands that whatever he sees is nothing but himself he will get rid of the miseries of the World and enjoy bliss. This is what the passage about Bhoomā really says.

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Some will object here, that the condition of Bhoomā is quite different from that of the sleep though as in the sleep there is not consciousness of others in Bhoomā and that the Bhoomā is Nirvikalpasamādhi i.e. perfect control of the mind, leaving no subject-object relationship in consciousness. That Nirvikalpasamādhi is different from sleep will be admitted on all hands. But that is not a state deserving of enjoyment is proved by the same reasons by which sleep is proved not to deserve enjoyment in Chhāndogya Upanishad 8/11. This same proposition is implied in Pañchadaśī in Triptideepa in the verse—If you regard Nirvikalpasamādhi as the realized knowledge because in it there is no consciousness of others, why should sleep also be not regarded as realized knowledge? The passage in Chhāndogya 8/11 is as follows. This means "Ah, Oh respected Sire, he (i.e. the Soul in sleep), does not know that I am, nor does he know that these beings are. He as it were is destroyed, non-existent. I do not think that there is anything deserving of enjoyment in this condition." What is said about sleep is also true about Nirvikalpasamādhi. In the sixth chapter of Kaṭha Upanishad Nirvikalpasamādhi having first been described in verses 10-11, the same proposition has been laid down about it in verses 12-13. Those verses are as follows—Some say that is the highest and best condition of self when the sensations of all the five kinds stop, when the mind also stops and the intellect does not work. That stationary condition of the organs is regarded by some as the Yoga, that is the Union of the Individual self with Brahma because (they say) the self makes no mistakes during that union and that condition is the source of happiness and the end of pain." But the following verses say that this is wrong. The verses are as follows: (In that condition of Union) the Supreme Self i.e. the Brahma, cannot be obtained i.e. known by speech mind or eye. How can that Brahma be obtained i.e. known during any condition other than that in which the Self (of course, the Individual self) says "Brahma is" i.e. in a condition other than the "Waking State". The "Supreme" self can be known properly and correctly, by the knowledge of the nature of both the self and not-self only when saying "the Self is".

The nature of the self becomes clearly understood if known only while saying that "the Self is" i.e. "in the Waking State." Here it is clearly asserted that the self can be known in the Waking State only and thus the proposition that the Nirvikalpasamādhi i.e. perfect control of the mind leaving no subject-object relationship in consciousness, is the highest and best condition of Self, has been refuted and that is quite correct. For, though the Nirvikalpasamādhi may appear to another man as being different from sleep on account of the facts that in it the heart, the circulation of the blood, respiration and digestion are stopped, that it is longer than sleep and that one in it cannot be awakened by others, it is not different from sleep if we take into consideration what the Self experiences while in it. This means that the difference between Nirvikalpasamādhi and the sleep is only *objective*, and not subjective. In conclusion it is wrong to hold that the Bhoomā is Nirvikalpasamādhi. It is correct to hold that the Bhoomā is the Waking State of one who seers the Unity of Souls. This is the only condition that deserves attainment and enjoyment.

This same thing has been told in Chhāndogya Upanishad 3/14. That whole passage is very beautiful and important. Here, we shall first consider whether this is the description on the Individual Self or

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of the Brahma unconscious of duality. The adjectives, Manomayah, Prāṇaśarīraḥ and Bhāroopaḥ can be significant primarily only in relation to the Waking State of the Individual Self and thus they must be taken to refer primarily to the Individual Self alone, Manomayah means "constituted of mind stuff," Prānaśarīraḥ means "having life as its body", Bhāroopaḥ means "constituted of light of consciousness." They apply only secondarily to the Brahma unconscious of duality. In Muṇḍaka Upanishad 2/1/2 on the other hand, we have the description Aprāṇo Hyamanaḥ (without life and without mind). It is clear that this is the description of the Brahma unconscious of duality. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the adjectives Manomayaḥ and Prānaśarīraḥ in this passage also describe the Brahma unconcious of duality. The same proposition is true of the adjective Bhāroopaḥ. In the verse—'When that shines, then all things follow it in shining; by its light, all this is seen it is clearly stated, that all this world is seen when Brahma shines. And all this world is seen only in the Waking State. Therefore, Bhā i.e. the light of Brahma means the Waking State and therefore Bhāroopa also means one in the Waking State. The adjective Sarvakāma also applies to the Individual Soul for the Brahma unconscious of duality can have no Kāma i.e. desires or intentions. Therefore, the description in this passage must be taken to apply to the Individual Soul, of course, to the Individual Soul who sees the unity of souls. The veiled statement in the word "Jalān" must therefore be so unravelled as to agree with this description of the Individual Soul seeing unity of Souls. The word "Tat-jalān" may be split up into "Tajjam", "Tallam" and "Tadan" meaning that is, that which is born from it, that which merges in it at the end and that which breathes or lives in it i.e. on account of its support.

But this explanation of the word "Tajjalān" does not agree with the description of the Individual Self in this passage and must therefore be rejected. I therefore split up the word Jalān into Jah, Lah, and an meaning जागर्ति ललते इति and अनिति इति that is, that which is in the waking state, that which plays i.e. does acts for rejoicing, and which has life. The word Jalān thus means the Individual Self that plays in the Waking State with the help of life. The passage is thus to be translated as follows keeping this discussion in mind.

All this is a Brahma. The Individual Self that plays in the Waking State with the help of life is also Brahma. One should therefore devote oneself to it i.e. that condition of the Individual Self, being calm i.e. undisturbed by joys and pains. Now, every man keeps some ideal in his mind that is he has something in his mind which he wishes to attain and for which he strives; man attains after his death that ideal which he was striven for in this life before death. Man should therefore strive to attain the ideal (described here) 1. That ideal is this. Life is his body. He is constituted of mind. He is the light i.e. consciousness i.e. the Waking State; he desires the truth and therefore regards his self as one that pervades the whole sky i.e. he sees the Unity of Souls. Therefore for the good of all beings he does all acts, desires all things, smells all smells, tastes all tastes and takes in all this world. He does not censure any body and does not praise any body /2/. This self of mine residing in the interior of the heart, is smaller than a grain of rice or a grain of barley or a grain of mustard, or a grain of Śyāmāka or of Śyāmāka-rice. It is greater than the Earth greater than the Space where the planets and stars move, greater than all these worlds (because all these are

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in the self in the form of knowledge) /3/. My Soul does all acts, desires all things, smells, tastes all tastes, takes in all this world, does not censure anybody and does not praise anybody. This is myself dwelling in the interior of the heart. This is Brahma. I shall attain this even after going away from this world, i.e. after death. He who has this firm opinion, has no doubt about it. So said Śyāṇḍilya. /4/. This passage also clearly shows that the Waking State of one who sees his self in every being is the state that ought to be attained.

The fourth condition also described in Māṇḍukya Upanishad, as deserving to be known and of course to be attained, is the Waking State of one who sees the Unity of Souls. In that description there is the adjective "Ekātmapratyayasāram". The meaning of this is that, the essence of that condition is the conviction of the Unity of Souls. Now a conviction can exist only during the Waking State of one who is convinced of the Unity of Souls. This condition, having been placed along with the three states, the Waking State, dream and sleep, one is misled at the first sight, to think that it is quite distinct from any of these three stages. But the author of the Upanishad has taken pretty good care to see that the reader is not misled and has used the words "Chaturtham Manyante" which mean that "This condition is regarded to be the fourth". The words he has used while describing the other three states are "Prathamaḥ Pādaḥ" (The first state), "Dwiteeyaḥ Pādaḥ" (The second state) and "Tṛiteeyaḥ Pādaḥ" (The third state). Similarly while describing a *distinct* fourth state he ought to have used the words "Chaturthaḥ Pādaḥ" (The fourth state). But he uses the words "Chaturtham Manyaṇte" instead. These words therefore convey to the mind of the reader the meaning that though regarded by some to be a fourth state, it is not really the fourth state, quite distinct from any of the three states. When one says, "I regard Rāma as my son", he implies that Rāma is not really his son Similarly as the Upanishads says, "It is regarded as the fourth". It implies, that it is not really fourth. Śree Śaṅkarāchārya says while explaining words—They consider it the fourth because it has characteristics different from those of any of the three states). But this explanation is not acceptable. For, it is has characteristics different from those of any of the three, it ought to have been straightly called "Chaturthaḥ Pādah" (The fourth state) only and not "Chaturtham Manyante" (Some regard it as the fourth). The words "Chaturtham Manyante" therefore imply that it is not a fourth state distinct from any of the three states; and the word "Pratyaya" (Conviction) in the adjective "Ekātmapratyayasāram" shows that the letter "OM" has three parts "A, U, M" corresponding to the Waking State, the dream and the sleep. (Maṇḍukya Upanishad 9/12) but that it has no part corresponding to the fourth state. This also shows that the fourth state is not an independent and a distinct state and the adjective "Ekātmapratyayasāram" shows that it is no other than the Waking State of one who is convinced of the Unity of Souls.

It may be objected here that this ideal namely the happiness in the Waking State of one who sees the Unity of Souls, being dependent upon actions, has termination. This objection can be met in the following manner. If we decide that this ideal does not deserve attainment, we will have to decide that a condition like sleep in which there is no consciousness of duality is the ideal deserving of attainment. But such an ideal is proved not to be deserving of attainment by the reasoning in Chhāndogya Upanishad 8/11. The positive happiness in the Waking State is certainly

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superior to the negative happiness in sleep and therefore if we have to pay for that positive happiness some cost in the form of "actions", we must pay for it and therefore though dependent upon "actions", it is the ideal that deserves to be attained. Moreover, all means of happiness depending upon others, having been rejected while attaining this happiness, this happiness can be called eternal in comparison with the happiness depending upon the contact of senses with their objects. (It should be noted here that though in the Waking State there is always the contact of senses with their objects, it is only some kinds of contact that give by themselves happiness called "sensual pleasure" and one enjoys happiness while doing acts if his mind is free from attachment about the results.

Bliss during actions was also created.

In conclusion, it is clear that the ideal deserving attainment set forth by the Upanishads is the Waking State of one who sees the Unity of Souls. This is called fourth state in the Māṇḍukya Upanishad, Brahmaloka in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad in the passage already quoted in paragraph 35 and in other passages and in other Upanishads also. In some passages it is also called Svargaloka. For example in the passage "अहरहर्वा एवं वित्स्वर्ग लोकमेति" in Chhāndogya Upanishad 8/3/3-5 (See paragraph 34). This is called Bhoomā in Chhāndogya 7/23-25 (See paragraph 36-37). This is called Brāhmee Sthiti in Bhagawadgeetā. This is described in Kaṭha Upanishad by the very expressive words—He enjoys Brahma in this life before death. In later Upanishads, for example in the Muktika Upanishad it is called "Jeevanmukti" (freedom during life) and it is also called "Turya" (the fourth) in some later Upanishads and writings but in some of them, it may have been mistaken, for "Nirvikalpasamādhi" (perfect control of the mind leaving no subject-object relation-ship in consciousness).

An objection may be raised here that this ideal deserving of attainment that I have described on the authority of the Upanishads, is a condition after death. This objection is however groundless. For, is none of the passages quoted above, are there any words indicating that it is a condition after death, On the contrary, there are words indicating that it is a condition before death. The words "Atra Brahma Samaśnute."

'Enjoys Brahma here i.e. in the life before death', in Kaṭha Upanishad 6/14 show that the condition is attained before death. In Bṛihadāraṇyaka 4/2 after describing this condition Yājñawalkya who is a living man says to Janaka, also a living man "Oh, Janaka, you have attained a fearless condition." This shows that Janaka attained that condition before death and that it is a condition before death. Bṛihadāraṇyaka, it is only after describing this condition in 4/3 upto "Eśa Bramhalokaḥ Samraṭ."

'This is Brahma Loka, Oh Emperor' in 4/3-33 that the conditions attained by fools as well as by the wise after death are described from 4/3/34 to 4/4/6. This shows that the condition described in 4/3/33 is a condition before death and has been expressly stated in 4/4/7 by the words "Atra Brahma Samśnute". In Muṇḍaka Upanishad also it is only after describing in 3/2/4-5 this condition by the words "Viśate Brahmadhāma."

Enter the abode of Brahma and "Sarvamevaviśanti."

'Enter all things', that the condition after death is described in 3/2/6-8 after clearly indicating by the word "Parāntkāle" (at the time of death) that the condition described in 3/2/6-8 is a condition after death. The word "Aharahaḥ" (daily) in "Aharaharvā Evamvit Swargam Lokameti" in Chhāndogya 8/3/3-5.

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'One who knows this goes to Swarga Loka daily', shows that it is a condition before death and that a wise man enjoys it before death. The words "Imān Lokānanusañcharan."

'Moving through these people', in Taitireeya Upanishad 3/10 also show that it is a condition before death. It may be urged against this that the words "Asmāllokāt Pretya" in the same passage show that it is a condition after death. The reply is that the contradiction between "Asmāllokāt Pretya."

'Having departed from this world' and "Emān Lokān Anusañcharan."

Moving through these words i.e. peoples can not be removed unless we understand "Ayam Lokah" in "Asmāllokāt" to mean the condition of ignorance as opposed to Brahma Loka, the condition of wisdom. Śhree Śañkarāchārya also takes a similar meaning.

The collection of desirable objects seen and unseen is this world. Therefore Asmāllokāt Pretya means having retired from the world i.e. having given up all desires for it. If we call the condition of the wise "Brahmaloka", we have to call the condition of the ordinary men "Ayam Lokaḥ". Thus it is clear that "Asmāllokāt Pretya" does not mean "After death". The descriptions of the conditions attained by the wise, before death and after death also differ. In the description of the former there are adjectives indicative of the Waking State. But the contrary is seen in the descriptions of the latter. One would be convinced of this by reading Muṇḍaka 3/2/7-8. There it is clearly stated that the organs, the actions and even the self-consciousness (Ahañkār) (the words used in the Upanishad are Vijñanamaya Ātma) are all merged in the Supreme inexhaustible and that names and forms are all lost. This indicates a condition like sleep. The same condition has been described in Praśna Upanishad in the same manner in 6/5. But the description in Muṇḍaka Upanishad 3/1/4 and in the Praśna Upanishad 5/5/-7 is of a quite different kind. For the words "Kriyāwān" doing good acts and when acts in the Waking State, dream and sleep are being done properly) show, that condition to be one before death. Similarly, the words "Dakśinekśan Purushaḥ" in Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad 4/2/1/2, the word "Manyate" in Bṛihadāraṇyaka 4/3/20, "Jakśat Kreedan Ramamāṇaḥ" in Chhāndogya Upanishad 8/12 and the words "Manomayah Bhāroopaḥ" and "Sarvakarmā" in Chhāndogya Upanishad 4/14 show that the condition described there is the Waking State. The difference in the description clearly shows that one is a condition before death and the other is a condition after death. It is also certain that the condition described by the adjectives indicating the Waking State is the condition before death. The same is named the fourth state in Māṇḍukya Upanishad.

This state has been described in the Upanishads as the culmination of desirelessness and happiness.

That condition in which one regards the whole world as himself, is a condition in which he becomes free from desires, free from sins i.e. miseries and free from fear. In that condition of his, he obtains all his desires, is free from desires and free from sorrows /21/. In this condition he goes beyond all sorrows of the heart /22/. That condition is his greatest happiness. Other beings live by enjoying only a small portion of that greatest happiness /32/. In Chhāndogya also it is said "Yo Vai Bhoomā Tatsukham" 7/23/1. (He who is great, that is, sees unity of souls, is happy). In the 5th chapter of Chhāndogya Upanishad there is a conversation between the King Kaikaya on one side and Oupamanyava and others

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on the other side. In the 18th section of that chapter the defect in Upāsanās (attendance upon with devotion) of Oupamanyava and others has been pointed out, and the true Upāsanā has been described. The chief portion of the section is this. The King said to them "You eat food, considering the Soul of the World i.e. Brahma, as if it were different from your Individual Self. But he who serves with devotion upon the conscious Individual Self dwelling in the span long space (of the chest or the head considering it to be the same as the Soul of the world, he eats food, through all peoples through all beings and through all Souls, i.e. he enjoys the happiness of the eating of food by all Individual Souls (including himself) while you enjoy the happiness of eating your food only i.e. he becomes happy by the happiness of others and thus his happiness is very very great /1/.

We have the following paragraph in Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad 1/5—After the Sampratikarma i.e. after a man transfers all his responsibilities of maintaining his family to his son i.e. after a man begins to do work for protection of all beings, the divine lives i.e. organs conferring great happiness enters into him /7/. From the Earth and the Fire, the divine speech enters into him. That is the divine speech, things spoken by which come actually to happen i.e. that is, that is divine speech, act promised by which are always done / 18/. From the heavens and the Sun the divine mind enters into him. That is divine mind by which a man is always happy and never bewails /19/.

From water and from the Moon, the divine Life enters into him. That is divine life, which never feels pain or feels exhaustion while doing acts for himself or while doing acts for others; "Ā" means "no all sides and hence it means for others). He who knows this i.e. he who acts according to this, becomes the Soul of all beings. He becomes as if he were this deity i.e. the Life of all beings. As all these beings protect this deity (i.e. Life) of theirs, so they protect him who knows this i.e. who acts according to this. Whatever sorrows these beings have, that remain with them. Puṇya i.e. happiness alone of other beings goes to him. Pāpa i.e. pains of other beings never goes to the wise men i.e. to those men in whom the divine speech, wind and Life have entered /20/. There is a similar passage in Bṛihadāraṇyaka. It is as follows: Now this Soul i.e. the Individual Soul, who as stated in the previous sentence "Tasmātsarvamabhavat" pervades all beings, is the shelter or support of all beings. By the offerings in the fire and by his Yajña, he becomes the shelter of the Devas. By his study of the Vedas, he becomes the shelter of the sages. By his offerings to the Manes and by his desire i.e. attempts for getting progeny, he becomes the shelter of the Manes. By his provisions for residence for men and by his giving food to the human beings he becomes the shelter of men. By his obtaining grass and water for cattle he becomes the shelter of cattle. By the fact that dogs and animals having feet like those of dogs, birds and insects including the ants, maintain themselves in his house he becomes the shelter of those beings. As one desires safety for one's own shelter or house all beings desire safety or happiness or good fortune for him who knows this in the same manner. (This manner that all his desires are fulfilled. This is in fact the rationale of the statement in Chhāndogya 8/2-31). This is the logic or reasoning of the knowledge of self /16/. In Kena Upanishad 4/6 we have the following statement-That Brahma which is named Tadwanam i.e. that which can be found in the whole world i.e. in all beings should be attended upon or served as such i.e. as

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found in all beings with devotion. All beings have longing for him who knows this i.e. all beings love him who acts according to this truth.

Hitherto I have shown the benefits obtained by Bhoomā i.e. the great. Now I shall show the benefits obtained by the society and others from Bhoomā. We have got a very beautiful description about this in the Chhāndogya 8/4. It is follows—He who is this soul described in the previous Khaṇḍa i.e. he who knows the Unity of Souls is a dam built for the safety (mean destructions) i.e. continuity of these peoples (Societies) (The meaning is that a man who acts according to the idea of Unity of Souls a great support to the good of the human society. Continuity includes happy condition or good, because there can be no continuity without happiness or good). Day and night, old age and death, sorrow, good acts and bad acts i.e. the desires arising from such acts cannot cross this dam. (The meaning is that the happy condition of the human society is as it were a city and that the Bhooma is as it were a rampart which protects that city and that day and night i.e. the destructive power of Time, old age, death, sorrow and desires generated by good and bad acts cannot enter into that city by crossing that rampart). The same thing is told in Bṛihadāraṇyaka 1/4/16. Now such a Soul is the shelter of all beings.

In the above passage and similar other passages, the benefits obtained by the Bhoomā have been shown. Of these, the absence of desires, having all desires and fulfilment of all desires appear contrary to each other. It is wonderful that in one and the same passage in the Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upanishad (4/3/31) such a Soul is said to be free from desires and is also said to have obtained all his desires. In Chhāndogya 3/14/2-4 he is said to have all desires. How can all these statements be reconciled? How does the Bhoomā become free from desires? How does the Bhoomā enjoy the greatest bliss? These are the questions which need to be answered. Moreover though it is evident that one who regards his self as separate from the selves of others is miserable, we must show that the Bhoomā who regards all selves as one, must necessarily be extremely blissful.

Now it will be agreed on all hands that the absence of desires during the Waking State is the essence of the greatest happiness; for positive happiness or bliss always makes its appearance in that condition. But the Waking State cannot continue to exist without actions and nobody can remain actionless while he is in the Waking State. There can also be no action without desire. How then can a man in the Waking State be from desire? This is the dilemma which faces us. The solution is as follows:—It is not true that there can be no action without the desire. During sleep there are no desires. But the act of circulation of blood, of respiration and digestion go on. Even during the Waking State the act of respiration is at times preceded by volition and at times not to so preceded. Moreover in the Waking State the act of digestion and circulation of blood go on without any volition. We must understand that volition and desire are different things. Acts other than those going on during sleep, cannot be done without volition but can be done without desire. Volition is merely the order of the Soul to the organs to do certain acts, while desire is the intention of getting for one's self the fruit of that act. It is also named Kāma (wish) or Phalāsakti (attachment to or longing for the fruit). When children play and frolic after their hunger and thirst they are satisfied, they have no desire. Then in that condition the positive bliss resulting from absence of desire, is, as it were, bubbling out in the form of play. All

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this shows that there can be acts without desire. We must therefore learn to do acts without desire. The best way to learn to do this is to do acts for the good of all beings, regarding all beings as one's own self. If a man does acts according to the rule of doing acts for the good of all beings, he has to abandon his personal desires and thus he learns to detach volition from desire which in ordinary men is always attached to every volition of theirs. Moreover he has to abandon desires (which of course always cause pain and weakness.), for keeping his body and mind in a condition fit to do good to all beings. Thus a man wishing to do good to all beings becomes ultimately free from desires and also goes on doing acts. He does acts that would produce a certain result but does not desire that result i.e. is not attached to that result. In this condition he can be said to be free from desire and as he does acts that would give certain results, he can also be said to have all desire. Acts give their results though done without desire and therefore he can be 'āptakāma' i.e. one whose desires are obtained. Because he has no desires, it can be said that he is always happy. This very thing has been stated in Bṛihadāraṇyaka in 1/5/19 while describing the Divine Mind and in 1/5/20 by stating that he gets the joy of all beings but not their pains or sorrows; such a man is loved and protected by all beings and all his wants are satisfied by them. These benefits are all clear. A man regarding others as his own self, is not also afraid that they will do any harm to him. In conclusion the benefits of the idea of Unity of Souls described in the Upanisads are all true and logical.

It is clearly stated in the Muṇḍaka Upanishad 3/1/3 that the Bhoomā who regards all beings as his own-self, attains extreme similarity with the Eeśwara or Brahma. He is similar to Eeśwara, because (1) like Eeśwara, he is free from desires and also does acts, (Eeśwara is there described as Kartā). Truly the Eeśwara always does the acts of creating, preserving and destroying the world or portions of the world), (2) the Eeśwara does not see duality and though the Bhoomā sees duality he does not regard it as true and (3) like Eeśwara he is free from pain and sorrow. The Bhoomā is said to have become Brahma or said to have enjoyed Brahma even before death, to express the same meaning of the Muṇḍaka Upanishad poetically. The Bhoomā is also said to be superior to Brahma because he experiences joy while Brahma does not, and is conscious of beings free from sorrow and pain and Brahma is not.

INDIVIDUAL SOUL

In theism, as distinguished from Monism and Absolutism, the soul is conceived to be an entity distinct from God. Its imperfections, suffering and bondage are so apparent facts that it cannot be likened to God. Although in the earlier Upaniṣads too we have examined the several instances when such an opinion relating to the difference of the soul from the Supreme Principle upheld by the seers cannot be questioned, nevertheless, it is important to remember that in these later Upaniṣads, such an amorphous character of the individual souls acquires a definite shape and its characteristics appear to be so pronounced as to preclude entirely the possibility of its being identified with Brahman. The very fact that the ever-recurring question 'who is the Ātman, who is Brahman? *Ko nu ātmā kim brahma* should have pressed itself upon the minds of the Upaniṣadic thinkers shows that to the majority of them the soul and God, the ground of the psychic activities and the ground of the

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cosmic activities were distinct principles.

Rāmānuja does not share the absolutistic view that the soul is identical with God. According to *Bhāvaprakāśa*, the famous *Brahmavid Bramaiva bhavati* the knower of Brahma becomes Brahman has been used in the Upaniṣad not in the sense of identity between the Jīvātmā and Brahman but in that of the attainment of the latter by the former. This interpretation well accords with another text 'the knower of Brahman attains the Highest' (*Brahumavidāpnati param*).

The soul, although substantially identical with Brahman, is existentially different from Him. As just pointed out, the contingency, imperfection, its toils and tribulation, hopes, desires, ambitions and failures point to its distinction from Brahman. The constitution of its psychological vesture suggests its difference from Brahman. It is, as it were, a wheel with one axle with a triple tire, the suggestion being that it bound by sattva, rajas and tamas, purity, passion and darkness. The five elements, the five organs, of actions, the five organs of sense and mind are its sixteen end parts, the fifty spokes hint at the fifty conditions of the Sānkhya school of thought. It is pointed out that it roams about according to its deeds and that its manifold births and deaths are due to its delusion, its touch and sight, its eating and drinking and so on. According as its qualities are it takes on various forms of existence. Again, it is described as being atomic in character, 'as a part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair though it partakes of infinity. In as much as, its consciousness is infinite. Though it is atomic, its knowledge is all-pervasive. The Śvetāśvatara Upanisad thus presents a vivid and lively picture of the complex psychological make up of the individual soul and goes on finally to proclaim that it is different from Brahman." The difference of the individual soul from Brahman has been emphasized more than once. That the soul is important, that it flutters about in this Brahma wheel that it is atomic, that it is bondage is due to actions and that it is saved only when favoured by God point to the impossibility of its being regarded as identical with Brahman. At one place, matter, soul and God are clearly distinguished from one another. Rāmānuja's Brahman with the distinct principles of matter and soul within Himself seems to be the main burden of such passages, We nowhere find in this Upanisad even the slightest inference as to the individual souls identity with the Supreme soul. The emphasis is throughout on the frailitis of the finite self which render it persistently endeavour for the appropriation of the perfection of Brahman in whom alone does its final destiny consist. *Bhāvaprakāsa* adds that the cessation of all pains is taught as being consequent only upon the knowledge of God as distinct from oneself. Even Radhakrishnan sees in *Kaṭha* 1-2-23, the doctrine of divine grace. The phrase 'dhātuḥ prasādāt' in the present text has no warrant for Śaṅkāra's interpretation. Perhaps knowing full will that the theistic rendering of this phrase might riot suit his monistic purpose. Śaṅkara distorts it by playing with the rules of grammar. According to Śaṅkara, means by the phrase, dhātuḥ prasādāt means 'tranquility born of the humours of the body' *dhātūnam prasādāt*, whereas the grammatical construction of the word 'dhātuḥ' here has reference to the Lord, the creator, in the genitive case. The root word is 'dhātṛ' declined in the genitive case, singular number is 'Dhātuḥ'. Even Vidyāraṇya, the well-known advaitin puts

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on it exactly this interpretation which is warranted by the rules of grammer. According to him, the word 'dhātuḥ' means the Lord and the word 'prasāda', grace, (dhātuḥ prasādāt Jagato Vidhātā parameśvaraḥ tasya prasādo' anugraha. Had the world meant, the humours of the body, in the genitive case singular number it would have been declined as 'dhātoḥ' like the word 'sādhuḥ' which is obviously not the case here. Therefore, there is no doubt that the text in question speaks of the grace of the Lord as the means of the annihilation of all troubles and anxieties. It does not support self-realisation alone as the highest goal of human life.

INORGANIC NATURE

In the whole of nature no distinction is so sharply drawn as that between the inorganic and the organic; and this distinction dominates the Indian view of nature also, in so far as they both, the inorganic no less than the organic, are derived from the âtman, but in quite a different sense. All organic bodies, and therefore all plants, animals, men and gods, are wandering souls, are therefore in essence the âtman itself, as it, for reasons which have still to be considered, entered into this manifold universe as wandering individual soul. Inorganic bodies, on the contrary, *i.e.*, the five elements, ether, wind, fire, water, earth, though they are ruled by Brahman, and remain under the protection of individual deities, yet are not wandering souls, as are all plants, animals, men, and gods, but are only the stage erected by Brahman on which the souls have to play their part. Before we consider the origin of the elements from Brahman, and in the immediately following section of the entrance of Brahman into them as the soul, a few words of introduction are necessary on the creation myths of the Upaniṣads.

It was shown above (pp. 183-186) how it became possible for the teachers of the Upaniṣads, in spite of the doctrine of sole existence which they defended, and which denied the existence of the universe outside of the âtman by an unconscious approximation to the empirical view to adopt the traditional scheme of the creation myths. Thus in Chând. 4.17. 1-3, and in a briefer form Chând. 2.23, a creation myth is reproduced, in part verbally, which we have already come to know from Ait. Br. 5.32. and Śatap. Br. 11.5.8. A creation myth is attached to the conception of the egg of the universe, whose earliest origin we have found in the "vital force that was enclosed in the shell," and in the "golden germ"; and the progressive development of the same idea met us already in Śatap. 6.1.1 and 11.1.6. This myth is preserved in Chând. 3.19; — "This universe was in the beginning not-being; his (not-being) was being. It arose. Then an egg was evolved. It lay there a whole year long. Thereafter it split open; the two halves of the shell were, the one of silver, the other of gold; the silver half is this earth, the golden is yonder heaven," etc. (On these predecessors the representation in Manu 1.9-13 depends.)

The conception of the egg of the universe appears in a more characteristic context together with that of the premundane purusha in the creation myth at the beginning of the Aitareya Upaniṣad that belongs to the Ṛigveda: "In the beginning the âtman alone was this universe; there was nothing else at all to meet the eye. He deliberated: "I will create worlds." Accordingly after he had created the earth and the atmosphere, the waters above and below, he drew forth the purusha from the waters, and gave him shape. Brooding over these waters they opened "like an egg," the mouth, nose, eyes, etc. of which are then developed, and

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from them the eight psychical organs, and from these in turn Agni, Vâyu, Âditya, etc. as the eight guardians of the universe, who finally take up their abode in men as speech, breath, sight, etc. Although however the human frame is thus animated by the organs of sense that spring from the purusha, it can only exist after the creator through the fissure of the skull (*vidṛiti*) has entered into it as individual soul. The tendency of this myth is clear. The purusha, that in Ṛigv. X. 90 had been the first principle, becomes here a power dependent on the âtman; and similarly only the organs of man's soul are ascribed to the purusha, but the soul itself to the âtman.

The most original and significant creation myth of the Upaniṣads is the representation of the evolution of the universe from the âtman in Bṛih 1.4. Here the traditional form of the creation myth appears only as a veil lightly thrown over the whole. The aim is not to relate a consistent history of the creation, but rather in a series of loosely connected creation pictures to teach the absolute dependence of all existing beings on the âtman. Accordingly the perpetual return of created things into the âtman is used to show how the division of the universe into male and female, and then into the different species of animals by the flight of the female before the male, how the evolution of name and form, and the entrance of the âtman into them, together with the creation of the castes of the gods and afterwords of men, etc., how all this signifies only the self-evolution of the âtman to become the manifold universe, and the essential identity of all its phenomena with the âtman. Through the consciousness "I am Brahman" (aham brahma asmi) the âtman becomes the universe, "and to this day whoever knows this 'I am brahman' he becomes this universe; nor have even the gods power to prevent his so becoming. For he is its soul (*âtman*)." Thus the traditional doctrine of the creation is preserved only as an external form. It serves merely to exhibit the sole reality of the âtman under the different phenomena of the universe.

From this lofty standpoint we see the Upaniṣads ever turning back to the realism natural to us, in order to teach in detail a creation of the universe, and of the elements of which it consists.

Like the Greek philosophers, Philolaus, Plato and Aristotle, most of the Indian thinkers distinguish five elements, —ether, wind, fire, water and earth. A dependence however of the Greek idea on the Indian, or the Indian on the Greek, is not to be thought of for this reason, if for no other, than the order of the elements is different, inasmuch as the Greeks place fire between ether and air, the Indians air between ether and fire. Further also because on both sides independently of one another the simple observation of nature led to the thought of the five compound states of matter, *viz.*, the solid, fluid, gaseous, permanently elastic and the imponderable, as the five component parts of the material universe, to which correspond, as we shall see, the five specific energies of the organs of sense. The result is that both in the Greek and in the Indian philosophy we see the doctrine of the fivefold character of the elements gradually formed out of simpler conceptions.

INTELLECT

Intellect is an important value of life. Though life is active, it is directed by intellect. Intellect is the light of judgment which regulates the activities of life and illumines the path of activities. But intellect is dualistic. It functions in the form of proposition which is composed of

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a subject and an object. The proposition also implies an individual who advances the proposition as his judgement. All these implications of the function of intellect involve duality between the entities which are distinctly recognised in intellectual action. Duality is an estrangement of entities which are also sought to be related in a judgement. In this respect intellect is opposed to be spiritual reality which is non-dualistic in nature and inspire affiliation in life. Understood in its own character, intellect is obstructive in rather than Conductive to spiritual attainment. Samkhya understand it as material and an evolute of primordeal Prakriti. Whether it reflects or possesses consciousness, it is dualistic due to consciousness also. Its main function is to distinguish and discriminate, which involves dualism. Both due to its materiality and dualisticness it is opposed to spirit and spiritual attainment. Intellect instigates argument and reasoning, which also imply duality. It requires two persons to argue and argument and reasoning is generally a relation of antagonism. Agreement and harmony is rare in reasoning. Intellect and argument are more inclined to differ and dispute.

The antagonism of intellect with integrating and affiliative spiritual reality is evident to the philosophers of the Vedānta from the very beginning. The Upaniṣads for spiritual attainment. The Katha Upaniṣad candidly denies the adequacy of argument and intellect loaded with learning for attaining spiritual understanding and enlightenment. The *Brahma Sutra* also confirms this view of the Upaniṣads about reasoning and also explains the reason of the above limitation of reasoning. It exposes the unfoundedness of reason as it can be disputed by alternative argument. More learned and more intellectual persons can dispute and unfound any argument, as Bhaṛtrihari says. There is no end to reasoning and we all have experience of endless and inconclusive argumentations. Intellect and reasoning are alienating and thus opposed to affiliating spiritual reality.

Later Vedānta got involved in dispute and argumentation with rival systems of Buddhism, Samkhya etc., but the Upaniṣad are clearly aware of limitations of reason. Hence they have not adopted the method of reason for spiritual inquiry. The sages contemplate about reality but they do not argue about it. The Upaniṣadic method of inquiry and instruction is more suggestive than argumentative. Disciples are directed to meditate and observe penance and to realize the spiritual reality for themselves. It is a mystical rather than a logical method. It is only in the later Vedānta that excessive reasoning developed inspite of the original Vedantic faith in immediate experience of reality. Brahman is inquired into and investigated in the Brahma Sutras. The Upaniṣad also originally recognised, the place of learning and contemplation in the Vedantic discipline. But they did not regard intellectual argumentation as of much value. All reasoning and argumentation is done through thought and language, is conceptual, hence intellectual. The spiritual reality is said to be beyond mind, thought and speech. Mind, thought and speech return from its way without reaching it. Narād lamented that he could not reach the spiritual reality though he had learned all the scriptures and sciences.

Intellect is conscious and cognitive. Cognitively it is related to an object and its consciousness is reflected in further cognition of cognition which is called 'anuvyavasaya' in Indian philosophy. Cognitive consciousness is dualistic as it involves a distinction between subject and

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object. In 'annuvyavasaya' with its reflective consciousness the subjective knowledge is further bifurcated by a keener isolation of subjective fact of consciousness from the complex of cognition. Thus it is further deepening of the dualism involved in the character of cognitive consciousness. This confirms all the more strongly the dualistic character of intellect which is opposed to the integral character of spiritual reality. This antagonism of intellectual consciousness with integral spiritual reality is confirmed in the paradoxical statement of the Kena Upaniṣad in which it is asserted that 'one who knows the spirit does not know it and one who does not know it verity knows it'. The meaning is that the spirit cannot be known in cognitive consciousness as an object, but it can be realized in integral experience. This spiritual realization is an intelligent experience but it is not fraught with the duality of cognitive consciousness. It is blissful consciousness which is integral and immediate and can therefore be better described as superconscious experience.

But with all the skepticism about the power of intellect and 'reason, the Upaniṣad give due importance to them. They only insist that intellect and reason are not capable of apprehending the integral reality of spirit. But these can be useful to a great extent in spiritual discipline. Common and normal life also cannot be possible without intellect, as it cannot be possible without functioning of senses. As the senses are ultimately inspired by spirit in view of the Kena Upaniṣad, so the intellect also is inspired more by spirit. The senses are below ego and function selfishly. But the intellect is above ego as it is general and impersonal. Though dualistic and in so far opposed to spirit, intellect is the light of the spirit shining in the being of man an illuminating his path of life and salvation. With all its duality and antagonism to spirit it is the only light available to man. It may not lead man all the way to the spiritual goal of life, but it can lead him a long way, even upto the threshold of the realm of spirit. It becomes detrimental to spiritual discipline only if it suffers from a downward tendency and fraternizes with egoism and arrogance. If imbued with spiritual humility, it is the highest light of man. Therefore, it is resorted to in the earlier stages of spiritual discipline concerned with learning of scriptures from teachers and contemplation on the truth thus learnt. Too much indulgence in the intricacies of reason is detrimental to spiritual interest of life. But a moderate use of intellect can afford initial and useful enlightenment even about spiritual and integral truths. Śankara also has approved the utility of reason and exhorted us to give due regard to it. Intellect is sattvic in character and is above ego, mind and senses. Thus it can help greatly to discipline, restrain and regulate senses and mind as required for spiritual discipline. Through the intellect comes to rest in spiritual realization, as the Katha Upaniṣad says, yet it can be the most reliable guide on the spiritual path of life. The Katha Upaniṣad assigns to intellect the role of the chariot driver who can drive the chariot of body according to the intentions of the spirit who inhabits it as the hero, and control the senses aligned to steeds. The Śwetashwatara Upaniṣad suggests that the intellect purified by spiritual discipline can be helpful in the vision of spiritual reality. For this as the Gitā, advises the intellect is to be surrendered to the spirit. Such chastened intellect can be serviceable in spiritual discipline and salvation of man.

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ISA UPANISHAD

This short Upanishad is composed for the purpose of exalting the knowledge of the supreme spirit above every other object of human aspiration. It appears to address the last advice of a teacher to his disciples, after the course of their instruction is completed, or to embody the sum total of human wisdom in a few words for those who have attained it.

There are, according to the Vájasanéya Sanhitá Upanishad, two roads which may be followed by man, the one is knowledge of Brahma, the other action in accordance with the precepts of the Védas. Those who are able to understand the nature of Brahma, should consider every thing, the greatest as well as the smallest, as god; for them every thing else should be annihilated by the idea of god; and they should renounce every desire of any worldly object. If he is known in his own nature, as the one, infinite, unchangeable, incorporeal, alwise, holy, all-supporting and self-existent spirit, who is in every thing and yet not defined by it, who is above the apprehension of the senses and the mind, if he is beheld in all beings, and all beings are beheld in him,—then the highest aim of man is attained; there is no longer any grief or delusion.

On the other hand, those who cannot elevate their thoughts to the perfection of his nature, should perform the works, enjoined by the Védas. This may be done in a threefold manner, either by the practice of works alone, or the attainment of knowledge alone, that is to say, of the inferior knowledge of Brahma, when he is represented by worldly qualities or individual deities; or, lastly, by the practice of work together with knowledge of the latter kind.

By the practice of any of those duties man will acquire after death a state of happiness; but as he accomplishes his whole duty only by practising both knowledge (the inferior knowledge) and works, so he obtains thereby after death higher and higher worlds and the objects of his worldly desires, and at the same time becomes prepared for the reception of the most exalted knowledge. However, all that he obtains compared with the effect of the knowledge of Brahma, is ignorance, transient and unsatisfactory; for in Brahma alone are absolute knowledge and bliss.

This Upanishad which bears also the title, I'śávásyam, from its two first words, has been translated by Sir William Jones (Posthumous Works, Vol. VI.) and after him by Ram Mohun Roy, Poley, and by an anonymous author in the Tattwabodhin; Patriká, (vol. I., pp. 339-45).

The first Mantra, according to S'ankara, is addressed to those who strive for the knowledge of Brahma, or for their eternal emancipation, while, the second gives advice to those who cannot yet liberate themselves from the bonds of the world; or, as A'nanda briefly expresses it, the first Mantra lays down the rule for knowledge, the second for works.

Vajasaneva Sanhita

1. Whatever exist in this world, is to be enveloped by (the thought of) God (the Ruler). "I's," the supreme ruler, the supreme soul, independent of all relations to the world. The whole world is to be considered under the idea of the soul, under the idea, that I, who am the same with the supreme soul, am the world, which in itself is unreal and gets only reality, when considered under the notion of the soul. By renouncing it (the world), thou shalt save (thy soul). Do not covet the riches of any one.

2. Performing sacred works, let a man desire to live a hundred years. If thou thus

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(desirest). O man, there is no other manner, in which thou art not tainted by work.

3. To the godless worlds covered with gloomy darkness, go all the people, when departing (from this world) who are slayers of their souls. The slayers of their souls are such as are ignorant about the nature of them. They kill the same, because they do not obtain their immortal and unchangeable nature. On this account they assume one worldly form after another.

4. He (the soul) does not move, is swifter than the mind; not the gods (the senses) did obtain him, he was gone before standing he outstrips all the other (gods, senses), now fast they run. Within him the Ruler of the atmosphere upholds the vital actions.

5. He moves, he does not move; he is far, and also near; he is within this all, he is out of this all.

6. Whoever beholds all beings in the soul alone, and the soul in all beings, does hence not look down (on any creature).

7. When a man knows, that all beings are even the soul, when he beholds the unity (of the soul), then there is no delusion, no grief.

8. He is all-pervading, brilliant, without body, invulnerable, without muscles, pure, untainted by sin; he is always, the Ruler of the mind, above all beings, and self-existent. He distributed according to their nature the things for everlasting years.

9. Those who worship ignorance, enter into gloomy darkness, into still greater darkness those who are devoted to knowledge.

10. They say, different is the effect of knowledge, different is the effect of ignorance; thus we heard from the sages who explained (both) to us. (Vid. Tal. U. 13.)

11. Whoever knows both, knowledge and ignorance, together, overcomes death by ignorance, and enjoys immortality by knowledge.

12. Those who worship uncreated nature, enter into gloomy darkness, into still greater darkness those who are devoted to created nature.

13. They say, different is the effect from (worshipping) uncreated nature, different from (worshipping) created nature. This we heard from the sages, who explained (both) to us.

14. Whoever knows both, created nature and destruction together, overcomes death by destruction, and enjoys immortality by created nature.

15. To me whose duty is truth, open, O Pushan, the entrance to the truth concealed by the brilliant disk, in order to behold (thee).

16. O Pushan, Rishi thou alone, O dispenser of justice, (Yama) O sun, offspring of Prajápati, disperse thy rays (and) collect thy light; let me see thy most auspicious form; (for) the same soul (which is in thee), am I.

17. Let my vital spark obtain the immortal air; then let this body be consumed to ashes. Om! O my mind, remember, remember (thy) acts, remember, O mind remember, remember thy acts.

18. Guide us, O Agni, by the road of bliss to enjoyment, (guide us) O god, who knowest all acts. Destroy our crooked sin, that we may offer thee our best salutations. This Īśāvāsyopaniṣad mentioned in the Saṁhita is of more ancient origin as Samhitas themselves which are more ancient than the Brāhmaṇās.

As can be seen from the survey of the imports of the Mantropaniṣad, one of the other names of Īśāvāsyopaniṣad, this Upaniṣad is the beauty queen among the society of the Upaniṣads. This Upaniṣad is the ocean of one Ātma-experience. It bears testimony to the confluence of all true joy

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of the Vedānta reflected specially in Mantra No. 4,5,6,7,8,15 and 16 and 17. The Īśāvāsyopaniṣad is the rich dainty choice of Brahmō experience of all times. It is the house of music. It lulls the astir Jīva soft sleep of divine peace. It is the fountain that warbles as it flows the melodious murmurs of Sohaṁ, I am he. Its body is characterised by the simplicity of structure and impersonality of authorship. Simple in style, ecliptic in suggestion the run of the thought-rill from Mantra to Mantra is "Su-Sukham"—naturally the choicest. The Īśāvāsyopaniṣad in its grand dignified concept of everything as being the divine dwell-house has painted god as wrinklessly old and fatiguelessly young.

'Do all thy acts in the Tena Tyaktena spirit of renunciation and with the Smara of 'Nama Ukti' or 'nāma ukti' and there all honour lies' is the message of this Upaniṣad to this world waxing warm over the in-action or retirement polemics on the grounds of Jñāna and Karma schools of thought. Doing of things thus and in this way only, decides the Upanisad, makes the act unsullied and unpolluted whichever it be.

There is no withdrawal from the world. This Upaniṣad is not the time-passing philosophy of the pedants, Sanyāsins, pensioners and the garrulous old. It rallies them and all under its banner of Satya Dharma exhorting them to bravely suffer or gladly enjoy their lot with spirit of surrender to Īśa to be brought to vision by the faith in Smara process made known through the Dhīrās "ye nastad vicacakṣire." The Upaniṣad sings lullabies to the Brahma Babe in the hexangular cradle hung by he vidvān in the breath of the Jīva. It dances with the sprinkle of the gold flowers at the nuptitals of Strī (Prakṛti) and Puruṣa. It marches tight with martial furies in theatres of War. It coolly sleeps in the plaintive dirges over the dead. The Upaniṣadic religion is the beauty of the Ātma-Dhyāna. The Upaniṣadic religion is the valour of the martials of the Field. It is the axe of the hewers of wood. It is the rope of the drawers of water. But hedging what is of others with thorn is the first condition which this Upaniṣadic religion lays and in the spirit of self-denial too. This is the ethical philosophy of the Īśāvāsyopaniṣad.

The Mantrās 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 above referred to weave into melodies the song of the divine philosophy of knowledge of self on the tall heights of commune of which the sun of wake never sinks and shades of pain and passion cannot fall. Mantra 9 to 14 deal with Karma (act) and worship (Upāsanā) and the consequences thereof under the egis of the ingenious concepts of Vidyā, A-vidyā, Asaṁbhūti, Saṁbhūti, Saṁbhava, A-saṁbhava, Saṁbhūti and Vināśa. The burden of song of these Mantrās is that the worship of ignorance is on par with the worship of knowledge imbued with shades of ego, wilfulness, arrogance and defiance being the aggravating circumstances of higher punishment. If there be any stain of sin that contaminates the acts, it tolls the knell of the Jīva back into darkest regions where are laid waste his hopes and dances the death with heavy thumps. Mantra 15 and 16 are the windows of heaven suggestive of the richest experience of Īśa residing in the nectar tunnel of the Smara of the 17th Mantra. The 18th Mantra is the one set to the sacred music—the music of Nāma Ukti,—the word of deliverance and the necessity with it of combating the imaginary windmills-giants of Avidyā against which the mad Jīva-Don-quixote has taken his firm stand to meet them on the streets of senses with lance of finite blurred reason held in tilt.

With the experience the Jīva gets in the 15th and 16th Mantrās the 18th branch

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of the Mantra-tree ought not to have been appareled with the flowers we see on it. It is something like the great-grand vetern Viśwāmitra Riṣi of the measureless depths of Brahma experience requesting King Daśaratha to send his tender boys—Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa—to protect him seated as he was in penance—performance from the fears of the Demons. After realizing the Tatvamasi, etc., after becoming Satyadharmaḥ, after becoming the moving Samādhi due to rains of Dharma Meghaḥ it is strange that the Riṣi still sees difficulties impending his Su-path of Mantra 18.

The concept of Īśāvasyopaniṣad are seen to have their similarities or resemblances in other Upaniṣads like Bṛhadārṇya, Kaṭha, Kena, Maitreya and Chāndogya. Main concept of the first three Mantras is that with the realisation of God as having his abode in each and every thing the realiser feels he is doing the Master's behest when he plays the role (allotted to him) of life. This is the spirit of surrender to or renunciation in God. This negates the feeling of bindingness in the doing of things. The renouncing attitude of the mind severs the feeling of ties between the doer and the done.

The surrender sings the psalm: 'guide me, lord, with watchful eye....Thy will be done.' It gives cheer to heart to think that enjoyments and sufferences are but god's dispensations (tyakta). It gives comfort in anxiety to think that the only wisdom of life lies in devotion to the Īśa whose presence everywhere supplies our wants according to our needs.

Those denying themselves the nectar-cup of renunciation become the settlers of the dark regions. Similar notion is seen in Bṛhadāraṇya 4-4-11.

The Idea of Mantra No. 5.

It quakes, it streams. It is quakeless. It is here. It is there. It is in. It is out. Its in is out. Its out is in. Bhagavadgītā 13.15.

The Idea of Mantra No. 6.

All beings in the self and the self in all beings. Bhagavadgītā 6.30

The Idea of Mantra No. 9.

If ignorance robs itself, if knowledge also robs itself of the light of the Atman, both then become guests of the Inferno Lodge. Both sup well in hell. Bṛhadāraṇyaka has similar idea. 4-4-10.

The Idea of Mantra No. 10.

The waters of Avidyā roll dark. The clear streams of fount of knowledge scorch up for want of knowledge of self. The honourable knowledge with hunger famishes and ignoble ignorance with thirst flames, falls and blazes for the lack of Ātma Jñāna (knowledge of Brahman). So say the sooth-sayers, as above. The idea is also in Kenopaniṣad.

The Idea of Mantra No. 11.

If the man means the death in the field of action his forehead beams with self knowledge and is honoured with laurels of immortality. The idea is akin to what is in Maitreya 7-9.

The Idea of Mantra No. 15.

The face of the truth is covered by the gold plate. Move it, ye protector for me whose one law, whose one religion and whose one object of life is to apprehend it rightly, love and worship it dutifully.

The idea is in Maitreya 6-35 and Bṛhadāraṇya 5-15-1.

The Ideals of Mantra No. 18.

Lord Brahman, lead us to the bliss, thou knowing what path leadeth to it. Keep us away from the way-laying sins. With love we bend in thy adoration. The same idea may be seen in Rig-veda, 1-189-1.

About six Liṅgas

(No way related to ṣaḍvidha liṅgas of the Vīraśaivaism)

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The author of the Upanisad employes silent rhetorics to persuade the Jīva to take to the Ātma Vidyā that makes to him the earth the kingdom of heaven. The first eight Mantras speak about six means of proof of the Ātman. These are called the Liṅgas, namely, Upakrama, Abhyāsa, Arthavāda, Apūrvatā, Phala and Upasaṁhāra. They are the means which determine and help to unfold the import of Sruti. The Upakrama is a liṅga. It is a process of reasoning from the presumption of the existence of the eternal principle to the consideration of its derivities. That this is perfect has been predicated of the sovereign lord. The unverse resulted from this means is perfect. This is Upakrama liṅga. The first two Mantras explain this. The Mantra No. 3 explains the rhetoric of Arthavāda. The characteristic of it is censure of one is the praise of the other with the only object of achieving one's own object. A Mahābhārata tale of a Brāhmin approaching Bhīma for a head-load of wood to burn the dead body of his mother though given went to Karṇa for sandle wood censuring Bhīma and praising Karṇa who gave him cart-loads of sandle-wood throws light on Arthavāda. The aim of Arthavāda is to keep the Jīva away from influence of desire for the pleasures of this and the next world and bring about the un-ending union of Jīva and Śiva. To censure the Asuras as slayers of the Ātman on the one hand and shower priaises on the good as knowers of Brahman is the process of Arthavāda.

The Mantra No. 4 mentions about Abhyāsa liṅga and Apūrvatā liṅga. The Abyāsa is the ebbless flow of the sea of divine commune. Unbroken continuance of the cool current of the commune is Abhyāsa. Keeping the beautiful lamp of self-commune burning quake-lessly in the single column of the same or similar sparks is Abhyāsa. The Mantra No. 4 also illustrates the Apūrvatā liṅga which indicates the existence of the divine state to be beyond proof (Pramāṇatīta). The five criteria or Pramāṇas: (1) Pratyakṣa (percept), (2) Anumāna (inference), (3) Sabda (testimony), (4) Upamā (comparison), (5) Arthāpatti (the inference explanatory of inconsistency as for instance Pino Devadāttaḥ Divā na Bhunkte and (6) Anupalabdhi (non-perception—an instrument of knowledge according to the Mimansakas but not according to the Nayyayikas). Hence the Mantra No. 4 says Devāḥ na Āpnuvan. Therefore God is Apramāṇa. Though God is aware of all, none else is aware of him. This unique and un-parallelled nature of God is shown by Apūrvatā Liṅga.

Mantra No. 7 speaks about Phala-liṇga. What the man has to bring to an issue of full success is becoming himself one with the Atma within (Ātmānubhūti). Ātmalābhāt Paraṁ na vidyate. Nothing is more valued than the attainment of Ātman. To grow conscious of the God of Upakrama (commencement) and wear the sacred wide vision of equality is by means called Phala liṅga. To conclude that Jīva in reality is God himself pervading all is itself the way of proof called Phala liṅga. The under-lying idea of this Phala liṅga is this that the knowledge of the Ātman is the knowledge of the universe. In this state there is no distinction between Deo and Jīva. All is God.

Mantra No. 8 discusses the characteristics of Upapatti and Upasaṁhāra liṅga. The word upapatti shows differencelessness of cause and effect. The jar made of earth is earth itself. Waves of water are water itself. Ornaments making appearance in gold are gold itself. Infinite though be the waves of the ocean they will hide in the ocean itself. The water rising from these in form of the cloud will ultimately enter the very sea from which

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it arose. The Prakṛti grows under the tutelary care of God sending up shoots of the numberless principles. But to what good? All this (Yathātathyatā) adjustment or arrangement will see its end in its origin. This is what is Upasaṁhāra liṅga.

Some of the preceptors to the Mantropanisad.

(Īśavāsyopaniṣad)

(1) Hedge up the way to what is others with thorns. (M.I)-Mā gridhaḥ kasya swidd-dhanam.
(2) Shake patiently the afflictions off, enjoy resignedly what is thy lot (M 2) -tena tyaktena kurvan eva iha karmāni bhunjithā.
(3) See all in thy-self and thy-self in all and thus act (M 6)- sarvāṇi bhūtāni ātmani eva ca ātmanāṁ sarvabhuteṣu ca anupaśyal
(4) Make all one in thee and thus behave (M 7 and 2)- sarvāni bhūtāni ātmāni eva ca ātmānāṁ sarva-bhūteṣu ca anudṛṣṭvā-eva iha karmāṇi kuru.
(5) Thus see in thy acts the divine union and the beauty of the union in the Multiplicity.
(6) Follow this religion of Truth divine (M 15), -satyadharmāya tattvaṁ apāvṛṇu.
(7) Sharpen this vision (M 15 and 16)- satyasya (hiraṇmayaṁ apihitaṁ) mukhaṁ dṛṣṭaye apāvṛṇu.
(8) And thicken this vision into fruit of Darśana (Dṛṣṭi) -hiraṇmayena pātreṇa-apihtena mukhena-apavṛṇu, satyāya apāvṛṇu, dharmāya apāvṛṇu, dṛṣṭye apāvṛṇu, iha karmāṇi kurvan dṛṣṭaye apāvṛṇu.
(9) Fulfill the terms of the sanad of sohaṁ (M 16).
(10) See his face in thy acts (M 2, 15).
(11) Remember thou him in breath, enjoy and Amṛta, be Amṛta, and drizzle on the earth the Amṛta.

Vedās' Aim

The secret of the Upanisad is the first revelation in the sacred calm of the within of the man caught in the net of the rituals and ceremonials contrived in one form or the other to appease the elemental wrath or fury. The all pervading Īśa shaped in limbs and clad in beauty of the sage (saviour) as said above to chasten the wicked with rod and protect the good with dole came as guru on errand to the earth declaring the four spiritual freedoms to the Jiva:—The freedom of "tatvamasi" (the message of the Sāmaveda, namely, *that* thou art), that of "ahaṁbrahmāsmi" (the massage of Yajurveda, namely, I am Brahma) that of "ayaṁ ātma brahma" (the message of Atharvaṇa Veda, namely "this is Ātman, this is Brahman) and the freedom of "prajñānaṁ brahma" (the message of the Rigveda, namely, "the specific knowledge is Brahman").

The only way to achieve the perennial peace and the highest happiness that never ends is the total elimination of doubt and waver of the Jīva with realisation in the span of the life that the sovereign power before which all might within and without trembles and bends its knees is within one's self. It is the Sadguru only that lights the candle within or rather shows the already burning candle within. The light with which the light is shown is what the Rigved calls "prajñānaṁ". The light already aflame is Brahman. Without this "prajñānaṁ" no Veda, no Upaniṣad will vibrate with life. Without this 'Prajñāna' the mount of Yajur will not break forth into singing its hum of "Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi". It is the Jīva's rapt playing on the fiddle of "prajñānaṁ" that its light

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dawns as the morning of "aham brahmāsmi". I am he and I am that person, the person or 'Puruṣah' whom you are accosting; it is I, the Puruṣah Sōhaṁ, of the Mantra 16 of 'Īśāvāsyōpaniṣad'. When this fireful "Prajñānaṁ" of Gurudeva is exceedingly hot in the air—chamber of the walls of the heart sending its flames high in heaven the ore of the yet lurking awareness that I am he "ahaṁ brahmāsmi" "puruṣaḥ sohaṁ" melts. It rains. The heat ends. Tender leaves sprout. Flowers smell. Fruits ripe. Beauty spreads. Music heard. Psalm of life fulfils itself. Accounts are settled. Balance is cleared. Sōhaṁ Sanad pawned held by the Sawkar senses is returned as "paid". "Pūrṇamadaḥ pūrṇamidaṁ" the benediction of the "Īśāvāsyopaniṣad" is sung in chorus by the universe. Stone, temple, wood, church, mortar, mosque the whole universe echo one song, one hymn, one tale of one Atman, one Allā, one Brahman. This is the message of Atharavana Veda" Ayaṁ Ātmā Brahma.

The secret of all the knowledge is the Prajñānaṁ as said above given by the Guru. He who knows this through the agency of the Sadguru is also the "Vijānataḥ". Though substantive law and procedural law can be distinguished from each other the former has its rail line in its own procedure. Both are law, Gift of Jñāna by the Guru with its power and dexterity under the direction or indication of the special manner of its use and enjoyment is the Prajñānaṁ. This Puruṣaḥ, the embodiment of Prajñānaṁ—is the "vijānataḥ" mentioned in Mantra No. 7 of the Īśopaniṣad. He is not "Vijānataḥ" who breathes the Prajñānaṁ. He is not "Vijānataḥ" unless he sees every thing within and without "After" it or Anupaśyati (mantra No. 6). He is not "Vijānataḥ" unless he clothes it whatever it be, with Prajñānaṁ. He is the "Vijānataḥ" who sees all beings in or with his own "prajñānaṁ" (Ātmāni) within himself or after his own Prajñānaṁ. If all things and beings be radiant with his own "prajñānaṁ" the Vijānataḥ fulfills the gospel of "Athar, Yajur and Sāma Veda." This Sadhaka saint when he gets the experience of Mantra No. 7 and 16, that is, when he himself becomes all beings (Mantra No. 7) and he realises that Puruṣaḥ is himself, (the Puruṣaḥ Saḥ Ahaṁ asmi), he translates into his experience Tattvamasi of Sāma Veda, Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi of Yajur Veda and by living, moving and having his being in this Ātman seen ever within and without—the Ayaṁ Ātma of Atharva.

The Mantra No. 1 and the bliss of the benediction illustrate the realisation of the Ayaṁ Ātma Brahma of Atharva Veda.

To sum up, the secret of this Īśāvāsyopaniṣad also called Brahmopaniṣad is the fundamental of all the Four Vedas. It is the "prajñānaṁ". This Prajñānaṁ the throb of the Rigveda thoroughly in-wrought into the vision of "anupaśyataḥ", is the "vijanānataḥ" of the 7th Mentra. The digging (Anupaśya process for the hid treasures with the Prajñānaṁ of Rigveda) into the expanses of the universe is passing through the Ahaṁ Brahmāsmi depths of Yajurveda where with the beauty eyes of Atharvaṇa deserts of life go gay with Ayamātmā, wides of sorrows smile with the springs of Brahman and death is the full-moon festivity of Tatvamasi celebrations.

The quintessence of Vedas is the Prajñānaṁ which is Mahāvākya itself. It is the golden thread of the divine experience. It holds key to all knowledge-self-knowledge. The author of it is the Sadguru whom Patanjali Ṛṣi calls Pūrveṣāṁ Guruḥ. This Guru is the ever-dawning light that indwells the states of wake, dream and sleep.

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JĪVĀ'S JOURNEY THE

Man yearns day and night for happiness. He invents a variety of means therefore and employs all possible skill and dexeterity in execution towards the achievement. The anxious cares and crafty wiles in pursuance of the happiness essentially sensual bring him mostly disappointment. His mind wandering in the wanton alleys of the senses may here and there catch casually a broken ray of happiness. Clearly this is unreal. Pure reason is not pleased with it. Society does not approve of it. The happiness conceived by mind of the man is no charm to the sight of the conscience and gladening to the self within.

On the tomb of the age-honoured heredity (this body) hangs the epitaph of the numberless families of the Jīva. The five "kleśās" were his kith and kin. The Jīva had made acquaintance with them, through senses. With its depening they appeared to become his relations. But they would not dine with each other. The Jīva is peer by birth. He is the Duke of the Palace. Their contact lowered his dignity. The rays of his light withdrew. The evening fell. The dark deepened. The relations sought their nightly shelter in the Duke's house. In-gratitude inhere as it does in their flesh they began in the palace their nightly frolics singing doleful songs and ringing the mourning bells. The fancy woes they wept in the howling night moved the prince so much so that he forgot his rank and became one with them. With the shivering cold of the night of the "kleśas" the Jīva languished for want of peace of heart to which nothing seemed agreeable. Happiness seemed to be the wave of the heat of the wide. In his hunger of it kingly honour, Godly adoration, richly left name loomed large to him and came to have charm on his eyes. Gold and Jewellery stores became lamps of dark to him. Miracles, feats, feats, austerities and rhetorics passed as marks of spiritual power and instruments of happiness.

Cold are the winds

This notion, too, later sickened him. His ever endeavour for happiness and peace became to him a mathematical asymptote. His mind takes a forceful swing to touch the curve of happiness but only not to touch it. Domestic shouts of love proved to be capsules of vanity. Fear sows shores of life with un-rest, distress and disdain. Suppression of competence seemed to be the time's brag. Education's cram, religion's pomp. Politics' revelry, roar of valour (borrowed) prevail. Under the "Parda" of the freedom immortality sails smooth. Indiscipline is a-foot. Sin with mien of merit walks the land with proud steps.

Education draws not out the residing divinity within. It is satisfied with its own achievement of the "intellectual and higher endowment of the mind". It has ceased to give a controlling grace to the progeny. Bigotry sermons on the glory of martyrdom. Selfishness that dines on

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vanity sups on contempt. Crusades crop up. To the humanity rocked thus with trouble and turmoil the Ātma talk is a child's babble. It is only for the Sanyāsin, they say, to be loud with its language and for the old men in dotage to be the champion of sweet absurdinty of God Idea.

Intelligence and reason are the gateways of the human knowledge. Their thick closure without any chink between them opens the portal of the Ātma or Brahma-Vidyā. The knowledge of the book, the philosophy of the intelligence, the theology of the mind, the education of the sense have all dismantled the house of Ātma-Vidyā with windows and shutters. Philosophy is an intellectual feat. It limps without the Ātma-Vidyā. It makes an attempt to re-state a concept determined by its own out-look and survey of the phenomenal dexterity. It avows to unfold man's experience and builds its own wisdom with the knowledge of the data that obtain in and out. Science probes into nature of the thing and thought of the thing with the plumb-thread of the reason. The waters of the ocean of Avidyā of word or ignorance has sunk the ship of the Brāhmi-Vidyā. A state of Commotion has ensued. A noisy fashion, empty entertainment, hurrycane eloquence and incompetence have heaped chaos on the twinkling light of the God of dome within.

Day-break

Happy calm is a mirage. If the aspiring Jīva seeks entrance into the purity realm of the Pratyagātman, within, the Jīva will cease to be jīva and the 'Anga-bhāva' or egotism which fills all objects with itself will drop. This angelic harmony will endure. The empty ox of intelligence going at large in violation of Māgridhaḥ law and the grazing ass of Mind feeding on the verdant meadow of the trapping lust are kept in the cattle-pound till re-deemed by penitence. There are then the morning buds and evening greens that appear in abundence. But they have no colour nor odour. The Īśa of the blowing breeze which shakes in joy the ever ready flower of the Ātman within is undreampt of by them. Unless the high concept that "I", "This" and "That" are all one Brahman (खलु इदं ब्रह्म) materialises itself in the being peace-dream is bound to be defeated. The terms "full" and "perfect" are vague and meaningless unless the eye (both the eyes i.e. within and without) becomes the seat of śiva-liṅga (the Ātman), ear hears, of course both, the rhyme of "Anal-Hakka", the psalm of Sohaṁ in the nostril beats flame fair the face and the wind plays the flute of the ever wake.

The purple mount, the running river, the dark forest, the blowing wind and all the elements must tell him now the tale of one God and one God only. Before him must spread the pall of love of God. Around him sing, then, the breezes of hope and faith. Evil fears him. Death to him must become the joy of meredian reach of the swing of the Mahāvākya. If this be his experience where then will there be room for fox to steal, wolf to be greedy? No fox, no wolf. The grief subsides. Distress disperses. Sorrow is soothed. To the Sādhaka of the above experience its every page is the morning's eye. The Universe swims with divine face. His mind is the interpretative research worker into the own-lit vaults of Bhakti-laboratory of the life.

Bhakti is the laboratory key of the life of sacredness. 'Anu-paśya' (see after one self) and Ātma-eva-abhūt' (becoming Ātma-itself) are in effect one and the same act. This Bhakti of the love of heart is the Bhakti of the Bhakti ("Bhakti māji bhakti") which is our the very Virakti, the unmixed asceticism ("tī hī āmuci Virakti"). Brimmed sva-jñapti is the over-flowing renounce-

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ment. The hymn of the heavenly Virakti is sung from the un-struck harp when plays free-Ātmā-rām's "tripto" (self contented) vāyuḥ (breath). Abhyāsa (practice of commune) and asceticism are the veins of the transparent purity. One cannot, without the other, thrive and make wing to the divine wood of the pratyagātman within. With the joy of 'anu-sandhānaṁ' and sound of deep Virakti sleep "Mā gridhaḥ" boat cuts fast the waters of the sea of sobs and waves of laughters and reaches safe—the home harbour of Viśveka-dhāma-of the divine ocean. Universe the home, the only sweet home.

Spiritual Dīkṣā and Samādhi

Dīkṣā is what gets knowledge and destroys ignorance. (Avidyā). The honey of the Dīkṣā dew cooly dips, quietly drops, silently flows into the calm lake of self-consciousness witn lipless prattle, tongue-less commune and breathful penance. On Dīkṣā the 'Satkarmas' are done determinedly in the cheer of the mind born of Dīkṣā. Dīkṣā discovers the exhaustless jar of Amṛtaṁ latent within. The honey in chrun the Dīkṣā enjoins falls out at the outset in silent specks. It counts clear in beads (Japa) unknown to the lips, then presses in Tapa, then reads loud in act, (nityakarma) losing last in the wave of light with the life. What conduces to this knowledge, to this Japa, Tapa, Nitya karma and worship is the act or Karma done in the light of the Pratyagātman within, made known through Dīkṣā.

To unite with the down-ward run of the breathing vein of the heart brought now under the law of the word of the lord is to make it raise its head up in the Dhyāna given in Dīkṣā which is meditational act or Dhyāna Karma that is richly fraught with the super power of its own. The cit in Dhyāna proper encounters first onslaughts of impresses that it puts down. Then it likes to stay at the high altitude of the pleasant cold of the Dhyāna hills where there is an agreeable union of Jīva and Śiva. There however lurks un-awares a dying ray to return to Jaḍa. Let us call this state SaṁpraJñāta Samādhi. But when this un-conscious distant throb ceases to pulsate, word retires (vacōnivar-tante), tongue babbles. Complete nirvāṇa ensues. Lord's word drowns Jaḍa and Ajaḍa spheres in ever the musically beating sounds. Let us call this a-Saṁprajñāta Samādhi.

The ceaseless drizzle of the drink of the Gods (nectar), of the Mahāvākyaṁ on all acts of mind on the dull-droned plains of life, its downpour in the flattering dream of the little life and drowning its deep valleys of sleep that rounds the dream is in the language of another Riṣi Patanjali by name Dharma—Meghaḥ Samādhiḥ. When sleeps the ego-wind the Dīkṣā Vākya (word) of the Dhīraḥ (Guruḥ) ascends along the column of the nectar air to the top of the meditation mountain and over spreads from there the entire conscious being of the Dīkṣita, the Sādhaka. This ascension of the Brāhmo Cit with its duration there in Īśa meditation is the Samādhiḥ which is thus the gold fruit into which the Dīkṣā flower thickened itself.

JOURNEY OF THE UPANISADS TO THE WEST

Our task in this section is to demonstrate how the Upaniṣadic thought had left an impact on the philosophical theories of the west in the nineteenth century. So long as the Upaniṣads were not translated into any European language, they remained as impervious as ever to the western scholars. It was Abraham Hyacin The Anquetil Duperron (1731-1805) to whom the credit of making

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the Upaniṣads accessible to the western world is due. Let us see how he undertook this pioneering venture.

The brilliance of the Upaniṣadic thought invited the attention of Dara Śhikoh, the eldest son of emperor Shajahan. A learned scholar and well-versed in Sanskrit language, Dara penetrated deep into the religious treaties of the Hindus and found that the Hindu thought was fundamentally the same as the Islamic thought. This he substantiated is his work 'Mazumā ue Vāharin' published in Persian language. When he was on tour to Kashmir he collected fifty two Upaniṣads and with the aid and effective guidance of the Kashmir Pundits he rendered these Upaniṣads into Persian in 1656. The name of these collected works was—"Sirri Akbar"-meaning mysterious knowledge. This work comprises four parts viz., (i) Introduction by Dara himself, (ii) the list of the translated Upaniṣads, (iii) Persian rendering of the Upaniṣads and (iv) Word meanings—persian and Sanskrit. In the introduction Dara states that he undertook this task of propagating the message of the Upaniṣads for the spiritual uplift of himself as also of his near relations. This Persian rendering had a wide publicity.

Long after (in 1755) Anquetil Duperron, the French Scholar of repute came to India with a mission of being acquainted with the oriental thought. During his stay for about six years in India (1755-1761) he had collected about two hundred treatises including Persian and Sanskrit texts of the Vedic period. With the assistance of the Brahmin Pundits he got many Sanskrit texts translated into Persian language. It is during this period that he was acquainted with fifty Upaniṣads translated into Persian by Dara Shikoh. On his return to paris in 1762, Duperron's first venture was the publication of the 'Āvestā'--the persian religious treatise in original and also in French in 1771. But perhaps the greatest achievement of Duperron was the Latin translation of Dara Shiko's Persian rendering of the Upaniṣads ("Oupnek' hat...." 2 Vols). MaxMüller enlightens us on this point. "It is true that under Akbar's reign (1556-1586) similar translations had been prepared, but neither those, nor the translations of Dara Shikoh attracted the attention of European scholars till the year 1775. In that year Anquetil Duperron, the famous traveller and the discoverer of the 'Zend Āvestā' received one MS. of the Persian translation of the Upaniṣads sent to him by M. Gentil, the French resident at the court of Sujauddaula and brought to France by M. Bernier. After receiving another MS. Anquetil Duperron collated the two and translated the Persian translation into French and into Latin. The Latin translation was published in 1801-1802." By virtue of his keen and assiduous search for oriental knowledge, untiring tenacity and unparalleled patience and perseverence Duperron came out successful in his mission of propagating the message of the ancient Indian philosophy in the western countries. His Latin translation of the Upaniṣads obliterated the barrier caused by the Sanskrit language and made the Upaniṣadic teaching easily intelligible to the western scholars, for Latin was then not only one of the chief languages of the intellectuals, but was also widely known and cultivated in European countries. It is well-known to all that Raja Rammohan Roy translated a good number of the Upaniṣads into English in the early nineteenth century (1816-1819), and that these translations were widely appreciated in Europe.

But there is no gainsaying that in the west the real impetus to study Sanskrit in

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general and the Upaniṣads in particular came much earlier from Duperron's Latin translation. It is also undeniable that prior to Duperron a few European scholars had undertaken the trouble in acquiring the knowledge of oriental literature and in disseminating the same in the west. It must, however, be noted that with the foundation of 'Asiatic Society' in Calcutta in 1784 by William Jones, an attempt was made to learn and propagate the oriental culture. English translations by William Jones of (i) Kalidāsa's 'Abhijñāna Śakuntalam' in 1789, (ii) Viṣnu Śarmā's 'Pañcatantra' in 1791, (iii) Joydev's 'Geet Govinda' (published immediately after the death of Jones i.e., after 1794), (iv) 'Manusaṁhitā' (translated) jointly by Jones and Wilkins in 1794), and the English translation by Charles Wilkins of (i) The Bhagavadgītā (the first English version of the Gītā)—published in London in 1785 by the directors of East India Company on the recommendation of Waren Hastings, and of (ii) 'Hitopadeś' published in Fath in 1787—are some of the remarkable undertakings which make it clear that prior to Duperron's Latin translation of the Upaniṣads, the European Scholars had some opportunity of being acquainted with the vast treasures of Sanskrit literature. Before the publication of the Latin translation Duperron is understood to have made a French translation of the Upaniṣads in 1775. But nothing is definitely known as to how far the French translation was circulated. The Latin rendering, however, was widely circulated and was greeted with ardour and enthusiasm, so much so, that many a thinker of the west had deeply imbibed the spirit of the Upaniṣadic philosophy. Schelling and Schopenhauer stand out as the two chief German philosophers of the nineteenth century who, we shall see presently, were profoundly influenced by the Upaniṣadic thought.

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KAIVALYA-UPANISHAḌ

Kaivalya means isolation or emancipation. Then Āśwalāyana went to Lord Parameshtī (Brahmā) and addressed Him thus: "Please initiate me into Brahma-viḍyā (Divine Wisdom), which is the most excellent, which is ever enjoyed by the wise, which is mystic, and by which the learned, after having soon freed themselves from all sins, reach Purusha, the Supreme of the supreme."

To him the Grandfather (thus) replied: "Know (It) through Śraḍḍhā (faith), Bhakṭi (devotion), Ḍhyāna (meditation), and Yoga. Persons attain salvation not through Karma, progeny or wealth but through Sannyāsa (renunciation) alone. Ascetics of pure mind through (the realisation of) the meaning well-ascertained by Veḍānṭa-Vijñāna and through Sannyāsa-Yoga enter into That which is above Swarga (heaven) and is in the cave (of the heart). They all attain Paramāṭmā in the Brahma-world and are (family) emancipated.

"Being seated in a pleasant posture in an unfrequented place with a pure mind, and with his neck, head, and body erect, having given up the duties of the (four) orders of life, having subjugated all the organs, having saluted his Guru with devotion, having looked upon the heart (-lotus) as being free from Rajoguṇa and as pure, and having contemplated in its (heart's) centre Parameśwara who is always with His consort Umā, who is pure and free from sorrow, who is unthinkable and invisible, who is of endless forms, who is of the nature of happiness, who is very quiescent, who is of the form of emancipation, who is the source of Māyā, who has no beginning middle or end, who is One, who is All-Pervading, who is Chiḍānanḍa (Consciousness-Bliss), who is formless, who is wonderful, who is the Lord (of all), who has three eyes, who has a blue neck, (Nīlakaṇtha), and who is serenity (itself)—the Muni attains Paramāṭmā, the womb of all elements, the All-Witness, and above Ṭamas. He only is Brahmā. He only is Śiva. He only is Inḍra. He only is the indestrucible. He only is the Supreme. He only is a Self-Shining. He only is Vishṇū. He only is Prāṇa. He only is Time. He only is Agni (fire). He only is the moon. He only is all things that exist or will hereafter exist. He only is eternal. Having known Him, one crosses death. There is no other path to salvation. He only attains Parabrahman who sees in himself all elements and himself in all elements. There is no other means. Having constituted his body an Araṇi (the lower attritional piece of wood) and Praṇava (Om), the upper Araṇi, a wise man burns Ajñāna by the churning of meditation.

"It is only He (Paramāṭmā) who, deluded by Māyā, assumes a body with the internal organs and does everything. It is only He who in the waking state is gratified with women, food, drink, and other diverse enjoyments. In the dreaming state, the Jīva enjoys pleasures and pains in the several worlds which are created by His Māyā. In the dreamless sleeping state

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when all are absorbed, He, replete with Ṭamas, attains the state of happiness. Then through the force of the Karmas of previous births, that Jīva again wakes up and goes to sleep. All the diversified objects (of the universe) emanate from the Jīva, who sports in the three bodies (gross, subtle and causal). The three bodies are finally absorbed in Him who is the source of all, who is Bliss, and who is Absolute Wisdom. From Him, arise Prāṇa, Manas, all the organs of sense and action, Ākāś, Vāyu, Agni, water and the earth supporting all. Parabrahman, which is of all forms, which is the Supreme Abode of this universe, which is the most subtle of the subtle and which is eternal, is only yourself. You are only That. One who knows himself to be that Parabrahman that shines as the universe in the waking, dreaming, dreamless and other states, will be relieved from all bondage. I am that Saḍāśiva, (or the eternal happiness) who is other than the enjoyer, the enjoyed, and the enjoyment in the three seats (or bodies), and who is witness and Chinmāṭra. All emanate from Me alone. All exist in Me alone. All merge into Me alone. I am that non-dual Brahman. I am the atom of atoms; so am I the biggest (of all). I am this diversified universe. I am the oldest of all. I am Purusha. I am Īśa (the Lord). I am of the form of Jyoṭis (light) and of the form of happiness. I have neither hands nor feet. I have power unthinkable. I see without eyes. I hear without ears. I am omniscient. I have one kind of form only. None is able to know Me fully. I am always of the form of Chiṭ. I am the One that should be known through all the Veḍas. I am the Guru who revealed the Veḍānṭā. I am only He who knows the true meaning of Veḍānṭa. I have no sins or virtues. I have no destruction. I have no birth, body, organs of sense or action, or Buḍḍhi. To Me there is no earth, water or fire. There is no Vāyu; there is no Ākāś. He who thinks Paramāṭmā as being in the cave (of the heart), as having no form, as being secondless, as being the witness of all and as being neither Saṭ nor Asaṭ, attains the pure form of Paramāṭmā.

"Whoever recites this Upanishaḍ belonging to Yajurveḍa, he becomes as pure as Agni (fire). He becomes purified from the sins of theft of gold. He becomes purified from the sins of drinking alcohol. He becomes purified from the sins of murder of a Brāhman. He becomes purified from the sins of commission (or those that ought not to be done) and the sins of omission (of those that ought not to be done). Therefore, he becomes a follower of Brahman. Were one who has stepped beyond the duties of the four orders of life to recite (this Upanishaḍ) always or even once, he acquires the wisdom that destroys the ocean of Samsāra. Therefore having known Him, he attains the Kaivalya State (or state of isolation or emancipation)—yea, he attains the Kaivalya State."

KALISANṬĀRAṆA UPANISHAḌ

This Upanishaḍ treats of the means of crossing Kali completely: Nāraḍa having asked the question in Ḍvāpara yuga—the third of the four yugas.

At the end of Ḍvāpara yuga, Nāraḍa went to Brahmā and addressed him thus: "O Lord, how shall I, roaming over the earth, be able to cross Kali?" To which Brahmā thus replied: "Well asked. Hearken to that which all Śruṭis (the Veḍas) keep secret and hidden, through which one may cross the samsira (mundane existence) of Kali. He shakes off (the evil effects of) Kali through the mere uttering of the name of the Lord Nārāyaṇa, who is the primeval Purusha." Again Nāraḍa asked Brahmā: "What is the name?" To which

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Hiraṇyagarbha (Brahmā) replied thus: (the words are:) "1. Harē, 2. Rāma, 3. Harē, 4. Rāma, 5. Rāma, 6. Rāma, 7. Harē, 8. Harē; 9. Harē, 10. Kṛshṇa, 11. Harē, 12. Kṛshṇa, 13. Kṛshṇa, 14. Kṛshṇa, 15. Harē, 16. Harē. These sixteen names (words) are destructive of the evil effects of Kali. No better means than this is to be seen in all the Veḍas. These (sixteen names) destroy the āvaraṇa (or the centripetal force which produces the sense of individuality) of jīva surrounded by the sixteen kalās (rays). Then like the sphere of the sun which shines fully after the clouds (screening it) disperse, Parabrahman (alone) shines."

Nāraḍa asked: "O Lord, what are the rules to be observed with reference to it?" To which Brahmā replied that there were no rules for it. Whoever in a pure or an impure state, utters these always, attains the same world of, or proximity with, or the same form of, or adsorption into Brahmā.

Whoever utters three and a half kotis (or thirty-five millions) times this manṭra composed of sixteen names (or words) crosses the sin of the murder of a Brāhmaṇa. He becomes purified from the sin of the theft of Gold. He becomes purified from the sin of cohabitation with a woman of low caste. He is purified from the sins of wrong done to piṭṛs, ḍevas, and men. Having given up all ḍharmas, he becomes freed at once from all sins. He is at once released from all bondage. That he is at once released from all bondage is the Upanishaḍ.

KARMA IN THE ŚVETAŚVATARA UPANIṢAD

The *Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad* has been described as the chief monument of theism. It puts forward the doctrine of Īśvara, a personal God or *saguṇa-brahman*, who is the Creator, Preserver and Destroyer. He is also benevolent. It also propounds the doctrine of grace. The *Śvetāśvatara* the traces of idealism and pantheism continue to exist, side by side, with theism making its representation often contradictory and philosophically unintelligible. Macdonell saw in this *Upaniṣad* an electric movement combining Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Vedānta doctrine. Belvalkar and Ranade consider that "the *Upaniṣad* is an excellent illustration of the electric tendency of its author or authors, it being, in fact, a conglomeration of various original and borrowed ideas, which makes it a very difficult task to critically evaluate the original contribution of the *Śvetāśvatara* to the Upanisadic philosophy." They add: "The six chapters of the *Upaniṣad*, as they stand, do not constitute a coherent, connected and consequential unity...."

We feel that a careful analysis of the *mantras* of the *Upaniṣad* will show that its genesis is to be traced to the efforts of the Brāhmaṇical schools to counter anti-theistic and agnostic schools.

The anti-theistic schools appear to have been the Kāla-vādins, Svabhāva-vādins, Niyati-vādins, Yadṛcchā-vādins and Bhūta-vādins. The agnostic schools were Sāṁkhya, Jainism and Buddhism. They also discounted Brāhmaṇical sacrificial practices.

(a) The Anti-theistic Schools

Śvet. Up. 1.2 question *kāla, svabhāva, niyati, yadṛcchā* and the great Elements (besides *Puruṣa*) as the cause (of the Universe). *Śvet. Up.* 1.3 makes hidden divine power as the cause of all these causes including of Time. In *Śvet. Up.* IV. 15, Īśvra Rudra is alone the protector of the world in or at the proper times: *sa eva kāle bhuvanasya goptā*. This could only mean that he is the protector against the ravages of time. In *Śvet. Up.* V. 5, the Brahman regulates *svabhāva* (nature)—

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svabhāvaṁ-pacati; and distributes all the *guṇas*.

In *Śvet. Up.* VI.1, it is asserted that because of delusion, *svabhāva* and *kāla* are deemed as the cause; and it is reiterated that God is the mover of the cosmic wheel. In *Śvet. Up.* VI. 2, the God is called 'maker of time', *kālakāra*, and lord of *guṇas*, *guṇi* and creates the world through the four *bhūtas* or elements. According to *Śvet. Up.* VI.3, it is God which brings about a union of *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* endowed with the three *guṇas* leading to the evolution of the various categories in time. In *Śvet. Up.* VI. 5, the Brahman is described as *trikālād akāla*, beyond the three kinds of time. In *Śvet. Up.* VI.11, he is called the *bhūta anara ātmā*, the inner self of the *bhūtas*, Elements. In *Śvet. Up.* VI. 16, God is again described as *kālakāra*, Creator of time, and *guṇi*, possessing the three *guṇas* and *guṇeśa*, *the* lord of *guṇas*. In fact, in *Śvet. Up.* IV. 10, he is called the wieldier of *prakṛti* named *māyā-māyinaṁ maheśvaraṁ*.

Thus the *Śvet. Up.* discounts the validity of *kāla*, *svabhāva*, *niyati*, *bhūta*, etc. and of *Prakṛti* of Sāṁkhya as a causative Force.

(b) The Agnostic Schools following the doctrine of Karma

The attack of *Śvet. Up.* on the doctrine of *karma*, a law of retribution that operates impartially and inexorably and automatically, is two-pronged. First: God is the refuge from sorrow and his grace can redeem the suffering of his devotees. Evidently the implication is that the law of *karma* can be got over by God's grace.

Śvet. Up. 1.6 says, "When blessed by him (the Lord) or at his pleasure, a person obtains immortality, that is liberation." *Śvet. Up.* III 17 calls Śiva, the great refuge of all (*sarvasya śaraṇaṁ bṛhat*). *Śvet. Up.* III. 20 claims that one becomes freed from sorrow through the grace of the Creator: *vīta-śoko dhātuḥ prasādān mahimānam*. Again *Śvet. Up.* IV. 7 reiterates that a man is helpless or powerless and becomes freed from sorrow by seeing the Lord: *yadā paśyaty...Iśam asya mahimānam iti vīta-śokaḥ*. In *Śvet. Up.* IV. 20, it is averred that the protection of Rudra is sought because he is gracious.

In *Śvet. Up.* VI. 18, the seeker of liberation seeks his *śaraṇa*, refuge.

In brief, the doctrine of grace seeks to abrogate subtly and implicitly the law of *karma* so far as the devotees of the Lord are concerned.

Karma born of *avidyā* or ne-science is also considered to be the causative principle both macro-cosmically and macro-cosmically. Buddhism considers *karma* as *vipāka-hetu*, law of moral causation; Jainism believes that *karma* is the root of birth and death; Sāṁkhya holds that *karma āśayas*, the accumulated *karmas*, are responsible for the evolution of *prakṛti*. *Karma* also regulates the rebirth of individuals in different *gatis* in accordance with the quality of their actions.

Śvet. Up: however, claims that *Iśvara*, God, can bring about *janma-nirodha*, cessation of birth and rebirth, and release beings from *karma-paśa*, bondage of *karma*.

Svet. Up. 1.7 avers that intimate knowledge of Brahman and consequent merger with it frees a person from birth, *yoni-muktaḥ*. Again, according to *Śvet. Up.* 1.11, the knowledge of God leads to falling off of all fetters and cessation of birth and death: *Jñātvā devaṁ sarva-pāśāpahāniḥ kṣiṇaiḥ kleśair janma-mṛtyu-prahāṇiḥ*. *Śvet. Up.* II.15, IV. 16, V. 13, VI. 13 maintain that by knowing God, a person is freed from all fetters, *jñātvā devaṁ mucyate sarva-pāśaiḥ*.

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In *Śvet. Up.* VI. 6, God is described as the producer of good and remover of evil: *dharmāvahaṁ papanudam.* In *Śvet. Up.* VI. 11, he is called the lord or ordainer of *karmas: karmādhyakṣa.* In *Śvet. Up.* VI. 16, God is described as the cause of the worldly existence, of liberation, of continuance and of bondage: *pradhāna-kṣetrajñapatiḥ guṇeśaḥ saṁsāra-mokṣa-sthīti-bandhahetuḥ.*

It deserves to be noted that though in some of the Upaniṣads, *viz., Kena* and *Muṇḍaka*, Brahman is synonymous with Iśvara, he is not conceived as a regulator of *karma.* All that is said in *Taittiriya Up. II.* 5.1 is that one who knows Brahman leaves his sins in the body and attains all desires and in *Kena-Up* IV. 9 that he overcomes sin.

It is true that there is full acceptance of the law of *karmab* in *Śvet. Up.* V. 7 and 12, viz., that the doer of the deeds wanders about and obtains rebirth according to his deeds. But evidently this is valid only so long as he does not possess genuine faith in God and does not seek his refuge. This interpretation is confirmed by Śaṅkara's Commentary on *Śvet. Up.* VI. 4 that "if we dedicate all our works to Īśvara, we will not be subject to the law of *karma.*"

The concept of *Īśvara* who operates the law of *karma*, helped to crystallise the doctrine of *saguṇa-brahman.*

Before we conclude, we may incidentally add that the reference to Sāṁkhya, in *Śvet. Up.* VI. 13, does not imply an acceptance of the Sāṁkhya doctrine; the term only stands for knowledge or discrimination.

Thus the *Śvet. Up.* was an open attack on the Kāla-vādins, Svabhāva-vādins, Yadṛcchā-vādins, Niyati-vādins and Bhūtta-vādins. It was a subtle attack on those schools which postulated the doctrine of *karma* as the cause of creation, suffering and inequalities.

The doctrine of *karma* of the Buddhists, Jainas and Sāṁkhyas had rendered God or Creator, as causative factor, irrelevant and unnecessary. Within the framework of Indian philosophical thought the doctrine was the most rational explanation of suffering and inequality in life. It was not possible to challenge it; nay, its validity had to be accepted. But this was done by coming to terms with it, by a process of assimilation in which the mutually contradictory postulates of *karman* and *Īśvara* co-exist: the believers making an effort to observe the law of *karma and* the erring among them seeking escape from its rigour through God's grace. Thus *Śvet. Up.* is not so much a testament of theism as a way of escape from the law of *karma.*

KATHA UPANISHAD THE

The Katha Upanishad, as commented on by Śankara Āchārya, consists of two parts (Adhyāya), each of them containing three Vallís (creepers). Dr. Weber is of opinion that the Katha originally closed with the third Valli, and his reasons are, that the first part is complete, and has a formal conclusion, that the second part consists almost entirely of Védaic quotations, that there is a difference of language in the first and second parts, and that in the Atharva list they are enumerated as distinct Upanishads. These arguments appear conclusive, and we would especially urge the difference in the composition of them. The subject of the Upanishad is indeed fully treated at the conclusion of the first part; in the second there is no new thought; and although not a mere repetition of the first, there is no leading idea by which its parts are arranged, so that it appears to have been composed at a later time, with a view of elucidating some of the topics of the first

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part more explicitly, and of proving its doctrines in a more convincing manner.

Even a hasty glance at the Katha Upanishad shows, that it consists of two parts, the first of which is formed by the first, the second by the second Adhyáya. While the first part is quite independent and complete, and moreover proved as such by a formal conclusion, offering promises to tnose who would declare or hear this "náchikétam upákhyânam,"—the second is composed almost exclusively of Védaic quotations, which are to prove more in detail the doctrines pronounced in the first, and which are always introduced by "étad vai tad," exactly in the manner and sense of the "tad api ésha sloko bhavati," "tad ésha bhyanúktá," etc. in the Brahmanas, and of the "tathá choktam, yatah", "aparam cha" in the Hitopadésa. It is therefore quite proper, that in the enumeration of the Atharva Upanishads with Colebrooke (and in Chambers 127 b.) both parts are directly counted as two different Upanishads. That the second part is later than the first, independent of the nature of the case, is clear from several other, especially linguistic reasons. First, the name of Nachikétas is no longer mentioned therein, with the exception of one passage (added to it at a yet later time) at its close, where, however, he is called Nachikéta instead of Nachikétas, but he is constantly addressed by the name of Gantama, which name again is not used in the first part. Farther the word "déha" for body is not met with in the first part, as it is in the second. Except in this passage, I have as yet found this word only in Taitt. A'. x. 13. and if its interpretation "what sullies" is correct, it belongs to a pretty advanced stage of Indian asceticism. With this it further agrees, that in of the second part the technical term of "Yoga" is known, and explained to denote the highest degree of devotion, which is perhaps a sign that this expression was then yet new and required interpretation ......Verses 7 and 8 in § 6, lastly, are only a (modified) repetition of 3, 10-11. However, likewise the second part, although later than the first, has yet a pretty ancient form, a character which it owes perhaps more to its quotations (as 5, 9-11 Agni, Váyu, Surya,) than to its original passages. It is evident, that the second part originally concludes after the words "tam vidyáchakram amritam" which for this purpose are repeated. The two next verses are a still later addition, the first prompted by a tender heart which could not suffer the reader to remain in doubt about the fate of Nachikéta (sic!); this, however, is quite un-Védaic, and never occurs in the legends of the Bráhmanas, viz., that he attended to the doctrines of Death,—the second is the introductory and concluding verse, already discussed, which it has in common with the three last Upanishads of the Taitt. Áranyaka, and which here also has crept in, because this is originally considered as a Taittiriya Upanishad.

The Katha has always been considered as one of the best Upanishads, and it must be admitted, that in elevation of thought, depth of expression, beauty of its imagery and an ingenuous fervour, few are equal to it. The lofty conception, by which in its introductory legend. Death is made to give a reply to the highest questions the human mind can propose to itself, the enthusiasm and intimate conviction which Nachikétas shows about the infinite superiority of what is good over the pleasures of the world, even if their enjoyment be as prefect as lies in its nature, the firmness which he maintains amidst all the allurements that are placed before him, and which bears some resemblance to the energy of mind with which Plato in the first and second books of his "Republic" shows that Justice

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has an incomparable worth, and ought to be preserved under any circumstances, the fine comparison of the body with a car, the soul with a rider, the senses with horses, the mind with the rein, etc., and which again recalls Plato by the similar comparison in his "Phaedrus,"—place it in a high rank as a poetical exposition of the doctrine that man is the same with the infinite soul.

In a philosophical point of view we cannot give the same praise, at least as to the form of the Upanishad; there is little connection between the thoughts, no progress from one to another, so that they rather appear a compilation than the production of an original thinker. If we moreover attend to the distribution of the subject, at first no arrangement is found, the sentences do not shew a connected sequence, as when treating on one subject, another starts up without apparent necessity. On a closer examination a certain order becomes manifest, and to render this more perceptible, I shall state here the chief questions to which an answer is sought in every Upanishad, questions which are in fact, and must be, the subject of investigation to every philosophy, although they may assume a form very different from the one in which they are found in the Upanishads. They are one practical and three theoretical questions. 1. What is the highest object of man? 2. What is the last cause of the world? 3. In what connection is this cause with the world? and, 4. How do we know of it?

The first Valli endeavours to answer the first question. Its views are briefly as follows:—It is generally thought that knowledge of the Védas leads to supreme happiness; but the happiness, which is derived from such a knowledge, and from the performance of the rites enjoined by the Védas, viz., the enjoyment of heavenly bliss, is transient, and does not satisfy the mind of man, who is desirous of a happiness wherein there is no change.

This happiness is possible only under the condition, that the soul itself attains to an unchangeable state, and hence the question arises, whether after death there is an existence of the soul, separated from all the instruments of transient enjoyment, as the senses, the mind etc. The investigation is difficult; but there should be no hesitation of entering upon it; for the object is incomparably high, as it is a knowledge which leads to unalterable bliss.

In the second Valli a general solution is given of he questions: —What is the last cause of the world, and how do we know of it?

The good, in accordance to it, is different from what is pleasant, and on this account man has to choose between either; for from the diversity of their nature both cannot be obtained together. By discrimination it will be found, that the good is the higher of the two. The knowledge of the things that are pleasant is in fact ignorance. The idea, here expressed that knowledge which has no reference to the supreme soul, is ignorance, approaches closely the tenet of the Védánta, that the world is produced by ignorance, delusion, and far out-strips the more cautious Mandaka Upanishad, (1. 4), according to which two sciences viz., the science of Brahma and the science which refers to the Védas, are admitted, although the latter is declared to be inferior.

There may be here a doubt, what is meant by the "two who drink the due reward from their works in this world," whether the individual soul, and universal soul, which is the totality of the individual souls, or the individual soul and Brahma in his real nature as separate from all worldly relations. The latter is evidently the

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sense of the passage; for with regard to the universal soul the same necessity would exist to know itself as the infinite soul, and therefore no contrast could exist to know itself as the infinite soul, and therefore no contrast could exist between the indivudual and universal soul; and, secondly, this meaning is borne out by the further exposition, where first the nature of the individual soul is described, and afterwards that of the infinite Brahma, while no allusion is made to the notion of an universal soul. Because it leads to delusion about the true nature of things, viz., by producing the belief, that only this world with its enjoyments exists, and not another. The result of this ignorance is, that the soul passes from life to death and *vice versâ*. Knowledge, on the other hand, refers to what is good, and its object is the true nature of the soul of man. It is different from virtue and vice, from cause and effect, different from past, present and future times. The soul then by which man knows, is not born, nor does it die; it is not cause or effect; it is unchangeable, and the visible changes are only changes of the body. It is the one, infinite Brahma, who is incorporeal, great and all-pervading and although infinite, placed in the cavity of the heart of the living creatures.

The knowledge of Brahma, or of the soul as Brahma, is difficult to obtain, it requires both an able teacher and an able disciple. It is not acquired by mere arguing, not by knowledge and understanding of the Védas, or by manifold science, but by the union of intellect with the soul (Adhyátma Yoga). The most perfect means to acquire a knowledge of Brahma is the meditation on the word "Om," which is the substance of all the declarations of the Védas, and which refers either to the inferior or supreme Brahma, or to Brahma, considered either in his relations to the world, or in his own absolute nature. Or the knowledge of Brahma can only be gained by a person whose senses are subdued, whose intellect is concentrated, whose mind is at rest, and who has the desire of knowing him.

The third Valli treats on the relation between the infinite Brahma and the world in general, and with special reference between Brahma and the individual soul.

There are two souls in this world, the embodied or finite soul, and the unembodied or infinite soul. There may be here a doubt, what is meant by the "two who drink the due reward from their works in this world," whether the individual soul, and universal soul, which is the totality of the individual souls, or the individual soul and Brahma in his real nature as separate from all worldly relations. The latter is evidently the sense of the passage; for with regard to the universal soul the same necessity would exist to know itself as the infinite soul, and therefore, no contrast could exist between the individual and universal soul; and, secondly, this meaning is borne out by the further exposition, where first the nature of the individual soul is described, and afterwards that of the infinite Brahman; while no allusion is made to the notion of an universal soul. The embodied soul is endowed with senses, their objects, the mind and intellect, and is the ruler and enjoyer. Among them the objects are higher, that is to say, more comprehensive and subtle, than the senses; the mind higher than the objects; the intellect (buddhi) higher than the mind; the great soul (mahátmá); higher than the great (mahat) the unmanifested (avyakta); higher than the unmanifested the soul, which is without limit, and which is the last aim. This soul, concealed in all beings, is not manifest, but it becomes so to concentrated intellect; to know one's self as gradually depending upon intellect, the

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great soul, the placid soul, is to advance to the knowledge of Brahma, by the acquiring of which true immortality is gained.

The fourth Vallí is, according to Śankara, to show that the great obstacle to a knowledge of the soul is ignorance. However, it appears rather to give an answer to the question:—How can the soul be known, if it is concealed, which was maintained at the end of the third Valli? The answer is:—When the senses are withdrawn from their objects and enjoyments, the soul is known by every one's own soul; for by this all sensual and other qualities, in the state of awaking as well as in dream, are perceived, known; nothing remains unknown to it; it is knowledge itself, and thereby the same with the supreme Brahma. Then follows a description of the different relations of the soul like that in the third Vallí. The individual soul is the same as infinite soul; it is also Hiranyagarbha, the first emanation of the universal soul, as also the soul in the creatures, where, together with all the senses, it dwells in the cavity of the heart. There is no real difference between the supreme Brahma and the individual soul; both are the same, and this knowledge is immortality.

In the fifth Valli an attempt is made to prove the existence of the soul as a principle different from the body, and to show how the one soul can be also manifold. The soul is the ruler of the senses, and all the functions of life depend upon its existence. When the soul has left the body, these functions cease. Life does not proceed from any of the vital functions; therefore it proceeds from something else, different from them, upon which it is founded. How the one soul can be manifold, is shown merely by comparisons. As one and the same fire by its coming into contact with various things becomes various, or as water, though of one nature, appears of many forms, when in connection with other and other things, so appears the soul various by its various relations. In all these relations, however, the soul is not affected by the imperfections of the various things, as the sun is not sullied by the defects of the eye, in which it is reflected; for it is not only within, but also without the creatures.

The question at the end of the fifth Valli:—How can I know Brahma, does he manifest or not? and which is answered there:—Nothing can manifest the infinite Brahma, because all is manifested by him,—is again taken up in the sixth Vallí. First, the answer is supplied by a comparison. The world is like a fig-tree, whose root is upwards, and whose branches go downwards. Then a description is given, which we already know (from the third Valli), of the soul in its relations to worldly existence, viz., that the mind is above the senses, intellect above the mind, the great soul above intellect, he unmanifested above the great soul, and the soul (Purusha) above the unmanifested, and which is apparently intended to show the instruments by which the soul might be possibly comprehended. The soul is not-known by the senses, nor by the mind; it becomes known through intellect by thinking; it is apprehended from the existence of its effect, the world, which like a tree to its root, points to its cause. The cause is afterwards to be considered in its independent nature, by which the true notion of Brahma is obtained. The chief means by which this thinking is produced, is the Yoga, which denotes a state, by which the senses and the mind are withdrawn from their objects, and the intellect is directed only to Brahman.

The question,—How we know of the infinite Brahma?—is in the Katha

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Upanishad more fully treated than in most of the others, and as the standing point of the Upanishads depends entirely upon this answer, viz., whether they claim to be founded upon revelation or upon philosophical thinking, it is worth while to ascertain it in this case. From such passages as:—"It (the soul) is difficulty to be known, it is very subtle" (1-21), "A wonderful teacher is required" (2-7), "The soul, more subtle than what is subtle, is not to be obtained by arguing" (2-8-9), it may at first appear that revelation is the source of that knowledge; for if the soul cannot be known by arguing (nor by perception,) there remains no other means to know it but tradition, and it is expressly asserted that a teacher is necessary. His knowledge is derived from another teacher, and so on, until we come to a last teacher, who must know it by immediate revelation from Brahma. However, the whole Upanishad is against this supposition. First, a knowledge of Brahma is impossible by the Véda, which is considered as the ordinary source of revelation. "The soul cannot be gained by knowledge of the Véda, not by the understanding of its meaning, not by manifold science." (2, 23.) Secondly, the soul is immaterial, and cannot be apprehended by the senses, and therefore not by tradition. "The soul's nature is not placed in what is visible, none beholds it by the eye." (6, 9.) "It is not gained by word, not by the mind, no by the eye." (6, 13.) "With regard to him (Brahma) the sun does not manifest, not the moon, not the stars.... When he is manifest, all after him becomes manifest; by his manifestation this whole world becomes manifest." (6, 11.) These passages deny even the possibility of a revelation. Thirdly, the knowledge of the soul is independent of everything else; it can be obtained merely by the soul itself. "By the soul which is chosen, it (the soul) can be gained. His (everybody's) soul reveals is own truth." (2, 23.) "Who beheld his (soul) as dwelling in their own body." (5, 12.) Fourthly, it is clearly stated, by what means a knowledge of the soul is gained, viz., by thinking. "The soul must be thought of in various ways (2, 8.) "The wise thinking him (Brahma) by union of intellect with the soul." (2, 12.) "He is beheld by the attentive, subtle intellect of men of subtle sight." (3, 12) "None beholds him by the eye; by the heart (intellect) through thinking (manasá) he becomes manifest." (6, 2.) Moreover, not only the instrument of our knowledge of Brahma (the intellect) is pointed out, but also the peculiar process of thinking, by which that knowledge is obtained, viz., in the passage:—"He is not to be gained by word, not by the mind, not by the eye, how could he be perceived by any other than by him who declares that he exists? The soul is to be perceived by existence as well as by its true notion, that is to say, by both when it is perceived by existence, its true notion becomes manifest" (6, 12-13), that is to say, Brahma will be known as the cause of the world, as the world is an effect and must have a cause; if this notion has been produced, the independent nature of Brahma will be also comprehended. Here the notion of Brahma is clearly based upon argument. And, lastly, it is asserted of the soul, that it can arrive at the knowledge of Brahma by its own nature; for the soul is Brahma, is knowledge in the highest senses. "His soul reveals its own truth" (2, 23) what remains unknown to the soul by which one knows of form, etc. (4, 4.) Hence the world denoting the perception of Brahma is knowledge, while every other perception is ignorance.

From this exposition it is evident that, according to the Katha Upanishad, the knowledge of Brahma depends upon a process of thinking, that is to say, that it

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is derived from philosophy, not from revelation. By reflection upon the world and the soul, by discrimination, the nature of Brahma becomes manifest, and it would have been rather surprising, if those bold and original thinkers, the results of whose enquiries are deposited in the Upanishads, had no been aware of the manner in which they arrived at the notion of Brahma, which is so far removed from common thinking and the conception of the Védas. In later times, when the process of thinking by which that idea was formed had been forgotten, and original thought had been abandoned for the formulas of the schools, the attempt was made to assign the origin of their leading notion to another source, than from what it was actually derived; and we may find in the Katha already some traces of this in the value, which is attached to the Yoga, according to which not the perspicuity, order, and mutual determination of the ideas lead to truth, but a state in which the senses and the mind by some artificial means are withdrawn from their objects, a state, therefore, in which, if it were possible, every thought would cease.

The standing point of the Katha is on the whole that of the Védánta. It is the absolute spirit which is the foundation of the world, and it is the object of true science to know him as the same with all creatures, especially with one's own soul, which by this knowledge attains its final aim,—absorption into Brahma. In the order of manifestations or emanations from the absolute spirit it deviates, however, from that adopted by other Upanishads and by the later Védánta, and is evidently more closely allied to the Sánkhya. The order is here:—The unmanifested (avyakta), the great soul, (mahátma or mahat,) intellect (buddhi), mind, the objects of the senses and the sense. The same order is followed by the Sánkhya, with the exception, that they have not between the unmanifested and intellect the intervening "mahat", which with them is equivalent to intellect. The "manas" (mind) has here also the same function as in the Sánkhya the ahankára (self-consciousness). Hence it is probable, that this Upanishad was written at a time when the Sánkhya had already been founded, and with a view of conciliating part of the Sánkhya, especially the followers of the Yoga, by some concessions: for which it disputed against them as to its assumption of many souls; and urges, that by mere thinking (tarka) the absolute spirit cannot be comprehended, it adopts, on the other hand, almost the whole order of their emanations as well as some of their technical names (mahat, avyakta, Purusha) and recognises the necessity of the Yoga. Beside the Sánkhya, the Katha seems also to refer to the doctrine of the Buddhist; for they, if not the Chárvákas, are probably referred to, in the passage (1, 20.)—"There is an enquiry. Some say, the soul exists after the death of man, others say, it does not exist,"—since the Sánkhya cannot be meant thereby which, as well as the Védánta, maintains the independent existence of the soul.

Of the Katha several versions exist. It was translated into English first by Ram Mohun-Roy, and again in the *Tattwabodhiní Pattrika* (vol. 1, pp. 316-27) where also a Bengalee version is given (vol. 1, 423-56). Into the German it has been translated by Windischmann (in the work, of his father "*Die Philosophic im Fortgang der Weltgeschichte,*" pp. 1706-17), and by Poley in the appendix to his translation of Colebrooke's Treatise on the Védas (pp. 113 to 128). Dr. Weber has commented on some of its parts in his "*Indische Studien*".

First Valli.

1. Once desirous (of heaven) the son of Vajásrava (Gautama) gave away all ***his***

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property. He had a son, Nachikétas by name.

2. When the presents were brought, filial anxiety (about the welfare of his father) penetrated the youth. He thought:—

3. (A sacrificer) who bestows (cows) which have drunk their water, eaten their grass, given their milk and which are barren, goes verily to the worlds of unhappiness.

4. He said to his parent: —O father, to whom wilt thou give me? (He said so) a second and a third time. (Enraged) he answered him:—To Death I will give thee.

5. (Nachikétas thought:—) Among many (sons) I am the first, among many the middle, (but not among the bad, therefore) is there any work of Yama, which he will perform to-day through me? (Nachikétas said:)

6. Remember, how former men (our forefathers acted; consider, how the present (good men) act. Like corn, the mortals, get ripe, like corn they are born again.

7. A Brahmana guest enters a house like Vaisvánara (fire). For him (the good) make this peace-offering. Take the water; O son of Vaivasvat the sun.

8. Hope, expectation, meeting (with the good), friendly words, sacrifices, pious gifts, sons and cattle,—all this loses the man of little sense in whose house a Bráhmana dwells without taking food.

9. (Yama speaks:—) O Brahmana, because thou, a venerable guest, hast tarried in my house for three nights, without taking food, therefore be salutation to thee, and welfare to me; moreover choose three boons instead (the three nights thou-wast here without hospitable reception).

10. (Nachikétas speaks:—) O death, that Gautama be appeased in thought, and composed in mind, that his anger towards me may have gone, and that he may salute me, liberated by thee, remembering (me as his son), this I choose as the first of the three boons.

11. (Yama speaks:—) Through my favour, Audálaki, the son of Aruṇa, will remember thee with love as before; he will sleep happily at night; free from anger he will see *thee*, when released from the mouth of death.

12. (Nachikétas speaks:—) In the place of heaven there is no fear of any kind; thou art not there, *none* fears decay. Without either hunger or thirst, beyond all grief (all rejoice in the place of heaven.

13. Thou hast, O Death, a recollection of the heavenly fire, make it known to me (also) who have faith. The dwellers in heaven enjoy immortality; this I choose as the second boon.

14. (Yama speaks:—) I will tell thee: do thou attend to this *my word*. I know the heavenly fire, O Nachikétas. Know that the fire, which is the cause of acquiring infinite worlds, which again is the foundation (of the universe), is placed in the cavity (of the heart).

15. He then explained to him that fire, which the fist of the worlds, the nature of the bricks, and their number, and in what way (the rite of that fire is to be performed). Nachikétas also repeated it in the same manner as it was explained to him. Then thereby pleased, Death again said:—

16. Satisfied, magnanimous Death spoke to him:-I grant thee now another boon again. After thy name shall be named that fire. Take also this many-coloured chain.

17. Whoever performs three times the sacrifice of the Nachikéta fire, when he has received advice from the three, (viz., the mother, the father and the teacher,) who has done the three works (offering, reading of the Védas and liberality), — overcomes birth and death. Whoever knows and

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judges well, (that fire) which sprung from Brahma, and is wise, which divine, and worthy of praise, obtains that everlasting peace.

18. Whoever offers three times by the Nachikéta fire, when he knows its threefold nature, leaves before (the death of the body) the chains of death, and without grief rejoices in the place of heaven.

19. This is the heavenly fire, which, thou, O Nachikétas, chooseth for thee by the second boon. Men will call this fire even after thee. Choose the third boon, O Nachikétas.

20. (Nachikétas speaks:—) There is this enquiry: some say, (the soul) exists after the death of man, others say, it does not exist. This I should like to know, instructed by thee, such is the third of the boons.

21. (Yama speaks:—) With reference to this (question) there was enquired of old even by the gods; for it is not easy to understand it, subtle is its nature. Choose another boon. O Nachikétas, do not compel me to this; release me from this (boon).

22. (Nachikétas speaks:—) Even by the gods verily was enquired (into this question), and as to what thou sayest, O Death, "that it is not easy to understand it," there is no other speaker to be found like thee, there is no other boon like this.

23. (Yama speaks:— Choose sons and grandsons who may live a hundred years, choose herds of cattle, choose elephants and gold and horses, choose the wide-expanded earth and live thyself as many years thou listeth;

24. Or if thou knowest a boon like this, choose it together with wealth, and far-extending life. Be (a king), O Nachikétas, on the wide earth, I will make thee the enjoyer of all desires.

25. All those desires that are difficult to gain in the world of mortals, all those desires ask thou according to *(thy)* pleasure,—these fair ones (of heaven) with their cars, with their musical instruments; for the like as they are not to be gained by men. Be attended by them, I will give them to thee; (but) do not ask (the question of the state of the soul after) death.

26. (Nachikétas:—) (All those enjoyments) are of yesterday; they wear out, O thou end of man, the glory of all the senses. And more, the life of all is short. With thee remain thy horses and the like, with thee dance and song.

27. Man rests not satisfied with wealth. If we should obtain wealth *and* behold thee, we would (only) live as long as thou shalt sway. The boon, which I have to choose, is what I said.

28. Which man living in this lower world, who knows that he decays and dies, while going to the undecaying immortals, (he shall obtain some exceeding bliss), who is aware of (the nature of the Apsaras and the like who) rejoice in and love, can be pleased with a long life?

29. Tell us, O Death, what it is which they inquire into, as to the great question, concerning the next world. Nachikétas asks for no other boon, but that (concerning the soul) of which the knowledge is hidden.

Second Valli

Yama speaks

1. Another thing is what is good, another what is pleasant. Both, having different objects, chain man. Blessed is he who between them takes the good (alone), but he who chooses what is pleasant, loses the (last) object (of man).

2. What is good, and what is pleasant, take hold of man; the sage comprehending them, distinguishes (their nature); the sage chooses even the good, because it exceeds (in value) what is pleasant; but the dull

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man chooses what is pleasant for acquiring and preserving.

3. But thou, considering the objects of desire, whether they are pleasant (as a son, etc.,) or of pleasant shape, (as the heavenly nymphs,) has abandoned them, O Nachikétas. Thou hast not chosen the road of wealth, on which so many men perish.

4. Those two, ignorance and knowledge, are known to be far asunder, and to lead to different goals. I think thee, O Nachikétas, desirous of knowledge, because (even) many objects of desire did not attract thee.

5. Those who live in the midst of ignorance, but fancy themselves wise and learned (Paṇḍita) go round and with erring step, deluded, as blind people lead by a blind.

6. The necessary causes for gaining the next world are not apparent to the careless youth, who is foolish by the delusion of wealth. Believing this world exists, and not the other, he is again and again subject to my sway.

7. Of the soul,—which is not gained by many, because they do not hear of it, and which many do not know, although they hear of it,—of the soul is wonderful the speaker, ingenious the receiver, wonderful the knower, instructed by an ingenious (teacher).

8. That soul, declared by an inferior man, is not easily to be known, as it is to be thought of in various ways, (but) when it is declared by a teacher, who beholds no difference, there is no doubt concerning it, (otherwise) the soul being more (subtle than what is subtle), is not to be obtained by arguing.

9. That knowledge, O dearest, (for which thou has asked,) is not to be gained by argument; (but) it is easy to understand it, when declared by a teacher who beholds no difference. Thou art persevering as to the truth. May there be for us an (other), enquirer like thee, O Nachikétas.

10. I know, worldly happiness is transient for that firm one is not obtained by what is not firm. Hence the Nachikéta fire (is established) by me through transient things; (thereby) I obtained the permanent (place of Yama).

11. Thou, O Nachikéta, although thou hast beheld the fruit of sacrifice, the eternal place (of Prajápati), where all desires are fulfilled, the world is founded, where every fear ceases, which is praiseworthy and great, of wide-extended sphere, and the abode (of the soul),—yet, wise by firmness, thou hast abandoned it, O Nachikétas.

12. The wise by means of the union (of the intellect) with the soul thinking him, whom it is difficult to behold, who is unfathomable and concealed, who is placed in the cavity, whose abode is impervious, who exists from times of old,—leaves both grief and joy.

13. Having heard this (nature of Brahma), comprehended it, having distinguished the (soul, as) endowed with qualities, (Dharmya) (from the body,) obtained it in its subtle nature, the mortal rejoices; for he has obtained what is a cause for rejoicing. (Thee), O Nachikétas, I believe a house, whose door is open (for Brahma).

14. (Nachikétas speaks:-) (Then) make known to me the (being) which thou beholdest different from virtue, different from vice, different from this whole of effects and causes, different from past, from future (and present time). (Yama speaks:—)

15. The word of which all the Védas speak, which all the works of penance proclaim, of which desirous they live as Brahma-students, this word I will briefly tell thee; it is "Om".

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16. This sound means Brahma, this sound means the supreme. Whoever knows this sound, obtains whatever he wishes.

17. This means is best, this means is supreme; whoever knows this means, is adored in the place of heaven.

18. The knowing (soul) is not born, nor does it die, it was not produced from any one, nor was any produced from it; unborn, eternal, without decay, ancient as it is, it is not slain, although the body is slain.

19. If the slayer thinks I slay, if the slain thinks I am slain, then both of them do not know well. It (the soul) does not slay, nor it is slain.

20. The soul, which is subtler than what is subtle, greater than what is great, is seated in the cavity of the living being. He, who is free from desire and without grief, beholds by the tranquillity of his senses that majesty of the soul.

21. Sitting it (the soul) goes afar, sleeping it goes every-where. Who else (therefore), save myself, is able to comprehend the God who rejoices and not rejoices.

22. Thinking the soul as unbodily among the bodies, as firm among the fleeting things, as great and all-pervading, the wise casts off all grief.

23. The soul cannot be gained by knowledge, not by understanding, not by manifold science. It can be obtained by the soul by which it is desired. His soul reveals its own truth.

24. Whoever has not ceased from wicked ways, is not subdued (in his senses), not concentrated, (in his intellect) and not, subdued in mind, does not obtain it, (the true soul), not even by knowledge.

25. Who is able to know in this manner, where that soul is whose food is both the Brahma and Kshattra, and whose condiment is death?

Third Valli

1. (The supreme and inferior souls,) drinking the due reward from their words in this world, entered both the cave, the highest place of the supreme (soul). The knowers of Brahma call them shadow and sunlight, thus also the performers of the five-fold fire, and the sacrificers of the three Nachikéta fires.

2. We are able (to understand both) the Nachikéta fire, which is the bridge of all sacrificers (to cross unhappiness), and the undestructible Bramha, the place, where all fear disappears, the refuge of those who are desirous of crossing, (the ocean of the world.)

3. Know the soul (the embodied soul) as the rider, the body as the car, know intellect as the charioteer and mind again as the reins.

4. They say, the senses are the horses, and their objects are the roads. The enjoyer is (the soul) endowed with body, sense and mind; thus say the wise.

5. Whoever is unwise with reins never applied, has the senses unsubdued, like wicked horses of the charioteer.

6. But whosoever is wise with the mind always applied, has the senses subdued like good horses of the charioteer.

7. Whoever is unwise, unmindful, always impure, does not gain that goal, (but) descends to the world (again).

8. But whosoever is wise, mindful, always pure, gains the goal from whence he is not born again.

9. But the man, whose charioteer is wise, (and) the reins of whose mind are well applied, obtains the goal of the road, the highest place of Vishnu.

10. Higher indeed than the senses are their objects, higher than their objects is the mind, intellect higher than the mind, higher than intellect the great soul.

11. Higher than the great one the unmanifested, higher than the

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unmanifested the soul (Purusha), higher than the soul is nought; this is the last limit and the highest goal.

12. Being the hidden nature of all beings, it is not manifested; but it is beheld by the attentive subtle intellect of men of subtle sight.

13. Let the wise subdue his speech by mind, subdue his mind by that nature which is knowledge (by intellect), subdue his knowledge in the great soul, subdue this also in the placid soul.

14. Arise, awake, get the great (teachers) and attend. The wise say, that the road to him is (as) difficult to go, as the sharp edge of a razor.

15. Whoever has understood (the nature of Brahma) which is without sound, without touch, without form, which does not waste, which is without taste, which is eternal, without smell, without beginning and without end, higher than the great one (intellect), which is firmly based,—escapes from the mouth of death.

16. The wise who says and hears the eternal tale, which Nachikétas received and Death related, is adored in the world of Brahma.

17. Whoever pure (in mind) explains this (work) of deep import, which (otherwise) should be concealed, in the assembly of the Brahmas or at the time of the Sráddha, obtains thereby infinite fruit, obtains thereby infinite fruit.

Fourth Valli

1. The self-existent subdued the senses which turn to external objects; therefore (man) sees the external objects, not the internal soul; (but) the wise, with eye averted (from sensual objects) and desirous of immortal nature, beholds the absolute soul.

2. Idle youths follow desires turning to external objects; they fall into Death's wide-extended net; therefore, the wise who know what is truly of an immortal nature do not ask (for any thing) here among the fleeting things.

3. To the (soul) by which (every one) knows of form, of smell, of sounds, of touch, of love, nothing remains (unknown). This is that (Brahma for which thou hast asked).

4. Thinking (the soul) by which he recognises both, what there is in dream, and what there is in awaking, thinking this as the great pervading soul, the wise does not grieve.

5. Whosoever knows this soul as the consumer of the fruit, as the bearer of life, as what is always near, as the ruler of the past, the future (and the present times)—does thence not try to conceal (the soul.) This is that.

6. Whosoever beholds the first born from the penance (of Brahma) who was created before the waters, when he has entered the cave, and dwells (there) with (all) the beings, beholds that (Brahma for which thou has asked).

7. Whosoever (beholds) Aditi, the nature of all gods, who through life (Hiranyagarbha) sprang forth (from the supreme Brahma), who was born together with (all) the beings, when she has entered the cave and dwells there, (beholds) that Brahma (for which thou hast asked).

8. As the fire is concealed within the two pieces of wood, as the embryo is hidden in the mother, so the fire—which is to be praised day after day by men, who are awake (careful to do their duties) and offer with clarified butter,—is that (Brahma for which thou has asked).

9. From whom the sun rises, and in whom it sets again, him all the gods entered; from him none is separated. This is that.

10. What is even here, the same is there, and what is there, the same is even here. He proceeds from death to death, who beholds here difference.

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11. By the mind is this (Brahma), to be obtained, then there is no difference whatsoever. He proceeds from death to death, who beholds here difference.

12. The soul (Purusha) which in the measure of a thumb dwells in the middle of the body (in the ether of the heart) is the ruler of the past, the future (and the present time). Hence from having this knowledge, the wise (does not desire to conceal) the soul (vide latter part of v. 5). This is that.

13. The soul, which is like light without smoke, the ruler of the past, future (and the present times), is even today, (and) will be verily to-morrow.

14. As water, when rained down on elevated ground, runs scattered off in the valleys, so even runs after difference a person who beholds attributes different (from the soul).

15. As pure water, which is thrown down on pure ground, remains alike, so also, O Gantama, is the soul of the thinker (Muni) who knows.

Fifth Valli

1. (The body is like) a town with eleven gates of (the soul) which has no birth and is of upright intellect. Adoring it (the supreme ruler), (the wise) does not grieve, and liberated (from ignorance, etc.,) he becomes liberated. This is that.

2. As Hansa (Áditya, sun) it dwells in the heavens, as Vasu (wind) it dwells in the atmosphere, as the invoker (of the gods) it dwells within the earth, as soma in the water jar; it dwells in man, it dwells in truth, it dwells in the ether, it is born in the waters (as aquatic animals), it is born in the earth (as rice, etc.), it is born in the sacrifice, it is born on the mountains (as the rivers), it is truth, it is the great one (infinite).

3. Him, the dwarf, sitting in the middle (of the ether of the heart) who raises upwards (from the heart) the vital air that goes forwards, who dejects the vital air that goes downwards, him all gods (all the senses) adore.

4. When the soul, which dwells in the body, departs and becomes separated from it, what else is left there? This is that.

5. No mortal whatsoever lives by the vital air that goes forwards, by the vital air that goes downwards (or by any sense); they live by another on which both (the two vital airs together with the senses) are founded.

6. Now again I will declare to thee that eternal Brahma, who is to be concealed, and (her), O Gautama, (how by the knowledge of him all concern for the world ceases,) and also, how (by not knowing him, the ignorant) obtaining death assumes a body (again).

7. Some enter the womb (again after death) for assuming a body; others go inside a trunk, according to their works, according to their knowledge.

8. The perfect one (Purusha) who, building desire after desire, is awake in those that are asleep, is called ever pure, is called Brahma, is called even immortal. Upon him all the worlds are founded; none becomes different from him. This is that.

9. As the one fire, when entering the world, becomes to every nature of every nature, so the one soul being of every nature to every nature, is the internal soul of all beings, and is also without them (in its own nature).

10. As the one air, when entering the world, becomes of every nature of every nature, so the one soul, being of every nature to every nature, is the internal soul of all beings, and is also without (them).

11. As the one sun, the eye of the whole world, is not sullied by the defects of the eye or of external things, so the soul, as the inner soul of all beings, is not sullied by the unhappiness of the world,

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because it is (also) without it.

12. He is one, the ruler, the inner soul of all beings, who renders (his) one nature manifold. The wise who behold him as dwelling in their own selves, obtain eternal bliss, not others.

13. The wise who behold (the soul) as the eternal among what is transient, as the intelligent among those that are intelligent, which, though one, grants the desires of many (who behold it) as dwelling in their own selves, obtain eternal bliss, not others.

14. (Wise) think that supreme bliss, which cannot be described, to be this (individual soul). How then shall I know it? Does it manifest or does it not manifest?

15. There (with regard to Brahma) the sun does not manifest nor the moon and stars, there do not manifest those lightnings; how then should manifest this fire? When he is manifest, all is manifested after him; by his manifestation this whole (world) becomes manifest.

Sixth Valli

1. It (the world) is like an eternal holy fig-tree, whose root is upwards, and whose branches go downwards. This is called even pure, this is called Brahma (all comprehensive); this is called even immortal; upon this all the worlds are founded; none becomes different from it. This is that

2. This whole universe trembles within the life (the supreme Brahma); emanating (from it) it (the universe) moves on. It (Brahma) is a great fear, like an uplifted thunderbolt. Those who know it, become immortal.

3. Through fear of him burns the fire, through fear of him burns the sun, through fear of him runs Indra, the wind, and Death as the fifth.

4. If here (in this life) one is able to comprehend *him* (Brahma) before the death of the body, (he will be liberated from the bondage of the world; if one is not able to comprehend him,) he is destined for the assumption of a body.

5. As one is reflected in a looking-glass, so (the soul is) in the body; as in a dream, so in the world of the forefathers; as in water, so in the world of the Gandharvas; as in a picture and in the sunshine, so in the world of Brahma.

6. Considering the different state of the senses which are produced one after another (from the mind) and their rise and setting, the wise do not grieve.

7. Higher than the senses (and their objects) is the mind, more excellent than the mind the intellect (Sattvam); above the intellect soars the great soul, more excellent than the great one is the unmanifested.

8. But higher than the unmanifested, is the soul (Purusha) which is all-pervading and without cause. Knowing this, one gets liberated and gains immortality.

9. Its (the soul's) being (nature) is not placed in what is the ruler visible; none beholds it by the eye, by the heart (the intellect) of the mind, through thinking it gets manifest. Immortal become those who know it.

10. The state which ensues, when the five organs of knowledge remain (alone) with the mind, and the intellect does not strive, is called the highest aim.

11. This they call concentration (Yoga) which is the firm keeping down of the senses. At that time (man) gets careful; for concentration has as well its furtherance as its hinderance.

12. It (the soul) is not to be gained by word, not by the mind, not by the eye, how could it be perceived by any other than him who declares that it exists?

13. (The soul) is to be perceived by (the notion of) existence; it is to be perceived

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by its true notion; (that is to say) by both of them; the true nature of the soul becomes manifest, when (first) it has been perceived by (the notion of) existence.

14. When all the desires cease which were cherished in his heart (intellect), then the mortal becomes immortal, then he obtains here Brahman.

15. When all the bonds of the heart are broken in this life, then the mortal becomes immortal; this alone is the instruction (of all the Védas).

16. There are hundred and one arteries of the heart; the one of them (Sushumaná,) proceeds to the head. By this (at the time of death) rising upwards (by the door of Áditya) a person gains immortality, or the other (arteries) are of various course.

17. The spirit, the inner soul, which is of the size of a thumb, is always residing in the heart of men; let a man with firmness separated it from his own body, as from a painter's brush a fibre.

Let a man know it, which is pure, which is immortal; let a man know it, which is pure, which is immortal.

18. Nachikéta, having gained that science declared by Death, and also the whole rule of concentration, obtained Brahma, and hence was without passion and immortal; thus also any other (will obtain Brahma) who knows in the same manner the unchangeable soul.

19. May he protect us both at the same time, at the same time support us both; may both of us at the same time, apply (our) strength; may our reading be illustrious, may there be no hatred (amongst us). Om! peace, peace, peace!

KNOWLEDGE

The Upanișads do not merely furnish us with a prefect picture of Reality but also enjoin us to know it and it alone to the exclusion of all else. "Know that alone and discard all other talks," is the injunction, the imperative command of the Upanișads. But why is this supreme stress on the necessity of knowing it? What is the value of knowing it? "This is the bridge of immortality", "Only by knowing it one transcends death, and there is no other way of attaining (immortality)", answer the Upanișads. So it becomes imperative for us to enquire into the nature of this knowledge that promises immortality and carries one beyond the sphere of sorrow and suffering.

The Upanișads, in many places, signify this knowledge by the term 'seeing': "He who is free from desire *sees* or beholds it," "It is *seen* by the keen and subtle intellect," "This Ātman is to be *seen*" and so on. This specifically denotes that this knowledge is not mere idle speculation or intellectual theorising about the nature of the Ātman, but a direct vision, an immediate apprehension of it. As the ordinary man of ignorance *sees* the outer world of objects, so also the exceptionally gifted soul *beholds* the inner Ātman, having turned his gaze inwards. As there is an outer perception through the senses, so there is an inner perception through the senses, so there is an inner perception through the soul and it is this perception or beholding that the Upanișadic knowledge denotes.

But a problem immediately confronts us. The Upanișad no doubt enjoins that the Ātman is to be seen (*drașțavyaḥ*). But how can it be seen? Is it an object of perception? The Upanișads categorically deny the possibility of its apprehension through the senses. "Not within the field of vision stands its form, nor with the eye can anyone see it." Perception being thus ruled out, inference, too, automatically becomes nullified. For inference is never possible without a basis of perception; nor has it any mark or *linga* to serve as the

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middle term of a syllogism. Then remains testimony. But testimony can never give us a direct knowledge about a thing, it only brings an indirect acquaintance with the existence of a thing. Neither is analogy of any help here, for the Ātman, as we have seen, is distinct from all else, and hence there is nothing in the universe which can be cited as analogous to it. Hence all the ordinary means of knowledge or *pramāṇas* that are at our disposal fail us in bringing the intimation of the Ātman.

The problem however is deeper. At the root of the failure of all the *pramāṇas* to comprehend the Ātman lies the supreme fact that the Ātman never becomes the object of knowledge, it is the eternal subject. It is, therefore, that the Upaniṣad asks: 'How shall ye know the knower?'. It is impossible to make the knower the object of knowledge, for that will need another knower and so on, leading to a *regressus ad infinitum*. As the Ātman never becomes the object of knowledge, the Upanisad paradoxically states that it is unknown to the knowing and known to the unknowing. In other words, he who asserts that he has come to know the Ātman, signifies thereby that he has made the Ātman the object of his knowledge, which is a manifest absurdity. For, the object is always the not-self (*anātman*), the *idam* (it) as opposed to the Ātman (the self), the *Īśa* (the Lord) or the *aham*. Therefore, so long as one knows 'another' as an object beside him, one does not know the self (Ātman), but only the not-self (*anātman*). On the contrary, he who states that he has not known the Ātman, rightly comprehends it, for he, thereby, asserts the great truth that the Ātman has not been the object of his knowledge.

But how then to distinguish between this not-knowing of the enlightened and the utter ignorance of the unenlightened? Does not this not-knowing amount almost to an agnosticism? Is the Atman or Brahman of the Upaniṣads then similar to the Great Unknowable of Herbert Spencer or the Thing-in-itself of Kant which is always beyond the grasp of the human mind? In the very next verse the Upaniṣad removes this apprehension: 'It is known in every act of cognition and thus one attains immortality.' It remains unknown (*avijnātam*) and yet is known in every act of cognition, *pratibodhaviditam*, that is the paradox. In other words, it is never the object of knowledge, and hence unknown, and yet the very ground of all knowledge, and hence is felt in each and every particular act of cognition. As in the problem of Reality we pointed out that the negative statements are made only for a deeper affirmation, so here in the problem of knowledge, the Upaniṣads deny the knowability of the Ātman in order to assert the foundational nature of its knowledge. As the Reality is unique, so the method, too, of knowing it is unique. Our ordinary consciousness fails to apprehend the nature of this knowledge, as it fails to realize the true nature of the transcendent Reality. It is necessary, therefore, to analyze the nature of our ordinary consciousness or modes of knowledge and then contrast it with the transcendental apprehension.

Perception—Our ordinary cognition always involves a dualism. It necessarily pre-supposes a knower and a function of the *vṛtti* or the mode of the mind is to effect a union between the two. In fact, our whole life is an unconscious endeavour to establish a link with the outer world. In every act of our life we are trying to take in what lies outside of us, to make the outer object a part and parcel of our being. But yet we are never wholly successful. Though we can take in a portion of the outer world into ourselves, the real essence still lies outside us and so there

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is no complete fusion of our being with the world, no absolute coalescence between the knower and the known. It appears that our intellect merely touches the outer fringe of the object and never enters into the heart of it. This happens because our intellect is unaccustomed to this act of identification and it knows things only from a distance, through a relation of separation. A second characteristic of our mode of perception is that in it the object is never revealed in its true nature, because the subject always makes an active contribution to the act of perception; and so, in the very process of knowing an object, it modifies or colours the latter. The subjective tinge always disfigures the pure original form of the object. Thirdly, every act of perception is bound by space and time. We only perceive a thing here and now. We cannot look before and after, but our gaze is fixed on the immediate present. Similarly a thing which is at a distance or covered by barriers does not come within our view. These limitations are inherent in all perception. Again, it knows only the particular and never comprehends the general or the universal.

Inference—Inference goes ahead of perception in this that it frees the mind from the limitation of the senses and thereby widens the field of knowledge. Though the fire may not be within the ken of one's perceptual knowledge, yet one may be quite sure of its existence, if smoke is perceived. The faculty of inference is, thus, not vain imagination, but a method of knowledge, a *pramāṇa*, and, in fact, it is this power of inference which distinguishes man from the animal. Man, being essentially a thinking being, can never rest content merely with what the senses present and report to him. He constructs, out of that data or material supplied by the senses, a coherent system of thought, extending, thereby, this knowledge to the future and to the past. Man, therefore, can look before and after; he can apprehend the future as well as bring back the past. The antecedents and the consequents of an event are all before the gaze of the intellect that indulges in inference. Inference also corrects perception and hence stands superior to it. The senses often prove to be false reporters and in many cases delude us by presenting the very opposite picture of truth. The senses tell us that the Sun moves round the earth and it is only reasoning which comes to correct this total misrepresentation of the actual fact, which is just the opposite of it.

Thus though reason or intellect helps greatly in the growth and correction of knowledge, yet, this help is rendered only at the expense of the directness that the sense-perception contains. Inference or reasoning always brings an indirect awareness of things, it cannot make one *see* directly that the fire is there. Inference is always mediate, that being its intrinsic character and it never becomes immediate, for that will destroy its very nature. Bergson has beautifully pointed out that the intellect is essentially a 'took-making faculty', or, in other words, it is a practical faculty evolved for the purpose of action in the world. The 'tool-making faculty' has no doubt helped man immensely in the management of the life in the world, but it has taken him away, at the same time, for the soul or heart of life. "It goes all round life, taking from outside the greatest possible number of views of it, drawing it into itself instead of entering into it." Hence the intellect presents us only with a snapshot view of things or an infinite number of static pictures, which never brings us in touch with the original living reality. Thus, so far as the heart of the reality or life is concerned, the intellect has not helped man to get near it, but, on the

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contrary, has taken him far away from the true centre. The circumference has been widened no doubt but the touch with the centre has been lost. The horizon of knowledge has been extended at the cost of direct awareness.

Intuition—But there lies in man another faculty, far deeper and richer than the intellect, through which he gains back the directness of apprehension he had lost. The intellect has made him look outward, away from the centre of life, 'but it is to the very inwardness of life that intuition leads us'. But what is this faculty called 'intuition'? As Bergson puts it: "By intuition, I mean, instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging indefinitely". In the terminology of Yoga philosophy it is *prajñā*. It does not mean a hazy or indistinct knowledge of a thing but signifies the clear light of reason, which views things directly all at once. *Prajñā* or intuition is, thus, not a faculty which is 'incapable of giving us anything else than simple being', but it is a vision direct as well as comprehensive (*aśeṣaviśeṣadarśanam*). It is other than inference or testimony, because it apprehends the unique or particular nature of a thing and does not stop with the knowledge of its general nature alone like inference or testimony. It is an intimate awareness, a 'knowledge by acquaintance', in the words of Russel. It is the supreme perception (*paraṁ pratyakṣam*) and is the source of testimony and inference, because they issue out of it.

This *prajñā* is, thus, the true perception of the mind as distinguished from the false perception of the senses. We generally take the *pratyakṣa* or the sense-perception as the basis of all other *pramāṇas* but, in fact, it is this *prajñā* or inner perception which is at the root of all *pramāṇas*, as the Yoga system points out. Again, this *prajñā* is not something which is opposed to the intellect, but, is the very culmination or perfection of it. It is only after the highest development of the intellectual faculty and its exploration to the full have been achieved that the intuition suddenly flashes forth from the deeps. When the mind becomes utterly limpid, clear like a crystal, being freed from the memories or associations of words and images, then the object is revealed in its true nature, the subject having ceased to contribute anything to the act of cognition. This intuition has also infinite ranges, beginning from the grossest right upto the subtlest. The highest form of intuition is called *tāraka* i.e. which springs of itself without any external cause or occasion. It covers all things of all times in a single moment. The intellect knows only through a process of succession but here a supercession of the process takes place. The object is seized through a single act of intuition, the whole is revealed in an instanteneity of moment.

Thus intuition gets us in touch with the flow of life or the actual movement of the world. It brings an all-comprehensive knowledge of the entire universe and of the principle that is active in all existence or manifestation, which the Upaniṣads call Prāṇa. But the knowledge of the Ātman is still to be gained. We have pointed out, in the previous chapter, that the Ātman or Brahman is not opposed to the movement or dynamis, and hence, is not a static *being* contrary to the dynamic *becoming*. It is something unique transcending all these oppositions. This is supported once again by the method of approach to the Ātman delineated in the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣads never try to grasp the Reality or Ātman through the intellect; and this proves that the Reality they envisage is not a mere staticity of being, for, as Bergson remarks about the method of the intellect,

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'it always starts from immobility, as if this were the ultimate reality.'

Inadequacy of Intuition—Again, the Upaniṣads do not seek the Ātman through, what Bergson calls, 'intuition', or what the Yoga system calls *samādhiprajñā*. The *prajñā* or intuition, though it brings a direct knowledge of things, is still a process, and even in the highest state of *nirodha* when all processes are apparently at an end, there still remains a touch of process, which is traced or detected by the divergences in the periods of time involved in *nirodha*. In other words, *nirodha* sometimes continues for a longer period than another *nirodha*, and again, sometimes endures for a shorter period. And this is inevitable, since intuition or *samādhi* or *nirodha*, after all, involves the mind and they are only deeper movements of it, and wherever there is mind, there must be a process. The process may be sometimes explicit, and sometimes all too implicit to be grasped at all, but still it is there all the time so long as the mind exists. Hence intuition comes and goes, it does not become an abiding vision. It, no doubt, gets to the centre but is again thrown out of it. Consequently, *vyutthāna* or return to the surface consciousness always haunts *samādhi* or the absorbed consciousness like a shadow, and is the eternal counterpart of the latter. So a constant was goes on for mutual overpowering between the *saṁskāras* or potencies of *vyutthāna* and *nirodha* or *samādhi*. There remains, therefore, always an effort to keep the mind fixed in the level of *samādhi* or intuition. But even when the intuition becomes almost spontaneous, or the *samādhi* or the *nirodha* almost a natural state, due to an overwhelming predominance of the inward movement towards the centre, there still remains an unconscious effort to retain or rather maintain that state or level of consciousness. *Samādhi* or intuition never becomes utterly spontaneous; there is always a trace of artificiality in it, because it is produced by the efforts of the subject or the mind.

Again, the object is not truly revealed in intuition in its utter purity. Though the mind is made absolutely clear as a crystal in *samādhi*, yet the object is known only as *reflected* in that clear mind and not as it is *in itself*. We still know only the image, though the image may, in this case, be very faithful, but not the original as yet. It is still a view of things through a medium, though the medium is seemingly non-existent due to its utter transparency and finest nature. Still there is a film though the film may be the finest. Hence, even in this deep union brought about by *samādhi* or intuition, the subject and the object are not totally identified. There is union no doubt but not unity as yet. It is only when this last and the finest film is pierced or lifted that we reach the utter unity, the absolute transcendence. The Upaniṣadic knowledge signifies the removal of this last veil that still separates the subject and the object, the finite and the infinite.

Hence the Upaniṣads discard the intuition of the mind or the *prajñā* of *samādhi* and seek a knowledge that is neither gained through a process nor lost after a time through *vyutthāna* or return to ordinary consciousness but which is spontaneous in its nature, depending not on the effort of the subject, but aroused or generated by the object alone; to be strictly precise, which is *vastutantra* and not *kartṛtantra*. This knowledge, "by reason of the immediate character of its operation, may be called 'intuitive' but only on the strict condition that it is not regarded as having anything in common with the faculty which certain contemporary philosophers call intuition, a purely instinctive and vital faculty that

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is really beneath reason and not above it." We may call it the intuition of the soul in order to distinguish it from the intuition of the mind, if we are keen to retain the term 'intuition'. "This faculty can also be called the pure intellect, following the practice of Aristotle and his Scholiastic successors, for to them the intellect was in fact that faculty which possessed a direct knowledge of principles. Aristotle expressly declares that 'the intellect is truer than science', which amounts to saying that it is more true than the reason which constructs that science; he also says that 'nothing is more true than the intellect', for it is necessarily infallible from the fact that its operation is immediate, and because, not being really distinct from its object, it is identified with the truth itself." Spinoza also hints at such a kind of knowledge or perception when he says, at the end of his classification of perception, that "lastly there is the perception arising when a thing is perceived only through its essence." He also points out later that "If the thing be self-existent, or as is commonly said, the cause of itself, it must be understood through its essence only". The Ātman or Brahman of the Upaniṣads is essentially such a self-existent thing and hence must be apprehended only through its essence and not by any other means. In the words of Eddington it may be called 'the intimate knowledge', which 'will not submit to codification and analysis.'

But the one term which truly expresses the nature of this knowledge is what the Upaniṣads use about it, viz., *sākṣāt aparokṣāt*. It is not called *pratyakṣa*, because *pratyakṣa* or perception always involves, as we have seen, the duality of the knower and the known, whereas in this knowledge there is an absolute identity of both. But any knowledge, other than *pratyakṣa* is described as *parokṣa* or indirect. The only source of direct knowledge is *pratyakṣa*, and all other modes of cognition like inference, testimony etc. are indirect. Hence, to indicate that though this knowledge is distinct from *pratyakṣa* yet it is not necessarily indirect, it is called not-indirect (*na-parokṣa*) *i.e.* *aparokṣa*. But this negative way of saying it merely as 'non-indirect' does not satisfy the Upaniṣads, and so they add the other word *sākṣāt* or immediate. Its immediacy surpasses even that of *pratyakṣa* or perception, for in perception the mediacy of the senses cannot be dispensed with and hence its immediacy is spurious. But here the soul perceives the soul without anything to intervene between the two. It surpasses even intellectual intuition in this that here the distinction between the subject and the object stands absolutely obliterated and hence the immediacy is complete. It is no doubt true that "intellectual intuition is even more immediate than sensory intuition for it is beyond the distinction between subject and object, which the latter allows to subsist; it is at once the means of knowledge and the knowledge itself and in it subject and object are identified. Indeed no knowledge is really worthy of the name except in so far as it has the effect of bringing about such an identification..... The only genuinely effective knowledge is that which permits us to penetrate into the very nature of things and if such a penetration may be effected upto a certain point in the inferior degrees of knowledge, it is only in metaphysical knowledge that it is fully and totally realizable." And here lies the superiority of this metaphysical or transcendental knowledge that intellectual intuitions and all other modes of knowledge find their final consummation in it, nay are verily rooted in it. It is the *avasāna*, the end or limit of all knowledge.

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The Self as the source of all Knowledge—Thus the Ātman or Brahman of the Upaniṣads is not unknowable, beyond all knowledge, but rather the very ground of all knowledge. All *pramāṇas* depend on this self-luminous light of consciousness and act only through it. As in our discussion on the problem of Reality, we found that nothing can *exist* apart from the Ātman, so from the analysis of knowledge too, it is revealed that nothing can be *known* except in and through the Ātman. That all cognition and means of knowledge or illumination depend on it is beautifully depicted in the famous discourse of Yājñavalkya and King Janaka. The King asked Yājñavalkya: 'Of what light is this Puruṣa'? In other words, what is the source of illumination that makes it possible for man to work in the world? What is his guiding light? Yājñavalkya first replies that it is the light of the Sun (Āditya) through which a man stays, moves and acts. The King then questions: 'With the setting of the Sun of what light is the Puruṣa'? The Āditya or the Sun cannot be the guiding light for all time, for it has its rising and setting but the Puruṣa has still to be guided, and he still needs a light and what then comes to his aid when the sun sets? Yājñavalkya replies that it is then the light of the moon which helps him to carry on his work. Again the King questions: 'With the setting of the Sun and with the setting of the moon of what light is the man'? Yājñavalkya replies that it is of the light of the fire. The King persists in his questioning and wants to know what happens after all these sources of light viz. the sun, the moon and the fire have set, and Yājñavalkya replies that then it is the light of *vāc* or word that guides. But, asks the King finally: "What is the source of light when *vāc*, too, is at rest"? Yājñavalkya then declares that it is the light of the Ātman. This points out that the final source of all lights or illuminations is the Ātman. While all other lights have their setting, this light of the Ātman knows no rising or setting. It is the Eternal Uncreated Self-luminous Light of lights.

Signifying this supreme source of light, another famous verse of the Upaniṣads declares: 'There the Sun does not shine nor the moon nor the stars, nothing to say of this fire. Following that shining (light) all others shine, by its light all these are lighted'. This unequivocally, points out that all other sources of light or knowledge are dependent on this light of the Ātman and act only through it. The only light or knowledge which is absolutely independent and self-shining is the light of the Ātman. All other lights being borrowed lights fail to reveal the Ātman which is the very source of them all. Hence in the attempt to reveal the Ātman they can do nothing but set i.e. merge in that original light and allow it to reveal itself by its own light. In all other cognitions, the mental mode encircles the object and the light of consciousness reflected in the mode reveals or illumines the object. But in this case when the mind wants to comprehend the Ātman, what happens is that the reflected light becomes merged in the original light, which is here sought to be made the object of knowledge. In other cases, the object revealed is inconscient and material, and hence it is lighted by the reflected light of the mental mode, but here what is sought as the object is the original light itself and so instead of lighting it up, the reflected light simply merges itself in the original. Hence it is said that the *act* of mental mode applies to Ātman or Brahman, but the *effect* does not follow from it. In the technical terms of Vedānta, there is *vṛttivyāpti* in this case, but no *phalavyāpti*. The mind moves towards the Ātman, becomes modified in, or takes the form of the Ātman as in the case of

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cognitions of other objects, but the result that follows in other cases, viz. the revelation of the object in the light of consciousness does not follow here, because what is grasped by the *vṛtti* here is the revealing light itself. Hence the knowledge of the Ātman is not an effect or product of a process but signifies the termination of all processes.

From this point of view it is said that the mind never knows the Ātman i.e. it can never make the Ātman an object of its knowledge, like other finite objects of the world. But, again, from the other point of view, it is only the mind that comprehends the Ātman, for the mental mode about Brahman or Ātman must be generated, the mind must be suffused wholly by it and only then will the original light take up the reflected light within itself. The reflected light can never reveal, it is true, the original light, but it can certainly help a great deal in its revelation by putting itself face to face with the original, tallying with it point to point and thereby ceasing to exist separately. The mind or intellect in thus 'committing suicide', in the words of Bradley, does not make the knowledge of the Ātman an impossibility, but by this very act, by moving, as it were, out of the way allows the Ātman to reveal itself. The self-manifest (*svayaṁprakāśa*) Ātman then shines in its own light. "Self-manifestness of knowledge means that knowledge can behave as being immediate without being an object of knowledge. This would be an exact rendering of the explanation of the term *svaprakāśatva* (self-manifestness) as given by the Advaitins:—*avedyatve sati aparokṣa-vyavahāra-yogyatvaṁ svaprakā-śatvam.*"

Realization of the Self-manifest—It may still be objected that, granted that the Ātman is self-manifest, yet how is that self-manifestness to be realized? If the Ātman is self-shining, no amount of effort on the part of the mind or the intellect can ever make the Ātman known. Only if it is revealed of itself, then and then alone can it be known. But this self-revelation of the pure light of *Cit* or Consciousness can hardly be realized so long as the other false lights are shining. The false lights must be put out one by one so that the true light may shine. We must warn that by 'putting out' we do not mean or suggest a deliberate suppression of the ordinary means of knowledge, for that is never the Upaniṣadic method, but simply indicate the transcendence of the lower method or means by the higher. The development from sensation to perception and thence to conception is all an inner unfoldment of consciousness, and as the higher keys of consciousness become operative the lower ones automatically cease to play and become included in the higher. In order to reach the supreme state of the transcendental knowledge, our consciousness must be raised higher and higher by degrees. This is also indicated in the famous discourse of Yājñavalkya, we have just quoted. There the sun, the moon, the fire and the word all stand for different methods or levels of awareness or consciousness. The light of the sun evidently stands for the sense-knowledge, for the sun is generally connected with the eye, and it is the lowest form of knowledge with which all men generally carry on their work in the world. But higher than this light is the light of the moon, which shines even when the former has set. This is the light of the intellect or the mind, for the moon is definitely connected with the mind (cf. *candramā manaso jātaḥ*). From sense-perception we thus rise to the intellect. But even higher than this faculty of intellect is the light of the fire, which evidently here symbolizes the power of intuition. It penetrates even deeper and sheds its light in a sphere where the

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intellect fails to enter. But even this intuitive faculty has its limit and the light of the fire, too, has its end. The last light which comes nearest to the supreme light of the Ātman is the light of *Vāc* or Word. In a section on Oṅkāra, we shall have occasion to deal with the conception of *Vāc* fully, but here we may only point out that this *Vāc* signifies the supreme faculty of reason, which is at work behind all manifestations. Just below the Ātman is the place of *Vāc*, and hence it is nearest to the Ātman. Hence in lifting the consciousness towards the pure self-shining awareness of the Ātman, one has finally to wait here, in the plane of *Vāc*, before entering the domain of the Ātman. It is *Vāc* which gives the clue to the Ātman being nearest to it and after serving as a pointer, it, too, vanishes or goes to rest. Hence the Vedāntins lay the supreme stress on *vākya* and assert that the knowledge of the Ātman or Brahman can only be gained with the help of the *vākyas* or words of revelation contained in the *Śruti* and never by any other means. "The consciousness of eternal freedom comes from the Word and not from anything else" is the emphatic assertion of the Vedāntins.

It is therefore that the Upaniṣad, after enjoining that the Ātman is to be seen, further enjoins that it is to be heart (*śrotavyaḥ*), for it is this hearing that leads here to the seeing. We have pointed out that the nature of the Ātman is self-shining (*svayaṁprakāśa*) and it is the pre-supposition of all forms of knowledge. Hence the knowing or seeing of the Ātman simply means the recognition or realization of the fact that it is the very ground of the knowledge that seeks to apprehend it. In other words, it means simply the removal of the illusion which makes the Ātman or Brahman appear as an 'other', as an object which is to be realized or apprehended. The identity of the knower and the known which is the aim of all knowledge is here sought to be realized in its completeness. "Every form of knowledge is different from every other in the degree of identification of the object in itself with the object for consciousness, and the only resting place for knowledge is where the agreement becomes absolute. Now, if knowledge deals solely with the self which knows, it is entirely self-constituted, self-determined, self-contained. To be completely self-sufficient, however, is precisely what is meant by being Absolute. Absolute knowledge is the presence to consciousness of its own Self-Thought". We have seen that the Vedāntins view all modes of knowledge or *pramāṇas* as nothing but the means of the contact of the self with the self. The subject and the object are really not two separate entities—they are one, and though the different modes of knowledge effect an union between the two and seek to bridge the gulf now and then, yet the identification is never complete. The identification is only with a part and that, too, is partial. Complete identity is not gained because all cognitions involve a process and a process necessarily presupposes a relation of separation. The Vedānta, therefore, seeks a method of processless cognition and it is only through the medium of word or *vākya* that such a cognition is found to be possible. The suggestive word, at the very instant of its utterance, brings about the knowledge in a flash by removing the ignorance that was preventing the apprehension of the fact that was already there, as in the case of '*daśamas tvam asi*'. Instanteneity is its marked characteristic. At the very moment of its birth it removes the ignorance all at once (*sakṛtpravṛttyā*), as light dispels darkness the moment it is kindled or brought. It does not require to be generated again and again nor an effort is needed to retain it, for it is not concerned

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with the production of what 'should be' but with the acknowledgment of that which 'is'. Its essential mark is givenness, and it does not depend on the subject. It is always the outcome of the objective factor and is the self-disclosing of the givenness. Hence the Upaniṣads symbolize this instantaneous revelation by the image of the lightning in many places. In the Veda, too, we find a passage which refers to it: "By plural consciousness she brought down the mortal but by becoming lightning she has torn off the veil." And Dr Maryla Falk rightly points out that "this is the earliest instance of the image of 'lightning' as applied to the event of instantaneous enlightenment produced by the union with the transcendent principle of universal wisdom."

Hence, the removal of the illusion of separation needs nothing but the pointing out of the identity through a single suggestive word or phrase, like '*tat tvam asi*'. Consequent on the hearing of the word, if the removal of the illusion takes place, it takes place all at once and does not need to be repeated through a process. This direct and immediate way of realization is, what is called in the Tantras, *anupāya*, or literally 'methodless' way of approach. The Ātman or Śiva, as it is called in the Tantras, being essentially self-luminous, it is felt that all methods to reveal this self-revealing reality are superfluous and futile and the self-luminous reality is hence sought to be grasped all at once by a single effort of consciousness aroused by the word of the spiritual guide (*guru*). As Abhinavagupta puts it: "The group of means cannot reveal the Śiva. Does the thousand-rayed Sun shine by the (help of the) jar? Having realized thus, the man with a wide vision attains the self-luminous Śiva in an instant." Again it is said: "The Śiva is not revealed by the methods, rather they are revealed through its favour. I am that self-luminous (entity) appearing as the world. Having thus heard the words of the teacher only once, some being convinced, without any further cogitation are found to shine full of knowledge."

But it must be remembered that the Upaniṣads always point out that this revealing word must be heard from an experienced teacher, and it is only then that the word acts as the supreme means to an instantaneous enlightenment and not otherwise. Only one who has broken through the illusion and has realized his identity with the self-luminous reality can generate in another soul the same knowledge through the suggestive words. His words become charged with a significance which will be entirely missing when uttered by an inexperienced soul. That is why the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* points out that "it can not be understood properly when taught by an inferior type of teacher, even if thought about in many ways." It must be 'taught by an able teacher' (*kuśalānuśiṣṭaḥ*). For the attainment of this transcendental knowledge, the Upaniṣads, therefore, nowhere ask the seeker to go on meditating or contemplating over the nature of the Ātman. They simply ask him to 'arise, awake and on attaining the great ones or enlightened souls understand it'. Here the injunction (*vidhi*) is not 'to contemplate' (*upāsīta*) but 'to know' (*nivodhata*). This knowing is a single act, like the opening of the eyes and the beholding of a thing in that very instant. Hence there is no process involved in it. The very hearing of the Supreme Word (*Mahāvākya*) brings back the lost consciousness and gets one established in the highest status of self-luminosity. There is no effort on the part of the recipient of this supreme knowledge, but it dawns of itself, spontaneously, and of its own accord, from the inmost depth of the soul.

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The short and suggestive words of the teacher work a magic in him by revealing the true nature, which was his and yet not his all this time while he was steeped in ignorance. His innate purity, which remains unsullied all through the even when he thinks that he is in the iron grips of ignorance or *saṁsāra*, is gained back. It is only an arousing or awakening of the latent consciousness that takes place in this case, merely from the living contact with the teacher and his word.

Eddington gives the striking illustration of 'humour' in connexion with what he calls 'intimate knowledge'. He points out that "humour can be analyzed to some extent and the essential ingredients of the different kinds of wit classified." But all this would not make us laugh because "the classification concerns a symbolic knowledge of humour which preserves all the characteristics of a joke except its laughableness. The real appreciation must come *spontaneously, not introspectively*". And this spontaneous outburst of humour can only come 'through contact with merry-minded companions, for 'probably in the recesses of his solemn mind there exists inhibited the seed of humour, *awaiting an awakening* by such an impulse.' Exactly similar is the method prescribed and adopted by the Upaniṣads concerning the spontaneous generation of the knowledge of the Ātman or Brahman. Because of its spontaneous nature, this knowledge is not gained by any process of inhibition or suppression of the mind or the desires. The path of Yoga is *samâdhi* or *nirodha*, while the method of Vedānta is *bodḥa*. The ignorance or nescience is removed only by knowledge (*bodha*) and never by any other method or process. And if this knowledge of identity between the individual self and the Brahman, generated even for once, does not remove the ignorance residing in the self then it is no knowledge at all. From this is must be clear that the knowledge, which needs to be supplemented after its birth by other processes like control of the mind or extinction of desires (*manonāśa vāsanākṣaya*), is not the true Vedāntic knowledge of which the Upaniṣads speak. It is not really *tattvajñāna* but is called so merely by courtesy. The true Upaniṣadic knowledge is self-sufficient and, as Śaṅkara points out, there is not even a trace of any process or action in it. Once this knowledge dawns nothing else remains to be done and herein lies its glory and uniqueness.

Relation between Jñāna & Karman— The true nature of this transcendental know-ledge has been grasped by very few, and even among the followers of Śaṅkara, there has been a divergence of opinion about its real character. The main dispute arises on the question of the relation between *jñāna* and *karman*. We have just seen that Śaṅkara denies all trace of *karman* or *kriyā* in this knowledge, because *karman* stands for process, while this knowledge is beyond all process. *Karman* again signifies or presupposes a relation of separation, while this knowledge aims at an absolute identification or complete unity. Hence the two can hardly be compatible and are fundamentally opposed to each other like light and darkness. 'Far apart, contradictory and leading to different ends are this pair, *avidyā* and what is known as *Vidyā* or Knowledge', declares the Upaniṣad. This leads to two extremes: there are some who take *karman* as the sole end or aim, like the Mīmāṁsakas and reject *jñāna* altogether; while there are some who strictly adhere to pure *jñāna* to the utter exclusion of *karman*. There are, again; some who stand in the middle, trying to effect a compromise between the two. This attempt for compromise or

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synthesis (*samuccaya*) also takes various forms. It may first be classified broadly into two: *samasamuccaya* and *viṣamasamuccaya*. *Samasamuccaya* means an 'even' compromise, which gives equal scope to both, without assigning any superior status to any one of them. *Viṣamasamuccaya* means an 'uneven' compromise and it takes two forms: there are some who make *jñāna* the principal element and *karman* its auxiliary part or limb, while others make *karman* supreme and *jñāna* subordinate to it. Thus, there are altogether five possible attitudes with regard to the relation between *jñāna* and *karman*, viz., two extreme attitudes, which exclude one or the other, and three compromising attitudes, of which one gives an equal degree of emphasis on both, and the other two vary in their emphasis on one or the other of the terms, though keeping the two together all the same. The Upaniṣads give equal scope to all these attitudes or viewpoints, appreciating fully the value of each at its own level, and yet at the same time not jumbling them up all together.

We have seen that the supreme knowledge is said to spring of itself and spontaneously, but the question remains: why then does it not manifest itself in every instance and at all times? The answer must be found in the presence of obstacles which prevent its manifestation. And here in the removal of obstacles the value of *karman* and its utility must be recognized. *Karman* never manifests the knowledge, for it is eternally self-manifest, but it only helps in making the conditions suitable for the revelation of that self-manifested nature of knowledge. In the level of the mind or the intellect the synthesis of *jñāna* and *karman* is indispensably necessary. Here theory and practice must join hands. We have to make the knowledge effective and enduring by acting it out; otherwise, it remains all too, impotent. That is why the Upanisads condemn mere pursuit of knowledge as an entering into deeper darkness and enjoin a combination of both action and knowledge (*ubhayaṁ saha*). The path of contemplation, which we shall discuss later, is essentially composed of these two elements, and *upāsanā* is a joint product of *jñāna* and *karman*. But as there is a level of togetherness of both (*ubhayam saha*), so there is a level of complete disparity and utter apartness between the two (*dūram ete viparīte viṣūcī*). This apartness is not due to a forced separation between the two, which always leads to a darkness, because of its artificiality, but due to a natural overtopping or transcendence of the lower by the higher term. Here the self-luminous knowledge is so potent that it does not stand in need of *karman* to make it effective. It dawns only when *karman* utterly exhausts itself and leaves the *jñāna* to shine by itself. In the level of utter ignorance, man is purely a creature of action, driven blindly by its impulses. With the first glimmer of knowledge, action assumes a new significance. It is the second level, where *karman* still predominates, but *jñāna*, too, accompanies it, though in a lesser degree. In the third level, with a further growth in knowledge, the proportion of the two becomes equal and there is a parity between the two (*samasamuccaya*). In the fourth level, the proportion of *jñāna* still increases, throwing off the balance of equality once more and this time in favour of *jñāna*. *Karman* is still there but only as secondary. In the last level, *jñāna* completely rids itself of all trace of *karman* and shines in its own majesty. Our whole history of thought is the history of this gradual growth of knowledge through the overpowering of the opposite force of *karman* or ignorance. The process that we see is a creation of *karman* and the

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knowledge is not a product of this process. The process is concerned merely with the removal of the coverings of *karman*. As the veils of ignorance are removed the knowledge *seems* to be growing brighter and brighter, though in fact it is self-shining and complete all through, and this is realized only when we reach this final level of transcendental awareness.

As in the discussion of the problem of Reality we found the difficulty in the true comprehension of transcendence, which leads to its misrepresentation as a mere blank or utter abstraction, so here, too, the transcendental nature of Knowledge is hardly grasped. Pure *jñāna* is represented as dry intellectualism, while, in fact, it springs from the very core of being, which is the source of all knowing, feeling and willing. Again, being unaccustomed to a processless cognition we reject the conception of pure *jñāna* and drag it down to the level of the knowledge gained through a process. This is also evident from the history of Vedāntic thought itself. Even before Śaṅkara there were many Vedāntins like Bhartṛprapañca, who, though, agreeing that *jñāna* is indispensable for self-realization, held the opinion that it should be combined with *karman*, or in other words, they were in favour of a *samuccaya*. The *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* refers to some of these views. There were some, like Brahmadatta, who held that the knowledge which is generated by the *vedānta-vākya* does not remove the ignorance all at once, but it is only after long meditation, day after day, that the ignorance is dispelled through the accumulation of thought about Brahman. The central teaching of the Upaniṣads is, accordingly, to be found in injunctive statements like '*ātme' ty evo 'pāsīta*', to which assertive propositions like *Tat Tvam Asi* are subsidiary, for then only furnish the subject-matter for the *upāsanā* enjoined therein. It is thus not the knowledge, which the latter statements convey, that directly brings about final release but rather its unremitting practice (*abhyāsa* or *prasaṁkhyāna*). There was again another view, held by Maṇḍana, of a similar nature. 'He also understands *kriyā* i.e., *upāsanā* here as the final import of the Upaniṣads and construes the assertive propositions as depending upon it for their eventual significance. Maṇḍana also, like Brahmadatta, thinks that after knowing the nature of Brahman as taught in the Upaniṣads, one should meditate upon it; but he differs from the latter in that he makes not this meditation itself the means to liberation but a different type of *jñāna*, distilled, so to speak, out of this meditation. That is why the Upaniṣad says that one should attain the intuition after knowing' (*vijñāya prajñāṁ kurvīta*). The great Bhartṛprapañca, whom we have already referred to, also holds a similar view. Bhartṛprapañca's conception of Ultimate Reality is that of a unity-in-diversity and hence, according to him, the approach to that Reality must also be of the nature of *samuccaya*. A mere adherence to *karman* means the recognition of diversity alone and not also of the unity that underlies it. For realizing the latter, *jñāna* is essential; so the Reality is attained only by a combination of both. Hence *karman* is not to be discarded but should be performed with a realization of its full significance, i.e., with the enlightenment of *jñāna*, and not blindly. The ignorant takes a limited vision of *karman* (*paricchinnakarmātmadarśinaḥ*), while the enlightened takes a broad view of it (*aparicchinnakarmātmadarśinaḥ*), and that is what distinguishes the two.

All these views draw their inspiration from the Upaniṣads and hence cannot be rejected as false or wrong. There is a kind of knowledge, the knowledge of the

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intellect or the mind, which always needs to be supplemented by *karman* and which never becomes potent or fruitful except through a long process or meditation. And pertaining to such a kind of knowledge of the intellectual level, the Upaniṣad enjoins meditation after the gaining of the initial knowledge, in order to make it permanent or abiding, or rather to transform the knowledge into a vision, through such statements as *vijñāya prajñāṁ kurvīta* or *ātme 'ty evo 'pāsīta*. In our discussion on *upāsanā* or contemplation we shall have occasion to refer to this kind of knowledge. But it would be wrong to make a sweeping generalization from this that all knowledge is of this nature. There is another unique kind of knowledge, which we may call the knowledge of the soul and hence processless and direct and immediate, that is quite distinct from the previous one. The true Vedāntic wisdom, therefore, recognizes this *samuccaya* in its proper sphere, while at the same time pointing to another level of knowledge where it shines in its own majesty. Sureśvara, therefore rightly says: "We do not reject *samuccaya* everywhere", because no power on earth can refuse to recognize it in its proper sphere.

The need for meditation is, therefore, admitted practically by all Vedāntins, including the followers of Śaṅkara, and even among the latter a difference of opinion is found to prevail on the question, whether it precedes *jñāna* or succeeds it. In other to 'see' or realize the Ātman, so does Vācaspati opine, one must first hear about it from a teacher and get an initial knowledge about it thereby and thereafter strengthen it by reasoning and finally meditate over it. So, according to him, it is *nididhyāsana* or meditation which leads to realization, preceded, of course, by *jñāna* or knowledge gained through *śravaṇa*. But the author of *Pañcapādikā* holds the opposite view. According to him, meditation or *nididhyāsana* is only a contributory aid to the right apprehension of the meaning of the *mahāvākya*. The *pramāṇa* itself needs no direct assistance whatsoever in revealing the *prameya*, which it does, the moment conditions become favourable. Meditation or *nididhyāsana* is thus an indirect aid and precedes *ātmajñāna* instead of succeeding it.

It is clear, therefore, that while thinkers like Vācaspati, Maṇḍana and Brahmadatta hold, in one or another, that the Upaniṣads by themselves cannot introduce us to the true nature of Brahman or Ātman but merely furnish a tentative conception of it and persuade us to discover its actual nature for ourselves, there are others like the authors of *Vivaraṇa* and *Vārttika* who take the *Āgama* or the Upaniṣads as the only means for the direct apprehension of the true nature of the Ātman. In any case, the Vedāntic conception of knowledge, if it is to maintain its uniqueness, must not be conceived as the product of any process, just as the Vedāntic Reality should not be conceived as the final term of a series. If this knowledge becomes a product of meditation, there is nothing at all to distinguish it from the *prajañā* that is gained through *samādhi*. That is why Sureśvara rightly points out, and Ānandagiri in his commentary thereon makes explicitly clear, that even *nididhyāsana* which is prescribed by the Upaniṣads, is not a process like meditation (*dhyāna*) and lest there should be a confusion with *dhyāna*, which is very likely, the term *vijñānena* is added. It is an independent knowledge, which only results in utter liberation that is called *nididhyāsana*. This is the final step of *sākṣāt aparokṣāt* as indicated by the Upaniṣads.

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Western theories of Truth—Human thought is still in search of a knowledge that will be independent and self-sufficient, absolutely certain and uncontradicted for all times. The different theories of truth in the West, like those of correspondence and coherence, ultimately fail to account for the real criterion of truth. 'The correspondence theory asserts that a judgment is true, if it corresponds with fact. Now the fact is either known or not known. If it is not known, we cannot know that the judgment corresponds with it. If it is known, it is to say the least of it, unnecessary to make a judgment about it.' In other words, 'Either I know directly the fact with which my true judgment is to correspond or I do not. If I know it directly, what need is there for me to pass a true judgment about it, in order that the judgment may correspond with it? If I do not know it directly, how am I to know that my judgment does correspond with it?" Thus an inherent contradiction falsifies the theory of correspondence.

The coherence theory no doubt goes ahead of correspondence in this that it tries to view the truth from a wider perspective with reference to different relations with the whole body of experience, and not merely as an isolated fact. According to this theory, 'conceivability is the essential nature of truth', and to be conceivable' means to be a 'significant whole' or a 'whole possessed of meaning for thought.' A 'significant whole' is such that all its constituent elements reciprocally involve one another.' Thus, according to this theory, 'until we know reality as a whole, we can never completely know the truth of any particular judgment, but this applies inevitably to the coherence theory of truth itself. On its own premises then we can never know that the coherence theory of truth is true. Joachim, therefore, feels that 'a theory of truth as coherence, if it is to be adequate, must be an intelligible account of the ultimate coherence in which the one significant whole is self-revealed', but, at the same time, he frankly admits that 'every metaphysical theory, as the outcome of experience which is partial and so far finite, is at best a partial manifestation of the truth and not the whole truth *self-revealed*'. In other words, we always know only a part of truth and never the whole of it, and if we do not know the whole of it, the coherence theory can hardly stand. 'The coherence notion of truth may thus be said to suffer shipwreck at the very entrance of the harbour', and 'the voyage ends in disaster, and a disaster which is inevitable'.

Joachim, therefore, ends his illuminating book, 'The Nature of Truth', with a complete note of scepticism, and with the frank acknowledgment "that no theory of truth as coherence can be completely true; for, as a system of judgments, as a piece of discursive knowledge, it must be 'other' than the truth 'about' which it is and thus it must fail to that concrete coherence which is complete truth. And again, as the knowledge of mind at a determinate level of appercipient character, it must fall short of *the complete self-revelation which is absolute truth manifest to itself* (italics mine).

Human knowledge thus essentially suffers from the limitation of incompleteness and hence always remains dubious and uncertain. The note of unknowability, which Kant sounded, still remains the basic note, and rings through all our knowledge. We feel that the complete knowledge of the whole always escapes us. We are knowing more and more of the whole by bits, but cannot seize it all at one stroke. Our knowledge, therefore, always remains uncertain; though a present knowledge is working alright today it may

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be nullified tomorrow through the discovery of its incoherence within a still greater whole. Jeans makes a profound statement full of the deepest significance in his illuminating book, "Physics and Philosophy". He says: "Now these waves of knowledge exhibit complete determinism; as they roll on, they show us knowledge growing out of knowledge and uncertainty following uncertainty according to a strict causal law. But this tells us nothing we do not already know. *If we had found new knowledge appearing, not out of previous knowledge but spontaneously and of its own accord, we should have come upon something very startling and of profound philosophical significance*" (italics mine). Modern science even after having such a complete and thorough knowledge of the workings of Nature finds that its knowledge is full of uncertainty and to its surprise, it also finds that what it has learnt so far is nothing new or unique. Hence all are looking forward to a new type of knowledge, which must be spontaneous in its nature, as well as self-revealed and appearing of its own accord. That only such a kind of knowledge can lift human thought from the sphere of relativity and uncertainty is felt both by Joachim and Jeans, and that is why the former uses the term "self-revealed' again and again, (which we have italicised in the quotations from him) and speaks of 'absolute truth manifest to itself'. Otherwise, there is no escape from a total scepticism or a complete denial of an absolute truth as is done by pragmatists.

The Upanisadic View of Knowledge—It is just here that the Upaniṣads come to our aid to life us out of this hopeless position into which all our theories of knowledge or truth ultimately land us. The Upaniṣadic or Vedāntic view of knowledge, we have pointed out, is rooted in *svataḥpramāṇa* or *svayaṁprakāśa*, i.e. self-revelation or self-luminosity. The 'self-revealed' knowledge, which Joachim vaguely apprehends as the only possible solution of the baffling problem, is recognized as the very fundamental fact of all experience in Vedānta. The very definition of *pramā* shows that, according to the Vedānta, the truth of knowledge consists in its non-contradictedness and novelty (*abādhitatva* and *anadhigatatva*), and not in mere correspondence or coherence. A knowledge works as true only in so far as it is not contradicted. In the sphere of our relative knowledge there is no guarantee that the truth of a knowledge will not be contradicted in any place or time. Hence what we ordinarily call *pramā* or true knowledge is only *pramā* by courtesy. The really non-contradicted knowledge of *pramā* is the knowledge of the Absolute or the Atman or Brahman. All other knowledge that goes by the name of *pramā* is so, in so far as it reveals this non-contradictedness of the self-manifest knowledge, or rather partakes of its nature. All else is true by virtue of this absolute truth, as all else is real by virtue of the supremely real. It is the same self-manifest truth, the *svayaṁprakāśa*, that is revealed at the level of the senses as correspondence between the knower and the known, *pramātṛ* and *prameya* and again at the level of the mind as coherence or harmony of experience or *saṁvāda*. But it shines in its completeness as absolute non-contradictedness only at the level of the spirit or the level of the *sākṣāt aparokṣāt*. The knowledge of the complete system of experience or the entire whole, which alone can make the theory of coherence plausible, can come only when one transcends the system. In order to know the whole one must pass beyond the whole. The whole cannot be known by a mere aggregation of the parts, for that only leads to an approximation, and never

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attains finality. Hence the Upaniṣads point to a unique processless type of knowledge which takes the cognizer at one bound beyond the sphere of the whole and gets him established in the transcendental sphere. It is only on reaching this sphere that one becomes assured of absolute non-contradictedness. Hence *tattvajñāna* or 'metaphysical knowledge essentially implies permanent and changeless certitude'.

Thus a bold leap is necessary in order to get the transcendental apprehension of Reality, and the supreme value of the Upaniṣads lies in this that they alone make this leap possible. The jump is taken only from the spring-board of the *mahāvākyas* of the Upaniṣads. No other *pramāṇa* is of any help here except the Word or *Śabda* because, as we have already pointed out in our exposition of Yājñavalkya's description of the different lights or sources of illumination, the light of *Vāc* or the Word comes nearest to the light of the Ātman. The function of the Word or *Śabda* is to *point* to this final light and then to go out, or retire. This pointing or suggesting is the peculiar virtue of the *śabda* or word and it is by this power of suggestion that the word transcends itself and carries one beyond its own bounds. But this suggestiveness of a word does not occur to all or is rather not caught by all, but is grasped only by one who has a keen mind, a refined intellect and who has dwelt over the problem long enough. The fall of an apple is common event observed by all, but it was only to the mind of Newton that this is all too common a fact of experience revealed the whole law of gravitation, and that was because his mind had been working all the time ceaselessly over the problem and the event just became an occasion for the final flash of revelation. Similarly the *mahāvākyas* of the Upaniṣads bring the revelation only to a mind that is seized wholly by this one passion for the supreme knowledge.

In this sense, therefore, *nididhyāsana* must precede the true revelation or knowledge, and should not succeed it. But if one, without the adequate passion for knowledge and refinement of intellect, happens to hear the *mahāvākya*, then he will certainly miss the true revelation and will be furnished merely with a tentative conception or knowledge of Reality, and in that case, *nididhyāsana* must follow *jñāna*. Thus the conceptions of the *jñāna* are different in the two cases, viz. in one case it is true revelation and in the other a mere tentative cognition, and the precedence or succession of meditation depends on the particular conception which one happens to hold about *jñāna*. In any case, the *mahāvākya* is indispensably necessary for the supreme revelation, whether it dawns all at once from the mere hearing or after a long meditation. The *manana* or *nididhyāsana* which is done independently of *śravaṇa* (i.e., without a basis of the *mahāvākyas*) is of no use whatsoever in the realization of the Ātman.

This is no dogmatism or a supercession of reason by authority to state that the words of the *Śruti* must be taken as the basis for all reasoning and meditation; a deeper reason lies behind the acceptance of *Śruti* as the starting-point of enquiry. As Prof Bhattacharya beautifully puts it: "Some provisional belief (*śraddhā*) is required to start the enquiry. A mere thought, even though necessary, can never induce belief, can never be mistaken for knowledge; for in knowledge there is an unmistakeable intuitive or 'given' character. This provisional belief can only be induced by authoritative statement (*ṣabda* or *āgama*) which may, for aught we know, be disproved afterwards. But the statement gains in reliability if on acting on it or after contemplation of it we attain

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a progressive *satisfaction* or *realization*. That is the only justification which we may expect to have of the truth of what is claimed to be revelation, from below, i.e., before we have finally realized its truth." That is why Śaṅkara states that in the enquiry about Brahman, the *Śrutis* alone are not the *pramāṇa* as in *dharmajijñāsā*, but here *Śrutis* as well as the experiences or realizations are the *pramāṇa*, because the knowledge of Brahman ends in realization and pertains to a real object. Thus the culmination (*avasāna*) of all *pramāṇas* or means of knowledge is in experience (*anubhava*) and hence the *Śrutis* are not accepted blindly but verified by experience.

Solution of the problem—Thus experience being the very basis of *brahmajñāna*, the question of the unknowability of Brahman does not arise at all. But this experience is not an ordinary experience of the sense or the mind, it is the supreme and unique experience of the soul. As in the discussion of the problem of Reality we pointed out that the Upaniṣadic conception of transcendence does not signify an exclusion or aloofness but only an *uniqueness (vilakṣaṇatā)*, so here the conception of transcendental knowledge similarly signifies and *unique* type of knowledge, which flashes 'spontaneously and of its own accord' and is not exclusively an intellectual process, as is generally supposed. As the Reality or the *prameya*, so the means of knowledge or the *pramāṇa*. The transcendental or unique Reality needs a transcendental or unique mode of apprehension, and once this mode of apprehension is present, the object, that is Brahman, is automatically revealed, just as with the opening of the eyes the physical objects are bound to be perceived, and here also lies its spontaneity. Similarly in order to seize the immanent Reality that is Prāṇa, which is by its very nature an unity-in-difference (*'mithuna'*) a method of apprehension is needed which also must be of a similar nature i.e., a combination of *jñāna* and *karman*. Lastly, when the Reality is viewed as utterly separate and distinct, as absolutely an 'other', then the method too becomes distinctly separative, like our ordinary perception. The Upaniṣads, therefore, in offering their solution to the problem of knowledge, do not exclude all the other modes of knowledge but recognize each at its own level, the *āditya*, the *candra*, the *agni* and the *vāc* and finally transcend them all through the conception of the self-luminous light of the Ātman, by which all others are lighted.

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This dictionary has been compiled by a leading Hindu spiritual teacher and eminent vedic scholar **Swami Parmeshwaranand** of Haridwar (U.P.) He has written several books on hindu religion and translated many important religious scriptures into english He has also conducted several seminars, and work shops where many reputed theologists from all over the world took participation.

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